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of the employee at the time said employee left a terminal, and which could not have been foreseen.

"Sec. 5. It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Transportation to enforce the provisions of this Act."

Sec. 2. This Act shall take effect thirty days after the date of its enactment.

S. 1939—INTRODUCTION OF THE FEDERAL PROPERTY AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES ACT AMENDMENT OF 1969

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I introduce, by request, for appropriate reference, a bill to amend the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, and ask unanimous consent that the bill and a justification be printed at this point in the RECORD.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the bill and justification will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 1939) to amend the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 to provide that the procurement of certain transportation and public utility services shall be in accordance with all applicable Federal and State laws and regulations governing carriers and public utilities, and for other purposes, introduced by Mr. MAGNUSON, by request, was received, read twice by its title, referred to the Committee on Government Operations, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 1939

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 201 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (63 Stat. 377, as amended; 40 U.S.C., Sec. 481) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(e) Any other provision of this Act or any other Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the procurement of transportation and public utility services under the provisions of this Act or any other Act shall be in accordance with all applicable Federal and State laws and regulations governing carriers and public utilities; *Provided*, That the Secretary of Defense may from time to time, and unless the President shall otherwise direct, exempt the Department of Defense from action taken or which may be taken by the Administrator under clauses (1)-(4) of subsection (a) of this section whenever he determines exemption from such action to be in the best interests of national security."

The justification, presented by Mr. MAGNUSON, follows:

FEDERAL PROPERTY AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES ACT AMENDMENT OF 1969

JUSTIFICATION

The purpose of the following proposed Amendment is to require the Government Services Administrator (GSA) in his capacity as procurement officer for the Federal Government, to adhere to applicable State regulatory provisions when procuring transportation or public utility services.

The effect of the proposed Amendment will be to overrule the decision of the United States Supreme Court in *United States v. Georgia Public Service Commission*, 371 U.S. 285, 9 L.Ed. 2d 317 (1963). This case concerned GSA authority to arrange the transportation of Federal employee owned household goods from Savannah to Atlanta, Georgia, by Georgia PSC certified carriers, but at rates below the PSC approved tariffs.

A three judge Federal district court unanimously upheld State regulation, but on appeal the Supreme Court, with Justices Goldberg, Harlan and Stewart dissenting, reversed, holding that Congressional policy, as expressed by the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 40 U.S.C. 481, as amended, 41 U.S.C. 251 *et seq.*, permits Federal procurement officers to disregard State economic laws in obtaining cheaper rates. See also *Paul v. United States*, 371 U.S. 245, 9 L.Ed. 2d 292 (1963).

The rationale of this decision might be applied to other areas subject to State commission regulation, such as permitting Federal procurement officers to arrange intrastate transportation by carriers holding no State authority. Also, there could be an erosion of Federal regulatory jurisdiction.

Adoption of the Act will avoid these consequences.

S. 1940—INTRODUCTION OF THE EXPORT EXPANSION AND REGULATION ACT

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, on behalf of myself, Mr. PACKWOOD, and other Members, I introduce, for appropriate reference, the Export Expansion and Regulation Act of 1969. This bill is designed to replace the Export Control Act of 1949, which expires on June 30 of this year. Hearings on this bill, as well as the Export Control Act, will begin on April 23, 1969, before the International Finance Subcommittee of the Banking and Currency Committee.

Mr. President, the Export Control Act was passed 20 years ago. I think it would be well for us to examine the circumstances under which it was passed and, without taking too much time, acknowledge some of the changes which have taken place since then.

