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N.D. Ill., Eastern Division, #67 C 612 et seq.) I am one of several Attorneys General representing states which have filed treble damage suits against substantially the same defendants. In fact, Michigan, along with West Virginia, Massachusetts, Texas, and Wisconsin, now has pending in the Chicago court a motion for leave to intervene in the Department's civil suits against the library book publishers, for the purpose of objecting to entry of consent judgments in the form presented to the court, and to protect the interest of the public as represented in the treble damage actions pending on behalf of our states' taxpayers. Michigan is particularly interested in protecting the work product of the Department's suit, since it was in substantial part developed by Senator Philip A. Hart, of Michigan, in hearings of the Antitrust Committee of the Senate, and made available to the federal grand jury.

The result of the conspiracy or conspiracies involved consisted of substituting library editions for trade editions sold to libraries and schools, and by this and other means eliminating previous trade discounts ranging from ten to forty percent. (Some of us who have been investigating this feel that the average loss of discount approximates 33 1/3 %, but we cannot state from our present knowledge how close this comes to the actual damages resulting therefrom.)

The practices which are the subject of your prosecutions and of your civil action significantly affect a substantial portion of school districts and public libraries in states throughout the nation. As you know, under Title II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, more than one hundred million dollars of federal money is made available to the states each year for improving school libraries, and this is only one source of funds allegedly overcharged by the conspiracy which is the subject of the litigation. Substantially all of these, and other public funds such as federal library funds, are affected by the conspiratorial diminution or elimination of trade discounts to public schools and libraries. The effectiveness of at least two major federal programs was, therefore, diminished.

In addition to the five states and numerous local municipalities which have already filed treble damage suits based on the above alleged conspiracy, other states contemplate filing similar actions. Therefore, I feel that the federal government has a significant interest in seeing that as many public agencies as possible, including the states, recover overcharges to their taxpayers resulting from the conspiratorial practices referred to. I therefore urge you to give all appropriate aid to any interested state to achieve this end.

It is appropriate in this connection that I call your attention to a resolution adopted by the National Association of Attorneys General, of which I am currently president, at its annual meeting on August 30, 1967, relative to the increasing public need for more effective antitrust enforcement by the states, and the necessity of developing better cooperation between the Department of Justice and the states as well as among the states. I write this letter as Attorney General of the State of Michigan rather than as President of the Association, of course, but forward for your attention a copy of the resolution referred to as germane to the subject being discussed.

Specifically, I request that you consider the following actions:

1. Insist on including in the consent decrees an "asphalt clause" which would protect the interests of the public money purchasers injured by the conspiracies.

2. Conducting in the Department of Justice a seminar or symposium for attorneys representing the Attorneys General of the several states and other units of govern-

ment to give them the benefit of the know how and work product of these employees of the Department of Justice who have worked on this matter.

We realize that the filing of these cases was preceded by a grand jury investigation and that the transcript of grand jury proceedings or any part of it cannot be revealed without a court order. However, except for this, the know how and work product of your attorneys and economists can be made available and it seems to us it should. Especially with costs of government and taxes rising to a point of national emergency, we can see no reason why legal and economic work already completed by federal employees should be needlessly duplicated by state employees, which will be the case if the federal work product is not made available to the states. It is in the common interest of the federal and state governments to avoid such waste.

Your earnest consideration of these proposals will be greatly appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

FRANK J. KELLEY,  
Attorney General of Michigan.

#### A PERSPECTIVE ON VIETNAM

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, recently I was asked to appear at an issues conference of the Young Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota. The issue, not surprisingly, was Vietnam.

In preparing for that session, I tried to come to grips with the dissent over the war. I wanted to describe my own position with regard to Vietnam policy as well as I could, and I wanted to try to put the war into a broader perspective of America's responsibilities abroad and at home. I also wanted to speak to Minnesota's young Democrats about political power and political parties and their responsibilities toward both.

My remarks offered a number of conclusions:

First. The differences in position among responsible people who discuss Vietnam policy are smaller in fact than they are made to seem through the polarization of views that is taking place.

Second. The courses open to us in Vietnam have implications far beyond Saigon, Hanoi, and Washington.

Third. The debate over Vietnam is drawing our attention from some other vital concerns of America—world hunger and development problems, the need for an effective international organization that will keep us from destroying ourselves, the crisis of missing opportunity for millions of Americans, the appalling ignorance in which we deal with our domestic problems.

Fourth. We badly need the idealism and devotion of our young people if we are to keep growing in America, and our growth is always likely to be less than we want—often accompanied by failure and disappointment.

Mr. President, this was a partisan group and I gave a partisan speech. But there was nothing partisan in my attempt to discuss Vietnam; one discusses that issue only as an American.

I desire to share these remarks with Senators, so I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### YOUNG DEMOCRATIC-FARMER-LABOR ISSUES CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM

(Remarks of Senator WALTER F. MONDALE, Macalester College, St. Paul, Minn., November 11, 1967)

Student political activity—your participation in the Young Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party and this kind of issues conference—really matters, because there is a critical relevance between your activity as a student in politics and the opportunity for involvement in American political life.

