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which he unveils in his book with all the awe accompanying the deciphering of the Rosetta Stone. All Hoopes writes about is what he either overheard in the corridors of the Pentagon or what some people told him. Therefore, it is an accounting which could have been done by any one of a hundred competent Washington reporters. Indeed, Henry Brandon's latest book is far more knowledgeable than Hoopes'. But because Hoopes allegedly was an "insider," a good many people in Washington and New York use him as The Diviner of presidential thought, and The Authority on top secret Vietnam meetings.

But the essential truth overlooked is one that every presidential assistant knows, or ought to know, and every professional reporter understands. This truth is best stated by Arthur Schlesinger in the foreword to his volume "A Thousand Days":

"A presidential associate, moreover, inevitably tends to over-rate the significance of things he does know about. Grace Tully who was FDR's personal secretary acutely observed of the books written by the men around FDR: 'None of them could know that for each minute they spent with the President he spent a hundred minutes by himself and a thousand more with scores of other people—to reject, improvise, weigh and match this against that until a decision was reached.'"

This statement is very, very true. Thus, it becomes comic lunacy to think a minor official in the Defense Department, or anyone else reporting events, has a more truthful grasp of presidential motives and thoughts and action than the President. Titus Oakes once had a good deal to say about what high-ranking Englishmen were alleged to have said and thought, but no historian cites Oakes as an authority.

Colorful news reports of the decision to stop the bombing on March 31 are labeled as "the struggle for the President's mind." This is laughable. Whatever you may choose to say about Lyndon Johnson, even his worst enemies would have to concede he was one of the strongest-minded, toughest men ever to occupy the White House. To picture him as a dangling puppet pulled and tugged by various factions may be good theater, but it is lousy reporting.

I daresay I was one of three or four presidential assistants privy to much of what President Johnson was thinking and planning, but none of us was privy to *all*. This is a crucial fact. I must confess I cannot specify under oath exactly how the President reached any decision, because I do not know everything that went into the framing of the decision.

As anyone who has served a President can testify, chief executives sometimes encourage conflicting views among advisers, incite one aide to believe he is right in order to generate spacious rebuttal from another. One cabinet officer or assistant can be totally truthful when he reports that he told the President thus-and-such and the President seemed to be agreeable, or shocked, or interested or wrathful or convinced. But the cabinet officer or assistant cannot know that an hour later the President was discussing the same problem with another cabinet officer or assistant and getting another view of the subject and feeding that information into his own mind as he tried to shape and form the right course of action.

My own personal experience with President Johnson makes me know that no one person in his administration knew everything he was thinking. Many times I presented an idea to him and was rebuffed after a merciless cross-examination. I would leave the President convinced I had failed to excite his interest. Several days later, after the President had scoured the idea with other aides and advisers, I would find him taking

hold of the idea, molding it and reshaping it, and finally using it for specific action.

But I could not swear that someone else had not offered the same idea to him, and I could not really know if it were an idea that had already occurred to the President and one which he wanted to circle and examine before he determined to use it.

That is why if I had scurried to my diary and inserted the presidential conversation in its pages as truth, I would not have been accurate. That is also why at memoir-writing time, each aide and adviser has a fixed and different opinion about what "the President thought." And that is why each memoir by aide and/or adviser can only be half-right, and only partly true.

The President's decision on anything may be right or wrong. It may be to the nation's benefit or it may not. But *how* he reached that decision can be told only by the President and no one else, because no one, no matter how high or powerful in the government or out, knows everything that went on in the President's mind, and the facts, the information, the instinct, the judgments that formed the final shaping of the presidential decision.

MISLEADING STATEMENT REGARDING IOWA FOOD STAMP PROGRAM

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, page 3 of today's Des Moines Register contains a story by reporter Jerry Szumski covering the Governor's Conference on Food, Nutrition, and Health at Iowa State University.

The keynote speaker at the conference was Mr. Nick Kotz, of the Register's Washington bureau.

The story reports that Mr. Kotz estimated 70,000 Iowa children go hungry because of an inadequate food stamp program and said "Iowa Senator JACK MILLER and Iowa Congressmen WILLIAM SCHERLE and WILEY MAYNE have obstructed legislation to expand food aid."

Mr. President, this is not the first time that Mr. Kotz has abused his power and responsibility as a journalist.

In the first place, the readers of this story have no way of knowing what Mr. Kotz meant by "obstructed."

In the second place, the facts do not support any such allegation.

