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privilege of operating at a high level of efficiency?

These and other questions were discussed in an editorial published in the *Washington Post* of Friday, December 11. I thought the editorial did a good job of pointing up the problems connected with House Joint Resolution 1413. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE MISSING EMERGENCY STRIKE LAW

If the national railroad strike which afflicted the country yesterday were not so disruptive and costly, it would qualify as a first rate comedy. For months the country has known that an emergency was in the making, but the President did not ask for a stopgap law to prevent the strike until Monday night. Congress got into action on Wednesday, but did not pass its antistrike bill until after the strike had begun. The President signed the bill at 2:10 a.m. and Judge Pratt, clad in pajamas and robe, issued a temporary order to restrain the strike at 3:17 a.m. Meanwhile the defiant president of the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks had disappeared so that no court order could reach him, and the nation-crippling strike went merrily on through the day. What a way to run a railroad, or a nation!

In its haste, Congress sought to sweeten the bitter but necessary pill that it was administering to the four unions involved. It legislated a 13.5 per cent wage increase for the employees, which corresponds to the first installment of a 37 per cent increase in three years recommended by an emergency fact-finding board. But Congress ignored the other parts of the emergency board's proposed settlement designed, as the President noted in signing the bill, to "increase productivity and cut back the inflationary effect of the pay increase." In effect, this attempt to meet a transportation crisis through special legislation failed to prevent the strike; it put Congress on record in support of an inflationary wage settlement; and it ignored the proposed work-rule changes designed to make higher wage rates economically feasible.

Essential though it was to take away the union's right to strike in the current circumstances, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Congress botched the job. Virtually every member was irritated, moreover, by the disruptive effect of this special legislation on its already overburdened catchup session. The basic fact is that Congress cannot legislate properly in such circumstances, and that is an overpowering argument for not letting crises of this sort go to Capitol Hill for settlement.

The chief ray of hope in the situation, therefore, is that the 92d Congress will overhaul the Railroad Labor Act so as to save itself and the country from fiascos of this kind in the future. Congress might not like the kind of legislation that the President recommended last February to deal with transportation emergencies which cannot be settled under existing law, but it has not said so. The inexcusable fact is that not a single hearing was held on the bill, and neither house did anything to initiate substitute legislation of its own. There is not much hope of meeting these occasional emergencies more satisfactorily until Congress is ready to buckle down and pass a new law to protect the public interest.

ASSESSMENT OF PRESENT SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, last December 15 President Nixon made a

brief report to the Nation on the situation in Vietnam. He referred in that speech to what he termed a "firsthand, candid and completely independent" report on the situation in South Vietnam by Sir Robert Thompson, the celebrated British expert on guerrilla warfare and architect of the victory over Communist insurgents in Malaya.

Sir Robert, the President announced had been "cautiously optimistic" after a 5-week trip to South Vietnam, and had reported "a winning position has been achieved . . ." The President told us that this favorable assessment was "in line" with other reports and his own thinking. However, he did not reveal Sir Robert's report beyond this brief characterization.

These Presidential remarks are particularly notable now, a year later, because Sir Robert Thompson has gone again to South Vietnam on an official mission for several weeks and again reported to the President. But his findings today have not been reported by the administration in any way to the American people, let alone in a Presidential address.

For, according to the *New York Times*, Sir Robert reported this time a disturbing failure to eliminate the Vietcong apparatus in South Vietnam. Such a failure undermines all other aspects of pacification and certainly belies continuing administration optimism about political realities in South Vietnam.

In a subsequent radio interview with NBC in London, Sir Robert faulted this press account as over-emphasizing "one detail" of his report, but he nonetheless publicly acknowledged that the threat of Vietcong subversion was not yet "sufficiently reduced."

We must ask, I think, what is "sufficient" after all these years, the billions of dollars, the tens of thousands of American lives.

I should add that these reports bear out an earlier account in the *New York Times* of October 19 that the Saigon regime was massively infiltrated by Communist agents.