My own case is not unusual. In Minnesota, young men and young women who believe in their principles and are willing to exert themselves in the political structure are quickly accepted and given access to the corridors of power in American government. This is exciting.

But more than that, it ought to be sobering. As students you cannot, any more than I, be flippant in your view of American problems. Nor can you be irresponsible in your outlook, or permit others to assume responsibilities that you are unwilling to assume.

We cannot avoid debate; we cannot avoid controversy; we cannot avoid dissent. As Americans we must choose which courses we will take. As Democrats we have the additional problem of determining the best strategy, because that is a part of politics as well.

It is impossible to deal with the issue of Vietnam in a few words, and especially not in slogans. It is enormously complex. It involves analysis of many factors and many features. But I have tried to set down, as best I can, where I stand on Vietnam, why I stand there, and why I think you should stand there, too.

Some disagree with me—there is another Senator from Minnesota who takes a different view, and I respect him as a sincere and effective public servant. In our party and in our state we have generally been right on the great issues that face mankind, whether justice, or opportunity, or human rights, or foreign aid, or free trade, or the responsibility of this nation to improve the possibilities for a stable and peaceful world. Our party has gone beyond that, and its public leaders have put meat on those bare bones. Searching for new insights, eager to seize new leadership opportunities, impatient with mediocrity—we have shaped this party to the highest standard in the nation on issues, ethics, and the competence and dedication of its office-holders.

We have often disagreed. In fact, we have a party composed of such conviction that it is becoming increasingly difficult to hold it together. When we finished last year's battle, we had proved that we really believe that there are more important things than winning. And only this year, you Young Democrats have told the National Young Democrats to chuck it and some of you have organized to defeat the incumbent President and Vice President of the United States. That includes Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota—whom I believe to be one of America's greatest citizens.

It may be that factionalism is the price of superiority. And yet the unique function of a political party is to translate ideas into political power and to legislate that power into administrative reality. You can't do that when you are out of office. We are out of office in Minnesota, and some of you, reluctantly, and some eagerly, would have us out of office in Washington.

I just can't believe that makes sense. Nor can I join those who would withdraw from Vietnam or pursue other policies that amount to the same thing.

It would be wonderful to see that great issue more clearly, to speak out more eloquently, to couple my deep distress over the Vietnam tragedy with a plea or demand for a single dramatic act that would bring it to

an end. But there is no way to wave a magic wand and have the issue disappear. There is no way to talk it, or shout it, or march it out of existence.

I am all too conscious that my position is not a popular one here. But there are two kinds of crusaders in this debate, and I just can't join either kind.

Just as I cannot subscribe to a domino theory or a monolithic communism theory, I cannot subscribe either to a demon theory or a dupe theory. Furthermore, I fear the passion which assigns broad significance to narrow distinction. As a young Democrat I watched another crusade—over loyalty. Like that one, though more intensely because there are two kinds of crusaders this time, I feel that this debate is on the verge of running away with us—of taking on a life of its own and sweeping us before it.

As I try to tell you what I think about Vietnam, I also want to try to put that struggle into a larger perspective. Our involvement in Vietnam is only one of our problems, and some of our others are at least as important to America and to those of us—to those of you—who must lead it. For whether we lead well or badly, it is tomorrow that we shape with whatever we do today.

First of all, I am terribly concerned about our involvement in Vietnam. I don't like the killing and destruction, the slowness of political improvement, and the colossal inflation.

Nor does anybody else. That is the first important consideration I must suggest to you. You may have to judge our policy in Vietnam as mistaken. You may have to call it ineffective. But it is not morbid, and character assassination only limits the possibility of sensible discussion.

Next, there can be little doubt that we have made some mistakes in Vietnam. I happen to think that two of them have been our gradual Americanization of the military effort and our decision to bomb beyond supply routes that directly affect our own forces. We have made errors before in domestic and international affairs, however. But the history of our involvement and the errors we have made in Vietnam have become an obsession for far too many.

Of course we need to be concerned about how we got there, what our commitments were, what better alternatives there might have been. But even if we could agree on answers to those questions, they are not worth our most serious consideration.

We must examine our presence in Vietnam in other terms than the past. Even if it be assumed that we could have done something else, something better, let us look at our present involvement and consider what we might do now.

Vietnam will end sometime. What will begin?

Some of our mistakes in Vietnam were made while we fought in Korea. What mistakes are we making elsewhere in the world as we fight in Vietnam?

We have half a million men in Vietnam today, fighting a live war. A newly elected government is threatened by the National Liberation Front, which desires to take control of South Vietnam. It is also threatened by a North Vietnamese government which is bringing troops and supplies to the South. The troops are North Vietnamese. The supplies are not.

The United States is carrying the brunt of the military struggle against both the NLF and the North Vietnamese. The United States alone is carrying on an aerial war intended to diminish the movement of troops and supplies to the South.

