LITTLE BLUE BOOK NO. 1286
Edited by E. Haldeman-Julius

Do Human Beings Have Free Will?

A Debate

Affirmative:
Professor George Burman Foster
Negative:
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PROFESSOR GEORGE BURMAN FOSTER'S FIRST SPEECH

PROFESSOR FOSTER: This is indeed an old subject. Many have thought all the juice has been squeezed out of it and that there is no more blood in this turnip. I think there is blood in it—lots of it. I am going to present the turnip and I am going to let Mr. Darrow squeeze the blood out of it.

It is also thought that it is an unimportant subject. There is one reason why that might be true. It is that whether you are determinists or libertarians all of you act pretty much the same way. And you forget about it. You eat and drink and sleep and work and love and get mad and get glad, no matter which way this thing is. So, that being the case, it might seem to be unimportant, but for all that the problem has persisted through the centuries and it must be fundamental; like Banquo's ghost, "It will not down." The statement of it changes, the solution of it changes, but the problem abides. And it is perhaps to the fore today in an unusual degree of acuteness.

After all, we are not to be distressed because no problem stays solved for the reason that we do not live simply by solutions, we live by problems; we do not live simply by answers, we live by questions as well; we do not simply live by faith, we live by doubt also, and it must be therefore that the existence of problems which are either insoluble or do not stay solved is functionally important in maturing the human spirit. If that be true we should be willing to accept the situation in the particular to which I have referred. So Mr. Darrow and I are here again today to break our teeth upon this old file—or, if Mr. Darrow's teeth are strong enough, he might break the file on his teeth. I do not quite feel that I can do it myself. The most that I can do in the time at my disposal, is to point out the means and import of this great controversy.

What do we mean by freedom of the will? Is the freedom of the will a reality or an illusion? I am concerned just now with thinking with you a little about these two points. At the outset, I wish to put in my demurrer against the way the question is worded. I accepted that wording of the question because others said that it was the way to word it for popular consumption. And so I am going to

state this problem the way it ought to be stated.

It is not—John Locke pointed this out 250 years ago—it is not properly a question, "Is the Will Free?" for you can not split up man into pieces this way and isolate a detachable bit like the will and say whether it is free or not. There is no sense in that. Moreover, it supposes that the will is a kind of independent substance or entity that gets on of itself, aside from any relationships. But there is no substance or entity as that anywhere, and of course the will is not one either.

Besides, if there be freedom it is not a property which inheres in the will, as, for example, heat inheres in a coal of fire. There is no such thing as that. As a matter of fact, freedom and will in any true sense of the word —will—are the same thing, I am not aware of anybody denying the freedom of the will who does not do so at the expense of the existence of the will itself.

I am very much interested to find out how my friend Darrow is going to do it, since, as I say, everybody else that I have known anything of has always succeeded in denying the existence of the will when he denies its freedom. And I can understand why, because there is no

difference between the two things if you take out the psychology of the matter. So I understand by this problem, not Will as an isolated atom, but mind—Is the Mind Free?—and the will is simply the mind as active. That is all that we have to mean by that expression.

To be sure, I know there is a difficulty, for long ago psychology lost its soul and I hear up and down the earth now that it is about to lose its mind. So that is part of the difficulty which I have to face. Darrow cannot escape it either. But the upshot is that our debate is concerned not with the question, Is the Will Free, but, Is Man Free? Is the Self Free?—or, if you will allow a word, characterized by mystery and depth, Is Personality Free? I am practically and theoretically interested in such a question as that. It is rather interesting that today we should debate a question of freedom in a world where only yesterday the earth was drenched with blood and the sky choked with storm, in what many called an effort to achieve freedom. For, if man is not free, what worth is it to have society free, or government free, or a race free, or an earth free? This points to another item that I wish to be particularly understood—inasmuch as I am urging that freedom is not a property of the will,

something already there, as extension or some property of matter.

I have to indicate to you why this is so. The reason is that freedom—if I make out a case for its existence—is not an endowment; it is an achievement. It is not a donation to man; it is a creation by man. Instead of its being something with which we started, it is the human task—it is man's deepest, most important task in the midst of the world and the social structure in which he is implicated, to achieve, for himself, his self-dependence, his self-direction and his self-guidance.

Now, freedom, as I am presenting the matter, may be one of two things, conceivably. It means only one in fact. There are those, and they have stretched through history, who hold to what the old theologians—and my friend Darrow knows all about this—what the old theologians called *liberum arbitrium indifferentiae*, the freedom of indifference. Freedom thus means that an act to be free must be uncaused. Here, then, in order for freedom, your act must be causeless, relationless, motiveless, something that just is, out of the blue, a kind of creation out of nothing, like—if I could imagine such a thing—an atom cut loose from the entire universe and bent, Heaven knows

which way, its freedom being that it does not know which way it is going either.

Now, of course, such an act is characterless as well. And the reason the old theologians excogitated such an idea is that they wanted man to be the kind of person that could repent very easily, hence there must not be anything in the way of his changing. If his conduct was determined by his character and if his character was in some degree substantial and fixed, he would have a hard job to repent. They wanted to make it easy for him. But if his conduct was characterless, if no act of his made for a deposit of character, then there was no predetermination, but only indetermination.

From such a point of view man was everlastingly on the balance and it was up to him, without any antecedents, to flop either way, any time, that suited his caprice. Of course, there is no such thing in the universe as that, and there is not a man born now, so far as I know, who defines freedom that way. Perhaps, however, I go a little too far in saying that, for what has passed away from the thinkers and from the authorities enjoys a vagrant life in the street, and in debates like this. Nevertheless, I insist that so far as I am concerned, it has no place in my thinking whatever.

Now, there is a second kind of freedom, and it is that for which I stand I am doing this, I very sincerely tell you, not as a possibility of winning the debate. Darrow would like to have me win this debate—he always feels that way about me. But I thank him just the same. I am not interested in it from that point of view. I am interested in getting the thing before you as I see it, on the basis of the truth of it.

So interested, what do I mean by freedom? It is action which is determined not simply by environment, heredity and character and by impulses, but action determined by reason and conscience. I am free when I exercise the resident powers in me under the guidance of inner intelligence. I am free when I, in my act, am determined not by the past but by the future. I put it in a single phrase—when my action is on the basis of self-determination, self-guidance, self-direction, as against alien determination, alien guidance, alien direction, all on occasion of at least dual possibilities.

Perhaps that expressed it as clearly and as briefly as I can—for how quickly my time is going—and how I might illustrate it for this audience here today: Here you are! How does it come you are here? Was your coming

here something that you did or was it something that was done to you? Now, that is not all of the question, so I go a little further. When you came here—when you made your choice to come here—could you have chosen not to do so? And in particular how are you going to know whether you could or not? I am getting at the root of this matter just there, with this audience, and so I state the matter in a large and specific way: Freedom is the assertion that possibility is in excess of actuality, in the life of the human spirit. That is the gist of this debate, my friends.

