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But the treaty buys us time, precious time, to gain control over our destiny. With American adherence, coupled with energetic efforts to bring the treaty's mechanisms into force among the widest possible number of states, the non-proliferation treaty can help stop nuclear arms races from multiplying around the world. Without the United States, the effort to stop proliferation can be no more successful today than the League of Nations was fifty years ago. The tragedy for the world would be all the greater.

Since achieving the role of a major power early in this century, our burdens of leadership have grown. We face enormous demands on our patience and strength in meeting global commitments, while our society at home undergoes stresses more dramatic and far-reaching than at any time in history.

For our own security and the security of our friends, this country can never withdraw from its central responsibility for the preservation of peace. In all prudence, we can, and we must, work to keep the dangers of nuclear war from getting worse.

It is for this reason—its elemental prudence—that I support the non-proliferation treaty, as I supported the limited test-ban treaty five years ago. Eighty Senators voted in favor of the test ban then. This treaty, which complements and strengthens the mechanisms of the test-ban treaty, is a further step along the same path of reason.

There are three basic respects in which I find the merits of the non-proliferation treaty compelling.

First, the treaty promises to be effective in creating a global consensus against the growth of nuclear arms races to new and terrifying levels of violence. For the almost ninety non-nuclear nations already pledging to accept a commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, the treaty represents relief from the prospect of deepening instability and the enormous cost these weapons represent in the diversion of resources.

Although several important non-nuclear nations have yet to agree they will adhere to the treaty, the consensus developed on behalf of the treaty will bring united pressures to bear upon the hold-outs. And even if nations such as West Germany, Israel and India do not unequivocally block out their options to acquire nuclear weapons, broad acceptance of the treaty by others will serve as a useful restraint to hinder and deny legitimacy to unilateral decisions on the acquisition of such weapons.

From the point of view of United States security and diplomacy, the treaty would thus dramatically lessen the risk that the spread of nuclear weapon capabilities would require major expansions of American commitments to protect threatened allies. At the same time, pressures on the United States and other nuclear powers to foster or tolerate selective proliferation would be negated by reciprocal commitments blocking the further spread of nuclear weapons. It should be noted that the treaty would not prohibit the evolution of our NATO allies to a nuclear-armed federated political union including one or more existing weapon states.

Second, the treaty's safeguards provision offers a major breakthrough in the principle of international inspection of arms limitations agreements. This is of utmost importance as a working precedent for the kind of reciprocal verification necessary for effective arms control. When International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards are applied to non-weapon states, major acceptance will have been achieved of the principle that arms reduction requires meaningful verification. The United States has long asserted that principle, but the communists have rejected it, providing the major stumbling

block to all efforts toward negotiated arms controls.

International inspection will, in turn, make possible the exploitation of the atom for peaceful purposes at the fastest pace technology will realistically permit, without the fear that peaceful projects will serve as the cover for nuclear weapons. I, for one, am fully satisfied with the assurances forwarded to the Senate that American participation in these peaceful nuclear activities can be conducted on a sound and practical basis.

Finally, the treaty embodies a unique pledge shared by the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union to work to control the arms race between the major powers. In the words of the Foreign Relations Committee, the treaty "formalizes the mutual concern" of these major powers "in containing the spread of nuclear weapons", embodying "a commitment to pursue with good faith and urgency new arms limitation agreements."

As a quid pro quo, between the non-weapon powers on the one hand, who are asked to give up their options for nuclear status, and the nuclear signatories on the other, whose nuclear competition represents a constant threat to world peace, the treaty's pledge to good-faith negotiation comes at a welcome time. The effort to line up non-weapon powers to complete the non-proliferation treaty will benefit from early negotiations by the major powers, and the prospects of meaningful agreement in these negotiations will, in turn, be strengthened by the climate of trust and give-and-take which the success of the non-proliferation treaty can help create.

It is my earnest hope that the shared commitment of the non-proliferation treaty between the U.S. and the Soviet Union can now be broadened into other fields. Getting on with the non-proliferation treaty, after almost five years of effort has thus become a desirable, and even necessary basis on which to strengthen this promise of U.S.-Soviet cooperation—in strategic arms talks, and perhaps too in such other related areas of vital U.S. concern as Vietnam and the Middle East.

Mr. President, it has been a long time since John F. Kennedy called on the Senate to ratify the limited nuclear test-ban treaty and "let history record, that we, in this land, at this time, took the first step." The next step, I submit, is the agreement before us today. I urge the Senate to act promptly and favorably upon the non-proliferation treaty, in the interest of moving on to the further efforts and opportunities for peace that lie ahead.

DISASTER IN EAST PAKISTAN

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, the people of East Pakistan—already ravaged by cyclone and civil war—are now threatened by a new disaster of incredible magnitude.

Only the most urgent action by the United States and other governments can save millions from dying of starvation.

The evidence of gathering tragedy was summarized in a letter printed by the New York Times, May 2.

