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unless infants and young children receive adequate nutrition, health care and intellectual stimulation, their potential is severely compromised and the cycle of poverty is perpetuated." That bill did not pass, but Mondale, still convinced of the need to do more for children, recently proposed a similar but broader program.

Much has been learned in recent years about the importance of assuring health services, proper food, education and a good environment for young children. About 80 percent of their intellectual development occurs by the age of 8, according to experts, and their physical condition in early years can affect health and mental capacity through much of their life. Experience with Headstart has shown the handicaps with which many children start life, the potentials for helping them to develop and the limitations of too-brief and fragmented compensatory programs. White House conferences last year on food and nutrition and on children and youth emphasized that America does have hungry children, neglected children, sick children and ill-educated children. The need for many more day-care centers—for educational and health advantages as well as custodial care—has become increasingly apparent as more women have entered employment.

The "Child Development Act of 1971," sponsored also by Sens. Humphrey and McGovern, puts this all together in a program of services for both poor and non-poor children up to the age of 14. The program would be administered by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The very existence of a new Senate subcommittee on children and youth, headed by Mondale, seems to offer encouragement for such a plan.

Many of the nation's children would be helped also by the administration's welfare reform bill, whose fate still has not been decided by Congress, and by the Nixon health plan. However, a comprehensive child-development program that could fill in gaps, coordinate existing programs and work toward broader goals in services to children is also needed.

CATASTROPHE IN EAST PAKISTAN

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, the evidence of catastrophe in East Pakistan continues to gather.

First, there was the warning by a U.N. adviser in the New York Times of May 2—pointing to the disruption of transport and the historical precedent of mass starvation in similar conditions in 1943.

Now there is an eyewitness report by Mort Rosenblum of the Associated Press, telling us once more that "millions face starvation from famine and from halted relief distribution."

And there are other, equally alarming reports—of the silence of the United States in the face of this tragedy, and the refusal of the West Pakistan authorities to accept badly needed emergency relief from the United Nations.

How much longer will our Government remain paralyzed?

Will the United States—with our economic aid supporting West Pakistan's occupation of the East—be a silent partner in the destruction of a people?

If the administration does not answer that question clearly and soon, the Congress must.

I ask unanimous consent that certain newspaper articles be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles

were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, May 2, 1971]

BENGAL: A THREAT OF FAMINE

To the Editor:

The exclusion of the foreign press and observers from East Pakistan has meant the loss of vital information on the course of events there and will deprive us of the dramatic facts that rouse individuals and governments to action. But there is enough conclusive evidence from the past and recent history to predict the result of the present conflict on the food position of the province.

The food grains that sustain a large part of the Bengal population come from abroad. Their distribution depends on the effective functioning of the port of Chittagong and on internal transportation and administrative services.

East Pakistan, with a population of more than seventy million, expected 2.5 million tons of imported food grains this year. That is about one-sixth of the total food requirements for the province, enough to feed twelve million people. However, a far greater number is actually affected by an interruption in the steady flow of food. For the 50 per cent of the population, living barely at subsistence level, these supplies maintain the balance between life and death.

Bengal has always been extremely susceptible to famine. The last such disaster occurred in 1943 when food expected from Burma did not arrive because of the Japanese occupation of that country. At that time military demands on the Indian transportation system prevented the timely distribution of the food that was available. The food deficit that year was 6 per cent; this year it is 16 per cent. Deaths in 1943 numbered 1.5 million, and the famine left social problems from which Bengal has yet to recover fully.

A crisis was imminent in 1965 when the Indo-Pakistani war stopped imports. It was avoided when the great powers used their influence to bring that conflict to a speedy close. Recovery was aided by normal internal supply activities, which had been unaffected by the war.

Today, in contrast, not only has the import of food been cut off, but the internal administrative and transport services have ceased to function normally. In addition, military action at planting time will reduce the coming harvest.

The regular import of food has been interrupted since February. Even if the conflict were to end today, the months required to return the system to normal would probably exceed the time during which the food reserves could sustain the population. The factors that determine mass famine are irreversible after a certain point.