That, of course, is what this war has always been about. Not arms caches in Cambodia, or bombing targets in the North, or strident speeches in Washington. But who is to rule South Vietnam. Who has the political stamina to survive the military stalemate.

That is the question our men have died for—and still die for.

The whole elaborate, much-celebrated structure of "Vietnamization" rests on the political balance. In plainest terms, so long as the Vietcong apparatus remains intact, and so long as the two sides refuse a negotiated settlement, the promise of an honorable peace in Vietnam is a cruel hoax.

The American people are entitled to know in full what Sir Robert Thompson has reported to the President from both his trips.

We are entitled to know the findings of the President's Vietnam Special Studies Group, which the President, in his report to Congress last February, characterized as the main forum for determining "the factual situation" in Vietnam.

A White House spokesman has refused to comment on the Thompson report, calling it a "classified matter." The most powerful rebuttal to that position was given by President Nixon himself in his foreign policy message of February 18. He wrote about informing the public on Vietnam:

We cannot try to fool the enemy, who know what is actually happening.

Nor must we fool ourselves. The American people must have the full truth. We cannot afford a loss of confidence in our judgment and in leadership.

This is indeed an issue of basic confidence. The administration must show it has not been misleading the American people in the continued spending of lives and money. It must show it is not the captive of the facile illusions that blinded its predecessor.

Most of all, Americans must know the truth about Vietnam to prepare us for whatever trials may lie ahead. For if Communist victories are to be the outcome, we face either the challenge of accepting reality or the madness of some attempt to reverse it. In any event, the sacrifice we have made obligates our Government to tell us the truth, the whole truth, and to tell us now.

All this relates, Mr. President, to yet another striking report, a column by Stewart Alsop in *Newsweek* of December 7. Mr. Alsop exposes the ominous deterioration of the morale and discipline of our army in Vietnam. There may be disagreement over the reasons for this unprecedented alienation of our men from their commanders. But it is clear that we cannot go on asking our soldiers to fight and die on false pretenses about what has truly been gained in Vietnam.

Mindful of these enormous stakes, I have written President Nixon to request that he make public the Thompson reports and other official assessments of the situation in South Vietnam.

I ask unanimous consent that the letter to the President and the relevant articles from the *New York Times* and *Newsweek* be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DECEMBER 11, 1970.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am very concerned over the series of reports about Sir Robert Thompson's recent trip on your behalf to South Vietnam. Certain press stories indicated that he returned with the judgment that efforts have still failed to eliminate the threat posed by the Vietcong apparatus throughout the country.

In a subsequent interview with NBC in London, Sir Robert did criticize these press accounts as having "picked on one detail" of his report. And he called the tenor of his latest findings "encouraging and even optimistic." Yet in that same interview he publicly acknowledged that the Vietcong apparatus was not yet "sufficiently reduced," and that Vietcong subversive strength within South Vietnam was a threat which could still "overturn" the Saigon regime.

All this comes in the wake of an equally disturbing press report in October that the CIA finds the Saigon government massively infiltrated with Communist agents.

These reports raise serious questions about the whole structure of pacification and Vietnamization policies. If the future withdrawals of U.S. forces are to depend upon the real stamina of the South Vietnamese regime, the continued strength of the Vietcong infrastructure—whatever the marginal damage it has suffered—certainly casts doubt on any promise to bring all our men home in the near future, except through a genuine compromise settlement.

Moreover, so long as this potential for Communist victories in South Vietnam remains obscure to the American people, and so long as the Administration remains publicly committed to quite an opposite outcome, the stage could be set, as in the past, for some dramatic U.S. military action to try to retrieve the situation. I fear that would not only be futile, but also disastrous for the peace of our own society.

I therefore request you, Mr. President, to make public in full both the reports of Sir Robert Thompson and other official assessments of the situation in South Vietnam, including those of the Vietnam Special Studies Group, which you cited for searching and factual analysis in your Message to the Congress on Foreign Relations last February.

As you said in that Message with regard to informing the public on Vietnam:

"We cannot try to fool the enemy, who knows what is actually happening.

