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receive refuge and medical treatment. Some base areas contain sizeable ordnance depots, weapons and ammunition factories, petroleum storage facilities, truck parks, and POW camps. Clearly, the base areas provide the foundation upon which rest Communist expectations of maintaining an effective military-political apparatus in southern South Vietnam while the U.S. withdrawal proceeds.

The more northerly base areas, opposite II Corps and northern III Corps, serve as safe havens for Communist troops operating into these areas, and also facilitate the southward movement of North Vietnamese troops and supplies toward COSVN and eastward into the highlands of South Vietnam. They constitute, in effect, an extension of the Laos corridor—but a sector in which the NVA has enjoyed virtual immunity from Allied attack. To the extent that the Communists were denied free use of these areas, their forces in the highlands of South Vietnam could suffer a loss in combat effectiveness and increased casualties.

The southerly base areas, opposite the Delta and the Saigon region, have grown rapidly in size and importance since August 1969 as Hanoi has sought to limit exposure of its main force units and reduce casualties while attempting to halt the erosion of its political-military base in the populous and decisive theater. The bases are situated in well populated areas, many in villages and plantations inhabited by ethnic Vietnamese and controlled by Communists since the days of the Viet Minh.

The Cambodian sanctuaries play a key role in Hanoi's response to the Vietnamization and pacification programs. Because of their existence, especially the sanctuaries in southern Cambodia along the III and IV Corps frontiers, Hanoi can always mass large hostile forces in close proximity to major South Vietnamese population concentrations. This ability enables Hanoi to pose a continuing threat to South Vietnam's internal security that progress in pacification or Vietnamization cannot eradicate.

Infiltration

The Cambodian base structure, as noted above, supports infiltration of NVA personnel into South Vietnam, and the shift of units from one portion of South Vietnam to another, as in the case of the movement of NVA regiments into the Delta last year. The infiltration system through Cambodia handled nearly 55,000-70,000 NVA personnel in 1969, an estimated 60 percent of total NVA infiltration into South Vietnam that year. About 45,000-55,000 of these enemy troops moved as far as the southerly base areas subordinate to COSVN. The foot trails used lie very close to the border and occasionally cross into South Vietnamese territory; they are, for the most part, heavily canopied and secure from aerial observation. The trip from the Laos border to the "Parrot's Beak" opposite Saigon takes 45 to 60 days.

The Communists' north-south logistic route through Cambodia has few motorable segments and is mainly a network of trails and waterways. Occasionally, it utilizes the same trails as the personnel infiltration system. It has never been possible to quantify the north-south movement of supplies to VC-NVA forces in South Vietnam via Cambodia, but there is evidence that the trails are being constantly improved and that supplies are being moved.

Large quantities of heavy weapons and bulk supplies have moved until recently through the port of Sihanoukville and along West-East routes to III and IV Corps in South Vietnam.

Over the past year the demands of the new NVA force in the Delta would have greatly increased Communist supply requirements there. These increased supply requirements probably account in part for the actions of the Communist forces in attacking Cambodian police and military posts in provinces

adjacent to the Delta region of South Vietnam. Food needs had evidently been met in part earlier by clandestine shipments of rice to the NVA/VC forces through Cambodia, but the recent decision of the Cambodian Government to halt such shipments has evidently induced the Communists to drive the Cambodian authorities entirely out of large sections of the country so that the Communists can then draw directly on the civilian population for their food supplies. Other purposes which the Communists undoubtedly have in mind in attacking the Cambodian forces are to strengthen and deepen the area from which they can threaten the allied forces in South Vietnam, as well as to threaten the overthrow of the neutral Government of Cambodia.

U.S. POSITIONS ON CAMBODIA

On April 16, 1969 the Australian Ambassador in Phnom Penh, representing United States interests in Cambodia, delivered to the Cambodian Government the following U.S. declaration:

"In conformity with the United Nations Charter, the United States of America respects the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia within its present frontiers."

