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way; yet when he was victorious, as he often was, he never attempted to take the honor for his achievements. Whether Walter was working in Washington for a new high school on the reservation, or whether he was here at Cherokee seeking to establish the Boy's Club, he had in mind one steady purpose: the advancements of his people. Never did he seek tribute for himself. In fact, as Senator Ervin said upon hearing of Walter's death, "North Carolina has lost one of its finest leaders. Walter Jackson devoted all of his life to his people. He virtually ignored his own material well being—and indeed, his own health—in order to serve the Eastern Band of the Cherokee Indians. He was a true friend."

Walter loved these mountains, these valleys, and these coves, and often he spoke of them and the people they have produced. As these mountains tower in Western North Carolina so did Walter's character and his devotion to the simple people of his home place. Walter derived his strength from these mountains, and he was always mindful of the 121st Psalm, which opens with the words "I will lift up mine eyes unto the hills, from whence cometh my help."

My friends, this is the way Walter Jackson lived. I do not attempt to make him larger in death than he was in life. I simply want him to be remembered as the good and decent man he was, a man who devoted his life to the needs of his people, and who was always able to defeat the forces of hate and jealousy with forgiveness and compassion.

Those of us who admired and loved him, and who accompany him to his rest today, pray that what he was to us during his life on earth will be an abiding inspiration to those of us who remain to carry his torch.

FRANK DRYDEN—OUTSTANDING ALUMNUS OF PARIS HIGH SCHOOL

Mr. COOK. Mr. President, this past Saturday, Mr. Frank Dryden, executive vice president of the Tobacco Institute, was presented an award as the outstanding alumnus of Paris High School, Paris, Ky.

I think it most appropriate that this honor was accorded to Mr. Dryden, as most of his career as a public servant has been directed toward serving the needs of Kentucky as well as the Nation.

Upon graduation from the University of Kentucky he became a marketing specialist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture until 1953. He has also held the following positions:

Administrative assistant to former Senator Earl Clements, 1953-56;

Member of professional staff, U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, 1957, 1958, 1962, and 1964;

Deputy chief clerk, U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 1958-62;

Director, Joint Congressional Inauguration Committee for 1961 Presidential Inauguration;

Deputy Director, Office of Emergency Planning, Executive Office of the President of the United States, 1964-66;

Alternate member of President's Conference on Administrative Procedures, 1962;

Executive Vice President, Tobacco Institute, 1966 to present;

World War II, lieutenant and captain with the 111th Infantry Combat Team—bronze star, beach arrowhead, combat infantryman's badge, honorably discharged as major.

Member: Baptist Church, Kiwanis Club, Capitol Hill Burro Club—past president—former Senate Office Building Administrative Assistants, and Phi Delta Theta.

VIETNAM REVISITED

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, my distinguished and extraordinarily able colleague from Hawaii (Mr. INOUE) recently addressed a gathering at George Washington University on the tragic war in Vietnam.

His words capture the horror and folly of this war. More importantly, he provides a clear analysis of the lessons we must learn from this tragedy.

Senator INOUE's speech should give all of us renewed hope that America can emerge from this experience a wiser people, able to avoid any repetition of the mistakes of the past.

I ask unanimous consent that Senator INOUE's remarkable speech be printed at this time in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

VIETNAM REVISITED

I wish to speak to you this evening about the most tragic difficulty which has faced our nation this past decade and which despite the claims of some political pundits is still very much responsible for the death in our spirit—I speak of Vietnam.

Some who claim to measure the public mood have told us Vietnam is no longer an issue—but I do not agree. I do not think the people are apathetic about Vietnam—they are rather discouraged—they rather have a feeling of some impotence concerning their ability to bring significant change to American policy.

These feelings are fully shared by many of us in the Congress but I think we must continue to face up to the issue which is Vietnam and to exert our maximum effort to bring about a truly new policy.

Vietnam is and remains the crucial issue facing our nation.