"Nor must we fool ourselves. The American people must have the full truth. We cannot afford a loss of confidence in our judgment and in our leadership."

Telling the plain truth about what lies ahead in Vietnam is surely the best insurance, Mr. President, against the divisiveness and recrimination we all want to avoid in trying to end this war.

Sincerely,

WALTER F. MONDALE.

[From the New York Times, Dec. 3, 1970]

EXPERT NOW GLOOMY IN REPORT TO NIXON
ON VIETCONG POWER

(By Tad Szulc)

WASHINGTON, Dec. 2.—Sir Robert Thompson, the British expert on guerrilla warfare, has told President Nixon that the United States and allied intelligence and police efforts have failed to destroy the Communist subversive apparatus in South Vietnam.

His report, submitted in writing to the President at an unpublicized White House meeting on Oct. 13, appears to be in marked contrast with the relatively optimistic views on the security situation in South Vietnam that Sir Robert offered Mr. Nixon last December.

Sir Robert's findings—outlined to The New York Times today by Administration officials familiar with the report—were based on a new five-week secret mission he undertook in South Vietnam at President Nixon's request during September and October before coming to Washington to deliver his report.

The previous mission for Mr. Nixon, which also lasted five weeks, was completed last Dec. 3, when he met with the President.

In his policy speech on Vietnam on Dec. 15, Mr. Nixon told of the Thompson mission, described his findings as "cautiously optimistic," and quoted him as reporting that, "I was very impressed by the improvement in the military and political situation in Vietnam as compared with all previous visits and especially in the security situation, both in Saigon and the rural areas."

Sir Robert's recent mission, however, as well as the existence of his October report has been kept secret, reportedly because his new conclusions seem to question the validity of the pacification and Vietnamization programs, including Operation Phoenix which has been described as a code name for a secret Central Intelligence Agency operation that led to the alleged massacre at My Lai March 16, 1968.

On Oct. 14, the day after he conferred with President Nixon, Sir Robert discussed the Vietnam situation at a meeting of high level military officers and Defense Department and intelligence officials, paraphrasing in replies to questions the key points contained in his report to the President.

The main theme of Sir Robert's findings was that despite some successes in pacification, particularly in the performance by newly elected officials in South Vietnamese villages, there has been a general failure in police and intelligence efforts aimed at eliminating Vietcong apparatus in the country.

The Thompson report was said to have emphasized that success in other aspects of pacification cannot solve the basic political problem in Vietnam after the withdrawal of the bulk of American forces so long as the Vietcong apparatus remains virtually intact.

Despite continuing Administration optimism over pacification, as expressed in public statements, there are officials here with extensive experience in Vietnam who privately not only share Sir Robert's new conclusions but also argue that the South Vietnamese political and security situation is so fragile as to pose a critical threat to the Saigon Government even in the presence of "residual" American combat forces.

FOLLOWS EARLIER ASSESSMENT

Sir Robert's report followed an earlier assessment given to President Nixon by the Central Intelligence Agency that more than 30,000 Communist agents had been infiltrated into the Saigon Government, including the office of President Nguyen Van Thieu.

When The New York Times published on Oct. 19 an article based on the C.I.A. report, White House officials said that it exaggerated the extent of the infiltration and was "overly pessimistic." These comments were made, however, five days after the submission of the Thompson report declaring the allied antisubversive program to be "inadequate."

The responsibility for eradicating the underground Vietcong apparatus is vested in an agency known as Civil Operations and Rural Operations Support, or CORDS, an arm of the United States military command in Saigon. CORDS works in cooperation with the South Vietnamese military intelligence and national police.

The American agency's main antisubversive instrument is the highly controversial Operation Phoenix, composed of South Vietnamese police and military and intelligence agents, United States civilian and military personnel and operatives of the Central Intelligence Agency, who play a key role in the whole operation.

Sir Robert was said to have reported, however, that the three-year-old Operation Phoenix and related activities were not doing "their job" and had failed to break up the enemy's main effort in South Vietnam.

