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CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D.C., April 8, 1970.

Mr. ROY L. ASH,
Chairman, President's Advisory Council on
Executive Organization, Executive Office
Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. ASH: At its February 26 meeting, the Board of Directors of the National Chamber adopted a policy position urging the implementation of a major recommendation made by the President's Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources.

The National Chamber urges creation of a new civilian agency (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency—NOAA) to administer the nation's civil marine and atmospheric programs. To complement this agency, the National Chamber recommends the creation of a National Advisory Committee for the Oceans (NACO) to advise the head of NOAA concerning his functions and coordinating responsibilities, and to report to the President and the Congress on the progress of government and private industry in achieving the objectives of a national ocean program.

Within the next few days the National Chamber will advise Senator Hollings of the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the Senate Commerce Committee that we support S. 2841 to create the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency. The creation of this agency is a necessary first step toward improving our national marine capability.

Sincerely,

JOHN J. COFFEY, JR.,
Senior Associate for Natural Resources
and Environmental Quality.

THE HILL-BURTON ACT

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I am most pleased that the Senate this week passed H.F. 11102, to revise and extend the Hill-Burton Act.

The members and staff of the Health Subcommittee and the full Committee on Labor and Public Welfare are to be commended for the great effort that obviously went into the preparation of this bill. I was particularly pleased with the provisions that permitted the use of Hill-Burton money for the construction and modernization of freestanding outpatient facilities. I have long felt that the neighborhood health centers that can be built with these funds will be fundamental in insuring the delivery of adequate health services to all our citizens.

I wish to thank the Senator from Ohio (Mr. SAXBE) for offering two amendments for me in my absence and the Senator from Texas (Mr. YARBOROUGH) and the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK) for graciously accepting them on behalf of the committee.

THE ATTACK CARRIER FORCE LEVEL

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, the Joint Subcommittee of House and Senate Committees on Armed Services is now holding hearings on the study of the attack carrier force level. This study, which was required under the 1970 military procurement authorization legislation, is focusing on the need for a fourth nuclear carrier, the CVAN-70.

On April 8, 1970, Congressman WILLIAM S. MOORHEAD of Pennsylvania and I testified before this joint subcommittee. Congressman MOORHEAD, one of the

outstanding leaders of the congressional effort to reduce unnecessary military spending and to eliminate Pentagon waste, questioned the Navy's carrier policy during last year's debate on the military authorization bill.

In his testimony of April 8, Congressman MOORHEAD pointed out that—

Since none of the Communist nations have any attack carriers, nor apparently have any intention of building any attack carriers, the question is whether our present superiority of 15 to 0 in aircraft carriers should be maintained or increased, or whether that absolute superiority of 15 to 0 might be reduced to say 12 to 0.

He then argued, as I had done in my testimony, that if only 12 attack carriers are sufficient for defense between now and 1980, then the Congress can afford to postpone any decision to build the CVAN-70—the third of three planned nuclear carriers—until fiscal year 1975.

Congressman MOORHEAD's statement also summarized the results of a most significant paper comparing land and sea-based air power prepared by Herbert Rosensweig—formerly of the Defense Department's Office of Systems Analysis. The Rosensweig study concludes that the optimum number of attack carriers for a balanced force should be 12 or less—a conclusion with which both Congressman MOORHEAD and myself agree.

I hope that every Member of Congress will find time to read this excellent statement. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TESTIMONY OF CONGRESSMAN WILLIAM S. MOORHEAD

Mr. Chairman, as a former officer in an attack carrier task force in the Pacific during World War II, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before this Special Joint Committee to raise some questions about the future role of attack carriers.

The issue to be determined by this Committee, it would seem to me, is not whether we need any carriers now for I know of few people who would challenge that need for some carriers. Instead, it would appear that what needs to be brought out, discussed and, hopefully, answered is:

1. How many attack carriers do we need now, in five years or in ten years to supply the defensive needs of the country?
2. Can part of the tactical air support mission of the attack carriers be provided more economically by land based aircraft?
3. And finally, is the mission of the carrier in the long term being eroded by increasing technology causing increased vulnerability to the point where the Navy ought to give serious consideration to placing its primary emphasis on up-grading its capability in areas other than attack carriers?