July 2, 1969—U.S. resumes diplomatic relations with Cambodia and appointment of Chargé's announced.

In a March 21, 1970 Press Conference, President Nixon stated that the U.S. would deal with the Government selected by the Cambodian Parliament and that:

"We respect Cambodia's neutrality. We would hope that North Vietnam would take that same position in respecting its neutrality."

In his April 20, 1970 speech, President Nixon warned Hanoi about the risks of North Vietnamese escalation in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as follows:

"But I again remind the leaders of North Vietnam that while we are taking these risks for peace, they will be taking grave risks should they attempt to use the occasion to jeopardize the security of our remaining forces in Vietnam by increased military action in Vietnam, in Cambodia or in Laos."

"I repeat what I said November 3 and December 15: If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation."

"My responsibility as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces is for the safety of our men, and I shall meet that responsibility."

CHARLES BAILEY'S STORY ON THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO INVADE CAMBODIA

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, one of the great tragedies of the Cambodian adventure is how it has undermined the credibility of the current administration and the faith of so many people in the manner of Presidential decisionmaking.

Given the administration's adherence to a military victory and its total commitment to propping up the Thieu-Ky government, the escalation of the war into Cambodia may well turn out to be tactically advantageous. The real question, of course, has never been in the tactic of Cambodia as much as the Indochinese strategy which this adventure revealed.

But whatever comes of Cambodia, America stands to lose if the credibility of the President is lost along the way.

It has been recently revealed that the story we were told on April 30 of the

decision to invade Cambodia was far, far from the complete story. In fact, the decision to invade Cambodia had been in progress for more than a month—far in advance of the April 20 speech, for example, when the President told the American people how well Vietnamization was proceeding.

Charles Bailey, Washington bureau chief for the Minneapolis Tribune, has done a remarkable job in piecing together this story. He describes in detail the elaborate background of the Cambodian invasion and how long this decision was in the making. He points out—vividly but objectively—the inconsistencies which have emanated from the White House since the Cambodian plan began.

Mr. Bailey has done a great service by this reporting. I commend his article to the Senate, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Minneapolis Tribune, May 17, 1970]

UNITED STATES ENDS ONE OPERATION IN CAMBODIA, WITHDRAWS—WHEN DID NIXON DECIDE?

(By Charles W. Bailey)

WASHINGTON, D.C.—Despite President Nixon's claim that a sudden increase in North Vietnamese military activity was the reason he ordered U.S. troops into Cambodia, plans for that attack were under top-level study for more than a month before it began.

This fact, now stated flatly by top officials, runs counter to Mr. Nixon's public assertion that he ordered the attack because of a step-up in enemy action between April 20 and April 30, when the operation was launched.

The contrast between public explanation and private action also provides new support for the growing belief here that the President and his military advisers viewed the Cambodian situation more as an opportunity than as a threat—as a chance for military gain rather than a danger which had to be checked.

This picture of the behind-the-scenes action in the Cambodian drama emerged Saturday on the basis of comments by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, who revealed additional details of the planning that preceded Mr. Nixon's April 30 order to strike into Cambodia.

On that night, the President told a nationwide television audience that he had warned the enemy 10 days earlier not to take advantage of U.S. troop withdrawals to increase its own military activity.

Mr. Nixon asserted in the April 30 speech that "North Vietnam has increased its military aggression . . . particularly in Cambodia" and that "the actions of the enemy in the last 10 days clearly endanger the lives of Americans who are in Vietnam now."

The President also said that "in the past two weeks" the enemy had stepped up guerrilla actions and was "concentrating its forces in these sanctuaries . . . where they are building up to launch massive attacks on our forces."

Finally, Mr. Nixon pinpointed "the last two weeks" as the period when the Communists had "stripped away all pretenses of respecting the sovereignty or the neutrality of Cambodia."

Nothing in Mr. Nixon's April 30 speech suggested that he had been considering an attack into Cambodia prior to April 20, when he issued his "warning." In fact, he went out of his way to say that "even after the Vietnamese Communists began to expand these sanctuaries four weeks ago, we counseled

patience to our South Vietnamese allies and imposed restraints on our own commanders."

