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tions Committee (Senator Green) as to whether the U.S. was "obliged to put down a revolutionary movement," Dulles stated: "No. If there is a revolutionary movement in

Vietnam or in Thailand, we would consult together as to what to do about it, because if that were a subversive movement that was in fact propagated by communism, it

would be a very grave threat to us. But we have no undertaking to put it down; all we have is an undertaking to consult together as to what to do about it."

## SENATE—Tuesday, June 2, 1970

The Senate met at 11 o'clock a.m. and was called to order by Hon. THOMAS F. EAGLETON, a Senator from the State of Missouri.

The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

O God, the source of our being, and the guide of our pilgrim days, we hush our busy thoughts that we may learn in silence what we cannot know by speaking. Put out all lesser lights that we may have Thy light upon our pathway. Subdue our pride, our passion, our sin, and all finite frailties and set our spirits free, in tune with the infinite, at home with the eternal. Give us faith to see behind the tangle of human affairs and beneath the collision of world forces, some mighty purpose working toward Thy coming kingdom, in the fulfillment of which we have a part.

O God, our life, our hope, our strength, make us sure of Thee. Amen.

### DESIGNATION OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will please read a communication to the Senate from the President pro tempore (Mr. RUSSELL).

The assistant legislative clerk read the following letter:

U.S. SENATE,  
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,  
Washington, D.C., June 2, 1970.

To the Senate:

Being temporarily absent from the Senate, I appoint Hon. THOMAS F. EAGLETON, a Senator from the State of Missouri, to perform the duties of the Chair during my absence.

RICHARD B. RUSSELL,  
President pro tempore.

Mr. EAGLETON thereupon took the chair as Acting President pro tempore.

### THE JOURNAL

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Monday, June 1, 1970, be dispensed with.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

### VACATING OF ORDER FOR SENATOR HRUSKA TO SPEAK THIS MORNING

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the previous order, under which the able Senator from Nebraska (Mr. HRUSKA) would be recognized for a period of 1 hour, be vacated.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

### ORDER FOR TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time prior to recognizing the able Senator from New York (Mr. GOODELL) at 12 o'clock be utilized for the transaction of routine morning business, with statements therein being limited to 3 minutes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

### COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all committees be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

### SENATE RESOLUTION 415—SUBMISSION OF A RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE ON THE GROWING THREAT POSED BY SOVIET PILOTS AND TECHNICIANS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Minnesota (Mr. MONDALE) is in the Chamber. I submit for appropriate reference a resolution on behalf of myself and the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. MONDALE).

It has been virtually axiomatic that the Middle East is the No. 1 trouble spot in a troubled world, and I submit that the presence of Soviet personnel in the cockpits of United Arab Republic aircraft and in the surface-to-air missile sites on the ground has turned a dangerous situation into a critical one.

The Russians already have done too much, and this resolution urges the President to call upon the Soviet Union—in the interest of peace and as a means of encouraging peace in the Middle East and in the world—to withdraw its personnel from the United Arab Republic.

Passage of this resolution, Mr. President, will enable the President to make such representations to the Soviet Union, and should the Russians comply, such action would aid immeasurably the cause of peace which we all seek.

Mr. President, I submit that this resolution—in which Senator MONDALE and I ask all our colleagues to join—could go a long way toward cooling down the hot spot of the Middle East and could lead to a deescalation of war activity. Indeed such action by the Soviet Union could avoid the confrontation which conceivably could lead to all-out war.

I cannot emphasize too strongly, Mr. President, that the balance of power in the Middle East is crucial to the security of the United States. The Soviets now

have warships in the warm waters of the Mediterranean in numbers which should alarm all of us.

And their entry into the missile picture is another example of the type of escalation we all deery.

Similarly, the presence of Soviet pilots in United Arab Republic aircraft is a situation which should not only be discouraged, but one which should be acted upon by the United States. It is the President who can best handle such a situation, and this resolution will express to President Nixon the sense of the Senate in this respect.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be printed at this point in the RECORD.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. EAGLETON). The resolution will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the resolution will be printed in the RECORD.

