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THE COMMERCIAL IMPORT PROGRAM IN VIETNAM

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, there have been a number of newspaper articles recently about the problems which have developed in our commercial import program in Vietnam, carried out by our Agency for International Development. A particularly perceptive series has been written by Charles W. Bailey, correspondent for the Minneapolis Tribune and the Des Moines Register.

As Bailey points out, the objective of this program is to fight against rapid inflation in Vietnam, which can threaten stability, particularly in the cities, in a very serious way. Our increased involvement in Vietnam has inevitably generated unprecedented demands on the economy there, and by shipping a large number of goods there for commercial sale we hope to soak up excess buying power and keep prices down.

As one might expect in a program of this magnitude, there have been very serious problems. Chuck Bailey's analysis of these problems is worthy of the attention of the entire Senate, so I ask unanimous consent that several of his articles be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Minneapolis Tribune, May 7, 1966]
CZAR WILL PROBE PX BLACK MARKET IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(By Charles W. Bailey, Minneapolis Tribune Staff Correspondent)

WASHINGTON, D.C.—The Defense Department, increasingly concerned over widespread black marketeering of military Post Exchange goods sent to South Viet Nam, has named a "czar" to investigate and where necessary clean up the situation.

Thomas D. Morris, assistant secretary of defense, has been named "Mr. Black Marketeer"—in the words of a Pentagon spokesman Friday—in an effort to clamp down on a problem that could cause the administration considerable embarrassment.

The thriving black market in PX goods is the most highly visible, though probably not

the most serious, symptoms of the theft, diversion and lack of control which have plagued United States military and foreign aid shipments to Viet Nam.

Diversion and theft of United States aid shipments, including goods purchased by Vietnamese businessmen with United States financing under the so-called Commodity Import Program (CIP), is under intensive investigation by civilian authorities, who have dispatched several dozen investigators to Saigon, South Viet Nam, in recent weeks.

Ironically, the Defense Department appointment of its own black market "czar" follows by less than three months the naming of a similar official by the South Vietnamese government at the insistence of President Johnson and other top U.S. leaders during the Honolulu conference.

It has been no secret in Saigon that the influx of PX supplies for U.S. troops has fed a thriving black market. Sidewalk vendors there offer radios, liquor, canned food, cigarettes, clothing, bedsheets and other items—many bearing Post Exchange price tags—for sale in hundreds of open-air booths.

The PX black market drew fire this week from Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Democrat, of Arkansas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a persistent critic of the war in Viet Nam.

FULBRIGHT said that "30,000 containers of hair spray were sent to Viet Nam in March... it seems reasonable to suppose that this item has found its way to the black market."

Anyone walking down Saigon sidewalks can confirm that hair spray is a popular item in the open-air black market. But FULBRIGHT, according to highly knowledgeable official sources, seriously understated the magnitude of the shipments.

Shipments of hair spray to South Viet Nam—destined for PX counters but often diverted to sidewalk stalls—have been running at a level of more than 140,000 containers a month for the past four or five months, these sources say.

There are fewer than 800 women in all of South Viet Nam authorized to purchase goods in U.S. Post Exchanges, the sources say—nurses, dependents of non-government U.S. personnel with PX privileges, and a handful of Vietnamese dependents of military men.

Thus the monthly consignments of hair spray would provide close to 200 cans of hair spray per month for each woman authorized to obtain it. The fact is that hair spray is a standard gift for GIs to give to their Vietnamese girl friends.

A Defense Department spokesman confirmed yesterday that Morris had been given the black market "czar" assignment by Deputy Defense Secretary Cyrus Vance. The spokesman said that Vance acted after receiving "some reports" on the situation following his recent inspection trip to Vietnam.

The spokesman said Vance also has ordered each service secretary—Army, Navy and Air Force—to give him a monthly report on actions taken by them to curb black marketeering, currency dealings, and similar illegal activities.

Morris, who is assistant secretary of defense for manpower, was chosen by Vance because his responsibilities cut across inter-service lines, the spokesman said.

[From the Des Moines (Iowa) Register, May 10, 1966]

TEAM SEEKS TO END VIET MISUSE

(By Charles Bailey, of the Register's Washington bureau)

WASHINGTON, D.C.—Foreign aid officials, spurred by evidence of major misuse of American aid to South Viet Nam, are hastily increasing their efforts to control the nearly \$500 million worth of U.S.-financed goods shipped each year to Saigon.