When the first stories and photographs of starving families are published, it will be too late to protect thousands of others. International action, immediate and strong, is perhaps the only defense the people of East Bengal now have.

DANIEL C. DUNHAM.

NEW YORK, April 20, 1971.

[From the Washington Post, May 13, 1971]

(The following dispatch was filed from Bangkok, to avoid Pakistan censorship by Mort Rosenblum, an Associated Press reporter who was one of six correspondents admitted to East Pakistan after a five-week period during which foreign newsmen were barred from visiting the region.)

DACCA, EAST PAKISTAN.—A civil war of staggering butchery and hatred has left the 23-year-old nation of Pakistan on the brink of economic and political ruin.

Though broke, Pakistan, is spending more than \$2 million daily to support the army that shelled and machine-gunned this province of 75 million into submissive inactivity.

Some estimates of the number of deaths since the war started on March 25 go above the 400,000 killed in the cyclone that hit East Pakistan last November. This time, each death means a family's lasting bitterness.

Killing was indiscriminate. Bengalis bent on a separate East Pakistan nation slaughtered many of the region's 6 million non-Bengalis. When the army moved in, it settled the score, aided by non-Bengalis seeking revenge.

Markets were razed and flattened, towns were devastated, road and rail links were cut at a dozen major points.

LOSSES ENORMOUS

Losses to industry and to commerce between the two wings of Pakistan are enormous, as are the effects of stalled development. The 55 mills that turn out jute, East Pakistan's chief money-maker, are working at 15 to 20 per cent of capacity.

Reporters touring East Pakistan found that millions face starvation from famine and from halted relief distribution.

In many areas, food supply is a critical problem. The key port, Chittagong, is choked with 400,000 tons of goods, 100,000 tons more than it handles in a normal month.

Before, river craft carried only a fourth of Chittagong cargo into the interior. Now they must carry it all, perhaps for months. Even when roads and rail were open, shippers say, 10 river craft carried food stock. Now, they say, the army allots to the food supply operation only four boats.

Politically, the problems are as great. In December, Bengalis voted 167 of the East Pakistan's 169 National Assembly seats to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami League. Now Mujibur is in jail and the party is banned.

President Yahya Kahn maintains that he wants politicians to take back the government.

But the betting is that Yahya won't last the year as President, and that the army won't find anyone who thinks their way and who can still walk unescorted through the streets of East Pakistan.

CONFIDENCE SHATTERED

Confidence is shattered among Bengalis, West Pakistanis and Indian migrants who settled here at partition in 1947.

At a Chittagong jute mill, where Bengalis evidently killed 180 women and children, only 20 of 7,500 workers have dared to return.

Non-Bengali officers and officials refuse to even admit that there are Bengali widows and orphans in need.

Hindu Bengalis make up 12 per cent of the population. They chose to remain here although West Bengal, in India, is largely Hindu and East Bengal in East Pakistan is mostly Moslem.

Radical Moslem students rejected the religion that bound them to West Pakistan, espousing instead Hinduism and "Calcutta culture." Hindus were widely blamed for fomenting the conditions leading to war.

As a result, the army singled out Hindus. Their shops and homes were smashed and burned. Undamaged shops in otherwise devastated Hindu areas sometimes bear signs in English and Urdu, the Western tongue, proclaiming the owner is a Moslem.

Often being a Moslem—or showing a Pakistani flag—didn't help.

EFFECTS FELT IN WEST

The effects are felt hard 1,000 miles across India in West Pakistan.

"After all," said one businessman, "we've lost a colony."

Sixty per cent of the goods made in West Pakistan were sold in East Pakistan. Not a single bale of West Pakistan cotton has come to the East since the crisis, stalling a normal year West Pakistan's total annual exports to the East have been about \$300 million.

The job of rebuilding what the army and rebels burned and battered down will take massive human and financial resources.

YAHYA TELLS THANT RELIEF AID IS NOT NEEDED NOW

(By Kathleen Teltsch)

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y.—President Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan has told Secretary General Thant that United Nations emergency help for East Pakistan is not needed now but he left open the possibility of accepting international aid in the future.

In a letter, the President also complained that news accounts of widespread casualties and destruction in East Pakistan were "highly exaggerated—if not altogether tendentious."