Now take your own case. You came here today. Could you have gone to the park? Could you have gone to sleep? Were there alternate possibilities? In other words, freedom is faith in ambiguous futures. Freedom is the conviction that there are possibilities with which you start and that by your action you can reduce at least a dual possibility into a single actual result.

Is there such a thing as that? Now I must not talk any longer this time for I have stated the case to you and I am to stand for this proposition that possibility is in excess of actuality.

Of what kind of proof does this subject ad-

mit? You have this situation: Mr. Darrow, you and I and all men, have, at times, an immediate consciousness that they are free. In deliberate action you feel free at times. That is the point on which we all agree. Now, there are two things to be done. I have to justify that feeling of freedom of yours. Mr. Darrow has to explain on the other hand that although I have that feeling of freedom, it is a humbug, it is not true. He has to show, if I understand the situation, that my idea that I am feeling that I am free—my idea that I am free—is not so, but is an illusion. To be sure, in the face of the fact of the universality of this feeling of freedom, the question might readily be raised whether or not my idea that I am free is an illusion or whether his idea that my idea that I am free is the illusion.

MR. CLARENCE DARROW'S FIRST SPEECH

MR. DARROW: The professor always saves me some time and trouble in these discussions. He is so honest that he generally puts my side of it about as well as he does his own, and I think a little better. Now, I am at a loss to know whether he believes in free will or not. Of course he and I could discuss with you for a long while the question of what is the Will and what is Freedom. It would take several debates to settle that before we got started on the main question.

I quite agree with him that perhaps the statement of the question is not what is should be. It ought to be, Is Man Free? I am willing to accept that statement, too. So far as the will goes, all you can say for it is that man's will is his state of mind before action; how he feels before he does something. The question is not so much whether he is free to do as he wills, but is he free to will as he will? If the will is free, man thinks before he feels and acts. The action is settled. The will is only a question of how he feels before he dives in, that is all. If you can call the will force, as so many phil-

osophers do, then I cannot see that it means anything much as applied to this subject. The professor is a theologian, or was, and I practice law.

To us it has some practical meaning. To the theologian it means that a man is going to hell because he purposely chooses to do the evil when he could just as well have done the right. That is out of his free choice, as an independent human being, he knew what was good and chose to do what was bad. That justifies God in damning man, as Nietzsche says. To the lawyer, it means that a man knows right from wrong, and purposely chooses to do the wrong and society sends him to jail to punish him because he purposely chose to do wrong when he could have done right. It means, to make it more specific, that a man may choose whether he will go to New York or Denver, or stay at home; that he may choose whether he will go to sleep at home this afternoon, as the Professor says, or come here and go to sleep.

I know we all have an illusion of freedom. That is not the only illusion we have. We are filled with them, most of which never materialize and never could materialize. We have a feeling of freedom, a feeling of choice, but it is simply one of those illusions—one of the

countless illusions that rule life, that govern us, keep us alive without which we would die and get through with it, for there would be nothing to live for. But the question of whether a man is free may be put in a practical way. Can you sit down if you are standing just because you think you want to sit down? Can you get up if you are sitting down of your own free will, if there is such a thing? You can not sit in a chair and rise from it through any intellectual process. You might do it on account of a pin or a tack. It takes some impulse that comes from outside of you and then you act, not through any intellectual process of any sort. You cannot have an intellectual process without impulse. It comes from somewhere.

The Professor's definition does not help us to any great extent that I can see. Of course, he admits that there is no such thing as free will in the universe, in the sense that we understand free will, in the sense of such eminent theologians as John Calvin and Martin Luther and Billy Sunday. Or in the sense of the judges who send men to jail because they wilfully do wrong, and they are justified in doing it because judges wilfully do right. He practically admits there is no such free will as that,

but he says it is action determined by reason and conscience.

Well, now, what about that? What action is determined by reason and conscience? Before you can decide that a man is free, if he acts on his reason and conscience you have first to ask where his reason came from and where he got his conscience. I settle most of the things that I do where I deliberate by my reason, and sometimes by some remnants of my conscience that I have not yet got rid of. But, where did I get my reason, and what is it? It is not, of course, a separate faculty. It is not something tangible, like an arm or leg. It is not the mind, if we know what that is. All we know about the reason is that its seat is memory, and from memory we have reflection. It has some relation to brain. The size of it; the fineness of it; the character of it. One man may reason one way and another man may reason another. The question is, "What kind of a brain has he?" He did not make his brain; he had nothing to do with it. That came long before he had any consciousness; that is a matter which is born without his consciousness, and it will die and dissolve when it gets ready independent of what he thinks or what he wants. What one arrives

at from his reason depends upon his brain, upon its size and its quality—mainly upon its quality and next upon the impressions he has. Some people may reason from a few facts, and some may reason from a great many facts, depending upon how many facts they have, or, some may reason from errors instead of facts, and reach different conclusions. No two brains reason alike because they are not made alike and they have not the same things to reason about. It is out of the question to determine it in any such way.

As to conscience: That is the unsafest guide any theologian ever talked about. The theologian's conscience may be one thing and a lawyer's another! A man's conscience depends entirely upon where he was born, almost entirely. If a woman was born in the far east, her conscience would not permit her to go on the street without a veil, but she could go barefoot; if she was born in the west her conscience would let her go out without a veil, but until recently she had to wear a long dress, at one period of her education, and at another one she might wear a short one. She did not make her conscience; it was made for her. Some people's consciences at some times will permit them to do one thing and sometimes

another. Some people's consciences forbid them lying under some circumstances; not under all. Everybody's conscience permits them to lie when it is necessary. There is no single act of man that can be determined by his conscience or that any two consciences will pass on alike. Man has inherited and acquired it just as he has inherited his arms and acquired his tastes.

This whole problem comes from the fact that man takes himself too seriously. Professor Foster, if he really believed in free will, would fly away before this debate was over. Why not? Why shouldn't he go and visit Mars if he wanted to? Why should he be bound by any of the things that hamper man in this world? If a man is free he can do as he will. Literature has furnished us with a fair example of what freedom is. I heard the Professor, in a former debate, quote: "I am the captain of my soul." Well, that means something. That means you can guide your soul around where you will, and do with it as you will. "Every man is the architect of his own fortune," says the copybook and the capitalist, but, has he anything to do with his fortune? Or, with his misfortune? Does man move around because he wishes to move around and go here and there as he sees

fit? Or, is he a slave of law, without the power to move of his own volition?