An entire new 27-man "special projects team" has been set up in the U.S. aid mission headquarters in Saigon, along with extra auditors and inspectors, in an effort to prevent further diversion of aid shipments by profiteering merchants or agents of the Communist Viet Cong.

The stepped-up policing efforts of the Agency for International Development (AID), which handles economic assistance programs, parallel the action of the Defense Department, which has appointed a "czar" to crack down on black marketing in military post exchange goods and currency.

The military and civilian enforcement drive apparently resulted, at least in part, from investigations conducted in recent weeks by the Inspector-General's office of the State Department. This office has formal policing authority only over the AID programs, but in addition has pointed up black marketeering activities in military PX supplies as well.

It was the curiosity of an official in the Inspector-General's office that resulted in the interception of 50 tons of a highly-explosive chemical compound bound for Saigon. The compound had been purchased by a Vietnamese importer—purportedly for use in making rubber-soled tennis shoes—under a program financed by AID.

COMPLICATED NAME

The inspector's curiosity as to the apparent huge demand for tennis shoes, plus the complicated chemical name of the compound, led to his initial inquiry, subsequent tests by the Naval Ordnance Laboratory showed the compound—trade-named "Unicel-100" and known chemically as "dinitrosopentamethalene tetramine"—to be almost as powerful as TNT.

A similar, though less lethal, item recently turned back from its Saigon destination was \$1 million worth of silver nitrate. It was questioned, and then canceled, because it seemed likely to have been purchased as a "money maker"—a nonessential import designed solely for the enrichment of the importer.

Silver nitrate can be melted down—"in the back of any shack," as one official put it—and it yields half of its original weight in pure silver.

Because the financing arrangements under the U.S.-backed Commodity Import Program (CIP) allow a Vietnamese importer to buy goods at an exchange of 60 piastres to the dollar, instead of the going black-market rate of 180 to 200 piastres per dollar now prevalent in Saigon, the potential for profit in such a manipulation is large.

Even if half the silver nitrate is lost in the conversion process, the importer would be left with a tidy profit when he sold his solid silver, in the form of ashtrays or spoons, on the Saigon market.

In addition, conversion of the unstable piastre into something as "hard" and thus stable as silver, particularly at a low pegged piastre price, gives a Vietnamese a chance to enrich himself in real, inflation-proof terms.

TARGET OF DEMANDS

According to an AID spokesman, the agency has been the target in the last few days of demands from both Congress and the White House for details of past losses and future control plans. The White House inquiries, the spokesman said, had become especially insistent, and he added: "There seems to be a real flap over this."

As for Congress, a House subcommittee headed by Representative JOHN MOSS, Democrat of California, arrived in Saigon last weekend to look into the diversion problem. It carries a special agreement giving it authority to probe military as well as AID programs.

The AID agency Monday was unable to provide specific information on the new tougher program of "end-use" auditing—that is, the

checking of goods sent to Viet Nam under the CIP program to determine whether they have been used for the purposes stated in the import application.

But an AID spokesman did provide this run-down on the new control measures being instituted:

A "special projects team," consisting of 20 AID officials and seven experts from the U.S. Bureau of Customs, has been set up in Saigon to see what happens to shipments after they arrive. This team will be strengthened by another 10 men within two months.

Two additional "management inspectors"—empowered to call for records on any transaction—have been assigned to Saigon to join the two already there.

Five additional staff auditors have been assigned to the Saigon AID Mission to join the 13 already there, and another 17 auditors are to be added "as soon as possible."

The AID spokesman added that one or the other of the two top officials of the Inspector-General's office—Director Kenneth Mansfield and his deputy, Howard E. Haugerud—has been in Saigon "most of the time" in recent weeks, investigating the situation.

Since there are about 375 employees in the U.S. AID Mission in Saigon, the current 47-man complement of inspectors, investigators and auditors amounts to about one person in eight in the mission. When the additional policing personnel now planned arrive, the proportion will be nearly one in five—a measure of the gravity with which the problem is now viewed.