Meanwhile, India charged that military forces from West Pakistan had carried out "wild destruction of life and property" in a drive to crush the East Pakistani movement. Pakistan in turn accused India of encouraging and aiding the separatists in hopes of breaking up Pakistan.

President Yahya's response to Mr. Thant's April 22 offer of humanitarian assistance was not regarded here as a refusal of all help in the future and United Nations authorities said that Mr. Thant was continuing to explore the possibilities of assistance.

The Pakistani President told Mr. Thant that there were adequate supplies of medicines and food in East Pakistan, that authorities there saw "no cause for concern" and that rehabilitation and reconstruction were moving ahead.

"As for international help," if and when required, "it will be administered by Pakistan's own relief agencies," the President said.

During the debate in the Economic and Social Council's Social Committee, touched off by India's charges, Mrs. Rita Hauser of the United States expressed hope that Pakistan would agree to make "early and full use" of the Secretary General's offer.

She said the United States and other governments were consulting Pakistan on the form of help. She added that Washington had allocated \$2.5-million to help East Pakistani refugees in India.

Samar Sen of India said there was a need for international aid for the refugees. He said they numbered 2,000,000 and warned of the danger of famine and epidemic.

Agha Shahi of Pakistan three times interrupted the Indian delegate and disputed his version of the causes and consequences of the East Pakistani conflict. He charged that India had taken every step short of war to help the secessionists.

[From the Wall Street Journal, May 12, 1971]

BANGLA DESH: A PRAGMATIC SILENCE

(By Peter R. Kann)

CALCUTTA.—Consider this scenario for an American intervention.

Our ally: the 75 million Bengalis of East Pakistan who, with considerable justification, consider themselves victims of two decades of political and economic exploitation by the Punjabs of West Pakistan. Bengali leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his moderate, generally pro-Western Awami League recently won national elections in Pakistan. The Bengalis were then savagely attacked by the Punjabi controlled Pakistan army. Many Bengalis are now determined to fight for an independent Bengal nation (Bangla Desh) but they lack the military knowhow and means with which to fight.

Our enemy: the 70,000 or so West Pakistani troops seeking to suppress the Bengali freedom movement and reoccupy East Pakistan. They are fighting for an autocratic military regime that has close relations with China. They have virtually no support among the Bengalis they seek to rule. They are fighting more than 1,000 miles from home, dependent solely on sea and air supply routes, without the economic resources required for a long and costly war.

An interventionist's dream. First some

strong words from Washington, then a few destroyers assigned to cruise the East Pakistan coast. Some dramatic overflights by American jets. If necessary, a naval blockade to cut off Pakistan army supplies. Perhaps some air-dropped American carbines for the Bengalis. Only as a last resort some air strikes on Pakistan army bases in East Pakistan. After that, it's only a matter of passing out miracle rice seed to the happy liberated peasants of Bangla Desh—that new pro-Western bastion astride the strategic crossroads where East and Central Asia meet.

If only Vietnam had been East Pakistan.

A NATURAL VICTIM

As it happened, of course, Bangla Desh did not even rate weak words of support or sympathy from Washington. Presumably the last thing America needs these days is another war, even a winnable one in a worthy cause. And even if Uncle Sam still considered himself the world's policeman, it's doubtful that he would arrest West Pakistan for assault and battery against the Bengalis. East Pakistan is simply one of those parts of the world that fails to provoke foreign passions. Overpopulated and impoverished, it encroaches on the world's consciousness only when stricken by a calamity of Biblical proportions, like last fall's fearful flood that claimed up to half a million lives. An East Pakistan earthquake that killed only 10,000 would probably rate less attention than a three-car collision on the Jersey Turnpike. East Pakistan is one of the world's natural victims.

All this is only to say the obvious: that American foreign policy doesn't follow moral imperatives. Neither does any other nation's. When the cause of Bangla Desh finally forced its way to the attention of the world's great powers they all reacted with what's called cynicism among men but passes for pragmatism among nations.