Other intelligence sources said that Operation Phoenix itself was infiltrated by Vietcong agents.

Officials familiar with Sir Robert's conclusions said that he was much less optimistic over the world wide aspects of the Vietnam situation than he was last year. Asked at the Pentagon meeting when the United States could leave Viet-tensified Communist shelling installations appeared to bear "not right away."

CIA SAYS ENEMY SPIES HOLD VITAL POSTS
IN SAIGON

(By Neil Sheehan)

WASHINGTON, Oct. 18.—The Central Intelligence Agency has told President Nixon that the Vietnamese Communists have infiltrated more than 30,000 agents into the South Vietnamese Government in an apparatus that has been virtually impossible to destroy.

Because of this, the C.I.A. reported, as United States troop withdrawals proceed, a

resurgence of Communist strength in South Vietnam can be expected.

The report to Mr. Nixon said that the secret Communist agents had included an aide to President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam, a former province chief and high officials of the police and of military intelligence.

CONFIRMATION BY OFFICIALS

While the study is not addressed specifically to the question of the President's war policy, officials of the United States Government who have read it say that it does raise questions about a key aspect of this policy—Vietnamization, or gradually giving the South Vietnamese the main burden of defending themselves against the Vietcong and North Vietnamese and thus allowing American troop withdrawals.

High White House officials confirmed the existence of the report. They contended, however, that it exaggerated the extent of infiltration and they rejected the analysis as inaccurate and "overly pessimistic."

They said that the President had read a summary of its contents and that he is understood to believe that the analysis is unwarranted because of the generally optimistic reports he has been receiving from other sources about the progress of pacification, the improved military performance of the South Vietnamese and the effects of the Cambodian incursion.

NO IMPLICATION OF FALL

The Central Intelligence Agency's analysis does not assert or imply that the South Vietnamese Government is likely to fall in the next few months, the officials who have read it said. Nor does the study discount the likelihood that the South Vietnamese Army will perform well in battle for some time to come, as occurred in Cambodia.

What the study does imply, the officials said, is that the South Vietnamese Government has little chance of enduring over the long run because of the great extent of Communist penetration.

In terms of troop withdrawals the President has so far committed himself only to reducing American men in South Vietnam to 284,000 by next May. He has indicated, however, that he hopes to make further withdrawals as his Vietnamization program continues. The President has also repeatedly stated, as did high White House officials in commenting on the C.I.A. analysis, that the Vietnamization program is going well.

Details of the top-secret study were made available to The New York Times by the Government officials who read it. The study was made last May, the officials said, and has been circulated in the White House, the Pentagon and the State Department. Information received since May—especially after the two-month attack on Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia that ended June 30—has continued to confirm the C.I.A.'s findings, the officials said.

The study was apparently based on new information about the nature and size of the Communist spy organization in South Vietnam as well as on a fresh analysis of captured documents and interrogations of prisoners and defectors during the last two to three years.

In its analysis, the Central Intelligence Agency says that early last year after a number of setbacks on the battlefield, the Communists decided to shift their long-range strategy from intense military activity to political erosion, against the day when American troop strength would no longer be a serious threat because of withdrawals.

The enemy is confident that this strategy will succeed, the analysis pointed out. It offered no contradiction.

To carry out the new strategy, the report asserts, the Communists stepped up their infiltration of secret agents into various branches of the South Vietnamese Government.

MOST NATIVES OF SOUTH

The study estimates that the enemy has infiltrated more than 30,000 agents—most of them natives of the southern part of divided Vietnam—into the armed forces, the police force and the South Vietnamese intelligence organizations charged with eradicating the Vietcong guerrillas and their North Vietnamese allies. (High White House officials said that the study gave a total of about 20,000 agents, but the officials who had read it said they were certain the figure was 30,000.)

The number of such agents is said to be growing, with a goal of 50,000. If this goal is reached, the spy organization would be 5 per cent of the South Vietnamese military and police forces. The C.I.A. study doubts, however, that the Communists achieved their goal by the end of 1969, the target date.