The South Vietnamese government has not been very successful in mobilizing an effective military effort, although there have been some very fine South Vietnamese forces involved in the fighting and I think they should be pushed far harder. The South Vietnamese government has also not been very

successful in mobilizing popular public support in the areas under their control.

A massive U.S. presence has economic effects, as well as military and political effects. Remembering that we have made mistakes, seeking some improvement, what can we do? The questions of policy affect South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Asia, and the rest of our world.

One of the major dissenting groups in this country suggests the kind of escalation of military effort that will bring the North Vietnamese and NLF to their knees in some sort of object surrender. The Administration does not seek such unlimited escalation, so this is a dissenting view.

The policy suggestions of these dissenters are dangerous, I believe. For the Chinese and the Russians cannot accept such an end to the war, and broadening it beyond Vietnam is unthinkable. Yet there are Americans who strongly favor this approach—a policy that seems to me to be an attempt to end the war in Vietnam by starting World War III.

A second major dissenting group calls just as vocally for immediate and unilateral withdrawal of our military presence in Vietnam. It goes without saying that this implies withdrawal of our economic and political presence as well. As Edwin Reischauer says in his new book, *Beyond Vietnam*, such a step, though more debatable than escalation, is not much more attractive. He considers it to be a minor disadvantage that all of Vietnam would probably fall under the control of the Viet Cong and eventually the North Vietnamese. He considers it insignificant that the United States would lose face and even suggests that we might be better off in our relations with other nations if we were not so powerful and prestigious.

But Reischauer, whose years of study and experience in Asia provide some reason for us to take him seriously, says that there could be disastrous political and psychological consequences of withdrawal. It would, he says, "send a massive psychological tremor through all of these countries (of South and Southeast Asia), further threatening their stability and perhaps sharply shifting their present international orientation."

In addition, he says, it increases the likelihood of "wars of national liberation" in the less developed countries in the world. He points out: that these unstable nations of Asia, almost uniformly, are fearful that they too might be visited by guerrilla warfare or wars of national liberation; that they continue to be concerned about what the enormous nation of China may have in mind so close to their borders; that if we were to withdraw from South Vietnam the Viet Cong and the NLF, at this point, when the stakes are this high, would be successful in causing us to withdraw; that the "high risk" politicians in the Communist world would have proved their case and the now nearly forgotten theory that communism is the "Wave of the Future" would be revived; and the prudent politicians in the Communist apparatus would lose much of their influence because they would be proved wrong.

Reischauer points out that there is something to the domino theory, though not in the simple mechanical sense in which it is typically put. In the countries closest to Vietnam, he says, there is some strong approval of our Vietnam policy and "a considerable degree of quiet support, masked either by discreet silence or by an official stance of mild condemnation."

These nations, because of internal instability or apprehension about China's intentions or the loyalties of substantial Chinese populations within their own borders, "would feel much less secure if the United States, after having committed itself to the fight, were forced to admit defeat at the hands of Communist insurgents."

In addition, Reischauer points out, the seekers for Communist control in under-

developed countries throughout the world would see this as proof that "wars of national liberation" are irresistible. Reischauer suggests that "it would be far better proof than Ho Chi Minh's victory over the French in North Vietnam, or the Communist triumph in China, or the sweep of Communism in the wake of the Soviet army in North Korea and East Europe, because in none of these cases was the military power of the United States directly involved."

Successful Communist insurgency, Reischauer says, would depend mostly on conditions within these countries, "but a clearcut defeat of the United States in the Vietnam war would certainly be one external factor that could have a seriously adverse influence on this situation."

Reischauer also maintains that shifting American military power elsewhere, as some have suggested, would have doubtful consequences. We would be spreading military power "into areas where the Vietnam war had just shown that our type of military power was relatively ineffective."

He questions whether less developed countries would still want close alliances with us after having seen that we could not guarantee "security from the threats that menace them most—namely, internal subversion and guerrilla warfare." A new defense line might simply pave the way for more disasters like Vietnam, he says, and rejection by Asian nations of such an approach "would probably further reduce our ability to play a helpful role in Asia, even in fields other than the military."

Reischauer sums up:

"The net results of our withdrawal from the war in Vietnam, however skillfully we might try to conceal the withdrawal, would probably be an increase in instability in much of Asia and a decrease in the influence of the United States and in our ability to contribute to the healthy growth of Asia. These adverse consequences might be felt in much of Asia for years to come."

Besides changing the political climate of Asia for the worse, Reischauer speculates, withdrawal from an American commitment for whatever reasons—political, strategic or moral—could encourage doubts in such nations as Japan and our European Allies about the reliability of commitments there, and might even encourage nuclear proliferation. What is involved here, he says, is not the loss of face, but the loss of faith.

Nuclear proliferation happens to be very much a central concern of peace in our world community. We hope and pray that the recently submitted draft treaty to the proliferation of nuclear power will receive the support of nations which are now not a part of the nuclear community. If our commitments that we have made in Vietnam over and over again—despite what may have been the wisdom of those commitments—prove to be commitments that we are willing to forget, how can these nations, India and the rest, believe us when we say we will protect them from nuclear attacks?