As you are aware, an answer to the first question is imperative if we in Congress are to fulfill our constitutional role of providing for the common defense. Since none of the Communist nations have any attack aircraft carriers, nor apparently have any intention of building any attack carriers the question is whether the present superiority of 15 to 0 in aircraft carriers should be maintained or increased, or whether that absolute superiority of 15 to 0 might be reduced to say 12 to 0.

Although we should not necessarily size our carrier forces to correspond to Soviet forces, it may be useful to look at what the Soviet Union is doing—especially since

so many of our military plans in other categories of defense are based on parity with the Russians. The Soviets are building missile cruisers, missile destroyers, high-speed missile boats, nuclear subs and attack subs—but no attack carrier. However, the Navy has estimated that 40 per cent of its budget goes to maintaining the carrier fleet. In terms of national priorities it is instructive to point out that we spend more than twice as much (over \$400 million) on operating costs of the 15th carrier task force for one year than we spent for water pollution control programs last year.

THE STATE OF OUR PRESENT CARRIER FORCE

The answer to the question of whether we should build additional aircraft carriers at this time depends on:

1. The number of CVAs we want to operate in the late 1970's; and

2. The number of CVAs we currently have which will be both seaworthy and capable of operating the modern tactical aircraft in the late 1970's.

At present we have nine modern aircraft carriers; eight *Forrestal* class ships which have been commissioned since 1955 and the nuclear-powered *Enterprise* which was commissioned in 1961. In addition, two new nuclear-powered carriers have been funded by the Congress. The *Nimitz*, which was funded in FY 67, will enter the fleet in 1972 and the *Eisenhower*, which was funded in FY 68-70, will enter the fleet in 1974.

In addition to these 11 ships, there are 3 *Midway* class carriers. These ships, which were commissioned in 1945-1947, have received extensive modernization since that time. The *Midway*, which is currently undergoing a \$200 million modernization program, will be recommissioned this year. After modernization it will be able to operate all of the modern aircraft envisioned for the Navy for at least the next decade. Thus it should be serviceable for at least 10 more years. The *Coral Sea* received an extensive modernization from 1956-1960 and the *Roosevelt* was modernized from 1953-1956. These ships can operate all of the current aircraft except the RA-5C. They will be able to operate all of the Navy aircraft currently under development; including the F-14 fighter.

Finally, there are 5 modified *Essex* class carriers. These are smaller ships which, with the exception of the *Oriskany*, were commissioned during World War II. They cannot operate the modern F-4 fighters or the RA-5 reconnaissance aircraft.

It is difficult to determine the age at which we should replace CVAs. The answer depends on the cost to keep the ships seaworthy and the extent to which they can operate the modern aircraft. While the Navy has indicated that the carriers have a nominal life of 30 years, there are many ships now in service which are substantially older than this. Without going into this issue any further, however, we can draw the following conclusions regarding the need for additional CVA construction:

1. There are 11 ships that will be serviceable well into the 1980's and at least one other (the *Midway*) that will be satisfactory until at least 1980. Since it takes about 5 years to build a CVA, we do not have to fund additional carriers until at least 1975 unless we want to operate more than 12 CVAs in the late 1970's.

2. If we want to operate more than 12 CVAs in the late 1970's, we must decide now on a replacement schedule for the *Midway* and *Essex* class carriers.

Carriers take five years to construct. Hence, we must know how many total attack carriers will be required in five years if we are to take proper action now. I have repeatedly questioned the Navy with regard to the total number of carriers they plan at any given time. Their answers have not been entirely

satisfactory in shedding a proper insight on the matter. For example, in response to questions I put to Rear Admiral Sonenshein after Joint Economic Committee hearings in December, Rear Admiral Johnston on March 9th indicated that only three *Nimitz* class nuclear attack carriers are currently planned within the approved Five Year Defense Plan. These would be the CVAN's 68 and 69 and the proposed CVAN 70. Since the Five Year Defense Plan extends for approximately the same lead time as carrier construction and since this appears to be the only officially sanctioned planning document, we in Congress have no way of determining what the Navy's plans are without knowing the overall size of the attack carrier fleet they plan to maintain.