The resolution (S. Res. 415) expressing the sense of the Senate on the growing threat posed by Soviet pilots and technicians in the Middle East, was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### S. RES. 415

*Resolved*, That it is the sense of the Senate that the introduction of Russian pilots and the manning of missile sites by Russian technicians in the United Arab Republic is contributing to the increasing tension in the Middle East, and the President is strongly urged to call upon the Soviet Union to withdraw all Russian personnel as a major step toward the encouragement of peace in the Middle East.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I am proud to join the distinguished minority leader (Mr. SCOTT) in submitting this resolution, urging the President to call upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its pilots and technicians from the United Arab Republic.

It would be a tragic mistake if the current Senate debate over our involvement in Indochina were interpreted by any other nation as an indication of a growing isolationism or as a weakening of American determination to stand firm wherever our real interests and real commitments are at stake.

It is no secret that I strongly doubt whether either national interests or, by this stage, real commitments are at stake in Vietnam or Indochina. Upon this matter there is honest debate in the Senate, and that is a most healthy and encouraging development.

But there is no debate of which I am aware over our firm commitment to the balance of power in the Middle East or to the need to stand by the beleaguered nation of Israel. Here, at the crossroads of three continents, in the face of an aggressive Soviet move for Middle Eastern

hegemony—and in defense of one of the most democratic, progressive, enlightened, and courageous nations in the world—there should be no doubt of our national interest or our moral commitment.

I applaud the administration for its steadfast attempts to avoid a Middle Eastern arms race and to reach an accord with all nations in that part of the world. If there has perhaps been any excess of objectivity and neutrality, it has undoubtedly been with the very finest motives.

But it has been increasingly clear that our efforts to restrain the conflict have not been met with any corresponding restraint on the part of the Soviet Union. The Soviets, in fact, have met every conciliatory move on our part with actions which have only escalated the hostility and intransigence of the Arabs.

The introduction of Russian pilots flying air defense and Russian technicians manning the missile sites has severely destabilized what was only a precarious balance, at best. There is little doubt that the Arabs have no intention of negotiating with the Israelis, in spite of the continuing willingness of Israel to discuss any and all matters directly with the Arab States. There is little doubt that only Israel air superiority has prevented the Arab nations from launching a new Middle Eastern war. And there is no doubt that with such heavy Soviet assistance, both materials and men, the Arabs are only counting the days until they can once again try for the total elimination of Israel.

The introduction of Soviet pilots and technicians has not only affected the balance of power. It has seriously and dangerously changed the very nature of the conflict.

We know, from the very bitterest experience, how "a few technicians and defensive military advisers" can escalate into an enormous commitment which grows far out of any planned proportion. Have the Soviets thought about what they will do if the Arabs should launch a strike tomorrow across the canal? Can the Soviets keep their pilots and technicians in a purely defensive capacity if hostilities should break out? What will happen when the first Soviet pilot strays over the canal and is brought down by an Israel flyer? What have the Soviets done by their actions to the Arab's willingness to reach a reasonable accord on the basic issues that still divide the Middle East? Can the Soviets truly control the Arab nationalists? Or, will they wind up being slowly and tragically drawn into a great and prolonged conflict much as we were drawn into the Indochinese war?

These are reasons why the President must take all possible steps to get the Soviet Union to abandon this reckless course. No escalation of the arms race in the Middle East can bring peace any closer. But we will soon have—we may now have—no other choice but to respond by providing Israel with jets and other implements of war with which to protect herself.

Unless the Russians can be persuaded of our resolve to stand by Israel and of the futility and danger of their recent actions in Egypt, I see a new and more dangerous level in the Middle East confrontation.