While the enemy operatives range from very effective to very poor, the study says, the network derives its power from the fact that the United States and the South Vietnamese Government have nothing remotely comparable.

The study describes the workings of three Communist political-action and intelligence organizations, one of which has proven so impervious to Government countermeasures that none of its important agents have been arrested. The C.I.A. refers to the relatively few arrests to tell how Communist agents have reached into army headquarters, into President Thieu's office and even into the negotiating team at the Paris peace talks.

APATHY A POSSIBLE REASON

In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency reports the failure of hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese policemen and soldiers to report contacts by Vietcong agents. The report adds that the enemy network could not exist without the tacit complicity—whether from fear, sympathy or apathy—of the majority of South Vietnamese soldiers and policemen.

The C.I.A. cited such feelings as evidence that the Saigon Government could not command the deep loyalty of the men on whom it depends to defend itself.

Although the South Vietnamese Government is infiltrated from bottom to top, the study says, the United States and Saigon have had little success not only in penetrating the Communist organization but also in keeping agents alive in areas the Communists control.

The study offers the following assessment of the advantages of the enemy's virtual monopoly on subversion:

There is a permanent imbalance in tactical military intelligence. The enemy is usually forewarned of allied moves and the United States and South Vietnam are usually ignorant of Communist ones.

Because most Government-held areas are nominally, rather than firmly, controlled, the enemy is able to recruit selectively and to decide freely who should be assassinated for maximum political effect.

The enemy has excellent security and can thwart Government efforts to infiltrate its organization and territory. Government agents are exposed in advance and programs such as Phoenix—an effort begun in 1967 to uncover and destroy the Vietcong apparatus in the countryside—are undermined. Officials noted that the study provided the most plausible explanation yet for the continuing failure of Phoenix, a program considered vital to Vietnamization.

Penetration of non-Communist political parties and religious groups allows the Communists to take advantage of, and worsen, the chronic political weakness of the South Vietnamese Government.

The Communists can survive despite great allied military pressure. Thus, as American troop withdrawals proceed, a resurgence of Communist strength can be expected. In cutting toward its goal of 284,000 men, the United States expects to have 344,000 soldiers

in Vietnam by the end of 1970—a reduction of 205,000 in two years.

Discussing the make-up of the enemy apparatus, the C.I.A. report says that the three Communist organizations that control the estimated total of 30,000 agents receive their orders from Hanoi, through the Central Office for South Vietnam, the Communist command for the South. The destruction of its headquarters was a goal of the American drive into Cambodia, but it is still operating in the jungles.

According to the C.I.A., the full-time operatives are to be distinguished from the many more tens of thousands of part-time agents and Vietcong sympathizers in South Vietnam.

The largest segment of about 20,000 full-time operatives is run by the Military Prose-lyting Section, whose primary aim is to undermine the morale and effectiveness of the South Vietnamese armed forces and police, according to the study.

Many of these operatives are South Vietnamese officers and noncommissioned officers. They try to recruit other soldiers to the Communist cause, foment dissent within units, perform covert assassinations, encourage desertions and defections and arrange accommodations in which Government military units, to avoid casualties, tacitly agree not to attack Communist forces. Such accommodations are a widespread practice that American military advisers have not been able to end.

NETWORK OF COURIERS

This group of 20,000 agents is supported by a large network of couriers and keepers of safe-houses, where agents can take refuge. Most keepers of these refuges are the wives or relatives of South Vietnamese soldiers and policemen, the study continues.

A second group—about 7,000 agents—is run by the Vietcong Military Intelligence Section, the study says. These agents are said to be spotted throughout all levels of the police, armed forces and civilian administration, principally for espionage. The study notes that the mission of some of the high-level agents is to try to manipulate Government policy. The Military Intelligence Section also intercepts South Vietnamese Army and police radio communications.