Furthermore, Reischauer suggests, the effect at home might be even worse. Along with those who would take renewed strength from a moral stand and those who would see it as a strategic cutting of losses, there might come a kind of racist isolationism that could damage our relationship everywhere in the world. I quote him when he says "in our eagerness to (save American lives and stop the carnage in Vietnam) we might help produce such instability in Asia and such impotence in ourselves that the development of a stable, prosperous and peaceful Asia might be delayed for decades."

Now all of this is speculation, as Reischauer admits, but it is the kind of speculation that looks to the future rather than

the past. And it recognizes, it seems to me, two vital points.

First, our involvement in Vietnam is not a matter strictly between us, Saigon, the NLF, and Hanoi. What we do makes a difference elsewhere. Any major action must be considered in terms of possible consequences—both those which are obvious and those which are not.

Second, there are other considerations in addition to history and morality which may be important to the policy of a nation involved in a tremendously complex network of relationships throughout the world. Just as we cannot think only of our pride and our prestige in discussing the war in Vietnam, we cannot think only of our errors and our guilt.

No doubt this is one reason for the gap between the real differences and the imagined differences in position on Vietnam among public figures in America. A few weeks ago, in the Sunday New York Times Magazine, one of the analysts reported that the emotional gap in Vietnam seemed to be far broader than the factual gap in differences of point of view. I think there is indeed an emotion gap, one that stems from assigning broad significance to narrow distinctions.

For example, one universal point of view ties the Senate critics of Vietnam to the Administration. No U.S. Senator, to my knowledge, has publicly advocated immediate unilateral withdrawal from Vietnam. When pressed, every Senate critic of our policy in Vietnam accepts the fact that our presence will be required for the foreseeable future.

There is no great joy among Administration critics over this fact of life, but they all know what precipitous action would mean in Vietnam, Asia, and the world. They know that the United States cannot act without considering all of these consequences. They know we cannot undo the past and the present, that there are no magic wands.

Their suggestions are limited to lesser steps which they believe can be taken with lesser consequence. But the passionate read their recommendations otherwise, with far too little serious analysis of differing positions and far too much wish—fulfillment. Let me use myself as an example.

I consider myself a supporter of the Administration policy, but I feel free to criticize, and I have done so when I felt our policy was wrong.

I've said publicly that I think we were wrong to go beyond bombing supply lines, railroads, and infiltration routes, and targets of that nature. I believe that we should stay away from targets which raise the risk of striking Russian shipping or that needlessly endanger civilian lives. Moreover, I would gladly suspend bombing, if a reasonable opportunity for meaningful talks arose.

I have said publicly that negotiations must include all parties, including the NLF.

I have said publicly that the United Nations, any other international group, any single nation, or any individual, should be used to bring about negotiations. I supported Senator Mansfield's Resolution introduced a few days ago, which 57 Senators signed, asking that this matter be brought before the Security Council and, hopefully, that there be a reconvening of the Geneva Conference.

I have said publicly that the war should be fought as much as possible by the South Vietnamese—that it is the responsibility of the new government to improve its army and reduce the manifest corruption in the military, political and business structures in South Vietnam.

I have called publicly for more emphasis on real achievement and pacification and more concern about the really sad and pathetic

aftereffects of the war in the villages and upon the refugees.

All of these statements, I believe, fall within the limits of support of the Administration in Vietnam. They fall there because they recognize the reality and the necessity of continued U.S. presence there. And they support the Administration's goals of a negotiated political solution to that tragic conflict.

Where, then, does the dramatic difference lie between my position and the positions of those considered critics of Administration policy? There appears to be one hard distinction.

Some of these critics—not all of them—are calling for an unconditional and complete end to the bombing of North Vietnam. That difference appears to be judged by substantial numbers of protestors as a major difference of policy. Particularly in light of the restrictions I would impose on North Vietnamese air strikes, my opinion is that this is a narrow distinction to loom so large.

Unconditional cessation of bombing might speed talks. It might also increase the flow of supplies to the South, increase American and South Vietnamese casualties, and weaken our defensive position to the point where the chances of negotiating would be substantially reduced. I think we must be willing to take a chance to get to the bargaining table, but I would like to see a hint of better accommodation by the North Vietnamese before I take that chance. It is instructive to read the article written by Wilfred Burchett, who has traditionally been used by the Hanoi government to disclose its position, about ten days ago. He pointed out that even if we cease bombing at this time, Hanoi is not interested—I think he put it—even in *contacts*, let alone *talks*, until the bombing of North Vietnam stops finally and completely. The only steps that would lead to *talks*—not *negotiations*—would be for us to stop bombing North Vietnam, cease all military activity, and withdraw our troops from South Vietnam. Then they would begin talks, Burchett suggests. Negotiations might follow.