I believe that but for this we would not see our Nation so torn by violence, so pummeled by bombing, and so wracked by inflation, or so polarized into opposing groups. If it were not for Vietnam our many problems of inadequate housing, and inadequate funds for education, health, pollution control, the problems of the draft, and innumerable other difficulties with which we wrestle would be immeasurably easier to resolve.

I believe, therefore, that the time is overdue that we re-examine the problem which is Vietnam despite the understandable desire of most Americans to push this unhappy subject from their minds.

I can understand the reluctance of many Americans to think about what we are doing in Vietnam and elsewhere in Indochina.

I can appreciate their reluctance to let it intrude on their thoughts. It is unpleasant to hear of massacres such as occurred at My Lai. It is unpleasant to talk of American war crimes. It is a most unpleasant task to bring criminal charges against American soldiers who, under the stress of combat, commit acts which no civilized people can tolerate or ignore.

Distasteful as it may be, Vietnam remains a problem that must be discussed and dealt with, if it is ever to end.

It would seem that the conflict raging in Southeast Asia is now entering a new and perhaps critical phase. The broader nature of this conflict becomes ever more evident.

The whole question of our continued and increased involvement in these areas which

recent events raise, directs our attention to what should be the lessons of Vietnam. I believe it would serve us well to take a good look at them.

This war has, to date, cost our nation the lives of over 45,000 of our finest young men. And the grim toll continues to mount each week. This climbing death toll is a tragedy fully appreciated only by those loved ones who bear the primary burden.

We must add to this total of dead the more than 295,000 Americans who have been wounded in battle—more than half of whom were wounded seriously enough to require hospital care. And of these numbers, many horribly scarred and mangled.

A new dimension has been added to this problem of the wounded. Because of the helicopter and the advances of medical science many more seriously wounded survive than was the case in previous wars. Men who formerly would have died on the field of battle are now living—though some exist as virtual vegetables.

Such has not always been the case. In my own situation, I remember well that day in World War II when I was wounded. It was about three o'clock in the afternoon. It was nine o'clock in the evening, six hours later, that I reached a forward aid station, and 1 a.m. by the time I got to a field hospital. Today, that time lag has been cut to less than an hour in most cases. The result has not only been a reduction in loss of life, but also a rapid increase in the number of permanently disabled who now flood over veterans hospitals; invalids whom we are not caring for with adequate funds, facilities, and programs.

This war has also brought forth a new breed of Americans—Americans bitter with their government—Americans without faith in our institutions or our leaders.

And our cost in this conflict is, of course, not a measure of the war's total cost. We must add the more than 125,000 South Vietnamese troops who have died to date. These still die at a 20,000 annual rate. We must also add the 4,000 dead among our other allies, who have been fighting there.

And we must add the 25,000 Vietnamese civilians who were killed last year and the more than 25,000 the year before plus the more than 100,000 civilians who were wounded each year.

This war's cost must also be measured in the number of enemy dead, which are estimated at more than 700,000, in addition to their uncounted wounded.

We must add further the awesome cost of the damage wrought on the Vietnamese countryside by the use of modern weapons of conflict. This includes the destruction of plant and animal life and the changes we have wrought in the ecology of the land—changes which will endure for many years.

The cost of warfare is fantastic. World wide military expenditures now total \$200 billion a year. These are increasing at a 7 percent annual rate with no limit in sight. This is more than three times the rate of increase in the value of our gross world product. Meanwhile education and health expenditures remain not only far less but are showing no per capita increases. Today, the nations of this earth spend an average of \$7,800 per year for each man in military uniform while spending an average of \$100 per year for education for each child of school age.

As we bear these awesome burdens of war, and witness our many other pressing, but as yet unmet needs, we must ask ourselves—why don't we stop? Why don't we bring this Vietnam war to an end?

It is to this question that I wish to address myself today.

We had taken an important step towards ending this war. We had publicly and officially concluded this war could not be won militarily.