In 1949, the entire world was struggling to overcome the ravages of the war. The Soviet Union had adopted policies and taken actions which were an obvious and immediate threat to the security of the United States and its allies. This threat, coming at the time and in the manner in which it did, raised tensions between the Western allies and the Soviet Union to a height never equalled before or since. It came at a time when all of Europe was economically and physically decimated. The United States was the only Western country whose industrial and technological capabilities remained intact. It was the only country capable of helping Europe regain its economic independence through technological, industrial and financial help. When Russia presented its threat, it was necessary for the United States to take whatever steps it could to minimize the danger. It should be remembered that Russia was also decimated by the war. Consequently, to deny Russia the benefits of American trade and technology was one effective way of minimizing the Soviet threat, at least for the time being. This fact occasioned the passage of the Export Control Act. That act served to provide positive scrutiny and control over virtually all exports to the Eastern European countries which were not already controlled by even more restrictive measures.

At that time, the act was an effective means of denying the Soviet Union advanced technology and strategic materials which could have military applica-

tion, and, consequently, it was an effective tool both for national policy and security.

But much has happened since 1949. The Soviet Union has rebuilt its economy so that its technological and industrial level is greater than ever. Thus, it can now produce many products which it formerly might have sought from the United States.

Also, our relations with the Soviet Union and other nations of Eastern Europe have changed. I would never pretend that our problems and differences with these countries are over. However, I do believe that we have moved to the belief that our problems and differences can, and ultimately must, be solved by constant attempts to effect a meeting of the minds. We must make these attempts over the conference table and in the marketplace—wherever and whenever we can meet with our East European counterparts—be they manufacturers, politicians, diplomats, or traders—to discuss our mutual interests and concerns. In order to expand this dialog, it is necessary for us to actively seek ways and means to increase our contacts and dealings with Eastern Europe. By taking advantage of every opportunity to meet, talk and deal, we should be able to accelerate what is going to be a long and laborious process to eventual understanding and accord.

There are other circumstances which have changed since the original passage of the Export Control Act which affect its current effectiveness. As I pointed out earlier, to deny the Soviets access to our goods and technology was at one time an effective way to minimize the threat to us. For at that time, the denied goods and technology were available nowhere else. However, the United States was successful in its endeavor to help Europe and Japan rebuild. We were so successful that the free world economy surpassed its prewar level many years ago. There are now very few U.S. products which cannot be approximated or duplicated by one or more of our allies. Moreover, our allies have not imposed the severe restrictions on themselves that we have upon ourselves in regard to trade with Eastern Europe. Consequently, at this date, a vast majority of products which cannot be obtained by Eastern Europe from this country because of our unilateral export restrictions can be easily obtained from one or more of our allies. In many other instances, goods which could be obtained from this country even under the current restrictions are bought elsewhere merely because of the nuisance and delays caused by excessive redtape made necessary by current U.S. regulations.

Thus, in short, restrictive U.S. trade practices formerly served to deny products to Eastern Europe. In most instances, they now serve only to deny sales to American business.

At one time, it is possible that this country could have said that it did not need the business—there was a severe shortage of American dollars after the war, and no one seriously considered the possibility of a balance-of-payments deficit. Now the situation is different. Every day we struggle to improve our balance-of-payments picture—over both the

short and the long term. The latest figures show that the percentage growth of our exports is decreasing. The ratio of our exports to imports is getting worse. Under these circumstances, it would be foolhardy to refuse to consider allowing American business a more competitive access to an existing market—an access which would in no way affect the national security.

These are a few of the compelling reasons to seriously consider bringing the U.S. trade practices in regard to Eastern Europe into line with the other countries of the free world.

Last summer, at my request, Senator MONDALE conducted extensive hearings on the subject of East-West trade. The material he accumulated is unique and comprehensive. It has been an invaluable aid in helping single out specific proposals which warrant further consideration by Congress. Many of these proposals are contained in the bill we are introducing. In the hearings which begin tomorrow, we will continue to explore means by which we can continue to afford maximum protection to the national security while, at the same time, allowing American commerce maximum opportunity to prosper without the burden of artificial barriers.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 1940) to provide for continuation of authority for the expansion and regulation of exports, and for other purposes, introduced by Mr. MUSKIE (for himself and other Senators), was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, today Senator MUSKIE and Senator PACKWOOD have introduced amendments to the Export Control Act in the form of new legislation, the Export Expansion and Regulation Act of 1969. I participated in the development, the drafting and the discussions of the bill. I am pleased to associate myself as a cosponsor with this effort to bring U.S. controls over East-West trade into line with present trade realities.