Now, I am firmly convinced that a man has no more to do with his own conduct than a wooden Indian. A wooden Indian has a little advantage for he does not even think he is free. Everybody's life and position are cut out for them. While one person may possibly influence the life of somebody else, they have nothing to say about their own. That is the position that I hold upon this question, which is fairly practical, if not philosophical. And that, it seems to me, must be settled by some propositions that are very plain. First, man is a part of the universe. Not a very important part, excepting to himself—as important as the trees and grass and fishes—as much the creature of law as any of the rest of them. He is born without his own volition and he generally dies before he gets ready. He has no faculty of saying, no chance to say whether he will be born or not, or whether he will die or not.

The great events of life are absolutely beyond his control. He has not even much to say about getting married. Man—I am speaking of. If man is like the rest of the universe, I suppose there can be little question about this. It is only when the theologian comes along and

endows man with a soul that lives forever and has no relation to anything else but God and the Devil, as the case may be, then is the only time we get into trouble over this question. If man is like all the rest of the universe, and controlled by the same laws and causes, I fail to see how there could be any question if there is free will in the universe. Why does not the earth make up its mind it will quit its foolish going around the sun every year? Why not try something new? It knows the old path all right. If it had any sense of freedom and liberty, it would start for the Dog Star and go around that for a while. Why not? It cannot go for the Dog Star; it is fixed by law; it has to go over the same old foolishness year after year when there is no reason for it any longer. If there is any such thing as free will when the farmer plants the corn in the spring why doesn't the corn take a notion to go to China instead of coming up the shortest way? Why does every man know it will come up and not grow down? If it had any free will there would be some diversity about it. It would not all grow the same way, anyhow. But, it all comes up unless there is a stone or something in its way, and then it goes around it. If there is any such thing as free will in the

universe, why don't the fishes fly? And why don't the birds dive in the water and take the place of the fishes once in a while? You would think the fishes would get tired of swimming in the same old pool and would want to see something of the world. But, they do not. They stay right where they are put. If there is any such thing as free will they would do it and the birds would. Why do the geese—I don't mean people—I mean the others—why do they fly north in the summer time and go south in the winter? I suppose those geese, just like the rest of us, think they do it because they want to. But they do not. They can not help it. If they could, some geese would fly north in the winter time, although nobody knows how they find out they ought to fly north in the summer time. And they fly south in the winter time in accordance with a fixed, immutable law that even geese cannot control. Why doesn't the deer fight instead of run? You would think he would fight once in a while. And why doesn't the bull dog run instead of hold on? He does not know. He just does it, that is all. The law of one being is different from the law of another's and each had nothing to say about his make; he had nothing to say about the forces that are controlling him and that are mixed to make him.

Is the human being any different? Is there anybody who believes that inanimate things have a choice; that the soil or rocks have free will? That the sap in the tree goes up when it wants to and goes down when it wants to? Is there anybody who thinks that the grain could do anything else but grow up in the spring and ripen through the summer and the fall? Is there anyone who thinks that the deer can do anything but run away from its enemy? Or that some other animal can do anything but fight? That the lives of animals are not controlled by the food supply? That the fishes of the sea do not swim here and there according to the food supply without knowledge or volition of their own? Is there anybody who thinks that any of these things have the slightest will or power to choose their own destinies or fix their own lives?

People used to think that. I have an old book at home which gives detailed accounts of how judges and juries used to try animals for crime. I was reading the other night the case of an old sow that was tried and convicted for killing eleven of her pigs by lying on them! These were human beings who tried the sows. Human beings governed by reason and conscience. A lot of them. And at that, they

were just as wise as our lawyers and our judges. Just as wise because the same law that governs the one, governs the other.

Is man any different? I probably would not need to argue with the Professor on the free will of animals and plants. Of course, the plant that finds itself in a soil that is not good and wants to help its growth cannot pick itself up and live somewhere else. It is fixed. That was all done for it. The animal follows his instincts, his nature, and his life, and he cannot avoid it. What about man? Is he a different creation? Of course, this comes down in the end to a theological discussion, where the Professor and I always shine. If man is any different, why? That involves us with God. We have not time to settle that this afternoon. It involves us in a belief that outside of all of this is some creator, conscious, who rules the universe and who has fixed these things to suit himself. And even then there would be no free will because it would be God's will instead of the individual's will. It involves the proposition that God made man; that he made him different from plants and different from animals, and endowed him with something that animals have not—gave him this divine reason the Professor talks about, which leads no two

men in the same direction because no two brains or lives are the same—but has endowed him with this and an immortal soul, and that he stands alone in the universe and has no relation to anything else. Can this be true?

What does Biology say about it? The origin of all life is alike. All animal life is born from a single cell; one cell is built upon another, according to the pattern of the cell, not according to the will of the individual animal. If it was built according to the pattern of the individual animal, a great many of us would look different from the way we do.

It is all built from the original pattern. The life of man is no different from any other animal except perhaps a little more complex, possibly a little higher developed. We say higher because we make the rule. The animals perhaps think it lower, and perhaps it is.

Can a man change his life? Let us take a few simple things. Is any man the master of his fate? Can he change his own life? If a man is born white can he be black? If he is born black can he be white? If you are born a woman, can you be a man? No; you might vote, but you cannot be a man. If you are born a man, can you be a woman? No; you might learn to knit, but you cannot be a woman.

Can you change your sex? Can you be tall, or short, as you will? Can you change your color? Can you choose your parents? Can you choose your environment? Can you do any one of thousands of things that enter into your life, and make you exactly what you are?

All this is cut out for you. It is cut out with no chance or power to change it. Can you make a philosopher out of a preacher unless he gives up theology? Can you make a poet from a ditch-digger? He might dig a ditch that would be something like poetry, but he cannot string words together like poetry. Can you make an artist from the germ for a blacksmith?

All these things are born first of all; they are not made. All of it is back in the original egg, from which the life came, and all the life developed according to the pattern and there is no power to change it. It is perfectly plain to everyone that no man has anything whatever to do with his origin. It is perfectly plain that in the big things of life he has nothing to say. Where he was born, what determines his religion, his social caste, his degree of intelligence, that is all far, far beyond him.

As to the power of the brain, man has nothing to do. Can a foolish man make himself wise and unhappy just by willing it? Or can a

wise man make himself silly and an optimist just because he wants to? That has all been done for him, away in advance, and you cannot help it. I cannot help being wise. The Lord knows, I wish I could. For it is great to be crazy.

And what are you going to do about it if you are born that way? About the big things of life nobody can argue that we have anything to say. If it is written down that the egg shall develop into a dog, you cannot make a horse out of it. If it is to develop into a woman, it cannot be made a man. It is probably lucky, because there probably wouldn't be any women if they could choose the egg. Anyway, it cannot be, so we do not have to discuss that. If the cell is to be a Hindoo it cannot be an American; it is out of the question. The cast has been fixed for all the ages and will come down. All the possibility is in the beginning, and when the egg is fertilized, the job is finished.