While this was a significant move, I regret that the steps we have taken subsequent to this declaration have not been consistent with that conclusion. Our actions have not demonstrated acceptance of that fact. We still speak blithely of Vietnamization of the war—of a military victory for the Saigon government. We named our adventure into Cambodia "Operation Total Victory". We stage and support a South Vietnamese incursion into Laos. We verbally unleash the South to invade the North. As long as we pace our withdrawal to the take-over of our share of the fighting by the forces of Thieu and Ky and to the level of military activity of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese forces, we will be unable to end our involvement in Vietnam. We can be forced to retain our military presence. We will not be the master of our own forces nor of our destiny in Southeast Asia.

The one essential step which we must take to bring this war to an end is to admit to ourselves—and to the world—that we made a tragic mistake. We must acknowledge that the Vietnam war has been a failure—that victory is unobtainable.

This is a difficult admission to make—especially when we remind ourselves of the enormity of this war's cost. Few want to admit error in judgment—and even fewer, when it involves a cost of nearly 50,000 American lives.

It is difficult to face up to the charge that these men's lives may have been wasted. And so we continually struggle to come up with a justification for continuing this war. We walk a tight rope of uncertainty.

We say we will withdraw our American troops—but there is to be no deadline. The grand justification for our continuing presence—the Vietnamization of the war—means merely we will substitute to the maximum extent possible, Americans killing and being killed by Asians, with Asians killing Asians.

The success of Vietnamization demands the military success of the government in Saigon and the defeat of the Communist forces. To achieve this success will require the continued presence and involvement of American troops in vast, if unknown, numbers.

There was a time when nearly all Americans supported the Vietnam war. On the important Tonkin Gulf Resolution only two Senators voted in opposition. Our most vocal doves of more recent years were not in that number. And neither, I must say, was Senator Daniel K. Inouye.

Looking back, I was convinced that there was legal and technical justification for our involvement in Vietnam. There were our treaty obligations under SEATO and other agreements. There were the reports of inhumane killing and slaughter of South Vietnamese civilians by the Viet Cong. There were the reports of some 8,000 political assassinations by the end of 1964.

Yes, one can agree that there may have been justification—but events have clearly demonstrated there was at the same time an error of judgment—an error of judgment which has involved four American Presidents as well as the lives of almost 50,000 Americans.

The rationale for our involvement in Vietnam assumed our ability to win the war and, thereby, gain the peace, and rebuild a nation—a nation at peace with itself, and the world.

Not only have we been unable to "win the war", but we now find our actions almost indistinguishable from those of the enemy. We developed operation Phoenix—employing mercenaries to torture, assassinate and murder members of the Viet Cong infrastructure. The ends now justify our means. We have adopted those tactics which we self-righteously condemned a few years ago.

We employed instruments of war we deemed too horrible for use on European battlefields. We have used chemical agents.

Defoliants and tear gas. We have employed tear gas not as a non-lethal weapon to avoid the killing of non-combatants, but as an agent to drive the enemy from his lair so we can gun him down.

Yes, we entered Vietnam as friends. We embraced the people of South Vietnam as brothers and sisters. An untold number of Americans made the welfare and the freedom of these Vietnamese people their personal cause. We tried to heal the bodies of the sick, and the injured. We tried to educate the children and help the farmers increase the food supply. In so many ways our cause was certainly humanitarian and moral.

But as we increased our presence, and as the conflict became increasingly an American war, we found a change taking place—a change in our national attitude as well as a change in the character of the war. The Vietnamese, whether friendly, neutral, or unfriendly, became "gooks." Our soldiers viewed them increasingly with contempt and suspicion. Some came to consider all Vietnamese as enemies in their inability to distinguish friend from foe in the kind of guerrilla war we were fighting. "The only good 'gook' is a dead one," became their philosophy.

And so now we have My Lai. We have American soldiers and officers charged with the murder of women and children. And we have American generals charged with trying to keep these tragic incidents from becoming more widely known, and the perpetrators from being punished.