I don't know for sure whether stopping the bombing is better than continuing, and neither does anyone else. But as I said, I would like to see a stronger hint on the part of the North Vietnamese and the NLF that they will negotiate.

That desire for negotiation does not separate supporters of the Administration from opponents of the Administration, except in the eyes of those who seek to oversimplify the debate. There is a group that is not in favor of negotiations now or any time, but they are the dissenters who believe in complete military victory.

Those who would discuss the war must be certain to make the real distinctions. They must be careful not to magnify differences or create them where they do not exist.

There is much more than Vietnam policy involved in this debate. I am concerned about the climate I see, that polarizes gradual differences in views on Vietnam and focuses on that subject to the exclusion of all other problems. Tom Wicker described it recently in the New York Times as an "agony" that has overtaken the nation. "Perhaps," he said, "it was summed up in a picture widely printed in the European press—the contorted face of the young American pacifist screaming with hatred, the veins of a passionate contempt outlined in his neck, his fists clutched under a policeman's riot mask. In what manner could a pacifism so fierce and so despising differ from the violence and cruelty of men in iron helmets?"

Wicker went on to say that perhaps if the war in Vietnam hadn't existed, it might have had to be invented. "Something," he said,

"was needed to symbolize, and thus to give focus and energy to, a profound but voiceless discontent with the land of the free and the home of the brave—to a deep sense that something was wrong, some failure was distorting and perverting the idea of America."

As Wicker went on to say, this is nothing new in America, this disillusionment over contradiction. Righting the wrongs of past and present, whatever they are, is fundamental to the development and leadership of our nation. But as Wicker said, "there is something repugnant in it, too, in the intolerance and ferocity of disaffections, as if human failure were evil, as if a sort of inquisition were needed to scourge the money changers from the American temple."

We have failed in Vietnam, as we have often failed in one way or another to achieve the ideals we have set for ourselves. Such failures have troubled us from the beginning—they troubled Jefferson and Lincoln and Bryan and Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy and Johnson. Our present failures go beyond Vietnam, and the danger is that in the dissent over Vietnam we will lose sight of their magnitude.

Vietnam is such an obsessive, emotional struggle that it is making us incapable of preserving ourselves in the corridors of power. I cannot see a world with only one issue and one position that can be taken on that.

Despite my deep frustration over Vietnam, my despair over the destruction of war, my concern for the dying—all the dying, I feel deeply that in all of its tragedy, our present course is the best that we have to pursue. And I cannot bring myself to magnify my reservations to the point where they would be seen—incorrectly, but probably enthusiastically—as a fundamental objection to our policy in Vietnam.

I would ask you, instead, to devote some of your attention to our other problems, where you are desperately needed, where the fragile coalition for progress is in danger of breaking down in the face of the Vietnam debate.

There are not enough of us in Congress who want to increase economic assistance to poorer countries of this world. That is our first failure of effort, the growing gap between the rich and the poor nations of this world. It is not just growing, it is exploding. And our response has been a shrug.

One of the most frustrating things a liberal can do is to try to come to grips with this issue, to mount the kind of lobby that will reconcile and implement the great ideas which have been advanced to deal with this problem.

I don't have to tell you that nearly two-thirds of the people of this world are incredibly poor—and that the population burst is making them poorer. I don't have to tell you that millions of people are continuously so hungry that they are stunted in body and mind, that well over 10,000 human beings will die today from hunger. Unless we can turn the corner on the hunger explosion, Vietnam will look like a tea party.

Meanwhile, the percentage of our Gross National Product devoted to foreign economic aid has dropped from two and one-half per cent in 1949 to six-tenths of one per cent last year. Before we are through this year we will probably have dropped it to four-tenths of one per cent, far below the average one per cent effort which experts feel the developed nations must make if there is to be steady international development. This was to be the Decade of Development; it is going to be, I fear, the Decade of Disappointment.

We promised the underdeveloped nations of the world that we would permit them to trade with us. But we have fallen miserably short of that promise, too. And today powerful Senators are proposing protectionist legislation that rivals the Smoot-Hawley tariffs of the 1920's in its restrictiveness.

Beyond that, we are stripping the underdeveloped nations of their skilled talents—their doctors and engineers and that thin veneer of professional leadership that is absolutely indispensable to them if they are to have any chance for growth.

There is, however, one area of trade where we have willingly entered into development efforts, along with every other developed country in the world. We have welcomed the underdeveloped nations of the world to the international arms race.

Since 1962 this nation has increased its grants and sales of arms to developing countries from \$404.8 million in that year to \$866.5 million in 1967, and almost all of the increase has been in sales, which are now more than six times as great as in 1962. The crush of the world's annual arms burden now approaches \$175 billion. And in this country we are threatened by an imminent anti-ballistic missile race that could cost \$50 billion by itself, to say nothing of what it will bring in reaction investment in other nations.

Some of us in the Congress have not only been concerned about these universally dangerous signs, but have worked on them. We've voted to try to change the trend. We've tried to recruit active participants for the attempt to help developing nations stand on their own feet and grow toward peace and stability. Developing an impetus for international development is as fundamental an issue as any of us face.