[From the Des Moines Register, May 14, 1966]
FEAR REBS GOT U.S. EXPLOSIVE—SEE POSSIBLE USE BY VIET TERRORISTS—CHEMICAL WAS SENT TO PRIVATE FIRMS

(By Charles Bailey, of the Register's Washington bureau)

WASHINGTON, D.C.—At least 100 tons of a highly explosive chemical compound were delivered to private merchants in South Viet Nam under U.S. aid programs before suspicious investigators discovered its potential value to Communist terrorists.

The agency for International Development, (AID), which administers the economic assistance program under which the chemical was shipped, is now trying to find out whether the compound—purportedly imported to Saigon for use in making rubber-soled tennis shoes—was diverted to the Viet Cong. It is suspected that it was.

AUDIT ORDERED

An "end-use" audit has been ordered on the 100 tons of Unicel-100 and Unicel-DN—two variants of the same compound. They were shipped before State Department inspectors learned of the compound's explosive properties last month.

In addition to the 100 tons, an AID spokesman said Friday that undetermined additional amounts were purchased by Vietnamese merchants, with U.S. financing, from manufacturers in Japan and Formosa.

Tests of Unicel-100, made after an official of the State Department Inspector-General's Office questioned a 50-ton shipment, revealed the compound to be nearly as powerful an explosive as T.N.T. A single pound, packed into a bicycle hand-pump and simply fused, could wreck a building, officials said.

(The most recent terrorist blast in Saigon reportedly was caused by a bomb attached to a bicycle.)

The 50-ton shipment of Unicel was stopped in mid-ocean. But the 100 tons shipped under earlier authorizations already had arrived in Saigon and had been picked up by the merchants who bought it under the AID Commodity Import Program, which finances purchases—at a favorable rate of exchange—by Vietnamese businessmen.

The program subsidizes the import of goods, with the aim of providing materials needed to strengthen the economy of South

Viet Nam without feeding the inflation that recently has become a major problem there.

But recent investigations, such as the one that turned up shipments of Unicel so large they obviously were not for the stated purpose of making tennis shoe soles more flexible and springy, have indicated widespread misuse and diversion of U.S.-financed goods.

Such misuse involves not only diversion of goods to the Communists—as suspected in the case of the Unicel and such other materials as drugs, steel and cement—but also its conversion in "Money-making" projects—such as the melting down of silver nitrate into pure silver for hoarding or resale.

AID spokesmen said Friday that the list of specific "end-use" audits ordered in the current crackdown is classified because the agency does not want it known which items are being checked. But they said that both Unicel and silver nitrate are among the commodities being checked.

A spokesman said he was "sure" that no more Unicel would be authorized for shipment to South Viet Nam regardless of the audit findings. As for silver nitrate, he suggested that the current stop order would be maintained until investigations are complete.

The discovery of such incidents as the Unicel shipment, plus increasing congressional concern over the operation of the Commodity Import Program, have resulted in a drastic step-up in auditing and policing procedures.

But the task of checking the \$420 million in goods shipped under the program in the last two years, and of preventing misuse of the equal amount programmed for the next 12 months, will keep auditors busy for weeks or even months, officials say.

Special emphasis will be put on checks of so-called "critical" goods—materials which would be of special use to the Communists. In addition to drugs—especially antibiotics—this list includes chemicals, small hand tools and such machine tools as lathes which can be used in making arms.

Of the \$370 million in goods being shipped this year under the Commodity Import Program, almost \$71 million is industrial machinery and equipment. Chemicals and pharmaceuticals account for another \$43 million. Iron and steel products shipped this year are valued at \$72 million, while motor vehicles and parts are listed at \$18 million.

[From the Minneapolis Tribune, May 14, 1966]

INFLATION COULD WIPE OUT ALL GAINS IN VIETNAM

(By Charles W. Bailey, Minneapolis Tribune staff correspondent)

WASHINGTON, D.C.—Behind the furore over black marketeering, currency manipulation and diversion of United States financed aid in Viet Nam lies one central concern: The fear that rampant inflation could wipe out every bit of dearly-bought economic and political progress in that shaky nation.

Inflation is traditionally a problem for developing nations, where each economic advance may trigger a rise in demand that outstrips the capacity to meet it. It is doubly troublesome in Viet Nam because of the huge impact of American military and war-connected spending there.