The politics of the Indian subcontinent were complicated enough before the cause of Bangla Desh came along. India and Pakistan have been enemies since they were carved out of the subcontinent's communal conflicts in 1947. Russia has edged close to India in recent years. China, for national rather than ideological reasons, is tied to Pakistan. Russia and China, of course, are at odds. America, worried over Soviet influence in India and Chinese influence in Pakistan, has tried to remain friendly with both.

What, then, are the politics of pragmatism of those nations involved with the Bangla Desh cause and of those that have sought to stay uninvolved?

For Pakistan there are several choices: To let democracy have its way, which would have meant a united Pakistan led, for the first time, by the Bengali majority rather than the Punjabi minority. To grant East Pakistan independence and seek good relations with the new sister state of Bangla Desh. To forcibly resubjugate East Pakistan, Pakistan opted for the third solution. Its army moved rapidly and ruthlessly, with tactics that included not only wanton slaughter but also systematic slaying of the Bengali middle class: politicians, professional men, students and civil servants. These are precisely the people needed to keep an administration and an economy functioning, in a conquered territory or a new nation.

In the short run the Pakistan army may well be able to maintain control of East Pakistan—now a hostile, occupied territory. But how to patch up the East Pakistan economy? How to support the cost of the occupation army? How, in the long run, to avoid being bled by a guerrilla war?

Perhaps even the Pakistanis are doubtful about their long-term prospects. But if they suspect that they will have to pull out of East Pakistan some year soon, why should they worry about killing off moderate Bengali leadership, about the Bangla Desh movement thus falling into militant leftist hands?

Pakistan could then at least leave a chaotic, Communist-veering Bangla Desh as a permanent plague on neighboring India. Or so the Indians fear.

A SYMPATHETIC INDIA

For many reasons, India has been openly sympathetic with the Bangla Desh cause. Pakistan is an enemy, and half an enemy is better than a whole one. An independent Bengal nation, under moderate leadership, might even be friendly to India. As a democracy, India is subject to public pressures, and articulate segments of that public, particularly in West Bengal, have demanded intervention. The sooner India provides support—arms, training, border sanctuaries—for a Bangla Desh liberation army, the more likely it is that the Bangla Desh movement will remain under moderate leadership. Some such aid is already being given. And if a more active Indian role risks war with Pakistan, it would suit some aggressive Indian army commanders just fine.

Yet India failed to extend diplomatic recognition to Bangla Desh and has moved only slowly and cautiously in giving military assistance. Why? Bangla Desh would have had to have been recognized very quickly, because once the Pakistan army began moving the liberation army collapsed. Only a month after the civil war began, on March 25, the provisional government of Bangla Desh could venture no further into East Pakistan than a mango grove 300 meters from the India border. Indian policy makers, whatever their virtues, are not noted for quick decision-making. By late April India would have been recognizing what amounted to a government in exile. And no other countries would have followed suit.

The poor performance of the Bangla Desh leaders and their makeshift liberation movement was a disappointment even to strong Indian sympathizers. Some of them realized that channelling aid to this movement would be far from simple. Giving guns would not be enough. Training and organization are needed. And the Indian army is no great repository of wisdom on the waging of guerrilla wars.

What even of the simple problems, like insuring that guns given to the liberation army don't end up in Communist hands?

Then too, the risk of a full-scale war with Pakistan, which large-scale Indian military assistance might entail, is not to be taken lightly. India probably would win such a war, but it would divert Indian resources from the monumental domestic problems that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was just re-elected to try to solve. And then there's China, which might support Pakistan with more than words. India's mountain passes along the Chinese border may be much better defended now than at the time of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, but few sane Indians seek a rematch. (Nor, probably, does domestic-oriented China.)

Finally, some Indians are concerned that a new ethnic state of Bangla Desh would provide a potent impetus for independence movements, among the many ethnic groups in the patchwork Indian nation.

Red China, the proponent and patron of liberation wars, chose to side verbally with West Pakistan's decidedly unrevolutionary military regime in its suppression of a popular revolution. An outrageous reversal of revolutionary doctrine, or is it? To Chairman Mao, liberation wars are not won by the likes of Sheikh Mujibur and the bourgeois bureaucrats of his Awami League who have led the Bangla Desh movement to date. Why not let the Pakistan army kill off these bourgeois nationalists, the sooner to see them replaced by leftist militants and a "people's war" that follows the gospel of Chairman Mao? That may be a long time coming, for East Pakistan's Communists are still a small force and Peking's policy is to

let even approved revolutionaries help themselves. But China is nothing if not patient.