A second great failure, as least as important as the first, is our inability to develop the kind of workable international institution which can keep the peace. You know the history of the League of Nations, one of the truly tragic stories in American history. We are coming very close to repeating it in the United Nations.

We must do far more to strengthen that institution, to contribute our resources and our faith to it, to call upon this organization to deal with the broad, fundamental issues which this world faces. Without an international institution that has some potential for keeping the peace, the chances of preventing Armageddon are dim indeed.

Nor are all our problems confined to international affairs. We face domestic problems of fantastic proportions for which we have yet to develop solutions or even to allocate the necessary resources. This despite the fact that we are in the 81st month of the longest, most vibrant period of economic growth in this nation's history, war or no war.

We now have a Gross National Product nearing \$800 billion. All of India with 500 million people has only \$43 billion; all of South Asia only about \$50 billion. Last year the economy of the United States grew by \$10 billion more than the full economies of all the nations of Africa produced, excluding South Africa.

Yet we still deserve Gunnar Myrdal's judgment in *Challenge to Affluence* that "There is an ugly smell rising from the basement of the stately American mansion." That smell is in the air. It mingles with the bitter odors of gunpowder and charred ruins in American cities across the land.

We are now dimly perceiving the fact that our domestic mistakes of the past have reaped racial bitterness, human frustration and failure, and the alienation of millions of American citizens who are trapped in American ghettos. Like the solution to the Vietnam crisis, a solution to the urban crisis defies simple identification.

Racial patterns of living are more deeply entrenched than ever before, and they are nationwide. As the chief author of the federal Fair Housing bill, I find nothing more difficult, nothing more frustrating than trying to raise this issue—which for the first time involves Northerners, not just Southerners—and call upon this nation to declare the principle that we are going to live together and not separately. Until we do so the

chances of solving the maladies of this country are very bleak indeed.

I am proud as a Democrat, and I think you should be proud as Young Democrats that this week the first Negro was elected mayor of a major city in this country—and he bears our party label. And we can be proud of the election of Andrew Hatcher too. But there is a darker side of those elections that none of us can ignore.

In Cleveland only one out of four white Democrats voted for Stokes. The other three jumped over to the Republicans. In Gary, Indiana, only 17 per cent of white voters voted for Mr. Hatcher. Those ought to be sobering statistics.

There is not only a question of substance. We have a profound moral issue in this country, the question of whether we really believe in each other as people regardless of color. It is fundamental and basic and far from resolved.

Millions of Americans have educational systems hardly worthy of the word.

Insensitive law enforcement officers, inadequate public services, and an apathetic American public have created a new generation of bitterness and cynicism and hate, with leaders who see violence as an accepted method of settling grievances.

What has been our response? Too often there has been too little sympathy and too little help, and too much inclination toward suppression; a reverse violence which could make this nation even more divided.

Now, we must insist upon order, but I don't believe you can have order unless you have justice. And the objective of a liberal, objective of a decent American, must be the accomplishment of both objectives.

Yet this is a country where the poverty program is being virtually dismantled. We will be fortunate to save the structure of these programs, and we are almost certain to see only minimal increases in funding. A profoundly wealthy country, after it has made promise after promise of greater opportunity, after it has gone through one explosion after another, after the injustices have been laid out for all of us to see, may yet turn its back on the poverty program.

We have salvaged only \$10 million for rent supplements, \$13.5 million for the Teacher Corps, and about half of what the President asked for Model Cities.

Our effort to create an emergency public jobs program lost in the Senate by 54 to 28. A program to fight rats in American cities was laughed down in the House of Representatives. Though we now know that children are starving in Mississippi, a remedy has been stifled in the House Agriculture Committee.

It's not that we lack money. A supersonic transport made it through the Congress, \$142 million and sonic booms and all. We found \$4.5 billion for space and \$4.7 billion for public works. Yet we could not find the resources for more than the most modest beginning attack on the problem of American cities. And that, it seems to me, is as important as any issue facing our nation—or indeed, our world.

Finally, while it may seem strange to say it, one of our biggest problems, in my opinion, is that we know so little about American society, just as we know so little about Vietnam and Asia.

When our cities exploded, public officials were astonished. Why would New Haven and Detroit—model communities under creative, sophisticated leadership—explode? Where had we failed? What could be done about it?

This past summer doctors found children, thousands of them, starving in America just as they do in India. No one in the federal government knew it was happening.

We still don't know what to do to educate the children of blighted areas. Some say the only way is full integration; others call for

massive and expensive compensatory education.

But the frightening thing to me is that after generation after generation has denied charity in this country, the American educational establishment has yet to agree on what is needed to achieve something as minimal and fundamental as giving children a fair chance.

Because we do not have the knowledge we need, some of us believe that the structure at the national and local levels must be changed to bring sophisticated social scientists to the highest executive and legislative levels. We must undertake the development of social indicators that will keep us informed of human progress and failure. We must search for answers deliberately and institutionally in the pursuit of full opportunity. Otherwise change will smother us and despair will be our watchword.