South Vietnamese counterintelligence has had its greatest success against these military intelligence agents, but the study cautions that the success has been a limited one. A widely publicized roundup last year probably apprehended less than half of the high-level agents working solely in the Saigon area, the study says.

The third and possibly most dangerous network of agents reported by the Central Intelligence Agency is an estimated total of 3,000 members of the Vietcong security service who permeate the South Vietnamese police intelligence service, the army intelligence and military security service, and the Central Intelligence Office, the South Vietnamese counterpart of the C.I.A. Other agents from the secret service are reported to be active throughout the non-Communist political parties and religious groups.

The Vietcong security service is reportedly a type of political and secret police with the main mission of combating infiltration or disloyalty in the Communist party, the armed forces and the population in Communist-dominated regions in the South.

The service also reportedly operates large networks of civilian informants in Government areas, draws up blacklists in the event a Communist-influenced government takes power in South Vietnam, and selects and kills those people on the blacklists whose deaths might have an immediate psychological and political impact.

The chief mission of its 3,000 agents in the South Vietnamese structure is to keep the Communists informed of how much the Government knows about them and to block any penetration by Government.

The Vietcong security service is so efficient that none of its important agents have been apprehended, the study says.

The analysis makes the point that although sufficient data are available to estimate the size of the clandestine apparatus and how it works, both the United States and the South Vietnamese Government have not been able to obtain the kind of precise information needed to identify and arrest thousands of individual agents and destroy the network.

The South Vietnamese Government has been making greater efforts in recent months to apprehend agents, the officials who read the report said, but has not achieved meaningful progress because the penetration by the enemy is already so great.

To illustrate the omniscience of the subversive apparatus, the study gives some examples from among the relatively small number of agents who have been apprehended.

One was Huynh Van Trong, President Thieu's special assistant for political affairs. As such he was privy to the innermost workings of the South Vietnamese Government as well as to secret communications between Mr. Thieu and President Nixon. He had also participated in the Paris peace talks and had been sent on a sensitive political mission to the United States.

Another agent was a National Assembly deputy and two more were army majors who had served in the section of the police force whose mission is to prevent Communist infiltration. A fourth agent was the former assistant chief of the counterintelligence branch of the army security service. One agent was the chief medical officer of the national police, another was a former province chief and another was the former deputy police chief of Hue, the old imperial capital. The chief of the principal army communications center in Dalat was also reportedly discovered to be acting for the Vietcong.

Some agents at the bottom have turned up in deceptively useful posts. One was the chauffeur for the commanding general of the army corps that encompasses the northernmost provinces of the country. A second agent was the main servant in another general's house.

In tracing the enemy's decision to shift to a strategy emphasizing political erosion, the study said that it had been made by the North Vietnamese Politburo. In addition to ordering a reduction in fighting, the Politburo called for a cut in infiltration from North Vietnam, the Central Intelligence Agency said. Infiltration declined from about 250,000 men in 1968 to approximately 120,000 in 1969, with the rate this year reportedly running toward half the 1969 total.

AMNESTY PROGRAM USED

The Communists also shifted thousands of trained personnel from their military forces into the three political bureaucracies that penetrate the South Vietnamese Government and sent large numbers of political leaders into government territory, the study says.

These new agents enter the South Vietnamese structure by several routes, one of the most common of which is the Government's amnesty program for Communist defectors. Some Communist documents refer to the infiltration process as "the transformation of party cadres into innocent people."

There is evidence that at least several thousand false defectors entered through more than half the provinces of South Vietnam in 1969, the study says. Officials said they could not estimate what percentage of the 47,203 Vietcong defectors reported by the Saigon Government last year were actually Vietcong agents.

The study asserts that large numbers of what the Communists call "legalized cadres" are now quietly living and working in sup-

posedly pacified districts. A legalized cadre is an agent who has acquired legitimate status in South Vietnamese society.

As an example of such cover activities, all members of a village council in an ostensibly pacified district recently were discovered to be Vietcong agents.