So I repeat my plea to our President which is contained in the resolution introduced by the distinguished minority leader and myself: Bring all the power and prestige of your Office and your past record of statesmanship in the Middle East to bear upon the Soviet Union to reverse their dangerous policies. Know that we in the Senate stand behind you in that effort, prepared to uphold American interests in the Middle East and our moral commitments to the people of Israel.

#### AMENDMENT OF THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ACT—THE CHURCH-COOPER AMENDMENT

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, in newspaper advertisements and on the floor, I have been struck, during this past 2 weeks, by one interesting line of argument being raised by opponents of the Church-Cooper amendment. In these advertisements and statements by Senators on the floor a great deal is being made of the fact that several years ago the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator FULLBRIGHT, made a number of statements in support of Presidential power as against congressional restriction, and supported the effort in Vietnam in 1964 at the time of the Tonkin Gulf resolution.

Mr. President, as everyone in this body knows, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has in the course of the years changed his position on both of these points based on the performance of the President and the course of the war. He has readily confessed he was mistaken in both matters.

Those who seek to use his words today seek to imply that once a position is taken on matters affecting defense and foreign policy there should be no change.

I find this position ironic, particularly in the face of the sharp change that apparently has taken place both in the White House and here in the Senate with regard to the administration's attitude toward so-called limiting amendments.

On December 15, 1969, the Senate approved overwhelmingly an amendment which reads as follows:

In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand.

I listened to the debate of that amendment and at no time was mention made of any inhibition of the President's constitutional powers or his right as Commander in Chief to protect American troops in South Vietnam or anywhere else.

On the day following that vote, when faced with newspaper articles which referred to the Laos-Thailand amendment as a curbing of Presidential power, both the White House and the President's

supporters here in the Senate were quick to argue that the Senate action in no way inhibited the President and, in fact, was endorsed fully by the White House.

At this point I would like to read a statement made on the Senate floor by the distinguished minority whip (Mr. GRIFFIN) on the day after the passage of the Laos-Thailand amendment:

The Senate did not take any action to "curb" an Asian role. The intent and the plain meaning of the amendment ultimately adopted by the Senate yesterday was to reaffirm the existing role and existing policies of the United States with respect to Thailand and Laos.

Indeed, the amendment was drafted—and I think most of the people on the Senate floor and those who were watching from the gallery were aware of the fact that it was drafted right here in the Republican cloakroom. In fact, the principal Senators involved in its drafting, along with the Senator from Idaho (Mr. Church) were the Senator from Colorado (Mr. Allott) and the Senator from New York (Mr. Javits); . . .

Following a meeting with the President and others at the White House this morning, I can report to my fellow Senators that the President is pleased with the amendment, and he recognizes that it is in accordance with his announced policies.

White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler and the Senate minority leader, Senator SCOTT, were no less forceful in pressing the idea that the Laos-Thailand amendment was approved by the White House, in fact there is an indication that they sought to take partial credit for the effort:

This wording, it was disclosed today, was approved by the White House in advance of adoption.\*

I would like to point out that no limiting language was offered to that amendment and in January of this year that same language was included in this administration's requested appropriations language.

That brings us down to the Church-Cooper amendment which, as any reasonable person must agree, is drafted in the same context as last year's Laos-Thailand amendment. Though it has more sections than the initial effort by the Senate last fall to set outer limits in line with Presidential policy, the thrust of this Cambodian amendment clearly follows the precedent of Laos-Thailand.

It is, therefore, strange to see statements such as the one made on the Senate floor on May 14 by the minority whip, which reads as follows:

Even if we were to draft an amendment which was precisely tailored to the exact and actual intentions of the President, it seems to me that it would be a mistake to adopt such an amendment. We would be tying our own hands needlessly in a way that would serve the enemy, and would make it more difficult to negotiate with the enemy. I am sure the enemy would be delighted if we were to announce that we are going to tie our own hands in this way.

I would be interested in knowing what has occurred between the enthusiasm of

\*"President Backs Senators on Laos," by John W. Finney, *New York Times*, December 17, 1969, p. 12, column 4.