For example, if the Navy in the years between 1975 and 1980 plans to maintain a fleet of 18 carriers and, further, adheres to the 30 year life guideline, then between now and 1975 we must approve the construction of six additional carriers. If the fleet force should be 15 as is widely mentioned, then we will have to approve the construction of three additional carriers. If, however, only twelve attack carriers are sufficient for defense between now and 1980, then the Congress can afford to postpone any decision to build additional carriers until 1975.

With this basic equation involving total size of the fleet and age as background, I would like to explore certain factors which ought to be considered in determining the size of the carrier fleet.

The role of attack carriers

The role of the carrier can be roughly separated into three parts which I present in order of ease of justification: 1) providing "presence" in time of crisis but no overt hostile action has occurred; 2) providing tactical air support in major but limited engagements such as Vietnam and Korea; and 3) some potential role in the event of an all-out conflict with the Soviet Union. Additionally, the Navy has indicated that attack carriers are necessary to ensure continuing freedom of the seas in the face of a growing Soviet naval threat. Each of these roles or missions is somewhat different and ought to be explored separately.

To provide a presence

The first mission, that is, providing presence in time of crisis but when no hostile action takes place, is perhaps the most difficult to assess. In this situation the carrier is presumed to act as a deterrent. Yet as in any case where hostile action is prevented by presence, no one—probably even the potential enemy—can say what factor tips the balance in favor of deterring aggression. Carriers undoubtedly assist. But so do our strategic bombers and our potential for rapidly deploying land forces and land based aircraft. Last year during the Congressional debate it was cited that since 1945 our carrier forces had been engaged in more than 50 of these incidents throughout the world. Assuming an average level of 15 carrier task forces during this period, this averages out to a cost of about \$2 billion per incident. I think that even the Navy would agree that \$2 billion per incident is a pretty steep price tag. The fact of the matter is that "providing presence" is an imponderable. It is doubtful if so many of our carriers could be justified if all they did was to provide presence. Furthermore, "presence" could have been provided with a reduced total carrier force.

COST OF LAND BASED VERSUS SEA BASED TACTICAL AIR

The main mission of the carrier fleet in the past 25 years has been to provide tactical air support first during the Korean conflict and of late in the Southeast Asian war. The carrier has augmented our land-based aircraft. The questions raised in this regard deal

with the relative cost of land based tactical air support vis-a-vis carrier based tactical air support.

Much of what follows is gleaned from a well documented paper entitled "Aircraft Carriers—Should We Build More?" prepared by Mr. Herbert Rosenzweig formerly of the OSD office of Systems Analysis and from notes taken in a seminar conducted by Mr. Rosenzweig at the Brookings Institution and attended by a member of my staff.

From these and other sources I would conclude:

1. A land based air wing costs \$165 million less per year to operate than a carrier based wing provided no air-lift support is required. In such a case the land based wings can be deployed almost as quickly as carrier based wings.

2. If airlift is provided to support the land based wing and bare base kits are pre-positioned in Europe, Southeast Asia and Korea, the land based wing is still \$120 million per year less than the carrier equivalent. In such a case the land based wing could be deployed as fast as the fastest possible carrier deployment.

3. In short term conflicts, carrier based and land based aircraft experience approximately equal sortie rates. As the term of the operation lengthens, the overall sortie rate and hence the effectiveness of land based aircraft is from 30% to 100% greater than carrier based aircraft.

4. Carrier based aircraft would be more vulnerable to enemy action in a Central European war than land based aircraft. In Southeast Asia, Korea and other areas of the world, the vulnerability is significantly lower than in the Mediterranean and North Sea and, therefore, in these areas vulnerability should not be as serious a factor in the choice between land based and sea based aircraft.