Over 35 million Bengalis depend on imported food to maintain a precarious balance between life and death.

Food imports have been interrupted since February. Internal distribution has stopped.

History has given us the clearest warning of tragedy. In 1943, when the food shortage in the area was one-third what

it is now, a similar break-down of food shipments meant the death of over a million people.

Famine will not wait on publicity or bureaucratic inertia. A massive relief effort must be mounted now to revive the distribution system and reach the needy before meager food reserves are gone.

By the time we see the pictures of starving children, it will be too late to save them.

Yet, in the face of this horror, the U.S. Government has stood by in unconscionable negligence.

We have made a vague, general offer of help, but failed to press the Government of Pakistan in any way to undertake the necessary relief effort.

We were silent when International Red Cross observers—whose impartial humanitarian mission is recognized by world community—were recently denied entry into East Pakistan.

The Department of State's "Pakistan Working Group," created when the civil war broke out, has been disbanded now that the fighting has subsided. Apparently the danger of millions starving was not deemed an occasion for a "special effort" by this Government.

But something can be done.

The Consortium of Governments giving economic aid to Pakistan are now in the process of meeting. They are being asked for considerable financial aid to bail Pakistan out of an acute foreign exchange crisis.

Joined by a bipartisan group of Senators, I yesterday wired Secretary Rogers to make clear that the United States will not meet that request, and will ask other donors to refuse likewise, unless, first, the Pakistani authorities undertake an emergency relief effort equal to the crisis in East Pakistan, and second, representatives of the International Red Cross are granted prompt entry to East Pakistan to plan a coordinated international food distribution and medical relief effort with Pakistani authorities.

I would hope the Secretary would also make clear the readiness of the U.S. Government to make available a generous share of emergency food aid and vehicles for distribution, including helicopters and transport aircraft to be loaned to Pakistani relief authorities or the International Red Cross.

Unbelievably, we seem on the verge of another Biafra—another combination of rationalized inaction and moral insensitivity which could cost millions of lives.

If America's claim to moral and humane values means anything, if the Government of Pakistan deserves to be recognized as the responsible authority in East Pakistan, the only course for both governments is the strongest humanitarian action now—before we watch the burial of another generation of babies.

I ask unanimously that a telegram to Secretary Rogers and a letter from the New York Times be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MAY 4, 1971.

Hon. WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Interests Section,
care of Spanish Embassy, Cairo, United
Arab Republic.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Tens of millions face starvation in East Pakistan without emergency efforts to restore full supply and distribution of food imports.

We urge you to instruct U.S. Rep. at Pakistan Consortium Talks to refuse further foreign exchange assistance, and ask other donors to refuse likewise, unless Government of Pakistan (1) mounts immediate emergency relief effort in east commensurate with potential need, and (2) grants ICRC observers entry to East to plan coordinated international food distribution and medical relief efforts with Pakistani authorities.

We recognize these are extraordinary actions but feel they are compelled by horrible prospects of millions starving in East Pakistan while governments have means to prevent it.

Sincerely,

Walter F. Mondale, Clifford P. Case, Fred R. Harris, Thomas F. Eagleton, George McGovern, William Proxmire, Harold E. Hughes, Hubert H. Humphrey, Birch Bayh, and Edmund S. Muskie.

[From the Sunday New York Times, May 2, 1971]

BENGAL: A THREAT OF FAMINE

To the Editor:

The exclusion of the foreign press and observers from East Pakistan has meant the loss of vital information on the course of events there and will deprive us of the dramatic facts that rouse individuals and governments to action. But there is enough conclusive evidence from past and recent history to predict the result of the present conflict on the food position of the province.

The food grains that sustain a large part of the Bengali population come from abroad. Their distribution depends on the effective functioning of the port of Chittagong and on internal transportation and administrative services.

East Pakistan, with a population of more than seventy million, expected 2.5 million tons of imported food grains this year. That is about one-sixth of the total food requirements for the province, enough to feed twelve million people. However, a far greater number is actually affected by an interruption in the steady flow of food. For the 50 per cent of the population living barely at subsistence level, these supplies maintain the balance between life and death.

Bengal has always been extremely susceptible to famine. The last such disaster occurred in 1943 when food expected from Burma did not arrive because of the Japanese occupation of that country. At that time military demands on the Indian transportation system prevented the timely distribution of the food that was available. The food deficit that year was 6 per cent; this year it is 16 per cent. Deaths in 1943 numbered 1.5 million, and the famine left social problems from which Bengal has yet to recover fully.

A crisis was imminent in 1965 when the Indo-Pakistani war stopped imports. It was avoided when the great powers used their influence to bring that conflict to a speedy close. Recovery was aided by normal internal supply activities, which had been unaffected by the war.

Today, in contrast, not only has the import of food been cut off, but the internal administrative and transport services have ceased to function normally. In addition, military action at planting time will reduce the coming harvest.