The facts are that, as a member of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, I supported the administration's recommendation that \$750 million be authorized for the food stamp program for fiscal 1970—more than double the \$340 million authorized in the old law and almost three times the amount appropriated for fiscal 1969; also, that \$1.5 billion be authorized for fiscal 1971 and 1972.

When the bill came before the Senate for debate, the junior Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN) offered an amendment to increase the amounts to \$1.25 billion for fiscal 1970, to \$2 billion for fiscal 1971, and to \$2.5 billion for fiscal 1972.

I voted against the so-called McGovern amendment. Nevertheless, the amendment was adopted—notwithstanding that the administration had advised that it did not have the organization and personnel to properly handle more than the amount approved by the Senate Agriculture Committee. Those who supported the McGovern amendment were warned that such great increases in the

program would not be approved by the House and might, in fact, jeopardize the entire program.

Although I voted against the McGovern amendment, I still voted for the bill when it passed the Senate, because I felt strongly that the food stamp program had been improved by the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry and I was hopeful that the House would take action on the bill and reduce the amounts down to what could be efficiently handled by the administration.

The bill passed the Senate on September 24, 1969, and it is still in the House. The warnings given the supporters of the McGovern amendment have come true. Had they been heeded, we would likely have had a bill passed by both Houses and signed by the President long ago.

I wonder whether Mr. Kotz should not have called the adoption of the McGovern amendment an act of "obstructionism."

Further, with this authorization bill being considered by the Agriculture Committees of the House and Senate, it became necessary to pass a special authorization bill just for fiscal 1970 as a basis for appropriations for the program in the Agriculture appropriations bill.

On June 24, 1969, the Senate passed Senate Joint Resolution 126, which increased the authorization for fiscal 1970 to \$750 million. I not only supported this resolution, but, in fact, made the motion to report it out favorably in the Committee on Agriculture. Subsequently the House passed a similar resolution.

I ask, now, Does this sound like "obstructionism"?

Mr. Kotz, as a Pulitzer prize winner, is quite capable of ascertaining all of the facts which I have recited; and, to the best of my knowledge, all of these facts were known to him.

Now, after making such a gross and misleading statement, abusing his position as a keynote speaker at a Governor's Conference, he will apparently be returning to Washington to continue to undertake reporting in a manner in keeping with the standards of his profession which provide: "Good faith with the reader is the foundation of all journalism worthy of the name," and violation of this principle "is not to be excused for lack of thoroughness or accuracy" within the control of the journalist.

Mr. Kotz does not owe me any apology, because the facts refuting his misstatement are apology enough. But he does owe an apology to those attending the Governor's Conference for misleading them and to the readers of the Des Moines Register who have also been misled by his remarks.

CANADIAN OIL IMPORTS

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, the authority for the oil import control program is vested in the President by section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act. Under that act, in order to restrict imports, the President must find that they "threaten to impair the national security."

When the present control program

was established in 1959 by President Eisenhower, Proclamation 3279 expressly exempted Canadian imports. This was clearly because Canadian imports did not, and could not, impair national security.

On March 10, President Nixon announced a significant cutback, about 150,000 barrels a day, in Canadian oil imports. Under what authority did he act?

He acted under the same authority which President Eisenhower concluded did not apply to Canadian imports. And everyone else has reached the same conclusion. Canada is, after all, our best friend and neighbor.

The President's own Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control, in a February 1970 report stated, on page 94:

The risk of political instability or animosity is generally conceded to be very low in Canada. The risk of physical interruption or diversion of Canadian oil to other export markets in an emergency is also minimal.

Have there been any new developments which would justify the President's determination that there is some security risk in Canadian imports? The President's statement points out:

The flow of oil from Canada, however, has recently risen to levels much higher than anticipated under the (voluntary) agreement.

Indeed, imports have risen sharply since January 1, when Chicago began to draw Canadian oil by pipeline. But exceeding a voluntary agreement is no basis for concluding that the national security is impaired.

The relatively small volume of Canadian oil now being imported is irrelevant to our national security, and it is difficult to believe that very much larger increases in such imports could affect our security interests adversely.

When the President released the task force's report on February 20, 1970, he said:

All members also agreed that a unique degree of security can be afforded by moving toward an integrated North American energy market.

Are we to believe that in 18 days the "unique degree of security" has, somehow, been lost?

I think there is a serious question as to whether the President's proclamation controlling Canadian oil imports is valid. There is no question, however, that it is unwise. It is unfair to the Northern States and offensive to Canada.