We established a price list for the accidental killing of Vietnamese in non-combat accidents. For instance, our military trucks, careening through narrow village streets, have killed many Vietnamese natives. The relatives of accidental victims of our unconcern can collect from Uncle Sam, \$318 for a year old child, \$201.95 for a ten year old. And if the son or daughter is twenty years of age the family gets just over \$30 whereas we may pay as much as \$100 for a water buffalo, and 400 times his daily wage to the surviving wife of a wage earner who loses his life through an American's misadventure. In 1969, we paid out a total of \$1,231,920.16 in claims to the South Vietnamese. Is this our war reparations?

I was deeply saddened by what happened at My Lai—but I was not surprised. When men are trained to hate and to kill with proficiency, and when they reach the frame of mind where those whom they have come to help are called "gooks", and when we place impersonal price tags on human beings, we should expect My Lais to occur. When we consider a six months old baby an enemy—when war reaches such a stage—when it causes Americans to so act—it is time we called a halt. There can no longer be any justification for the war's continuation. Nor can any legal argument be considered a sufficient reason for continuing the fighting and killing.

Almost all our leaders have admitted that there is no military solution to this conflict—that it must be resolved politically.

I know it is the prayer of every American that the course upon which the President has now embarked our Nation in Indochina is a correct one. This is a prayer which I share deeply and fully. As a member of the United States Senate and as an American citizen, I want very much to support my President, particularly on an issue of such magnitude, in these trying times.

But if the experience of this past decade has within it any lessons—particularly for the Congress—for those of us who are fixed with some direct responsibility for the conduct of our Nation's foreign policy—then we must recognize and act on that higher responsibility to our Nation's welfare. We cannot abdicate our responsibility.

I, therefore, could not support the President's decision to widen the war. I deplored

the President's decision to launch an American attack into Cambodia.

Neither could I welcome the more recent incursion into Laos.

The President's words and actions must make us doubt our ability to learn from the past. His are the same arguments which were summoned forth in sending advisors to South Vietnam a decade ago. These are but a repetition of what we heard when advisors became combat divisions. It is but a reiteration of the voices which were raised in justification of the bombing of North Vietnam. Must each American President learn anew from the experience of his own administration?

Our President's arguments indicate that this may be so. He opened other and even more dangerous chapters in the tragedy of our involvement in Indochina. History shows that this involvement came in a three step phase. First, American advisors were sent to assist the South Vietnamese. Second, with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, our President requested of the Senate the authority to deploy American combat troops to Vietnam. Third, was the bombing of North Vietnam. The war escalated and still there was no victory in sight, and President Johnson then moved to de-escalate the war.

And now, President Nixon, has expanded the conflict, to Cambodia and to Laos and increased the bombing once again.

Our President presented us with a fait accompli. These expansions were initiated without prior consultation with the Congress much less its approval.

President Nixon has renounced his own earlier statements of policy and purpose. This is no longer a war to be curtailed, contained or settled politically, this is now once again a war for military victory.

The President justifies his action as necessary to prevent the defeat and humiliation of our great Nation. Frankly, what is so wrong with a great people swallowing some pride and admitting mistake? What is the test to true greatness? Is it to continue and expand a bankrupt policy? I think not. I pray not.

Can we possibly achieve peace by insisting that Hanoi, and China, and the Soviet Union, must acknowledge defeat and admit humiliation? I think not.

If we are to be true to ourselves—to our highest ideals—we must be big enough to place the peace of the world and the saving of human life above saving face. We must be willing to admit error and so adjust our policy. For neither our conscience nor the conscience of mankind will permit us to use our awesome weapons of war which will be essential if we insist on military victory and expand this conflict to that end.

Yes, a political solution will require that we swallow some pride—that we even lose some face. Difficult as that may be for the United States, I believe it will be essential and we must face up to the unpleasant task.

By so doing we can close an unfortunate chapter in our history. We can ring down the curtain on the Vietnam war, and do so a little stronger for lessons we have learned.

It is not our will or courage which is being tested. It is our judgment.

If we truly learn our lesson from this tragic experience and apply it as a guide for future action, then we can say our Nation's sons have not died in vain. Their sons and younger brothers, and your sons and mine, may be saved because of their suffering and sacrifice.