The amendments to the present Export Control Act reflect the concerns and purposes developed last year in the Senate on East-West trade. In May 1968, I introduced an East-West trade resolution on behalf of myself and Senators CLARK, HARTKE, INOUE, JAVITS, EDWARD KENNEDY, Robert Kennedy, MCGOVERN, MORTON, MOSS, PELL, PERCY, and STEPHEN YOUNG. The resolution states:

Whereas current export credit and other restrictions on United States trade in peaceful goods with Eastern Europe impede the response of the United States to changes within the Communist world; and

Whereas the changes in Eastern Europe are vital to the maintenance of United States objectives in building a peaceful, democratic world; and

Whereas an increase in United States exports to Eastern Europe will assist in meeting the United States balance-of-payments problems; and

Whereas public misconceptions plague efforts to expand East-West trade: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of

Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That it is the sense of the Congress that the Export Control Act regulations and the Export-Import Bank financing restrictions should be examined and modified to promote the best interests of the United States by permitting an increase in trade in peaceful goods between the United States and the nations of Eastern Europe.

This bill is introduced as a result of findings in hearings on the resolution last summer before the International Finance Subcommittee of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee. The witnesses substantially agreed that the military and economic strength of Eastern European countries is not affected by U.S. trade restrictions which are more severe than the restrictions imposed by Western Europe and Japan. Both economic and political advantages could be gained for American business and diplomacy if U.S. restrictions on East-West trade are reduced to the level of those imposed by Western Europe and Japan.

Witnesses warned of the consequences should the United States continue to apply its restrictions upon East-West trade extraterritorially to foreign subsidiaries of American firms and to foreign purchasers of American exports.

These amendments, which I worked on, to the Export Control Act are intended to reduce the complexities, delays, and uncertainties in the administration of export controls, which now hamper American business enterprises in competing for trade both in Western and Eastern Europe, without sacrificing the objective of controlling the export of strategic goods. We believe that these amendments will be conducive to an appropriate expansion of U.S. trade and an improvement in relationships between the United States and other nations, while at the same time providing adequate safeguards against the sale to other nations of goods of military significance.

The cold war may have diminished on other fronts, but the United States still battles vigorously in the trade arena, waging our own brand of economic warfare. Ideally, trade should be neutral, regulated only by the marketplace, and until World War II, the U.S. Government restricted exports only in time of war or special emergency. When the war against the Axis powers ended, trade restrictions continued—but the enemy changed: It became any nation under the control of a Communist government. American lines are drawn in the Export Control Act of 1949:

It is the policy of the United States to use its economic resources and advantages in trade with Communist-dominated nations to further the national security and foreign policy objectives of the United States.

The apprehensions about East-West trade center on our participation in the advancement of a rival economic system. The argument is that as long as the United States maintains a "leadtime" in economic and technologic progress, the nations of Eastern Europe cannot outproduce or threaten the United States.

The Soviet Union's achievements in space and the growing volume of trade between Western and Eastern Europe belie the theory that Eastern European

countries cannot achieve economic success without us. In fact, economic warfare may result in exactly the opposite of the intended effect. By withholding trade, we encourage a nation to develop its own resources. Rigid export restrictions result in a denial forcing the creation of new industrial capacity to produce the item denied.

The Russian space technology and missile guidance systems may be the world's most sophisticated, yet American high technology industries are told that the United States should restrict exports of these commodities in order to maintain a technological lead over the Russians of 2 to 5 years. Too much information is available through other sources in Western Europe and Japan or published in technical journals for "straightarm" techniques to be effective. American creativity has kept our technological lead intact in most fields; products on the market reflect technology that is 3 to 5 years old. If Communist importers copy such technology from items bought on the world market, they only succeed in locking themselves into out-dated systems.