Of course, there are some things that affect the weight and the strength and the tendency of individuals after that time comes. But what are those things?

Man is made up of only two things, heredity and environment. And all he is and all he has is the product of these two. As to his heredity

—no one is insane enough to think that a man has anything to do with that and yet we send people to jail and hang them every day on account of their heredity and environment.

When you turn to his environment what then has he to say? An acorn will grow into an oak tree; it may be bigger in a fertile soil and a sheltered place; it may be stunted in a poor soil, but it will be an oak. The environment may possibly add something to its strength. But in can in no way change its pattern; that is there. And it is the same person that crawls into the grave that was laid in the cradle—the pattern is alike.

It must be admitted that man has nothing to do with his heredity. What has he then to do with his environment? For the first eight or ten years of his life, at least, when all of his most lasting impressions are formed, it is perfectly plain that he has nothing to do with this environment, no more than with his heredity. He had no chance to choose his parents. He had no chance to choose his early nurturing. He had no chance to place himself in an environment that was easy, where he could develop what was in him. He was cast in a certain environment and placed in that environment and slowly changes—and what the Professor

calls his character, forms from the environment. Later in life there is a more apparent freedom of action. But is there? After ten or twelve years of life with the heredity which nature gave him, with all of the environment added to it, an environment that he had nothing whatever to do with, and with this equipment he goes out into the world to use his reason and his conscience.

His conscience which came to him as his reason, which perhaps he has not. And if he is entirely the creature of his heredity and of his environment, supposing that man can think for a moment that he acts according to his reason, then what is meant? Then at the best his mind is a set of weighing scales where he dumps on this side the reasons for doing a certain thing and on that side the reasons for not doing it. And which side is heavier depends upon a lot of things.

First on the scales, which he did not make, and nature or law provides no way for testing these scales so he will know whether they are correct. All we know is that they are not correct, that no two weigh alike. He uses these imperfect scales which came to him—nobody knows how, excepting that he did not make them—that come to him from all of the dead

that are gone, and are fixed. Then he dumps into these scales the different reasons for this and for that.

And the reasons depend upon what? Upon the extent of his experience in life. Upon the character and the nature of the brain. According to the way the individual man determines the relative weight of this and that. No two men can determine it the same, because the scales are different and the life experience is different. Man can only act according to what seems to him to preserve life, and to bring happiness. In other words, man is purely a selfish creature. Everything comes into his scales, and he weighs it to see which will give the greatest satisfaction. The scales may be different and the vision may be different.

Take a simple question. Two men go down the street. They both see a blind man begging. One person gives him money, the other passes him by. Is one a selfish man and the other an unselfish man? Nothing of the sort. Each acts from the same motive. Each acted to satisfy himself. Each acted to ease himself. If the man who gave money could have felt better had he kept it, he would have kept it. The man who gave the money was probably cursed with an imagination and he thought how it

would be if he were blind, and in giving he relieved himself. And the man who kept his money had less imagination, and it did not bother him, and so he found his highest pleasure in keeping his money. But both of them acted from the same motive, in accordance with the same law, which is self-preservation. Or, you might carry it a step further. Seeking your own happiness; seeking your own good. And nobody can act from any other.

We all find comfort in our various philosophies of life, and our various religions. Some get it by being Catholics and some Methodists; some by being Christian Scientists; while some do not get it. But, all of us act along the same lines. We cannot help it. Let me put another thought to you.

There is nobody who believes in free will. Even the ignorant people do not believe in it, let alone a wise man like the professor. All society and all life is formed on a consciousness that there is no such thing as free will in the universe. Man is a creature entirely of heredity and environment, who has nothing to do with his own life and with his own destiny.

Let us see about it. Why it is that we have schools? Why should a child be educated? Why teach him the difference between right and

wrong, which we always teach although we do not know ourselves. Why point to the endless punishments that follow wrong and the never-ending delights that follow righteousness? We do it simply because we know that the child will be influenced by the people that he meets in life, and we try to make the foundations of his character deep, so that when he is called upon to choose, he will choose rightly. We teach him right and wrong, and the rewards and penalties that follow, so that when these things confront the child in later life, he will act rightly. If his teaching meant nothing to him, and he had free will, he would be just as apt to do wrong no matter how much we taught him. Every school in the world is founded upon the idea that as the child is born and as the child is reared, he will most likely act.

If there is free will, there can be nothing fixed and certain and definite in life, and no man could tell from another's thought or teachings how he would act, and no man could be sure if he sowed wheat in the spring that he would get a harvest in the fall.

PROFESSOR FOSTER'S SECOND SPEECH

PROFESSOR FOSTER: My friend, Mr. Darrow, is certainly a hard man to manage. Not because what he says is true, or because it is not true, but only seems to be and nonsense has one advantage over sense, you can't refute it. Also because it is suffused with such a delightful humor with which he sugar coats this ungodly pill that he insinuates down our all-too-gullible throats. The humor is something to be enjoyed, but not refuted.

The second point that makes it difficult is his charming aggregation of such a mélange of heterogeneous and irrelevant facts that it is impossible for his opponent to pick them all up and appraise them. It would take a long time to do that, even if I could remember them, and I cannot. I enjoyed them so much I did not think it worth while to interrupt my enjoyment by jotting them down as he went along.

However, perhaps I can improvise a classification of all these facts and treat the classes instead of his particular instances, and in doing so meet the issue.

But before doing so, I want you to see the

series of thoughts or conceptions into which all this anti-freedom talk articulates. Mr. Darrow, like myself, has rather a consistent theory of the world. To be sure, like myself, he does not practice his theories. He could not; he would not be here today if he did; he would be in the lake. But what is the string of things that should go together as he thinks, and what is that other string of things that should go together as I think?

Well, you are more interested in him, so I will give you his. This is the way the thing runs on.

Monism, by which is meant there is only one thing in the universe, only one kind of thing, and that this was always there, that what was not always there, was never there but only seems to be—eternalism to the negation of temporalism.

Then follows determinism, about which I will say a word of explanation. We used to speak of necessitarianism. It is of two kinds, Fore-ordination, if you think that God fixed what was to be, or Fate, if you think that nature or circumstances fixed what is to be.

Mr. Darrow has tried to make out a case for both Fore-ordination and Fate this afternoon, the two together fixing things and so they are pretty well fixed!

Now, under the promptings of Hume and Jonathan Edwards, John Stuart Mill changed the terminology from Necessitarianism to Determinism, which is better. And William James pointed out that Determinism is of two kinds: Hard Determinism and Soft Determinism.