The piastre, South Viet Nam's currency unit, has so weakened in recent months that it is now valued on the free market in Saigon at more than 180 to the dollar—compared to official exchange rates ranging down to 60 to the dollar for some American-financed official transactions.

The big United States build-up has made an already bad situation worse. American contractors pay wages to construction workers well above local scales. American military personnel, diplomats, correspondents

and others bid up the scale of rents in Saigon.

Hundreds of thousands of dollars in United States military pay is dumped each month into the economy, sending consumer goods prices sky-high for already hard-pressed Vietnamese.

Not all the inflation can be traced to United States spending. The build-up of Vietnamese armed forces required bigger government outlays—without comparable revenue increases.

Transportation and communications were cut back by the war, thus hindering production at the very time when more was needed. A manpower shortage brought repeated wage increases as employers bid for scarce help.

With the piastre thus reeling under the impact of American spending, it is not hard to see why some Vietnamese businessmen find it attractive to manipulate United States aid programs.

A merchant who can buy a dollar's worth of silver nitrate for a "pegged" price of 6 piastres, melt it down and sell the resulting silver for upwards of 200 piastres has an automatic profit, even after the shrinkage involved in processing.

And if he chooses to hold onto the silver, he has an inflation-proof asset which can be sold for hard currency at any time—whether in Saigon or in some other country to which he has taken his silver in the form of spoons or bullion.

The political effects of inflation can also be disastrous. Saigon's middle class population—the civil servants, teachers and professionals who must be counted on to play a major role in any real national government—is progressively impoverished by inflation.

Their fixed salaries are worth less each month. They must not only compete for decent living space with the Americans but must pay more and more for it as prices go up. The cost of food, clothing, fuel, transportation—of everything—goes up.

The best simple measure of the impact of inflation is one statistic: In 1965, after some years of relative stability, consumer prices rose about 40 per cent in one year. And in some remote areas and refugee-crowded centers, prices doubled during the year.

Fighting this inflation has a high priority in the Johnson administration's over-all economic aid program for Viet Nam. The United States is financing \$370 million worth of commodity imports this year and will pay for another \$420 million worth in the coming fiscal year.

But some officials here believe that even these massive efforts are not enough. "I spent time in China after World War II," one expert said, "and I watched inflation wreck that country's economy. I'm afraid the same thing could happen in Viet Nam, and wash out everything we've done or hope to do."

This official, and some others like him, believe the ambitious plans for social and economic development which grew out of the Honolulu conference, while certainly desirable, may not be necessary as immediate objectives—at least not imperative in comparison with the greater need to choke off inflation.

The attempt to produce the "social revolution" proclaimed at Hawaii, some officials suggest, is like "trying to attach a garden hose to a fire hydrant" because Saigon's resources of time, energy and export manpower are so limited that it cannot fight a war, curb inflation and also carry out the added new tasks.

It is certain that the inflation problem is at the heart of many of this week's meetings between Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and his Washington superiors. It is also at the root of the stepped-up effort to control the ultimate use of the millions of dollars worth of U.S. goods being sent to Saigon.

[From the Minneapolis Tribune, May 20, 1966]

VIETCONG GETS SOME MATERIAL—U.S. BOOSTS GUARD OVER AID GOODS

(By Charles W. Bailey, Minneapolis Tribune staff correspondent)

WASHINGTON, D.C.—The head of the United States foreign aid program conceded Thursday that controls over shipments to Viet Nam have been "inadequate" and that some supplies have wound up in the hands of the Communist Viet Cong.

David Bell, administrator of the Agency for International Development (AID), said in an interview that the administration has "added greatly" to the number of officials in Saigon charged with overseeing the AID program and will "more than double" existing watchdog personnel.

As a result of newly revealed evidence of major misuse of United States-financed goods sent to South Viet Nam, an entire new 27-man "special projects team" has been set up in Saigon. Another 25 or more inspectors and auditors are to be added to this force soon, AID spokesmen said.

The stepped-up policing of AID shipments—sent to Saigon under a commodity import program now running at a \$420 million annual level—parallels action by the Defense Department, which recently appointed a "czar" to crack down on black marketeering in post exchange goods and currency.

The degree of the military crackdown remained unclear yesterday despite Defense Department statements that 41 servicemen and 70 civilians have been punished or investigated for black marketing.