To learn our lesson we must look to the origins of our Vietnam involvement. How did this come about?

It grew out of a period in our history when out of our fear of Communism and fear of being called "soft on Communism", we went to the aid of every self-proclaimed anti-Communist on the face of the globe. It grew out of the McCarthy era. It was part of the fall-out from charges of a China sell-out,

and the public condemnation of a great American patriot, General George Marshall.

Vietnam grew out of an oppressive atmosphere which produced a Title II as part of our Internal Security Act authorizing the establishment of American concentration camps. It grew out of times which approved the destruction of an Oppenheimer for his views and friendships.

Vietnam grew out of a post World War II period in which we held unchallenged military supremacy in the air, at sea, and in nuclear power. It grew out of the mistaken belief that such power provided an adequate response to "wars of liberation". Military might became a substitute for understanding.

Vietnam grew out of an almost religious fervor to fight monolithic Communism wherever and whenever we sensed its presence.

Vietnam grew out of an American public opinion which encouraged our intervention at any time and place whenever a leader of a foreign government found himself insecure in his seat of power and could "con" us into the belief that the only alternative to coming to his rescue was a Communist takeover and, therefore, a threat to our national security.

Having described the conditions which led to Vietnam, what then are the lessons?

I believe there are several.

Vietnam should teach us to be very cautious in making commitments less we be "conned" into offering our men and our treasury to scoundrels who proudly proclaim "send me help and I will fight the Communists for you". Some of these now live in fancy European villas and have fat Swiss bank accounts. We must be very selective when and where we involve our Nation. Every currently non-Communist part of the world is not necessarily vital to our security.

Vietnam should teach us that we must whenever we have the opportunity, decide in favor of people and not tyrants.

Vietnam should teach us that though we may have superior weapons and military hardware, conscience will not permit, or circumstances may prevent, their use. Our possession of this vast arsenal may encourage our engagement in circumstances where it is of no value. Therefore, weak countries may be able to nip with relative immunity at the heels of the mighty.

Vietnam should teach us that it is very easy to get embroiled on a very limited scale in conflicts where the pay-off may look good, but which have a capacity to spread, dragging us in ever deeper in a futile effort to salvage our investment.

Vietnam should teach us a greater realism of our limited ability to effect change in the social, economic, and political order of a Nation or a people, as well as the possibility disastrous affects of such misdirected efforts on ourselves as a people, and as a Nation.

These then are some of the lessons which must be clearly kept in mind as we look to the future in Cambodia, in Laos, and in Thailand. Our involvement now may be quite limited. The pay-off may look good. But the dangers are also great. It is much easier to get in than to get out.

Despite the Nixon Doctrine—or Doctrines which have now been enunciated, our future course in Southeast Asia is far from clear. It is certainly not clear to Hanoi and Peiping. How could it be when it is unclear to us?

It can only be clarified if we go beyond Vietnamization. We must, therefore, take additional steps.

The first of these is, as I have said, to acknowledge failure for our Vietnam policy. We must admit error in judgment. Neither we, nor the governments we support, can militarily win the war in Indochina. We must make clear that we seek a political settlement.

Second, we should propose an immediate and complete cease fire without terminal date. To secure such a cease fire, we should if necessary, be prepared to unilaterally halt

all offensive operations and limit our forces and those under our control to purely defensive roles. Negotiations with an enemy is always a difficult process, but it is more difficult while the fighting rages, than after it has been halted.

The talks in Paris are getting no place. There is no sign of progress. But Vietnam is not isolated from the larger problems of Southeast Asia—from the problems of Cambodia and Laos.

We should, therefore, call for a conference on the over-all problems of this area known as Indochina. This should be an Asian conference, and not a European conference trying to impose European solutions on Asian problems.

It is time that we and other Western powers realize that these Asians are no longer wards of Western colonial powers. We should recognize not only their weaknesses, but also their apparent strengths—the desire, capacity, and ability to govern themselves.

We should make it crystal clear that we will abide with the outcome of these political negotiations. Accordingly, we must forthrightly face the possibility of an Indochina in the sphere of influence of Hanoi.