Determinism is hard if you hold that it is circumstances or, as Mr. Darrow would say, environment, that determines you. Determinism is soft if you hold that it is your character which is so fixed that it determines you. Thus you see from Monism consistently comes Determinism. What is, is, by virtue of the antecedent and not at all by virtue of the influence of anticipated consequences. What is, is, by impact of some past, and not by the inducement of some future.

Now, Determinism eventuates in Pessimism. And you observe in Mr. Darrow's discussion that he, himself, passed from the problem of freedom to the problem of pessimism. He is not to be criticized for that, he could not help himself, he had to do it that way. But, singularly enough, when you pass into the world of morals, Monism, Determinism and Pessimism carry with them what such a man as Mr. Darrow would call Hedonism in Ethics. That

is, that the causes and motives of our actions is pleasure, and that man lives for pleasure.

As against one of our own poets who said:

Not enjoyment and not sorrow is our destined end and way,
But to live that each tomorrow finds us further than today.

As against all this, I am rather inclined to pluralism. I hold that plurality, diversity, multiplicity, are as original in this universe as unity is. There would not be any unity if there was not something to unify. And, if I am to make a choice, choose the concrete particularities, diversities, multiplicities, as the real, rather than the unity. I am reminded of a story that I now and then tell my class of an old monk. I will tell it to you.

There was a time in the Middle Ages, when there was a controversy between nominalism and realism, and the question was, which was the real, the universal or the particular. The monk was so enamored with the universal, it fits his church you see, that he said that the universal was the only real, and that he was going to practice what he preached about the matter; hereafter he was not going to eat apples and peaches and pears, he was going to eat just fruit. You see, I eat apples, peaches and pears, and Darrow eats fruit!

Then, I pass from pluralism to freedom as Darrow passes from monism to determinism. For, I affirm a relative independence to these separate existences. They are not fated by antecedent unity that forces them to be as they are. They are just as original as the unity is. I do not deny unity, but unity is an achievement. I do not deny continuity, I affirm discontinuity, I mean creativity, novelty, uniqueness.

The question is not whether we are determined at all or not. We are. And we are externally determined in part. The question is whether we are inwardly determined or not. The question is whether we are determined not by a past and a force in the past simply, or are we determined by a future and its temptation upon us because of an achievement that we are competent of making in regard to that future.

Then, along with freedom comes, not Hedonism in Ethics, but idealism. According to this a man does not always act from the pleasure-pain motive. A man does not always act that he may avoid pain and have pleasure. A man does not always choose to do what from the point of view of any proper use of the word is a selfish thing. But there is an altruistic

instinct. The very issue before this planet today is whether there is only a brute upthrust in evolution, whether brute force and selfishness shall alone determine the destiny of man and the fate of the earth, or whether to this is added an ethical process of which love is the inner force. That is the ultimate, moral issue today. And up and down the earth there are men who are saying: "I know it will cause pain and worse than pain, but I am determined not simply by the pleasure-pain thought of a hedonistic world; I am determined by the notion of duty! And let no man mutilate and dishonor the sacred word duty and ought and conscience.

Take an illustration. By the blood and treasure of your fathers and mine, this country is enjoying the priceless boon of freedom today. We were in a great struggle, where it was to be decided once again whether a nation so conceived shall survive or not; we were in a struggle which called us to declare whether we will be influenced by our own ease and comfort and pleasure and let the blood-bought treasure of freedom perish from our hands, or whether by our own treasure and blood and sacrifice, we shall, at any cost, pass on to the

future the treasure of freedom which has been purchased us by the fathers that are gone. That was our issue. So that as a fact, unless we abuse the words conscience and duty and altruism and make them mean what they do not mean, we are bound to admit that the real, inner, spiritual dynamic of this great struggle was as to whether there shall be some place for the altruistic impulses and ideals of humanity to exercise themselves in the world. As man struggles on into the region of the spirit and of will, he may leave behind him the agony of the past, and mount through a clearer air into a wider world beneath serener skies. This shall be not a monistic tyrannical universe, but a pluralistic democratic universe!

So, you see, another kind of man from Mr. Darrow will stand for pluralism, freedom, moral idealism, activism, instead of that former string of things. Now, I stand for the latter sort of thing. We cannot give up one thought without giving up all. And it is the same sort of thing in the other series of beliefs. We are isolating today just one of these items to which we are drawing special attention. That is the idea of freedom. In every debate, there should be some point, some starting point, upon which both the debaters stand. There is

such in this debate. It is the fact of the consciousness of freedom. I feel free in some of my actions. Others I do not, and so I insist upon this important matter. I am not concerned with the extent of our freedom in this debate; just how extensive it is, I do not know. It is of no extent unless we achieve it.

Can we achieve it? is the question. I am not concerned with the extent of freedom. I am concerned with the existence of it. Has there ever been in the history of the human race an act of freedom? Are there acts of freedom on the part of any of us? That is the question. Were it a question of the extent of freedom, Mr. Darrow could say that I belong to a world without my choice, and a race without my choice, and parents without my choice, and so on. He could say that, as he does practically say, I am pushed into the world, pushed through it and pushed out of it, and that is all there is to it. As against all that pushing, I want to know if there is something I do without being pushed. Well, I feel that there is. I feel that I do some things when I could have done something else. And it is on this account that I blame myself and at times respect myself. It is on this account that I have a good conscience and a bad conscience, that I have a

sense of guilt and a sense of innocence. It is on this account that through our whole life, throughout all our living socially, we are tied up and involved in praise and blame, in approval and disapproval, in esteem and contempt, in admiration and in disgrace.

So, I start with a universal conviction. Now, inasmuch as this is a universal conviction, inasmuch as this feeling is an admitted fact, why, according to any proper idea of a debate upon this question, the burden of proof rests with my opponent, not with myself. It is not incumbent upon me to prove the validity of this feeling in the face of its universality. It is first incumbent upon Mr. Darrow to disprove it, and upon me to refute his proofs. Which I will now do.

I said I thought his pell-mell of stuff with which he pummeled us could be classified. His first point is the triviality of man. Much that he said can come under that head—the triviality and transitoriness of man. I have got an instinctive and inveterate aversion to that proposition. I am rather glad to say so. How does he prove the triviality of man? He does it in two ways. The first way he classifies man with the animals—says he is just an animal. Well, I admit that. But, there are ani-

mals and animals! A man is different from them all. We are told that you can train animals to count. You cannot do any such thing. They do not inwardly and actively and planfully count. They imitate your count. That is all they can do. So, you cannot make out a case for the animal quality of man by showing the man quality of animals, that way. Moreover, you have got men organizing themselves into societies to teach hogs to count and horses to figure things, and all that. But did you ever know of a lot of animals organizing a society to make men do stunts? Did you ever? So, there is a difference, a great difference. It is an old trick to lower the dignity of man by exalting the dignity of animals. That is Darrow's trick.