The President said that the task force concluded that the present Canadian situation "does not effectively serve our National security interests and leads to inequities within the United States." And he also said that he deems it necessary "in the interest of the national security objectives of Proclamation 3279" to establish the import limitation. But he did not say expressly that these imports "threaten to impair the national security."

Perhaps, the most significant part of his finding is that it "leads to inequi-

ties within the United States." I can find nothing in the statutory authority for the import control program that relates to such internal inequities. And what about the inequities created for Canada? Has the United States no concern about those?

The President declined to adopt the recommendations of the majority of his task force calling for substantial increases in imports from the Middle East and Venezuela. These would have been of great benefit to American consumers and clearly would not have impaired the national security. The only ones who can benefit from that decision are the profit-swollen American oil giants. And now he has taken another decision, in the interest of these same giants, which can only hurt consumers and refiners in the northern part of the United States and our friends across the border.

In the case of my State, the problem is especially acute. The independent refiners there depend entirely on Canadian crude, except for quite limited amounts from North Dakota and Montana. The refiners use all of the domestic output which is available to them. If Canadian imports are curtailed, they must curtail operations.

Before the entry of these refineries in the Minnesota market, my State was plagued with uncertain supplies, high costs, and outright shortages of heating oil in the winter months. These refiners have stabilized the market, eliminated shortages, and controlled costs in what remains a high cost area. To cut back supplies for these refiners is intolerable. Contrary to the President's decision, his task force recommended that these refiners not have their supplies reduced.

For other-users of Canadian crude, there are substantial domestic sources of crude oil available, although at a somewhat higher cost. I cannot condone the President's decision which will force higher cost petroleum on the consumers in other parts of the northern United States. In the case of my State, however, it is not a question of costs but of the survival of the refineries which have safeguarded the consumers of Minnesota from the serious problems which they have experienced in the past.

I understand that the Committee on Finance has promised to hold hearings on the oil import program. I thought that was very desirable before the President received his task force report. When he declined to implement his task force's proposals, I concluded that a congressional review was essential. Now I am convinced that it cannot wait.

There is a significant basis for concluding that the President's decision is in violation of the law. It is an unwarranted slap at our Canadian friends. I hope the Committee on Finance will examine in detail the basis for the President's action.

If he has violated the law, his action must be rescinded. In any event, I believe that Congress must seriously consider whether authority which can be exercised in such a cavalier fashion should be permitted to remain law.

INCREASED BROKERAGE COMMISSIONS

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, recently the New York Stock Exchange asked for a substantial increase in brokerage commissions being charged the small investors; that is, those purchasing 200 shares or less. They suggested that this proposed increase for small-lot purchases be offset by a corresponding reduction for the large institutional buyers.

The approval of such a plan would be grossly unfair to the small investors, and it would also have an adverse effect on a recent national program to encourage every citizen to buy securities whereby he would become an owner of a part of America.

On February 20, 1970, I registered my objections to this proposal with the Chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission, and I was encouraged by his reply indicating a similar concern for the small investors.

I ask unanimous consent that my letter of February 20, 1970, addressed to Mr. Hamer H. Budge, Chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission, and his reply thereto, dated March 4, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. SENATE,

Washington, D.C., February 20, 1970.

Mr. HAMER H. BUDGE,
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. BUDGE: I am very much concerned over the recent proposal of the New York Stock Exchange for a substantial increase in brokerage commissions for the small investors to be offset by a corresponding reduction for the larger institutional buyers.

Just a few years ago the Exchange, supported by Government endorsement, launched a national campaign to encourage the low and middle income investors to buy securities and thereby become owners of a part of America. I heartily endorsed that program not only because it promoted and encouraged savings but also because it is a constructive step toward better citizenship when every individual has an interest in our capitalistic system.

The present proposal to raise the commission rates for the small investor from 60 per cent to over 100 per cent above present rates is a backward step. Already the small investor is being penalized in that by Government regulation he is only getting 5 per cent for investing in a seven-year Government bond whereas the larger investors get from 8 per cent to 9 per cent. Likewise the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation have authorized an average of 2 per cent variation in the interest that can be paid to the small depositors as compared to the large depositors. This discrimination against small investors with executive approval is highly discriminatory, and I express the hope that your Agency will not approve such a plan.

It should not be overlooked that the various exchanges have a virtual monopoly on the sale of these securities, and if they expect to maintain this monopoly they should recognize their responsibilities to the public and be willing to accept the obligation to protect and encourage the small investors.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN J. WILLIAMS.