On the other hand, Western trade can have a profound effect on the nature of life in Russia and in Eastern Europe. For example, the implications of a contract between the Italian Fiat Co. and the Russians for an automobile manufacturing plant in Russia are many: they will need repairs, gasoline, highways, and insurance, all factors in social change. The Russian auto plan projects expenditures of \$800 million for the new Fiat plant, \$400 million for tires, gas, and steel, and \$1.4 billion per year for highways and gasoline stations. By 1975, their investment in transportation will equal ours in the 1920's.

Such Western trade with Communist nations is not a form of aid. All imports must be paid for, and the money for the imports can come only through exports developed by investment in the production of items for export. No nation can gain through imports the economic advancement it is not capable of providing for itself; trade quickens the economic growth of both trading partners.

A companion to the broad economic warfare approach to trade is the concept of trade as a political weapon. Our Government tends to bestow trade upon nations we consider our friends and withdraw it from others as punishment for unfriendly political acts. Czechoslovakia is a good case in point. Although Czechoslovakia is one of three Communist members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—GATT—we withdrew most-favored-nation status—a normal status for all of our other trading partners in GATT—from Czechoslovakia in 1951.

Our entire system of export controls reflects political relationships. We refuse to trade at all with some Communist nations—Mainland China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba; within Eastern Europe, Poland and Rumania are treated more liberally than Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and all of these trade with us under better conditions than does East Germany.

To undo restrictive trade practices, we must dismantle complicated administra-

tive export controls. No specific Government authority is necessary for American businesses to participate in international trade. However, individual transactions are subject to a variety of trade controls.

The constitutional basis for this control is the Commerce clause, providing that "Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations." Congress has delegated this power to the President, particularly under the Export Control Act which gives the President nearly unlimited power to prohibit or curtail exports, and the President, in turn, has delegated discretion over export control to administrative officials, primarily in the Office of Export Control of the Department of Commerce. These administrators now control the movement of more than \$30 billion worth of exports per year to all countries of the world.

The Export Control Act of 1949, as extended and amended most recently in 1965, restricts exports of materials which are in short supply in the United States, and restricts exports of materials which have potential military and economic significance and may adversely affect, if exported, the national security of the United States. The short supply controls at the present time, have little effect. On the other hand, an elaborate mechanism restricts exports of possible military and economic significance.

The first step for an exporter is to determine whether his product may be shipped under a general license or whether it requires an individually validated license. A validated license application, accompanied by an "order" from the importer for the item, may take 6 to 8 weeks to be processed through the Office of Export Control. The processing may include review by an interdepartmental committee consisting of representatives from the Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, Treasury, and sometimes from the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Federal Aviation Agency. The exporter's problems increase if it is his American subsidiary in Western Europe, for example, that wishes to obtain a license.

American businessmen complain that licensing delays and redtape lose sales in Eastern Europe and often prevent American businesses from trying to develop the market. If goods equivalent to American products are available elsewhere, other countries will buy from the alternate sources to avoid the complicated paperwork and restrictions and interference imposed by the American Government, which also result in long delays in delivery to customers who can find faster and less complicated arrangements by dealing with other western countries.

Most businessmen engaged in East-West trade will complain in private about the complicated applications and the long delays associated with export licenses. A few companies described the problems they have encountered in the public hearings before the Subcommittee on International Finance of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee last summer.

The Minnesota Mining & Manufactur-

ing Co., the developer of magnetic tape, now finds itself competing with qualified manufacturers of video and computer tape: two firms from the United Kingdom, two from France, one in Belgium, a German firm, and four Japanese companies. Foreign buyers are switching from wire to magnetic tape for almost all communications purposes, but American sellers are not sharing this market as fully as they should because magnetic tape is on the U.S. export control list and subject to licensing delays.