Then, secondly, he proceeds further, and he puts men and animals into the class of things, of nature. Man is like a wooden Indian, Darrow said. As a question of fact, is he? The Indian does not debate with me, and Darrow does! The wooden Indian does not smoke. I do. The wooden Indian does not enter into the wet and dry controversy. I do. There is a difference. So, he goes on and lowers man still further and makes him all the more trivial by putting him in along with nature. Now, a

tree cannot go from Hyde Park to Washington Park. I can. An animal cannot read *The Critique of Pure Reason.* I can. You scatter an alphabet out-doors here along the street. Nature cannot pick them up and put them together into Homer's Illiad. Homer could. There is a difference. I protest against this effort to strip man of his dignity by such sophistries as that. I am told he is such a little thing. Man is such a little thing—a grain of sand upon the shore of the universe. So, he says. But man's triviality or dignity is not determined by bigness but by fitness and by an estimate of values. Gettysburg was not known to the peoples of the earth until the battle was fought there in which rebellion and slavery were shot to death by the million guns of the republic. Is there any triviality in man because of the smallness of the field of Gettysburg? Oh, I am told that man is trivial also because he is a small atom in a vast universe that itself will perish. Who knows that the universe is going to perish? Maybe it is characterized not simply by death but by life; not simply by decay, but by rejuvenescence; maybe there is not simply a Calvary, or a Cross for the cosmos but that there is an Easter Day for the Cosmos itself—an everlasting recurrence

of a cosmic Easter Sunday as well as a cosmic Good Friday.

Who knows to the contrary? Think how much I would have to know, to know the contrary! So, I do not accept his argument on trivialities. There is another possibility.

But then Darrow has another point, namely, the old argument from causation. That is, the universality and inviolability of cause. Man is an effect of causes, he says. I wonder if he never goes on and asks the question whether that is a half-truth and whether or not man, of all the realities of the universe, is the only being that lacks, on his own account, causal efficiency? Maybe, however, man in turn is a cause of effect? That he is not simply a being to whom things are done, but that he is a being who does things in return. That is what freedom is. Freedom is just adding the other half to his Determinism. Not merely that he is an effect of causes, but that, in turn, he is a cause of effects.

But then the objection to that is that man's very being a cause of effects is itself caused, and caused not by himself. To which I reply a thing is not what it comes from; a thing is what it is. A thing is not what is done to it; a thing is also what it does. Suppose it be

true, that man comes from a number of blind atoms; he is not blind atoms on that account! Suppose it be true, as it is popularly stated, that human consciousness springs from a monkey-consciousness. Suppose that is true. It does not follow that human consciousness is a monkey consciousness. You will observe a thing is not what it comes from; it is what it is and what it can do, and what it is to be in the untrodden years of its future existence.

So, the half-truth of Darrow's Determinism must allow this other truth on account of which the proposition seems to be indeed a half-truth.

The question of causation is an interesting one. I want to say two or three things about it. The real problem of freedom, you understand, is whether there is an excess of possibilities over actualities, or whether along with the actuality-world there is also a possibility-world. It is a question between the possibility-man and the anti-possibility man, just exactly that. Now, according to the Determinist what has actually happened is all that could possibly have happened. And what shall happen in the future shall happen solely because of what actually already is, since what is fatally forefixes what is to be, so that there is no alternative possibility. Now, I grant that this may be

so. But I deny that it is known to be so. Think how much you would have to know, to know this. I wish to point out to you, and I ask your particular attention for a moment, that the determinist's assertion transcends the competency of science. All that science can do is to deal with matters of fact. All that science can do is to pass from fact to fact; with facts, determine what other facts exist. It is not within the competency of science to pass from actuality to possibility, from facts to non-facts —from matters of fact to fact-lessness. Science simply deals with the actuality-world and it neither affirms nor denies the existence of the possibility-world.

But, therefore, if there are other considerations which warrant mention to assert the possibility-world, science allows me to do so. The contention of the man who, like myself, has faith in freedom is that there are other considerations. I have already referred to some of them, namely, the universality and the dignity and the importance of our judgment, of regard and approval of censure and condemnation, of right and wrong, and the like. Our living requires the assumption of a possibility-world. Science does not exclude the postulate that there may be such a world. Science is

the explanation, explicit and demonstrated, of all facts that are non-values. The opposites of science are two things, one is faith and the other is an estimate of values. Faith is an explicit disobedience of the maxim,—I put it gravely,—that whatever is asserted as true should be perceived or demonstrated. To have faith is to assert what lacks proof. Faith is the assertion of an unfounded conviction. I put it briefly, but truly, to you. I repeat, faith is the assertion of an unfounded conviction for no other reason than the value of that conviction in the high and holy business of human living. But neither does science assert values, as our moral and esthetic convictions do.

There are two sets of judgments. Two plus two is four. Water comes from hydrogen and oxygen. It is a mile from here to the Coliseum. Those are science judgments. Those are judgments of fact. Now, there is another kind of judgment. He ought to be a better man. He could be a better man. The sunset is beautiful. His cause is noble. Truth is better than lying. Courage is better than cowardice. God is holy and ought to be worshiped.

That is another set of propositions. Those are propositions of life. Those are judgments of faith and estimates of values. You cannot

establish by coercive demonstration a single one of them. And yet our daily life is lived upon the basis of unfounded convictions in this way.

There is not anything done in the daily round by any of us that has not been done upon the basis of convictions that are undemonstrable from the point of view of coercive proof. Freedom belongs to this class. Freedom is unprovable, but indispensable. Paradoxical as it may seem, the proof of freedom could only be made on a basis which would exclude freedom. The rational justification of your faith in freedom is that you cannot live without it. Freedom is simply my act on a basis of an estimate of value saying that this thing is good, that thing is not good; I will do the one, not do the other. And I repeat that science leaves room for the assertion of faith and for the estimate of value and it is in that region, the possibility-world, where freedom belongs.

Mr. Darrow's appeal to cause and law as negations of freedom is naive. I meet it with two considerations. Cause means more than physical, mechanical, inert causation. That is cause from out the past. But there is also personal, moral, purposive causation. This comes out of the future. Ability to lay hold of the future and make it a factor in shaping the pres-

ent is human freedom. Acts induced by a future possibility, not coerced by a past actuality, this is another way of saying what we mean by freedom. The dignity of man is just measured by the degree in which he is determined by an idea of an end instead of by an impact from a force out of the past. In a word, mechanical causation does not exhaust the human notion of causation.