The regular import of food has been interrupted since February. Even if the conflict were to end today, the months required to return the system to normal would prob-

ably exceed the time during which the food reserves could sustain the population. The factors that determine mass famine are irreversible after a certain point.

When the first stories and photographs of starving families are published, it will be too late to protect thousands of others. International action, immediate and strong, is perhaps the only defense the people of East Bengal now have.

DANIEL C. DUNHAM.

NEW YORK, April 20, 1971.

THE ECONOMICS OF JOY: A CRITICISM

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, the joy of the administration knew no rhetorical bounds when first quarter figures revealed there had been a \$28.5 billion advance in the gross national product. We were enthusiastically assured then that the upturn furnished "positive proof" that the economy at long last had "turned the corner" and was moving swiftly toward recovery. There were even those administration apologists who proclaimed—without apparent embarrassment—that the President's goal of a \$1,065 economy this year was now within reach. Those economists and other interested parties who protested that the advance in GNP did not conclusively show that the economy was on the road to recovery were quickly dismissed as "politically motivated nay-sayers."

A column written by Hobart Rowen, which appeared in last Sunday's Washington Post, cannot and should not be so easily dismissed. Focusing on the much-trumpeted first quarter advance, Rowen shows that the gain was illusory. He points out that \$19.2 billion of the increase in GNP was directly attributable to the predictable recovery of the auto industry after the 1970 strike and that only \$9.3 billion represented a gain in other sectors of the economy. More importantly, Rowen stresses that there was actually a decline in the "real" GNP after the "real" automotive GNP is subtracted from the \$28.5 billion figure.

The Pollyannish pronouncements of the administration notwithstanding. Rowen concludes that our economy is still sick. I agree with this conclusion, and would add that positive fiscal stimulus is needed now, and not later, if the economy is to finally recover. Figures for the second quarter are bound to show that the catchup recovery of the auto industry, and the artificial stimulus of the steel industry in anticipation of an industrywide strike, have run their course and the basic weaknesses in our economy remain unattended. The question is whether we must wait for the release of these figures before we accept the inevitable truth that monetary policies working alone will not suffice to make the economy healthy again. It is for this reason that I urge prompt attention for my proposal to reinstate the investment tax credit at a level of 10 percent. I agree with the administration that what is needed now is renewed confidence in the ability of the economy to renew itself. I cannot agree, however, that this confidence can be created absent some dramatic signal that the time for economic growth is now, and

not 6 months from now. It is my firm belief that only reinstatement of the investment tax credit carries with it the potential to rekindle the needed confidence. Misleading advances in the GNP and changes in depreciation rules will not have the effect of inducing necessary capital investment. And unlike the proposed changes in the depreciation rules, reinstatement of the credit would not be a boom to industry but rather a positive and equitable stimulus to all segments of the economy.

Mr. President, I recommend Hobart Rowen's excellent column to the attention of Senators and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OFFICIALS EXAGGERATE GNP IN ORDER
TO SELL "CONFIDENCE"

(By Hobart Rowen)

From the President and his Secretary of Treasury on down, this Administration is orchestrating an effort to drum up "confidence" in the economy. It was one of the main themes of Mr. Nixon's address last week to the Chamber of Commerce.

In part, this sales pitch is based on an extraordinary exaggeration of the improvement in the economy in the first quarter, coupled with self-congratulatory statements about the boom in stock market prices.

A corollary and perhaps more serious element is the suggestion that it's almost unpatriotic to question the Administration's analysis of what's going on.

Critics, said Secretary John B. Connally in his own speech to the Chamber, are "playing games with numbers." The "politically oriented" comments by former Kennedy-Johnson officials, he added, "could well be hurting those workers and consumers whom they profess to want to help."

The implication, of course, is that alert criticism of economic progress to date will shrivel that delicate commodity, "confidence," vitiating what Connally called "the solid economic advance of the first quarter."

Well, this is all a lot of bull, and I'm sure that Secretary Connally, who owes his appointment to a well-earned reputation as a first-rate politician, knows it as well as anybody else.

The "numbers game" reference concerns the Administration's goal for a \$1,065 billion economy this year, which would be a nearly unprecedented 9 per cent boost over 1970. Professional economists, without regard to political party, agree almost to a man that without new expansionary moves (such as tax cuts or increased spending), this goal won't be reached.

A high Nixon Administration official, who obviously must remain anonymous here, observed this week. "That number hurt our credibility more than anything else, because everyone in the business community knows we can't reach it without new programs—and we've said there won't be any."

As for that "solid economic advance" of \$28.5 billion in the Gross National Product in the first quarter, detailed statistics published this week by the Office of Business Economics of the Commerce Department show that \$19.2 billion of the increase was in autos and associated products (recovering from the 1970 strike) and only \$9.3 billion was a gain in the rest of the economy.

But what is even more significant is that "real" gross national product, after the "real auto GNP" is subtracted, actually declined in the first quarter, compared with the fourth quarter of 1970, and in fact has shown no improvement going back more than a whole year.