In the meantime China has cemented its friendship with West Pakistan, a valuable national ally as a counterbalance to India (with its Soviet ties) and as a solid link in Peking's chain of contacts with the rest of the noncommunist underdeveloped world. China has given Pakistan large amounts of economic and military assistance over the years, including a \$200 million loan late last year, and Peking, like other nations, does not lightly write off such investments.

So China, in the short run, has backed an old friend and picked a winner in the process. And China's longer run options are still open. By the time China is ready to commit itself to a Communist insurgency in East Pakistan the West Pakistanis may already have decided to abandon the area.

The Soviets were openly critical of West Pakistan's actions in East Pakistan and called for an end to the bloodshed. But the reasons probably have much more to do with Soviet friendship with India and hostility to China than with any sense of brotherhood with the Bengalis. And Soviet sympathies have not been so strongly expressed as to ruin relations with West Pakistan.

WHILE FROM THE UNITED STATES

From the United States, silence. And in a situation like this, silence naturally supports the status quo—which is not a Bengal nation. There are probably several reasons: the simple wish to avoid any new foreign entanglements, a fear of reducing U.S. influence in West Pakistan and thus increasing that of the Chinese, a tendency to stick with a country in which the U.S., too, has invested much military and economic aid. Perhaps there's also another, somewhat subliminal, reason. The West Pakistanis, in addition to being a known quantity, are a rather compatible one for U.S. policy makers. Military men with handlebar mustaches and Sandhurst accents run a superficially efficient regime with clear lines of authority.

It is a nation that can use American dollars to build impressive dams, train its soldiers to use American weapons and teach its farmers to grow miracle wheat. It's not a mysterious corner of Asia teeming with little black people. When American VIPs go to Pakistan, it's to see parades in Islamabad (in the West), not to see poverty in Dacca (in the East). Lyndon Johnson invited a West Pakistan camel driver to the White House, not a Bengali rickshaw puller.

It's several years too soon to say whether or not America, China, Russia, India or Pakistan made the right moves in the spring of 1971. But it's at least a reasonable bet that some kind of new nation will evolve in the years to come. When that happens, ambassadors from Washington, Peking, Moscow and Delhi will be standing at attention in Dacca for the singing of the Bangla Desh national anthem, "My Golden Bangla Desh, I Love You." And some ambassadors, of course, will be in better favor than others.

[From the Baltimore Sun, May 13, 1971]

UNITED STATES ASKED NOT TO AID PAKISTAN

WASHINGTON.—Any American economic aid to Pakistan "will leave cash in their hands to pay their French arms bill and to step up arms purchases in the open market," a spokesman for the East Pakistani rebels charged today.

The United States should give no aid, except for relief to be dispensed by international agencies, according to Rahman Sobhan, the Bengali spokesman.

Mr. Sobhan, an adviser to the imprisoned Bengali leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, said any other aid "would simply prolong the conflict at tremendous cost in direct deaths from military operations as well as deaths from the pending famine."

SEEKS SUPPORT

Mr. Sobhan, who fled East Pakistan in April after fighting began March 25, is in Washington seeking support on Capitol Hill and elsewhere for Bangla Desh, as he and other Bengalis call the independent state they have proclaimed. State Department personnel have been ordered not to see him.

In an interview, he challenged the claims of M. M. Ahmed, a senior Pakistan government official now in Washington on an aid-seeking mission, that central government control of East Pakistan has permitted the resumption of normal administration.

"The government simply does not have the administrative control over Bangla Desh to run an aid program," he said contending that in 16 out of 17 administrative districts higher local officials had sided with the independence movement and lesser officials were still in hiding.

POLITICAL TOOL

He charged that the central government wants to use relief as a political tool and for "coercion" not for humanitarian reasons. It is seeking boats, he said, not because there was any shortage of them in East Pakistan, but in order to provide assault landing craft for the Army. He said some of them had already been secured from Turkey—"U.S.-supplied, inevitably."