A defense spokesman said that the totals cover an 18-month period, and he said that the civilian cases "remain under investigation" with no punitive action taken so far.

Bell's comments in a television interview gave only a partial picture of the step-up in AID policing activity. He said that 18 Americans are working "full-time" to oversee the program in Saigon, and that this number will be more than doubled.

Bell thus appeared to be referring only to auditors, who are primarily engaged in following through on delivery records to determine what happened to goods sent to Saigon under a program in which the U.S. government finances imports by changing Vietnamese piastres into U.S. dollars at a pegged rate of 60 to 1, far below the free-market exchange rate of 180 to 1.

Actually, the auditors—many of them newly assigned to Saigon—are only part of the check-up team sent there since recent investigations by State Department inspectors focused attention on abuses.

In addition, the 27-man "special projects team," including seven experts from the U.S. Bureau of Customs, has been put to work on the problem, and two additional "management inspectors" with broad investigatory power have been assigned to the Saigon AID mission.

AID spokesmen say that another 10 men are to be added to the "special projects" group within two months, while at least 17 more auditors are scheduled to be dispatched to Saigon as soon as they can be recruited.

Bell explained the possibility of diversion of United States-financed goods to the Communists in this way:

"When the goods have been delivered to the businessman to whom they were supposed to go open and aboveboard, then they are available in the markets, in the shops, in the stores in Saigon and other parts of Viet Nam.

"Then they may be purchased by someone who is really acting for the Viet Cong and they may be smuggled through the lines, so to speak—as you know, there isn't any front line in Viet Nam—out to the Viet Cong in their jungle bases."

Bell conceded that "to some extent" charges that United States-financed concrete was being used by the Viet Cong to build tunnels in its jungle redoubts were true.

Cement, he said, could be purchased in Saigon by a Viet Cong agent and smuggled into the jungle. "We haven't adequate data to answer the question of how much of this there is," he said.

To counter this diversion, Bell said, a "major police program," including road blocks, control points on waterways and other checkpoints is being developed.

[From the Des Moines Register, May 24, 1966]

HOW U.S. AID FOR VIET GOES TO RED TAXES— REVEAL HEAVY LOSS OF GOODS

(By Charles Bailey, of the Register's Washington bureau)

WASHINGTON, D.C.—State Department investigators have uncovered substantial losses of U.S. foreign aid goods being shipped to out-lying points in Viet Nam—apparently through outright theft by haulers or in the form of taxes exacted by the Communist Viet Cong.

The losses—which include cement, aluminum sheet roofing and food—ranged from 16 to 42 per cent of shipments leaving central depots in Saigon, according to spot checks made in seven South Vietnamese provinces.

This latest disclosure of trouble in massive American aid to Viet Nam came in an unpublished report by Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The report also cited a number of other examples of problems in Viet Nam which have been brought to light by the department's inspector general's office. These included black marketeering, currency manipulation, opium smuggling and questionable administration of a variety of aid programs.

CHECKS BY U.S.

While previous revelations have pointed up the looseness of controls in programs involving private Vietnamese merchants who receive goods under U.S. aid programs, the details of intransit losses revealed Monday indicate similar problems in direct government-operated aid efforts as well.

More than a year ago, the inspector general's office—charged with overseeing all U.S. aid programs—ran checks on commodities being shipped from Saigon to provincial towns under the so-called counter-insurgency program.

Rusk reported to the Senate committee that the probes "developed figures showing apparent significant discrepancies between the amounts of commodities leaving Saigon and the amounts arriving in the provinces."

Specific figures, not included in Rusk's report, tell the story more vividly.

Investigators checked records to find out how much cement, aluminum sheeting, wheat and vegetable oil were shipped in one year from central warehouses in Saigon to An Xuyen Province, in the Mekong Delta near the Cambodian border.

REVEAL LOSSES

They then checked provincial records in An Xuyen to find out how much was delivered, allowing for truck and barge shipments known to have been captured outright by the Communist Viet Cong between the national and provincial capitals.

The results of the check showed these figures:

Of 9,000 bags of cement shipped and not seized by the Viet Cong outright, only 7,367 bags reached the provincial warehouse—a loss of 1,633 bags, or 18.1 per cent.