5. There are more than enough land bases in Europe to meet our needs. In the North Asian theater, we can operate 1,200 fighter/attack aircraft from bases in Korea, Japan and Okinawa. Differing assessments of the needs of another Korean-type conflict range from 500-1200 aircraft for tactical support. In southeast Asia, we have more than enough land bases to meet all of our tactical air needs. In other areas of the world such as Africa or South America our needs are likely to be quite small—probably no more than a few wings of tactical aircraft. The Middle East and the southern flank of Europe presents a difficult problem. In an Arab-Israeli involvement, while land bases are not prevalent, the use of large numbers of carriers in the Mediterranean would be quite risky—especially if the situation were such that the Soviet Union might become involved.

6. In the past, General Purpose Forces were planned to support 2½ wars. The present Administration appears to be heading towards a 1½ war policy. It was difficult to justify 15 CVA's under the previous policy. Under the present policy it seems clear that there ought to be a reduction.

Mr. Chairman, the results of the Rosenzweig study conclude that the optimum number of CVA's for a balanced force should be twelve or less. The report further recommends that the Congress reconsider the action taken last year approving the construction of CVAN 69.

The need for analysis

As a complete layman in the field of Systems Analysis, I found the arguments presented in Mr. Rosenzweig's paper very persuasive. In all of the debates over this issue, I have never seen any real analysis of the issues involved. This paper is the rare exception and I highly recommend that the Committee obtain a copy for study in order to get a balanced view of the issue that will mean billions of dollars in expenditures over the next few years.

I understand that the Committee has requested the paper from the Brookings Insti-

tution and has been turned down because Brookings hopes to publish the paper shortly.

However, the Pentagon has a copy of both Mr. Rosenzweig's Brookings paper as well as the classified OSD Systems Analysis version of the paper. The Committee should demand that the paper be made available on both a classified and non-classified basis. The issue of the relative cost-effectiveness of land based versus sea based tactical air is skillfully analyzed and is crucial to any determination of the future role of attack carriers.

Questions on the joint study

On this same subject I have the following questions about this Joint Committee study:

Has the Committee been provided access to last year's highly touted study by the National Security Council on the future role of attack carriers? Has the Committee been briefed on this study and will it be made available to Congress?

Due to the enormous sums involved in the decision of whether to buy any more attack carriers—has the Committee commissioned any studies on the issues in the seven months it has been in existence?

Who is studying the foreign policy implications of the carrier issues?—Is there any liaison with the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees?

What is the impact of the President's Guam statement and the new Nixon low profile in foreign policy on the future of attack carriers?

Have any of the analytical people who are carrier critics been invited to testify before the Committee, such as Herbert Rosenzweig, William Kaufman of Brookings, M.I.T., and former Special Assistant to Secretary McNamara; Alain Enthoven, former Assistant Secretary of Defense; Arthur Herrington, currently in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Arnold Kuzmack, formerly of Systems Analysis; and Ivan Sellin, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis. And I am sure there are other qualified people outside of the Pentagon who could address these issues and substantially increase the level of debate.

Now I would like to make some observations on what I view as a critical issue—the vulnerability of the attack carriers.

CARRIER VULNERABILITY

The question of carrier vulnerability has been debated for some time. There are a number of scenarios that must be considered—some of them reasonable and some that are really far less than reasonable. The first is an all-out war with the Soviet Union. In such a situation, the war would most likely be fought with both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. In this case, I am quite sure that even the Navy would admit that carriers would be extremely vulnerable. Only through a quirk of fate would any survive.

The remaining potential enemies do not constitute a significant threat to our carriers. The Chinese do have about 30 conventional submarines of medium endurance. However, their tactical missileery could not be considered a major threat, although in any engagement we probably would not get off scot free. The North Vietnamese present no real threat to the carriers. The Egyptians do present a modicum of trouble for carriers in a first strike since they do possess the Soviet-built Styx missiles. However, it is unlikely that any sustained attack could be mounted since the Egyptian patrol boats would be quickly destroyed. The remainder of the nations of the world present no significant threat to our carriers.