Even if we could simply stop the war right now—and I don't believe we can—we would not be assured of the resources we must have.

Even in present circumstances we could have commenced significant new efforts with only the most marginal kinds of sacrifice. As I have said, we found money this year for the SST, space programs, and expanded arms credit sales to poor nations. But we barely saved new and beginning innovative programs for the cities.

There is no perfect correlation between attitudes toward the war in Vietnam and attitudes toward social programs. Some of those who have made the argument that we can't afford both guns and social programs have always voted against those same social programs. What is basic in dealing with problems at home and abroad is not the question of resources going to Vietnam, although that clearly complicates it. There is a fundamental problem of the will to see it through, to design programs and appropriate funds to alleviate human problems at home and abroad.

To do that will require your effort, your involvement in this political party, your success at the polls.

Our need is not to burn flags or draft cards, or to convert decent human beings into demons and seek to destroy them. Hating is easy and self-righteousness is satisfying, but this course destroys more than it builds. It steers people from the forces of progress and further weights the balance in favor of the reactionary, insensitive, and selfish, who already have the upper hand.

If we are to generate full opportunity for all Americans, we will need resources in unprecedented proportions.

This will require a political coalition that can obtain greatly expanded support in Congress and at all levels of government. Where will the moral, intellectual and material resources be found to remake our America? What hope is there that we can accomplish this goal of full opportunity?

I think it rests with you. Much has been said about the Generation Gap. I personally believe there is a difference in your generation—deeper commitment to more honest, personal, moral and intellectual standards. If my appraisal is correct, I hope you never grow up—never adjust to the apathetic compromises that deprive the nation of the committed idealism that we must have.

Our party cannot continue to translate ideas into power and action unless there is a continuing infusion of creative and inspired and selfless young leadership—prodding and pushing us, but prodding and pushing themselves toward leadership in party and government that ultimately achieves a society that fulfills the larger purposes of a humane and compassionate people.

We have been torn by a bitter fight here in Minnesota. We could be torn by an equally bitter fight over Vietnam. I fully respect and honor those who disagree with me on Viet-

nam, but my plea here today is that we see, despite this disagreement, that there is a larger objective. It could be shattered and paralyzed if we let our differences destroy the effectiveness of our party, if our great movement toward human improvement is further divided, split and shattered.

The party and its ultimate success are the only hope for millions of people in this country and in the world who hope for opportunity. This is our cause and this must be our effort, despite our mistakes. We can't succeed without you.

You are here on the specific issue of Vietnam. And you must deal with it as best you can. We all must. But I would ask that you consider two things:

First, make your decisions about Vietnam with full knowledge of the present and as much insight into the future possibilities as you can generate. Do not be deaf to the multitude of voices. See the distinctions as they are, not as you'd like them to be.

Second, pass your judgments as citizens of the world. Place Vietnam in the context of the unfinished work before us—the battle against starvation, the fight to build workable international institutions, the struggle to avert hatred and violence in our own society, the absolute demand that we plan for the kind of world and nation we want. Knowing what must be done, which party do you want to place in power? For you can't get out of the world, and it's not a pastoral symphony. And 1968 will make a difference to America and the world.

Tom Wicker concluded his New York Times article by saying:

"From reality man reaches toward promise, fails, and in an agony of failure finds his greatness by reaching again."

The fundamental requirement for trying in agony to reach and succeed next time is young leadership, unwilling to compromise where compromise is dishonest, working with energy and understanding, infusing our party and government with the idealism that we need. Not withdrawing from the process because of inevitable disappointment, but in those disappointments and in the agony of the failure of our society, reaching and trying again.

Those of us in public life certainly cannot argue that we've even approached perfection. But I think it makes an awful lot of difference whether you are willing to try; whether your dreams are still important enough to make a special effort. It is an attitude, it is a commitment, it is a willingness to be involved that's at stake here.

I see precious little chance that it is going to come from the other political party. If it comes at all, it will almost invariably come from our own. That's why what we do with this institution, what you do as young Democrats is not, as some would say, irrelevant to the power structure of this country. It is fundamental and it is important.

Recently I received a letter from a student in California about a speech that I had given on the generation gap. He wrote specifically about what he considered to be my thesis—that if you disagree with the system, then fight it, or reform it, from within.

"Although I am a devoted follower of the New Left (he said), I do take issue with their surprising naivete on the political system and how to change it. I heartily agree with your example of recent California gubernatorial contest and how the apathy of the New Light in that race may hold potentially tragic results. Indeed the tragic result has partially taken effect.

"You are almost totally correct in your insights into the thoughts and goals of my generation in your impression that many of us regard national politics as being largely irrelevant."

Then he suggests some reasons, some compelling ones, for this attitude.