Although the study does not do so directly, it raises questions about the optimistic reports on pacification that Mr. Nixon has been receiving. Its implication, some officials who have read it said, is that the Communists have decided—to some extent at least—not to oppose allied pacification efforts frontally but to concentrate on infiltrating the pacifiers.

Concluding by discussing the lack of meaningful political commitment to the Saigon Government by the majority of South Vietnamese soldiers, the study remarks that during an 18-month period only 348 soldiers reported that they had been approached by the Vietcong. During this time, the Central Intelligence Agency says, it is known that the Vietcong made hundreds of thousands of approaches to military personnel.

COMMENT BY OFFICIALS

When first asked about the study yesterday, the White House declined to acknowledge its existence. Today high White House officials did so but contended that the study had been "essentially a one-man product," that it did "not represent the formal position of the C.I.A." and that it had not involved a combined analytical effort by all American intelligence services.

Under questioning, they explained that what they meant was that the analysis had been done "on a narrow basis" in the Central Intelligence Agency, but with raw material furnished by all the intelligence agencies. They also said that the analysis had been coordinated within the C.I.A., then with the rest of the intelligence agencies "on a limited basis" and lastly distributed under a Central Intelligence Agency stamp as an institutional report.

A spokesman for the agency had no comment on the study.

VIETNAM: OUT FASTER

(By Stewart Alsop)

WASHINGTON.—Obedient to his Pavlovian impulses, Senator Fulbright charged last week that the air raids on North Vietnam and the prisoner-rescue operation signaled "an expansion of the war." The chances are that the precise opposite is true. For there is a growing feeling among the Administration's policymakers that it might be a good idea to accelerate the rate of withdrawal from Vietnam very sharply.

There are two good reasons why this would be a good idea. One is that discipline and morale in the American Army in Vietnam are deteriorating very seriously. The other is that the Army has accomplished the basic mission for which it was sent to Vietnam.

As to the first point, an item of evidence is the addition to the verb "to frag" to the enlisted man's vocabulary in Vietnam. The word means to use a fragmentation grenade to cool the ardor of any officer or NCO too eager to make contact with the enemy. No doubt the number of men who have been fragged is small, but the word itself tells the story.

Much other evidence tells the same story, like the recent article in *Life* about an infantry company whose West Point commander had to plead with his men to go on patrol—when a commander has to plead with his men, instead of ordering them, his outfit has gone plumb to hell. That the whole Army in Vietnam is in danger of going plumb to hell is further attested by a small flood of letters from Vietnam stimulated by a couple of recent pieces in this space.

AVOID CONTACT

A sergeant, for example, writes that "leaders of small combat units like myself" are under fierce pressure from their men to do everything possible to "avoid contact with the enemy." Other letters bear witness to the bitterness of the combat soldiers who feel—with reason—that the system discriminates against them. "I am a combat infantryman, a draftee, a loser," one man wrote. "The few times we go to the rear we are treated like scum by the clerks and jerks . . . I would rather shoot my commanding officer than the enemy."

There are certain obvious reasons for the deterioration of discipline and morale. A retreat is the most difficult of military movements, partly because no one wants to be the last man killed in a war. "No one wants to be a casualty for no reason at all," writes an enlisted man, "especially when the decision to terminate the fighting over here has already been taken."

Any army, moreover, reflects the home front, and the home front has lost stomach for the war. The war was hardly mentioned in the recent campaign, and no brass bands greet the returning veteran. The Army reflects the home front in another way too. Recent witnesses before a House committee testified that between 60 per cent and 80 per cent of the enlisted men have tried the powerful Vietnam marijuana. The drug culture, in other words, has invaded the Army. A pot-smoking army can hardly be expected to be a first-class fighting force.

DREADFUL SYSTEM

There is also a less obvious reason for the deterioration—the Army's dreadful system of recruitment. Under the system, the Army entices men to enlist by promising them, almost in so many words, that they will not have to fight in Vietnam. A man who enlists before he is drafted is permitted to choose his own "MOS" or military occupational specialty. Not surprisingly, only 2.5 per cent choose the infantry.