Conventional war at sea with the Soviets?

These then are the reasonable scenarios. Let us consider an unreasonable one, but one which many people continue to dwell upon with analytical fascination: a conven-

tional war with the Soviet Union. Carriers do not fare too well when considering their vulnerability in this situation.

The vulnerability of aircraft carriers in a conventional United States/Soviet War is an issue that has not been sufficiently studied; or if it has, the results have not been made available to the Congressional membership. The Navy has not stated in a clear-cut manner what the survivability of aircraft carriers would be against a potent enemy such as the Soviet Union under conventional war time conditions. Rear Admiral Johnston has stated that carriers are not completely vulnerable and they are not completely invulnerable. This is less than marginal help. Last year during Congressional debate, Admiral Moorer made the statement, purporting to demonstrate the invulnerability of carriers, that during World War II not a single carrier had been sunk by Kamikaze attack. This statement is technically cor-

rect. However, it is misleading for two reasons. First, the comparison is not good because the Kamikaze is a vintage 1945 weapon. The weaponry of this country cannot be predicated upon defending against an enemy armed with obsolete weapons. For example, if the Army were to propose an anti-aircraft weapon capable of destroying Sopwith Camels, I hardly think the Congress would swallow such a rationale. Modern defenses must be capable of countering an enemy equipped with equally modern weapons. Another reason the Kamikaze statement is misleading is that while no carriers were sunk by these human guided missiles, a number were seriously damaged and put out of action for extended periods or permanently. I have been informed that 13 carriers were seriously damaged by Kamikaze attacks, but the following list is the most comprehensive we could put together on short notice:

CARRIERS BADLY DAMAGED BY KAMIKAZE ATTACKS

Ship ¹	Date	Number of hits	Notes
Saratoga (CV-3)	Feb. 21, 1945	4	Serious damage, went out of commission.
Ticonderoga (CV-14) ²	Jan. 21, 1945	2	Returned to base.
Bunker Hill (CV-17) ²	May 11, 1945	2	Returned to base, went out of commission.
Intrepid (CV-11) ²	Nov. 25, 1944	2	Returned to base.
Enterprise (CV-6)	May 13, 1945	+1	Returned to base, went out of commission.
Others listed as badly damaged by Morison ² :			
Franklin (CV-13) ²	Mar. 18, 1945		
Wasp (CV-18) ²	Mar. 19, 1945		
Hancock (CV-19) ²	Apr. 7, 1945		
Intrepid (CV-11) ²	Apr. 16, 1945		

1. M. Korotkin, "Battle Damage to Surface Ships During World War II." Translation 310, David Taylor Model Basin, Feb. 1964.

² Essex Class or later.

³ Vol. 14, pp. 389-392.

So instead of dwelling on an enemy armed with historical relics, let up dwell for a moment on modern weapons that carriers might face if we were at war with the Soviets.

Soviet attacks on our carriers might be expected from one or a combination of three sources: manned aircraft armed with air to surface missiles or bombs; surface-to-surface missiles launched by surface ships; and submarines launching either torpedoes or underwater launched guided missiles.

Aircraft and ASM threat

Considering the first source, that is, armed manned aircraft, we know that the Soviet Union has a considerable force of Badger, Blinder, and Bear aircraft. These are capable of carrying up to 10 missiles per plane. From 6 to 10 of these aircraft can be launched simultaneously which means that they can direct bursts of from 10 to 20 missiles at the carrier. Since we cannot expect over 90% reliability of our defense systems, the carrier probably would not survive. Admittedly the utility of these plans is limited by their range. However, areas of vulnerability include the Mediterranean, the North Sea and the area around Japan, Korea, and off the East Coast of the Soviet Union.