Actually, according to Laird, U.S. military commanders were put to work in late March planning possible actions in Cambodia.

"When the change in government came about in Cambodia, I requested planning to be done at that time on various courses of action that could be taken by our government," Laird said.

"Planning was started in the latter part of March. Various proposals were presented to me. I approved certain actions, and made certain other recommendations to the National Security Council and the President

"The plan that is currently going forward is a plan submitted to me by the NSC, and supported by me."

The NSC (National Security Council) met at the White House on March 24 and again the next day, March 25. The next NSC session was on April 8.

Laird's comments make clear that Mr. Nixon began to study the plan for the Cambodian attack early in April.

The defense secretary said he had given the plan to the President probably more than a week before Mr. Nixon's trip to Hawaii on April 18.

While in Honolulu, where he flew to greet the returning Apollo 13 astronauts, Mr. Nixon received a briefing on the invasion plan from Adm. John McCain, U.S. commander in chief in the Pacific.

Laird said that McCain's briefing "did give the (Cambodian) plan as presented by Gen. Abrams, modified by discussions we had had here."

But, he added, Mr. Nixon had seen the plan before:

"I had given him the plan. The plan had been transmitted to him."

When a reporter asked if that had occurred "the previous week," Laird replied:

"Well, before that, I think. But it had not been approved."

Mr. Nixon returned from Hawaii to his California home on April 19 and the next day announced to the nation that another 150,000 U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Vietnam in the coming year.

In that announcement, he noted a recent step-up in Communist attacks in Vietnam but added that, "despite this new enemy activity, there has been an over all decline in enemy force levels in South Vietnam since December."

Mr. Nixon referred specifically to Cambodia at one point, charging that "almost 40,000 communist troops are now conducting overt aggression there."

And he said that the leaders of North Vietnam "will be taking grave risks should they attempt to use the occasion (of more U.S. withdrawals) to jeopardize the security of our remaining forces in Vietnam by increased military action in Vietnam, in Cambodia or in Laos. . . . If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation."

Except for these two passages, Mr. Nixon did not refer to Cambodia in his April 20 speech. At no point in that talk did he discuss the border sanctuaries which only 10 days later became the target of U.S. attack.

Indeed, the tone of April 20 was upbeat—and obviously purposely so. Mr. Nixon said, "We shall not be defeated in Vietnam," that "we finally have in sight the just peace we are seeking" and that "we can say with confidence that all American combat forces will be withdrawn."

At that moment, however, Mr. Nixon's military planners were in the midst of a decision-making process that would send U.S. combat forces to new territory.

Laird said last week he had initially opposed the use of American troops to attack the Cambodian sanctuary areas—because of

his concern that strong enemy resistance could lead to heavy fighting and high U.S. casualties.

But in mid-April, he said, the situation changed. North Vietnamese troops began moving westward out of the sanctuaries and further into Cambodia—thus reducing the force in the base area so that "the risk involved militarily" in the proposed attack "became much less."

At that point, Laird said, he changed his mind and supported the use of U.S. troops in the Cambodian attacks. "This was the time to hit them," he said.

Laird told reporters last week that about one-third of the estimated 40,000 Communist troops in Cambodia had moved out of the sanctuaries and were "facing the other direction" when the U.S. attack began.

Laird's statement that the North Vietnamese had moved something like 13,000 men out of the sanctuaries and away from South Vietnam contrasts with Mr. Nixon's claim in the April 30 speech that "the enemy . . . is concentrating his main forces in these sanctuaries where they are building up to launch massive attacks on our forces in South Vietnam."

This was not the only contradiction between official accounts.

On the same night that Mr. Nixon spoke publicly of the enemy "concentrating" in the sanctuaries, a high White House official, who briefed reporters, said Communist forces had moved out of the sanctuary.