For example, Minnesota Mining received the following in a letter from a Swiss firm to which they had made a bid for the sale of video tape:

We have come to the conclusion it would be too long to supply you with all the information you require in order to get approval of the Department of Commerce in Washington and much to our regret we will for the time being have to use other products.

Another letter to Minnesota Mining reads:

Your statement regarding the long delivery time due to the procurement of the export license surprises us greatly. For comparison we might quote we recently purchased these magnetic tapes via the suppliers of the computers, for example, the British ICT, and we have gotten the merchandise always promptly, in many cases even within one week.

One of the largest of the country's electronics firms, Hewlett-Packard in Palo Alto, Calif., must obtain export licenses for 97 percent of its product line. Hewlett-Packard received an order for a computer designed for medical application from a charity hospital in East Germany. The company knew the recipient, knew the doctor in charge of research, and knew the purpose of the ordered computer: patient monitoring. But the hospital would order the computer only if Hewlett-Packard could guarantee an export license, and it takes weeks to process the application through the Office of Export Control because East Germany is subject to very stringent U.S. export controls.

I ask unanimous consent that two letters from Mr. David Packard, then president of Hewlett-Packard Co., be included in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HEWLETT-PACKARD Co.,
Palo Alto, Calif., June 21, 1968.

HON. WALTER F. MONDALE,
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Banking and Currency,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MONDALE: Thank you for your letter of May 27th, and your invitation to comment on the East-West Trade Resolution (S.J. Res. 169) you have recently introduced. Before commenting, however, I wish to commend your succinct and well-phrased introductory statement. It is extremely encouraging to me, as a businessman, to see that a key member of the U.S. government has such an excellent grasp of the major difficulties faced by U.S. businessmen interested in East-West trade.

The Hewlett-Packard Company is a major designer and manufacturer of highly sophisticated instrumentation used in electronics, medicine and analytical chemistry. Hewlett-Packard has sold its products outside the United States for many years, and now has wholly owned or controlled sales companies

in nineteen of the more highly developed countries of the free world, and factories in West Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan.

During 1967 the company received almost \$250,000,000 in orders for finished goods. Of this almost \$60,000,000 was from outside the United States, with approximately 75% representing U.S. exports. In addition, some \$5,000,000 in parts and components were supplied from the U.S. to our three international factories. Hewlett-Packard expects its international sales to more than double within the next five years.

To date, only a small amount of our products have been sold to Eastern Europe—less than 1% of our total international sales volume in 1967. This is not too surprising, however, since up to recently we have done very little to stimulate interest in Eastern Europe. We believe that the restrictions imposed by the COCOM and unilateral U.S. controls, made the sale of virtually any of our products in Eastern Europe difficult and time consuming. Any efforts we might have expended to stimulate sales would yield small returns, when compared to the return we might expect from the same effort elsewhere.

Late last year, however, we decided we could no longer afford to ignore the East European market, which as you point out, has been growing at a remarkable rate. We were, and still are, hopeful that some day tensions would ease sufficiently to allow a considerable increase in U.S. trade with Eastern Europe. We were convinced that we should now undertake a more active sales program against that day, or else we would find it virtually impossible to break into a market which had gone to our West European competitors largely by default.

As a result, the Hewlett-Packard Company is presently engaged in a long range program to increase its sales of non-strategic products in Eastern Europe. Several sales engineers employed by Hewlett-Packard S.A., our Geneva based wholly owned European marketing subsidiary, have been assigned the task of traveling in the territory and providing on-the-spot assistance to East European purchasers and end users. This year we have participated in the Leipzig and Budapest Fairs. We will also take part in the Poznan and Brno Exhibitions, as well as other smaller shows. We anticipate this new effort will cause our East European sales to more than double in 1968, with an even further substantial increase the following year.