"One of the reasons," he suggested, "is the

ancient theory that you can't legislate against hate which much of today's young activists at least subconsciously believe. I take issue with this, for there is no better argument against that statement than the record of liberal legislation in America. I believe that one can legislate against evil and I further believe that one must, for I am completely assured that if one does not fight evil at the top, then its pressures will permeate our existence.

"A handful of young radicals ignoring the structure will not produce the results that we want, but it will leave that much more room for the enemy to run free, crowding the hills with billboards, clouding the air with pollution and ravaging our forests with the exploitation of packaging.

"A political system must be radically changed. But it must be internal. Obviously we can't exist without government as of yet. Nor, can we of the new left muster enough people to totally ignore the system.

"We shall show ourselves shortly around Washington. Rest assured that we make our pressures strongly felt. I myself hope to be in the front lines."

My message to you as young Democrats is that I hope you know what this young man knows. I hope you too will be in the front lines, in Washington and in St. Paul.

Maybe one of you will have to push me out to get there someday. I won't like it if that happens, but I'll have to take it. And I say better one of you within the Young Democrats than one of them.

For they'll be after me, too, and they'll be doing it inside the system, inside one of the best organized and politically powerful state Republican parties in the nation. Is that what you want? That could be what you get, if you abandon the party as a vehicle for a change in government and policy.

I hope you've thought about it carefully and deeply.

#### KOREA AND VIETNAM

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, Mr. Y. J. Rhee, of Uniondale, N.Y., sent me a copy of an informative letter he wrote on November 1 to Under Secretary of State Katzenbach. In the letter Mr. Rhee makes a number of interesting comments in rebuttal to Secretary Katzenbach's analogy, in a recent speech, between the Korean war and the war in Vietnam. I ask unanimous consent that the letter be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

UNIONDALE, LONG ISLAND, N.Y.,

November 1, 1967.

HON. NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH,  
Under Secretary of State, U.S. Department  
of State, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: As a Korean-born American citizen, I was intrigued by your unsubstantiated analogy between the Korean War and the Vietnamese War, which you presented in your recent speech at Fairfield University, Fairfield, Connecticut.

I should like to cite several significant differences between these two wars. First of all, Korea had been a nation-state for many centuries until Japan annexed her in 1909. Vietnam, on the other hand, is a geography which has never developed into nationhood. In Korea, the North Korean troops commenced an unprovoked attack on June 25, 1950 against the government which was established under the supervision of the United Nations. The United Nations General Assembly recognized the government in Seoul as the only lawful government on the peninsula. As you are aware, none of the South Vietnamese governments have enjoyed similar recognition by the United Nations.

Secondly, the aggression from the north in Korea was an external attack, whereas, the hostilities in Vietnam are largely guerrilla type operations by the South Vietnamese against the South Vietnamese government. In other words, a military victory over the aggressors was possible in Korea, but in Vietnam the ultimate victory must be a political one, for which the United States military power can not determine its final outcome.

Thirdly, you stated that there were criticisms against the Korean government led by Dr. Syngman Rhee that it was not really representative. I regret to inform you that your information and knowledge of the Korean government before the Korean War are totally inaccurate. The pre-Korean War government under Syngman Rhee was truly representative. In fact, Rhee's Minister of Agriculture was a communist. The election which was supervised by the United Nations Commission on Korea was completely honest and a group of powerful opposition parties were in operation. Of course, during and after the War, Syngman Rhee used the American-equipped and American-advised forces of organized violence to crush his political enemies. In the end, as you are well aware, Koreans now have a war lord government which rules the country with American tanks and guns.

Lastly, your statement in connection with the complaints that the Koreans were not doing enough for themselves during the Korean War is callous. Please allow me to cite my own personal account of how much sacrifice Koreans made to repel the aggressors in cooperation with fighting men from eighteen member nations of the United Nations. I have two brothers; all three of us actively served throughout the War. My younger brother then was in tenth grade and I was in the second year of college. Like many friends of mine, we did not claim student deferments but chose to fight. When I graduated from a boys' high school in Seoul in 1949, I was one of the one hundred fifty graduates and all of us advanced to colleges. At the end of the War, I found more than a half of my high school classmates were killed in action and many more were maimed. I am familiar with your military service during the World War II and subsequent captivity in Germany. I am proud to say that my brothers and my friends served during the Korean War with the same dedication as you did for the United States.

In conclusion, I do not believe that your strained analogy of the two wars would serve any purpose in defending the dubious Vietnam policy of the Johnson Administration.

With highest esteem,

Sincerely yours,

Y. J. RHEE.

#### ERVIN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION BILL DRAWS FIRE FROM ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXPERT

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, some weeks ago the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on legislation introduced by Senator Ervin to define the ground rules for the calling of a constitutional convention under article V of our Constitution. It was my privilege to testify on this significant proposal.

Two thought-provoking commentaries on the Ervin bill have since come to my attention. The first is an editorial from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the second, an article by Prof. Charles L. Black, Jr., Luce professor of jurisprudence at Yale Law School. Both commentaries are sharply critical of the Ervin proposal, although Professor Black feels it should be