But the other consideration is the wrong valuation which the Determinist puts upon cause, law, science. All this rigid mechanical determination is not actual fact, but a mere postulate of the physical sciences. Law? Law is not an ontological dogma, it is a symbolic formula of explanation. Science? Science is but our intellectual technique of purposive action. All these are but tools of man's toil. They are servants of man, by man, for man; not his master. They are not a refutation but a proof of man's freedom—not a menace but manifestation of human freedom. All this talk of law as if it were a substance, or property of a substance, or cause on its own account, is crude and naive, and should never be treated as a bug-a-boo to frighten us out of our freedom. Mr. Darrow's whole argument on the basis of mechanism amounts to saying that be-

cause a piece of pie is triangular, there is nothing to pie but triangularity!

But many of the cases which he cites comes under the old head that we are not free because choice is determined by the strongest motive. The chooser does not determine his choice, the motive determines his choice? But what determines the motive? What makes this motive strong and that weak? Why, the chooser of course. There is no motive-in-itself. There is only motive-for-me. But motive-for-me is what it is because I make it so. Instead of a motive, as something independent, determining me, I determine it, for in a very real sense I am the motive. And if you take away from me my motive-making capacity, you mutilate me,—another instance of what I said, that an anti-freedom man can make out his case only by mutilating and decimating human nature itself. As a matter of fact this argument from the strongest motive has been dropped by thinkers and now leads a vagrant, mendicant life about the streets. How do we know a motive to be the strongest? By seeing action ensue. Have we any independent means of testing its strength? None. Then in saying that the will follows the strongest motive we have merely declared that whatever precedes precedes.

But I must not let myself grow abstruse. Take an illustration. There is a ripe apple over there on my neighbor's tree. I might go along there and I would not take the apple. Even Darrow would not. A boy goes along. What will he do? Climb the fence and get the apple or not? But the apple is there for all three of us, so the motive is not in the apple but in the man. So to be determined by the strongest motive is still to be self determined, which is freedom.

Well, I can't follow Darrow in all his ramblings. Heredity makes me, he says. Why, heredity just gives me my job. Whether good or bad, it is but the raw material out of which I achieve character. I master it, not it me, or I feel I am not the man I ought to be. Environment makes me. Darrow's dirge. Why, the very dignity of man is not in his subjection and submission to environment; it is in his conquest over environment, in his making environment a servant of himself, and not himself a slave of environment.

Well, that is almost enough. We live not in a block universe. We live in a universe that is open, plastic, malleable. We live in a universe to which we bring some new force and worth by the ideals we construct and honor.

Hence we do not live in vain. We can transform the world and make it more congenial to the heart and hope of man. Life can be buoyant. Moral tasks can be carried on and fulfilled with zest and exhilaration. Man is not a fool when he has faith in the final balance of the best. The world is such that man can bend it to beat the worst and serve the best. But if, as Mr. Darrow seems to think, this world is only a machine, mindless and merciless, then the life of instinct would be all, then the enthusiast for a far-off hope, for an endlessly progressive humanity, for a profound and logical love of life, would be cast off from the land of the living; then the martyr plays the fool; then it is to saints and sages that the world has lied.

MR. DARROW'S SECOND SPEECH

MR. DARROW: Professor Foster would be by all odds the greatest philosopher that I know anything about, if he had not been first educated in a theological cemetery. He is always lapsing, and when he lapses, why, he lapses.

Now, let us see. I did not claim for a minute that science is sure; that it has found the ultimate. It has not. Because science furnishes no proof is no reason why a thing should be accepted as true.

PROF. FOSTER: It is.

MR. DARROW: The Professor says "It is."

Then of course, any man may believe anything that will help him.

PROF. FOSTER: Surely.

MR. DARROW: It would help me to believe that I had a million dollars in the bank. But I cannot. I am not fool enough. It might help the Professor to believe that he is to be transported in a chariot of fire to a place where he can sit on a damp cloud through all eternity and play a harp.

PROF. FOSTER: Not that bad; I don't fancy that job.

MR. DARROW: But, can he believe it? If he is foolish enough to believe it, all right, I do not find any fault with him. I do not know what it is to have faith without some foundation of fact. I think nobody else knows even the person who believes that he is going to be transported immediately to Heaven when he is dead. He has a foundation of fact, his grandmother told him so, and the preacher told him so. He is not believing without evidence, it is mighty poor evidence, but it is evidence.

The human mind cannot believe anything without evidence. Even if you say you believe it because you need to, that is something; it isn't much. You may be like the ostrich, put your head into the sand, to get rid of unpleasant facts, and think you are safe. The ostrich is the original Christian Scientist—he gets rid of fear by denying unpleasant thoughts.

The Professor surely does not mean all he said. The difference between him and me is he doesn't mean all he said and I mean more. That was some panegyric that he uttered on duty. But it does not do for people who want to be intelligent to just shut their eyes. What is duty, anyway? Is there any reason why you should not ask yourself a simple question like that?

Some people think it is their duty to go to mass. Some think it is their duty to stay away. Some think it is their duty not to eat meat on Friday and some not to eat it on any day. Some think it is their duty to believe in Mohammed and some think it is their duty to practice snake worship. Some think it is their duty to take care of their grandmother. Where do they get the idea? Why, we catch it just like the measles; that is all. For the most part it is a terrible hobgoblin.

A great many people have had their lives ruined by a fool sense of duty. No doubt there are a great many places where duty serves a purpose. But to govern life by duty is simply crawling out of one hole into another. It doesn't mean anything at all.

The professor does not believe what he said about conscience; I know he does not. Because, in spite of what he says he is an intelligent man and I know it. He knows just as well as I do that conscience is purely a question of heredity and environment. A man's conscience depends upon where he is raised; that is all. Of all the uncertain things to guide the conduct of man, conscience is most unreliable. What are you going to test it by? I suppose you could test conscience by duty and duty by conscience, then you would get it.

A man's conscience, if it is strong enough, does not permit him to do the things that he has been in the habit of thinking are wrong. That, of course, means that the person is governed by the past. The professor is going to add to the horror of that and say we should be governed by the future. As far as I can I want to get out of both of them, and if I were free, I would.

Now, absolutely, there is no question about this. I do not need to make an argument about it. All you need to do is to think about it just a little. The professor knows better. He did not think what he was saying. I know how a man's mind goes. He set his in motion, revolving, philosophically and wisely, and all of a sudden a cog slips and he ran into one of his old sermons. I think by the Professor's silence he has admitted that animals have no free will, or not much to speak of.

PROF. FOSTER: That is true.

MR. DARROW: But he objects to my comparing human beings with animals. Well, as long as the animals don't object, I can't see why he should. They cannot object, because he says we control animals. We cannot conceive of animals that control us—well, we might—how about the alligator, the tiger, or something or

other? But if animals do not try to control us, we try to control them. Why, in one sense that shows the superiority of the animals, does it not?