Missile and torpedo threat

The other sources of potential threat to our carriers stem from missiles and torpedoes fired from submarines or surface ships. Surface-to-surface missiles launched either from surface ships or submarines present a real threat to our carriers. The enemy objective is to try to hit aviation fuel supplies causing extensive damage. Experts estimate that two to four missile hits are sufficient to knock out a carrier for an extended period of time. This particular threat may be increasing considerably. According to an article in the Chicago Daily News on April 2, the Soviet Union is developing a new missile that has a range far in excess of the Styx. It can be fired from a submerged submarine and speeds to its target in the air just above the waves. The potential danger of such a missile is increased not just by its extended range or the fact that it can be stealthily fired, but also be-

cause of its altitude. A low altitude missile is quite difficult to defend against with our own surface to air missiles.

Torpedoes also constitute a threat to carriers. There are two types of torpedoes: straight running and homing. The damage potential of straight running torpedoes is low. A carrier could probably sustain 20 hits with low effect. However, according to experts the damage potential of homing torpedoes is relatively high despite the fact that counter-measures exist. Homing torpedoes are generally designed to home on the ship's screws. A carrier most frequently has 4 screws. If two are hit and rendered inoperable the carrier would most likely be incapable of fulfilling its mission of launching aircraft. While the carrier might not be sunk it would have to withdraw for some period of time.

The torpedoes mentioned thus far are conventional in their mission. Experts now believe that there is a possibility that the Soviets could develop a new type of torpedo capable of actually sinking a carrier. Such a torpedo would be designed to explode under the hull, in effect breaking the back of the carrier.

These conventional weapons exist and they can incapacitate or destroy carriers. This country does possess carrier defenses in the form of missiles and aircraft. However, no one, not even the most optimistic, could expect these defensive systems to operate in excess of 90% reliability. Therefore, we must assume that even under conventional war-time conditions with the Soviet Union, in the face of determined opposition attack carriers are quite vulnerable.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, there are any number of questions that this committee should answer. Detailed analyses exist that show that carriers are not cost-effective when compared to land based aircraft. The committee should study this report. It should request the Navy to provide similar studies justifying its position. Unless the Navy can provide additional insight and information, additional carriers seem not to be warranted at this time. Beyond the question of cost-effectiveness there

are very real indications that carriers are becoming increasingly vulnerable to sophisticated weaponry such that in the event of a major conflict with the Soviets, they would not survive.

For these reasons I believe that a balanced force should not exceed 12 carriers and that under these circumstances the Congress need not make a decision on the procurement of additional attack carriers until 1975.

ATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Number	Class	Name	Date commissioned
CVA-14	Essex	Ticonderoga ¹	1944
CVA-19	do	Hancock	1944
CVA-31	do	Bon Homme Richard	1944
CVA-34	do	Oriskany	1950
CVA-41	Midway	Midway ²	1945
CVA-42	do	Roosevelt	1945
CVA-43	do	Coral Sea	1947
CVA-59	Forrestal	Forrestal	1955
CVA-60	do	Saratoga	1956
CVA-61	do	Ranger	1957
CVA-62	do	Independence	1959
CVA-63	do	Kitty Hawk	1961
CVA-64	do	Constellation	1961
CVAN-65	Enterprise	Enterprise	1961
CVA-66	Forrestal	America	1965
CVA-67	do	Kennedy	1968
CVAN-68	Nimitz	Nimitz	(*)
CVAN-69	do	Eisenhower	(*)

¹ To become a CVN (ASW carrier) when Midway rejoins the fleet in 1970.

² To rejoin the fleet in 1970.

³ Undergoing modernization.

⁴ Modernized 1953-56.

⁵ Modernized 1956-60.

⁶ Under construction.

Note: Total, 18. In addition, there are presently 8 ASW carriers.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HUGHES). Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

PEACE CORPS ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 3430) to amend further the Peace Corps Act (75 Stat. 612), as amended.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, it was my intention earlier to offer an amendment to the pending bill, S. 3430, which would restore \$4 million of the 10 percent cut made by the committee. The committee cut the amount from \$98 million to \$90 million. However, in thinking it over, I have come to the conclusion that we could probably do better by waiting for the conference, because the House figure, although they have not acted as yet, is still at 98 plus million dollars.

I think the House would prevail. Also, I do not think it would be fair to act on an amendment today because so many