Of 26,793 gallons of vegetable oil shipped from Saigon, only 15,446 gallons were checked into the provincial warehouse—a loss of 11,347 gallons, or 42.3 per cent, with a value of \$24,800.

Of 8,020 bags of wheat that left Saigon, only 6,363 reached the An Xuyen warehouse—a loss of 1,657 bags, or 20.7 per cent, with a value of \$18,740.

Of 7,938 sheets of aluminum roofing material shipped from Saigon, only 6,843 arrived in the province—a loss of 1,445 sheets, or 18.2 per cent.

Officials said that similar spot-checks in six other provinces yielded comparable statistics. There are 43 provinces in South Viet Nam, so the total loss through this kind of diversion was obviously substantial.

Those familiar with the investigation said Monday that two factors undoubtedly accounted for most of the losses between Saigon and the provinces—either outright theft or taxes by the Viet Cong as the price of allowing the transporters to proceed in safety.

[From the Des Moines Register, May 25, 1966]

BID TO BUILD VIET BREWERY WITH U.S. AID—BUT OFFICIAL BLOCKED \$4-MILLION PLAN

(By Charles Bailey, of the Register's Washington bureau)

WASHINGTON, D.C.—U.S. officials in Saigon sought to finance the operations of a private Vietnamese brewery with \$4 million in American funds under a foreign aid program intended to provide only "essential" goods, official reports revealed Tuesday.

The proposed transaction was stopped by the State Department's inspector general, who refused to allow the use of U.S. dollars for importing malt and hops to be used in making beer.

Details of the case, obtained by The Des Moines Register Tuesday, provide new examples of the confusion and lack of controls which have plagued U.S. aid efforts in Viet Nam.

The malt-hops case also illustrates another problem plaguing U.S. foreign aid programs—the difficulty of persuading American aid officials to seek ways of utilizing the huge and still-growing amounts of local currencies piled up in various nations as payment for American food shipments.

The Vietnamese malt-hops issue arose in 1965 when officials in the U.S. aid mission in Saigon asked Washington for a waiver of rules limiting the outlay of aid funds under the so-called Commodity Import Program (CIP) to "essential" goods.

ARTIFICIALLY LOW

[Under the CIP, private Vietnamese businessmen receive goods purchased here with government dollars. They pay for the goods with Vietnamese piastres, at an artificially low rate of exchange.

[The piastres are then used in Viet Nam on joint U.S.-Vietnamese government projects, so the cost of the goods shipped under CIP is fully borne by U.S. public funds.]

The inspector general's office, in the State Department—charged with checking the operation of all overseas U.S. assistance programs—questioned the waiver application on several grounds.

First, it saw no reason to waive the essential-goods-only rule for a project involving the production of beer.

Second, it found the proposal objectionable on the ground that malt and hops were commodities which have to be imported into the U.S. to meet the full needs of brewers here. Thus the transaction would have further increased net import requirements in the United States and would thus tend to worsen our balance-of-payments problem.

FIVE-MILLION-DOLLAR CREDIT

Third, the inspector general pointed out that South Vietnamese officials already had available a \$5 million credit from West Germany, an exporter of the desired goods, but had not drawn on that credit.

Fourth, the inspector general pointed out that the United States owned about \$250 million worth of Yugoslavian currency, as a result of Food-for-Peace sales to that nation, and that this might be used to purchase the malt and hops, since Yugoslavia is an exporter of the commodities.

Official sources here said Tuesday that the inspector general sought to persuade aid officials in Washington to explore these alternate methods of financing, but that the aid officials refused and continued to press for a waiver that would permit use of U.S. dollars under CIP.

But the inspector general again refused the waiver, and this time provided the required written notice to the secretary of state which made the refusal final.

The upshot, informed sources said, was that the Vietnamese financed the malt-hops imports out of their own foreign exchange resources rather than using U.S. aid funds to pay for them.

According to official sources here, the case—despite the action of the inspector general in preventing a \$4 million U.S. outlay to pay for beer production—points up several problems.

INDIANA'S SECOND NATIONAL MEMORIAL—GEORGE ROGERS CLARK AT VINCENNES

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I would like to call attention to my bill, S. 2886, the George Rogers Clark Memorial bill, upon which the Senate Interior Committee has concluded hearings. June 7 the House unanimously passed H.R. 9599, the companion bill introduced by my own Congressman WINFIELD K. DENTON, Democrat, Eighth District, Indiana.