Despite these large percentage increases, we do not expect our 1969 East European sales volume to exceed more than two or three percent of our anticipated 1969 West European volume. This relatively low figure is due in part to the lower degree of sophistication, and hence smaller overall size of the East European market. It is also due to the fact that we are new and inexperienced in dealing with Eastern Europe.

We do not believe credit will be an immediate problem, since the dollar value of a typical transaction is quite small in comparison, for example, to an expensive automated machine tool, or to an entire factory.

We feel by far the most important factor limiting our sales to Eastern Europe is the high level of unilaterally imposed U.S. export controls. Controls of this type, not imposed on our West European and Japanese competitors, drastically lower our effectiveness, despite the fact that many times our products have better inherent performance capabilities, are frequently of better quality, and often lower in price.

It is our firm belief that if Hewlett-Packard Company is to be successful in Eastern Europe, steps will have to be taken to reduce the effect of the unilateral U.S. controls to more nearly that of the COCOM controls. To maintain a high level of unilateral controls merely serves to deny business to U.S. firms, for the East Europeans can and do purchase similar products from West European and

Japanese manufacturers, who can sell their products freely.

Needless to say, we are opposed to the sales of strategic goods and materials which might be in the nature of aiding the enemy, but at the same time we feel the long term interest of peace will be best served by increased communication and understanding between the various countries of the world. We believe a larger volume of East-West trade can and will contribute to a better understanding without in any sense providing substantial aid which would strengthen our enemies, or potential enemies. In balance we believe increased East-West trade would be a very constructive program.

Sincerely,

DAVID PACKARD.

HEWLETT-PACKARD CO.,

Palo Alto, Calif., August 28, 1968.

HON. WALTER F. MONDALE,
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Banking and Currency,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MONDALE: In my letter to you of June 21, 1968, commenting on the East-West Trade Resolution (S.J. Res. 169), I stressed that we felt the high level of unilateral U.S. Export Controls was the most important factor limiting our sales to Eastern Europe. At the time, I was not able to offer any statistical evidence to support this claim. However, we have recently completed a major study of our world-wide business during the six-month period November 1, 1967 to April 30, 1968. If we apply the various current levels of international (COCOM) and unilateral U.S. Export Controls to the mix of products sold during this time, dramatic evidence can be obtained as to the effect such controls have on our business.

The results of this study are shown on the attached chart. In each of the three cases internationally imposed COCOM controls affect 44% of our sales. These controls would also, presumably, affect the same portion of sales of foreign competitors with similar product mixes located in the other COCOM participating countries. However, as a U.S. firm, we must also contend with the unilaterally imposed U.S. export controls. These controls, which are not duplicated by the other COCOM countries, affect 6% of our sales to friendly Western countries and a huge 53% when we deal with the USSR and the other East European countries, excluding Poland and Romania. In fact, in this latter category, we are able to sell only \$3 out of every \$100—mainly medical equipment such as electrocardiographs—without restriction under General License.

In contrast, West European and Japanese competitors with similar product mixes can sell \$56 out of every \$100 to Eastern Europe without restriction. Now, this wouldn't be so bad if little or no competition existed in Western Europe and Japan. But this is not the case. In every instance we have investigated we have found similar items to be available from non-U.S. sources. In this light, the high level of unilateral U.S. controls makes our marketing task much more difficult. We must contend with the time and added expense required to make formal license application, the long delays encountered in obtaining decisions, and the fact that our East European customers and our East European sales force is never quite sure whether a substantial portion of our product line can be sold or not. Since most of the material over which the United States exercises unilateral export controls is readily available elsewhere, it seems to us that the high level of these controls merely serves to deny business to U.S. firms. The controls, in effect, serve to push East European purchasers into the hands of our West European and Japanese competitors who are only too willing to sell their products.

Sincerely,

DAVID PACKARD.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, another example involves an electronics firm on the east coast which received a request for television equipment intended for the Czechoslovak television system. The order represented a Czech decision to favor the United States-West German television system over the French-Russian approach, but the license application took over 2 months for processing. Fortunately, the buyer was in a position where it was possible to wait.