It is true that such a policy is not without risks. But neither is the current policy—a policy with no end in sight after nearly a decade of fighting.

Throughout most of my years in public life, I have wrestled in my own mind and conscience with the problem. I have joined Presidents and bishops, as well as military men, in support of some of our actions. I hope that I have learned—that we have all learned—from this tragic experience. I hope that we as individuals have learned more humility—and also that we have learned some humility as a Nation.

This knowledge will serve us and mankind well in the years ahead.

A RICH ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY IN ALASKA CAN BE INSURED

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, one of the most perplexing problems facing our Nation today is the question of how we may make sufficient use of the great natural resources of the State of Alaska and, at the same time, preserve and insure a rich environmental legacy for our own and succeeding generations.

A great debate over this question has been carried on at all levels of Government, in the media, and has even reached into the campus and the home. As a representative of the people of Alaska, and as a resident and frequent beholder of its natural beauty, I have been deeply concerned with this problem and have been active both as a participant and as an auditor of the debate.

You will be pleased to know that at least one company in one recent situation found a viable and workable answer to this problem, a solution which should be of benefit to the people of Alaska while having a minimal present and future impact upon the ecology.

This solution is described in a recent U.S. district court decision in Alaska, Sierra Club against Hardin, in which the plaintiffs sought to have the sale of timber in Alaska's Tongass National Forest by the U.S. Forest Service declared invalid. There is an aspect to this decision which will be most reassuring to all of us who have sought an answer to the problem of how to use and simultaneously protect the environment of Alaska. The court's decision in favor of the defendants was based to a significant degree

upon the fact that the company purchasing the timber, U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., had selected and retained a "blue-ribbon panel of conservationists" to supervise the selection of a site for the company's mill which would have the least environmental impact.

In the language of the court:

... U. S. P. (U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers) had expended substantial sums to insure that the impact of the mill would be minimized by comprehensive site planning and the most advanced technology available. The mill site selection was supervised by a blue-ribbon panel of conservationists selected from universities in the United States and Canada. A specially commissioned field study sponsored by U.S.P. resulted in a seventy page technical report published in November of 1969 by the Institute of Marine Science of the University of Alaska. It seems unlikely that in investigation by federal experts would have been more comprehensive and unbiased.

Considering the impressive credentials of the U.S.P. panel of environmental experts assigned to the project, the high quality of its research product, the advanced stage of planning as of January 1, 1970, and the exorbitant cost of any further delay, the Forest Service was justified in its reliance upon U.S.P.'s environmental studies.

In its conclusions, the court adds:

The Forest Service was justified in relying on the environmental impact investigation conducted by U.S.P., and under the circumstances the Act was complied with "to the fullest extent possible."

The decision includes the names of the members of this blue-ribbon panel, and I would like to cite them here, as they are a most impressive group of environmental scientists. They are: Dr. Donald J. Zinn, professor of zoology, University of Rhode Island; Dr. R. Van Cleve, dean of the College of Fisheries, University of Washington; Dr. A. Starker Leopold, professor of forestry and zoology, University of California, Berkeley; Dr. Stanley Cain, professor of natural resources, University of Michigan; and Dr. Ian McTaggart, dean of graduate studies, University of British Columbia.

Certainly, U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, which is one of our Nation's leading forest products companies, is to be commended for its foresight in selecting and using this panel of eminent conservationists. In the first place, they have found a viable solution—one acceptable to a Federal court—to the development of one of Alaska's great natural resources. However, in the broadest sense, the company has demonstrated that through the right cooperative effort between industry and people who understand the environment, Alaska and our Nation can, indeed, progress while preserving and ensuring the protection of our natural beauty and our resources.

EVENTS IN EAST PAKISTAN

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, all of us have watched with deep concern the events of the past 2 months in Pakistan. We watched first as the Government of Pakistan, reportedly with considerable disregard for human life, suppressed those in East Bengal who favored either a looser confederation of the two halves of the country or complete separation.