This dreadful system has now caught up with the Army in Vietnam. The combat forces in Vietnam three or four years ago were highly professional, and very impressive. Now, as a result of the system, the combat forces are manned by bitter draftees. Almost nine out of ten (88 per cent) of the infantry riflemen are draftees.

The result is inevitable—the draftees get killed in disproportionate numbers. They make up less than a third of the men in Vietnam. But according to a study by Andrew Glass for the *National Journal*, confirmed by the Pentagon manpower experts as accurate, they get killed at nearly double the rate of the non-draftee enlisted men.

Is it any wonder that the draftees are bitter? Is it, in fact, any wonder that they do as little fighting as possible? And is it any wonder that those who know the score are beginning to think about pulling this non-fighting army out of Vietnam in a hurry?

Present plans call for withdrawing to the level of about 280,000 men by May, with gradual withdrawals thereafter to around 50,000 men in the fall of 1972. This "residual force" will be manned wholly by non-draftees. Its job will be to ensure continued air and firepower superiority to the South Vietnamese, thus protecting to the extent possible the huge American investment of blood and treasure in Vietnam.

This rate of withdrawal could certainly be accelerated. According to those who should know, the draw-down to the residual-force level could be completed, in an orderly fashion, by the fall of next year, perhaps by late summer. The chief argument against such an acceleration is that it would undercut our bargaining power in Paris. But surely it ought to be obvious by this time that the Communist side has not—and never has

had—the slightest intention of negotiating a compromise settlement our side could conceivably accept.

There are risks, of course, in an accelerated withdrawal, but the greatest risk of all is inherent in the constant deterioration of discipline and morale in our Army in Vietnam. There is also another reason why the withdrawal could and should be accelerated.

OBJECT ACHIEVED

The object of our long agency in Vietnam has been to prevent the Communists from seizing power by force in South Vietnam. No one can predict what might happen five or ten years from now. But for the immediately foreseeable future, according to sensible men who know what they are talking about, that object has been achieved.

The Communists can still make a lot of trouble, of course. But even after an accelerated withdrawal, they simply do not have the forces or the political support to make good on their promise to rename Saigon Ho Chi Minh City—not unless we Americans are asinine enough to throw away our whole huge investment in Vietnam by withdrawing, in a fit of pique, all our support for the people who have fought on our side.

Back in 1966, Sen. George Aiken proposed that we make a "unilateral declaration of military victory," and withdraw our forces from Vietnam. In the sense that the basic American objective in Vietnam has now been achieved, that "victory" has at last been won. So it is time to take those bitter draftees in our crumbling Army out of Vietnam—and the sooner the better.

THE WELFARE REFORM PROPOSAL

Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, probably no issue which has been before Congress has been more important, more complex, and more confused than the welfare reform proposal which the Senate will be taking up this week.

The statement by Secretary Richardson, which was printed in the *Washington Post* this morning, is the most clear and concise summary of this matter I have seen.

For the benefit of Senators who might have missed the article, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the *RECORD*.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the *RECORD*, as follows:

SECRETARY RICHARDSON ON FAMILY ASSISTANCE (By Elliot L. Richardson)

Our Nation today is facing a burgeoning welfare crisis which is costly to our states, demoralizing to our workers, and degrading to our poor.

In the last few years, the numbers of Americans added to the public welfare rolls has increased sharply and the costs of welfare have escalated even more precipitously. Some of our cities and states are facing the choice of cutting back programs or enacting confiscatory taxes. Total costs of AFDC are projected to increase *threefold* by 1976 if present trends continue.

But money and caseloads are not the major reasons the system called "welfare" has failed. No one doubts that there are many persons in great need; if the program provided hope, opportunity and dignity to those whom it tried to help, the price would be well worth it. And if it were equitable to those it does not help, there would be far less social cost in the form of resentment. Yet the system does just the opposite; it discriminates against the co-called working poor who comprise fully *43 per cent* of the poor; it crushes people's hopes, robs them of opportunities, and erodes their dignity.