The present Office of Export Control Licensing procedure is based on a "case method" which relies upon past decisions by the Office to set the guidelines for present licensing policies. The process is inherently conservative because it discounts the rapid pace of growth in high technology industries. The concept of economic warfare embodied in the present act's language requiring licenses for items of "potential economic significance" and the actual operation of the licensing system combine to limit the foreign trade possibilities of the most dynamic segments of American industry.

Most businessmen believe that the spectacular economic growth of the United States has been and will continue to be dependent upon the unfettered development of high technology. When American companies are denied markets, whether in Western Europe or in Eastern Europe, by restrictions on the exportation of sophisticated items, then the export controls act only to inhibit the growth of these industries.

The longer the United States refrains from participating in these markets, the more entrenched become our growing Western competitors.

Total East-West trade in 1967 with the West was over \$15 billion which means the market is growing at the rate of 24 percent. In 1966 the United States had 4 percent of this market; in 1967 the U.S. share of the market decreased to between 2.5 and 3 percent of total East-West trade.

As long as other Western countries trade with Eastern Europe—as they are to an increasing extent—the objective of denying Communist nations the advantages of advanced technology are circumvented, at the expense, only, of the United States and its businesses.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 96—
INTRODUCTION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE POSTHUMOUS PROMOTION OF THE LATE GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT DAVID EISENHOWER TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL OF THE ARMIES

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I introduce a joint resolution for appropriate reference, and I should like to read it into the Record:

S.J. RES. 96

Joint resolution authorizing the posthumous promotion of the late General of the Army Dwight David Eisenhower to the grade of General of the Armies

Whereas, the late General of the Army Dwight David Eisenhower served as Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces during World War II; and

Whereas, the said General Dwight David Eisenhower was Commander-in-Chief of the

Armed Forces of the United States for eight years while serving as the thirty-fourth President of the United States; and

Whereas, the said General Dwight David Eisenhower served his country for many years with great honor and high distinction as both a military and civilian leader: Now, therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) notwithstanding any other provision of law, in recognition of the late General of the Army Dwight David Eisenhower's outstanding service to his country and his high devotion to duty, the President is authorized to issue, in the name of the said General Eisenhower, a commission in the grade of General of the Armies.

(b) The commissioned grade authorized by subsection (a) of this section shall, after issuance by the President, be appropriately reflected on all records of the Department of the Army relating to the late General of the Army Dwight David Eisenhower.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The joint resolution will be received and appropriately referred.

The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 96) authorizing the posthumous promotion of the late General of the Army Dwight David Eisenhower to the grade of General of the Armies, introduced by Mr. DIRKSEN, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 98—
INTRODUCTION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING EMERGENCY CREDIT FOR FLOOD VICTIMS

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, at the quest of Senator GEORGE MCGOVERN, who is recuperating from an illness, I am introducing a joint resolution to authorize the Commodity Credit Corporation to advance \$25 million to the emergency credit revolving fund in the Department of Agriculture for loans to farmers who are victims of the floods in the upper Missouri, the upper Mississippi, Idaho, and other areas this spring.

The joint resolution is identical to a similar resolution passed by Congress a year ago to give assistance to flood victims.

The Farmers Home Administration recently obtained the release of \$41 million in loan funds, but I am advised that these funds, plus collections into the FHA's revolving loan account will be necessary to meet already outstanding loan commitments.

The amount of the authorization in the joint resolution has been set without detailed information on needs. The floods are right now cresting in some areas and the full extent of damage to farmers and the amount of their credit needs has not been accurately determined. The Agriculture Committees of the Senate and the House should be able, during hearings, to make a determination whether or not the \$25 million specified in the joint resolution is adequate to meet needs and to amend the amount, if necessary, when the resolution is reported to the floor.

I saw the extent of this year's flood damage from the air and on the ground last Friday when I examined devastated areas in Minnesota. It is clear that loan