

homes of their own." Poverty is "self-imposed," according to this idea. Well, no one can question that drink is a fearful evil and that it causes poverty—and if all poverty could be traced to it we should be immensely glad of such a simplification of the social problem. But now for what apparently are the facts! The results of investigation in some 115,000 cases of poverty in the United States, England and Germany have been given recently to the public in Professor Amos G. Warner's *American Charities*. The tables show that the chief single cause of poverty is sickness or death in the families of the poor. The cause second in consequence is lack of work—though if under this could be reckoned insufficient work and poorly paid work, lack of work would rank as the supreme cause of poverty. *Drink stands third, though only one-half as great a cause as unemployment.* Professor Warner says: "Probably nothing in the tables of the causes of poverty, ascertained by cold counting, will more surprise the average reader than the fact that intemperance is held to be the chief cause in only one-fifteenth to one-fifth of the cases, and that where an attempt is made to learn in how many cases it had contributory influence, its presence can not be traced at all in more than 38.1 per cent of the cases." And yet our worthy contemporary, no doubt, will go on preaching its sermons, and probably the majority of its readers will go on believing them!

We have received the following communication:

October 6, 1897.

Editor *The Cause*: A year or two ago I undertook the task of setting you right on the injunction question. My efforts were so hopelessly unavailing that I would not presume to try again, but it is possible some reader of *THE CAUSE* may see the mischief in your comments in the October number, and in that hope I write you these few lines. You say: "Why strikers should object to being restrained from interfering with a company's employes by means of violence, threats or intimidation, we do not see. If they use such means they are plainly in the wrong, and if a strike can only be won in this way it had better be lost." Of course, you are still less able to see why one should object to being restrained from burglary, arson or murder, and a large class of the American people seems to be in the hopeless dilemma in which the editor of *THE CAUSE* seems bound to remain.

The only reason why anybody is so foolish as to object to injunctions in any of these cases is because

the use of the injunction in such instances deprives the individual of trial by jury, which is, of course, a very minor matter and not worth considering. Trial by jury was adopted and has been more or less jealously guarded (generally less) because the findings of judges were not true and honest, and, therefore, human liberty was not safe in their hands. Judge Woods punished Mr. Debs and his associates because they, *unlawfully* interfered by *violence, intimidation* and otherwise with the property of the railroad companies. As a matter of fact, there was not one line of evidence as to any unlawful interference, and Judge Woods' finding was prejudiced, unfair and false and would not have been made by any jury, which he and many others understand perfectly well. A number of men were sent to jail because they were denied a trial by jury. But the great mass of people who believe in government by injunction do not care for trial by jury, and it is for this reason alone that they support the injunctions of courts. Of course, some misguided individuals cannot see the point in the controversy and very likely never will. These men powerfully aid the enemies of human liberty, who would place all workmen under the tyranny of judges who are often the creatures of the powerful and rich.

CLARENCE S. DARROW.

We recognize the force of the above contention, and do not mind the sarcasm—from an old friend. Undoubtedly there are abuses connected with injunctions and with equity proceedings generally. But we doubt if Mr. Darrow, as an educated member of the bar, would deny the legitimacy of injunctions absolutely; hence the question is simply when are they proper and when are they not? In every case trial by jury is dispensed with under this method of judicial procedure, since the offence (if the injunction is disregarded) consists in disrespect to the order of the court, and of that, in the nature of the case, the court must be the judge. Judge Woods may have been mistaken in adjudging Mr. Debs guilty of violating his injunction (as to that we have only our correspondent's opinion), but if Mr. Darrow questions the propriety of the injunction in the first place, and will give us his reasons why and distinguish them from the reasons that in other circumstances make an injunction allowable, he will make a contribution to the subject that may be of value; while the expression of distrust in judges generally seems to us to serve no good purpose. Trial by jury has its place, and it may be that for lack of clear thinking the people are allowing that place to be unduly contracted; on the other hand, injunctions to protect property against irreparable injury have their place.

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Who will draw any clear line between the cases to which they respectively apply? Perhaps the Ethical Society should have a Conference on the subject, with trained men to address it.

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