And while the Pakistan government is talking about seeking reconciliation and turning over power to a civilian regime, said Mr. Sobhan, this should not be taken seriously. "Murderers of 200,000 people do not know the meaning of good faith," he said.

OUTRIGHT LIE

He said Mr. Ahmed is telling officials here that about 70 officials of Sheikh Mujib's Awami League are ready to co-operate with the government. This is "an outright lie," he said, adding that only one elected official has thrown in with the central government.

The Dacca University economics professor said if Mr. Ahmed does not get the economic aid and postponement of debt payments he is seeking, continued military operations against the Bengalis would become economically unbearable for West Pakistan.

"The major economic demands," he said, "are for commodity assistance to keep industry afloat. They are geared to supplies from the West." He said the suggestion that China might meet these needs is false because "the Chinese are in no position" to supply Western materials.

"The U.S. has to make up its mind," he said, "whether it wants to underwrite a military adventure with no conceivable policy solution at the end of it." He suggested the government here tell the Pakistan government "If you want to do it, you foot the bill."

BUSINESS WEEK SAYS ADMINISTRATION FAILS IN EFFORT TO CONTROL PRICES AND PROFITS IN CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY

Mr. EAGLETON, Mr. President, back on March 29, 1971, the White House very proudly announced that the suspension of the Davis-Bacon Act had been lifted and that a system had been worked out to control both wages and prices in the construction industry. That system entailed the setting up of two boards—one to control wage increases and the other to restrain increases in prices and product costs.

Two months have passed and there has been some opportunity to at least watch the progress that has been made. A report on the program appeared in the Washington Outlook column of Business Week of May 15, 1971, and states:

President Nixon's program for stabilizing wages and prices in the construction industry is going to be only half-size. The Administration appears to have given up any serious effort to rein in prices, profits, and executive salaries.

This statement shows that the fears some of us had when the program was announced were justified. It seemed then that there was one standard for employers and another for employees. I believe that this country must treat all of its citizens equally. Runaway inflation has hurt all of us, but to place the entire blame on the workers in one segment of the economy is to be blind to reality. If the President wants to control wages, he must also be willing to control prices and profits. It is not the construction workers that are causing the economic difficulties that this country is undergoing and it is wrong of the administration to try to make them the scapegoat.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article referred to from Business Week magazine be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WASHINGTON OUTLOOK

CONSTRUCTION PRICE CURBS GET STICKY

President Nixon's program for stabilizing wages and prices in the construction industry is going to be only half-size. The Administration appears to have given up any serious effort to rein in prices, profits, and executive salaries.

So far, the wage side of the machinery is still functioning. Unions are cooperating, reluctantly, with the Construction Industry Stabilization Committee.

But the price and profit side of the equation is giving trouble. Seven weeks ago, Nixon handed the problem to an Interagency Committee for Stabilization of Construction Prices. A committee spokesman now concedes privately that there seems little the Administration can realistically do.

Nixon rejected outright wage-price controls. So there is no machinery to police contractors. Nor is there an excess profits tax to help restrain prices.

The best idea the committee has been able to come up with is a self-enforced contract certification program. Washington would issue price standards; contractors would certify that they were complying.

The main goal of the committee is simple: to lean on management hard enough so that labor leaders will continue to cooperate.

LATEST ADVICE ON WEAPONS: PROFITS CAN WAIT

A new approach to profits in negotiated contracts is bubbling up within the Pentagon: Forget about them for a while.

A career Navy procurement specialist, Gordon W. Rule, is urging his chiefs to stop trying to set profits in advance on major high-risk development contracts. Instead, he suggests, initial agreements should just cover costs. Profits—if any—could be fixed after weapons have been delivered and tested.

The idea will get serious consideration by a government-industry committee studying profit policies. The procedure has been used in a limited way by both the Navy and NASA, but never on a major weapons program.

The approach has potential snags. Evaluation boards that would determine profits would have to do so partly on a subjective basis. And troubles with complex defense equipment often do not crop up for two years or so.