We have a right to use such scientific knowledge as we have. Is not man an animal? He says, yes. But then he says something that certainly science will not bear out, that man is a different animal from any other, that he is endowed with reason, I suppose nobility of character, although we are not working at it very hard, and a few other things. So far as nobility of character is concerned—if you call duty noble—which I would not, exactly, the animal has got it all over us.

If you count gratitude and fidelity, why, the dog has got us beaten to death! In fidelity and gratitude, we do not compare with them. But, of course, that question is not a matter of discussion. Even an angleworm has a brain. It is very weak and inferior, of course, but it is there—a little flat thing at the end of the angleworm, is the rudiment of the brain. Of course, I presume there are probably no people who have not a better brain than an angleworm, though a good many of them have no better backbone.

From there up to the ape. An ape has a brain

half as big as a man's, with the same weight of body. Of course, a man does not act like he had twice as much, but he has twice as large a brain, anyway. And that an ape uses it, cannot be questioned.

Every faculty of man is in the other animals. They can learn. But, they cannot learn as much. Of course, they could not read Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason.* Thank God! Nor could they understand Butler's "Analogy." Nobody else does! But, they can reason. They can reason imperfectly. So does the professor. Their brain is not as big; it is not as well developed; it is not as useful. But it is there. And there is no faculty, physical or mental, that belongs to man that does not belong to any animal. And I still think that it is impossible to say that there can be any general law that does not control them both alike. Each one acts from motives. The professor denies it. Did any of you ever do anything without a motive? How can you? Can any human mind imagine an effect without a cause? An effect standing up in the universe without having been caused by anything? That is beyond the realm of reason; that is in the realm of faith, and he has got me when he comes to faith—I cannot follow him. Do not cause and

effect go hand in hand through everything in Nature? And through every act of life? There are many things that we do not understand, of course, but that is no reason why we should close our eyes to the things we do understand. It will not do to say that the patient labor of scientists to arrive at facts that can be proven over and over and over again in a thousand different ways, upon which all the world acts, must go for naught, and that we should accept blind faith in place of them. Nobody could compound a dose of medicine without the use of facts. It is known how the chemicals will act upon each other. It is known as far as we have knowledge, and we can only reason from such knowledge as we have.

I am not exactly sure that my theory of reward—of pleasant sensations or painful ones, is absolutely true. I have thought a good deal about that question. I think I am fairly sure of some parts of it, but, to be sure of these things is—well, you have to be pretty wise or pretty foolish, and I am far too intelligent to be sure and not wise enough nor silly enough to be sure.

As a matter of fact, the will to live permeates the whole universe. We struggle for life. And, pleasure is part of life. It is a life-giving thing.

Pain brings death. And the struggle for pleasure is almost instinctive and probably is instinctive.

The professor says we often choose the hard things. True, we do. I have been to a dentist to have my tooth pulled, and it is painful. Why did I do it? Because I would get more pain if I did not have it pulled. That is all. We have to undergo the hard thing if it relieves or will prevent suffering or give future pleasure. We do it instinctively, we act from instinct and feeling. These things preserve life. And what we call duty, and what we call conscience, often lead us to do the things which seem the hardest, but are not the hardest. Take the example of a ship burning at sea. Under the rule of life, as it prevails on the seas, it is the duty of men to get out of the way, burn with the ship and let the women escape. I suppose that is because women are—well, never mind that. That is the rule, anyway. Then, I assume that the professor and I, and almost all men, would do that. Why? Because we could not think of living in the world if we didn't do it, that is all. Because the code is so strong and the demand is so universal that a man cannot live on the earth who does not do it. Suppose he could. Suppose he thought that he

would be happier to save himself and let the women take his place. Do you suppose the women would get their lives saved? Not at all. The men would save their own. Those are clearly established lines which men act on automatically; that is all there is to it.

It may appear sometimes that we do the thing that causes pain, but to my mind it is simply an impossibility. We feel the thing that reaches us, and until it reaches us we do not feel it. The professor says the pain and pleasure theory will not work. I am not quite sure about it. To my mind it is the most reasonable of all of them. But, he says—he quotes a little piece of a poem—what was that? "Not enjoyment and not pleasure, is our destined"—so on and so on. "But to act that each tomorrow finds him further than today." That is Longfellow. He was not much of a philosopher, nor much of a poet, either. Is there any philosophy in that? But to act that each tomorrow finds him further than today! What do you want to go so "fur" for? You might get so "fur" you would have to come back! But, is there anything in going further? If you assume there is, then you have to settle first which way is further. Further may not be so far. It does not mean anything. I would rather

call his attention to that other poem of Longfellow—"Mary had a little lamb, its fleece was white as snow," it means just exactly as much. It means nothing, so far as this question goes.

Now, everybody can settle this question for himself if he wants to. Pick out any act in your life—the most important—and trace out the chain of causes that led you to it. Find out if you had anything to do with it yourself excepting you may count that you had a wonderful brain that helped you along. But you surely did not have anything to do with your brain. You can take the most important matter in your life, after getting born and before dying. Pick out any of them—getting married. How did that happen? Well, you probably happened to go to a party, or maybe to church—and that accident got you into all the trouble—a bare accident. Take the professor or myself. How much had we to do with ourselves? How many accidents are there between Adam and our parents? How many tens of thousands of people happen to be thrown together in the universe—happen to be! Tens of thousands of them. That we were born, must have been a terrible accident, or else God was looking out for us. And now we say we did it and that what we do—so large a number of

accidents that a man cannot even consider them —that we do it of our own free will! it is the result of all the past. All of Nature has had a share. Aren't we small? What is man, anyhow? What part of the universe? What part of earth, let alone the universe? But, what part of the universe is his brief span of years, measured by eternity?

That is the reason the people who have faith to believe what they want to believe, have invented heaven, because the whole thing is not worth anything without it. Heaven is a kind of faith bank—a bank you can draw on without putting in a deposit. I have talked to many people. I have seen too many people in trouble, who would tell me—because they would tell me the truth—exactly how it happened; who would show to me conclusively that they could not have done anything excepting what they did. The professor says a thing might happen in some other way than the way it did happen. Well, how? If it could happen some other way, why didn't it happen some other way? The fact that it happened this way shows that it could not have happened any other way!

This world and all life is a chain of cause and effect, the effect perhaps in turn becoming another cause. No man can go back into his

own life; no man can imagine anything in his own life or in any other persons that came there without a cause. We are mixed with the universe; we are a part of all that is, and to say that there is any free will for any portion of matter in the universe is to deny laws and would set us afloat in a realm of speculation and chance where no one could count upon any future act in any way.

In a world of free will there could be no guide and no compass and no law and no certainty, but only lost souls, as the professor would call them, wandering aimlessly in the night.