There have also been signs that the administration rationale for the attacks has shifted. Originally—as in the President's speech—the strikes were depicted as basically defensive, as a response to a new and growing threat caused by Communist moves to connect the sanctuaries and thus form a 600-mile-long base for attacks on South Vietnam.

More recently, however, there has been a new tone to the explanations.

Laird put it bluntly to a congressional committee last week:

The President, he said, saw the operation as "an opportunity."

The military has seen it that way all along, and weeks ago authoritative military figures were arguing—anonously—that the overthrow of the neutralist Sihanouk government provided a good excuse for letting them do what had been forbidden previously for diplomatic reasons.

The "opportunity" argument is being advanced more openly now that the operation against the sanctuaries seems to be going smoothly with low casualties and a high box score of captured enemy materiel.

This may prove to be a politically advantageous line. But the disclosure that the attacks had been in preparation long before the time cited by Mr. Nixon in his April 30 speech could create problems for an administration seeking to preserve its credibility with a troubled and divided public.

LUBBOCK AVALANCHE-JOURNAL EDITORIAL ON SBA

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I invite the attention of Senators to an editorial published in the Lubbock Avalanche-Journal of May 14 which describes the quick and effective response of the Small Business Administration and its Administrator, Hilary Sandoval, to the recent tornado disaster which occurred in the Lubbock, Tex., area.

Mr. Sandoval was on the scene shortly after the tornado hit and quickly brought the resources of the SBA to bear on the reconstruction of the shattered businesses and homes of the area. This is the type of flexible and responsive Government action to a natural disaster which

the people of this country deserve, wherever they may live. I commend the service performed by the Administrator in this situation and in other disaster situations in Texas and around the country. I also want to express my confidence that this same public service ethic will continue to make the SBA an outstanding model of a truly effective and functional Government agency.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OFFICIALS SPEEDING FINANCIAL AID—LIKE HILARY SANDOVAL

Whatever the final figure may show, it is safe to say that the tornado damage to construction in Lubbock—homes and business buildings—will be tremendous.

Whether the overall figure of losses will run \$100 million, \$150 million, or what, a great deal of money has gone down the drain and rebuilding and repairs will demand terrific expenditures.

Therefore, it is important to note that money in massive quantity will be quickly available. Whether it will be enough, or come cheaply enough, cannot be said at the moment. But a lot of it will be available through both private and public sources.

Sen. John Tower, Rep. George Mahon and Gen. George Lincoln, who heads the President's Office of Emergency Preparedness, all said during a flying visit here Tuesday that money would be made quickly available from Washington. Sen. Ralph Yarborough wired the same statement. But more important, Hilary Sandoval, the perceptive and indefatigable young head of the Small Business Administration, echoed those words. In the final analysis, it will be Mr. Sandoval and his organization who'll tote the wood and water and who will get the money where it needs to go and soonest.

Mr. Sandoval flew here with the others to view the situation both on the ground and, by helicopter over the city. He told *The Avalanche-Journal*: "There will be no delays. I've told Fred Neumann, our divisional supervisor stationed in Lubbock, that he can have all the loan officers here he needs. He can have 100 of them tomorrow if that's necessary."

Sad as the situation is in many homes and business concerns, there will be financial help and much of it. That is the best kind of news as the rubble is being cleared away.

Mr. Sandoval's personal visit to view the tornado's damage here is the second of its kind he has made to West Texas in recent weeks. He was Johnny-on-the-spot then in Plainview, Clarendon and other points hit by a savage storm, taking a personal hand in solving the problem, not leaving it to a subordinate. As was said on this page then, we say again: El Paso's Hilary Sandoval is a take-charge guy of the type the Government needs more of. A native West Texan and former Texas Tech student, he gives his whole home area a sense of pride in the way he works, *really works*, at his job.

AUTO SAFETY—AN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, the distinguished Secretary of Transportation, Hon. John A. Volpe, is a man whose public pronouncements are almost always worthy of note. He has spoken with vision about future developments in the field of transportation, from low-emission engines to adoption of intermodal transportation systems. Even though the