I ask unanimous consent to include my testimony on S. 2886 in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT OF SENATOR VANCE HARTKE ON S. 2886, GEORGE ROGERS CLARK MEMORIAL, SENATE INTERIOR COMMITTEE, JUNE 8, 1966

Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to appear before your Committee. I want to express my appreciation for your willingness to act so swiftly for the creation of Indiana's second National Memorial.

We Hoosiers have great pride in our historical heritage which includes the names of George Rogers Clark, William Henry Harrison and Abraham Lincoln, as well as many others.

S. 2886 authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to accept from the State of Indiana the George Rogers Clark Memorial at the historic site on the Wabash River, now the city of Vincennes, and enter into cooperative agreements with the owners of other historical buildings.

One of these properties is the two-room frame building which served as the first capitol of the Indiana Territory and as the seat of the territorial court from 1800-1813 where many decisions on land policy, Indian relations and military affairs were determined.

Another of the properties is the Francis Xavier Catholic Church. The present building dates from 1824-1834 and is the same tract of ground on which, in 1749 was erected the first rough log cabin church to serve the French and Spanish settlers when Vincennes was the western outpost of our country. At that time, this western outpost was Fort Sackville, a British Fort until 1779 when Lt. Colonel George Rogers Clark captured and renamed it Fort Patrick Henry.

Grouseland, the home of William Henry Harrison, is the third property which we had hoped to include. It is owned by the

Daughters of the American Revolution, who, I am informed, do not wish it to be part of the National Memorial. However, they have assured the House Committee by telegram that the building will remain open to the public and that the D.A.R. will continue to maintain it. I would like for their telegram to become part of this record.

I urge that the Committee favorably consider S. 2886 so that the area of Vincennes, which is so beautifully depicted by Maurice Thompson's novel, *Alice of Old Vincennes*, can be elevated as it should be, to national recognition. I appreciate the overwhelming passage by the House of Representatives of the George Rogers Clark Memorial bill, and congratulate my own Congressman, WINFIELD K. DENTON, for his fine work in guiding the measure through the House.

I would like to say a few more words about Vincennes, in Knox County, Indiana.

The George Rogers Clark Memorial is a domed structure supported by 17 Doric columns. It contains a bronze statue of Clark and murals depicting his career and the history of the old Northwest Territory. This Memorial was first dedicated by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1936.

It was at Vincennes that the Lincoln family, with young Abe, crossed over the Wabash River into Illinois. Vincennes is the point at which the proposed Lincoln Trail National Parkway crosses into Illinois toward Springfield. This proposed National Parkway originates at the Lincoln birthplace in Hodgenville, Kentucky, and passes through the Lincoln Boyhood National Memorial in Spencer County, Indiana. I mention the Lincoln Trail National Parkway for I am certain the Interior Department, as well as other members of the President's Advisory Council on Recreation, is interested in these national parkways as access routes to scenic and historic sites to promote tourist travel in the United States. I would like to point out to the members of this Committee that a National Memorial at Vincennes would fit well into the plans for tourism development and the preservation of such sites in the Midwest.

I hope that the members of this Committee will favorably report Indiana's George Rogers Clark National Memorial so that we can begin our work on it before this year is out.

RESOURCE RESPONSIBILITY

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, DeWitt Gilbert, editor of *Pacific Fisherman* magazine and a member of the International Pacific Salmon Commission, recently talked with members of the Chamber of Commerce of Astoria, Wash., about resource responsibility.

Mr. Gilbert spoke of the great number of nations which have established 12-mile territorial fishing zones.

Mr. Gilbert spoke of international agreements designed to protect fish resources against shortsighted overexploitation. He noted some of the attitudes that both made such agreements necessary and possible.

And finally, he concluded:

And I find myself coming back to the individual and his part in "resource responsibility" I feel that the individual's responsibility does not end with buying a fishing license, and using it only in season, and taking no more than the limit. I find myself feeling that every intelligent, thoughtful, earnest individual can find compensation in keeping aware of his "resource responsibility," and in meeting its demands on his soundness as a citizen.

Mr. President, while Mr. Gilbert's discussion was made in terms of fish, he