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(e) The Secretary shall terminate and include the lease designated as P-0166 within the Federal Ecological Preserve as provided in section 3 of this Act at such time as the State of California terminates the lease designated as PRC-3150, granted by such State, with respect to adjoining lands in the Carpinteria Oil Field.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert a statement by Mr. TUNNEY at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR TUNNEY

Mr. President, I introduce today, with Senator Cranston, a bill to establish a Federal Ecological Preserve in the Santa Barbara Channel, and to meet an urgent need to deal immediately with a dangerous threat to one of California's beautiful coastal areas.

Tomorrow is the end of the second year during which our Government's policies have permitted the risk of further destruction. Even today, the oil is still leaking into the sea. On this eve of that anniversary, we join in action to protect the Santa Barbara Channel from the despoliation of ocean waters, shorelines and marine life caused by ill-planned oil drilling. The legislation we introduce will also provide a mechanism for fair compensation where loss occurs due to suspended and terminated leases.

On this basis, we can now proceed immediately to protect a vital part of the natural heritage of California which all Americans share. Let us act now to guarantee that the third anniversary of the disastrous blowout near Santa Barbara will be a time of real celebration—not just a reminder of the past.

S. 376—VIETNAM DISENGAGEMENT ACT OF 1971

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. President, I introduce for myself and for Senators HATFIELD, CRANSTON, HUGHES, BAYH, EAGLETON, GRAVEL, HART, HARTKE, INOUE, JAVITS, KENNEDY, MONDALE, MOSS, NELSON, PROXMIER, RIBICOFF, TUNNEY, and WILLIAMS, a bill entitled the "Vietnam Disengagement Act of 1971."

The provisions of this act, which would amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, are similar to those of the Vietnam withdrawal amendment considered in the last Congress.

We offer it in the conviction that it remains an urgently necessary alternative to the Nixon administration's so-called Vietnamization strategy.

The earlier version was defeated in the Senate on September 1, 1970, by a vote of 55 to 39.

What has happened since?

Young Americans continue to bleed and die. And their sacrifice is made all the more painful by the knowledge that it will affect not at all the cause that demands it.

Gradual withdrawals of U.S. forces have continued, with each step raising the risk to those who must remain as the war goes on.

Hundreds of Americans still languish in enemy prison camps with no real hope of release. "Vietnamization" is a policy which, even if it could succeed militarily, would leave those prisoners languishing in prisons into the indefinite future. The administration deplors their plight but ignores the course that would return

them and our troops to their homes and families.

It has become increasingly clear that the negotiations in Paris have no chance of producing agreement. That condition will remain so long as we maintain our desire to win goals on the conference table that we have long since foregone on the battlefield. But since the defeat of the McGovern-Hatfield amendment last fall spokesmen for the National Liberation Front and Hanoi have said that if the U.S. Government would declare a definite date for the withdrawal of all our forces, they would immediately begin discussions leading to the release of our prisoners and would pledge a safe exit for our troops. A Gallup poll last fall showed the American people favoring this formula by a 2-to-1 margin.

Yet, we cling still to a South Vietnamese Government which resists reform and practices contempt for the principles that would give it legitimacy.

And while they bear the indecencies of that regime, the South Vietnamese people still bear, too, the devastation of their countryside and the destruction of their lives by weapons that cannot discern between enemy and innocent.

The war has spread farther across Indochina. Cambodia now wears the scars of heavy bombardment, faces economic ruin, and feels the devastation of widening conflict. Activities in that country now confirm precisely what the sponsors and supporters of the Cooper-Church amendment sought to prevent—an American commitment to yet another wobbly Southeast Asian government.

At home our own national economy continues in the most serious recession in a decade. Each month's indicators defy the administration's rose-colored predictions—while the President vetoes national programs to assist recovery and to meet urgent domestic needs.

To win acceptance of its war policy, the administration has discarded vital elements of its own capacity to govern. Daily air missions over Cambodia violate the President's own guidelines. He gives lie to the statements of his own Cabinet officers—Secretary Rogers on Cambodia and Secretary Laird on the Son Tay raid. Invasions are "incursions," failures are "victories," air attacks are "protective reaction," and Vietnam is our "finest hour."

The rhetoric cannot long shield the weakness of a policy mistaken from the beginning. It can only deplete the reservoirs of trust, good will and respect which are essential to effective national leadership. It deprives our society of the moral strength it needs now as much as at any time in our national experience.

We wait in vain for a solution that can save our national face and avoid the pain of admitting our mistake. The removal of any cancer leaves a wound to heal. What intelligent being would ask to keep the cancer instead?

The war corrupts all it touches. We must end it now. We must begin now the redemption of our own society at home and the restoration of wisdom and commonsense in our posture abroad.

This bill is a decisive step toward those goals. The commitment to com-

plete withdrawal of U.S. forces by a date certain can open the way to a political settlement. It offers the one responsible, realistic means of bringing U.S. prisoners home. Within hours after adoption we could expect the negotiating machinery to begin working, probably to produce an immediate ceasefire, possibly to produce an early settlement of differences among the Vietnamese people themselves.

We can hope to achieve no more through continued war.

If it can chart a more hopeful course in Asia, this bill would also define a more responsive government in America.

The framers of our Constitution foresaw a Congress with supreme obligations on issues of war and peace. Only the Congress, they said, can raise and support armies. Only the Congress can declare war. And with those powers, Congress was given an obligation to review its military decisions once every 2 years.

Last year we heard pleas for Presidential flexibility. The President has had it. The war continues. And now, with repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, there is no longer the slightest vestige of positive congressional authority for U.S. participation in the Vietnam war.

It would be difficult indeed to find a Member of Congress who would dispute the need for new attention to the conditions and the procedures for committing American forces to battle. Vietnam has clearly strengthened the resolve of Congress to reexamine its constitutional prerogatives. I suspect that each one of us has made his own individual resolution for "no more Vietnams."

But can we deal only in abstract theories? Why not be relevant to today?

If we worry about the peoples' regard for the Congress, I submit that while we concern ourselves with new procedures to prevent future wars, we ought to be even more anxious to use the procedures set forth in the Constitution to end the war that bleeds our society right now.

There are many reasons to resolve "no more Vietnams."

Let us resolve, then, against this one.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the "Vietnam Disengagement Act of 1971" be printed at this point in the RECORD.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the bill will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 376) to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, introduced by Mr. MCGOVERN (for himself and other Senators), was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, as follows:

S. 376

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the Vietnam Disengagement Act of 1971.

SEC. 2. Congress finds and declares that under the Constitution of the United States the President and the Congress share responsibility for establishing, defining the authority for and concluding foreign military commitments; that the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution raises new uncertainties about the source of authority for American involve-

ment in Vietnam; that both the domestic and foreign policy interests of the United States require an expeditious end to the war in Vietnam; that the conflict can best be resolved through a political settlement among the parties concerned; that in light of all considerations, the solution which offers the greatest safety, the highest measure of honor, the best likelihood for the return of United States prisoners and the most meaningful opportunity for a political settlement would be the establishment of a date certain for the orderly withdrawal of all United States armed forces from Vietnam.

SEC. 3. Chapter 1 of part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"SEC. 620 (a) In accordance with public statements of policy by the President, no funds authorized to be appropriated under this or any other Act may be obligated or expended to maintain a troop level of more than two hundred and eighty-four thousand armed forces of the United States in Vietnam after May 1, 1971.

(b) After May 1, 1971, funds authorized or appropriated under this or any other Act may be expended in connection with activities of American armed forces in and over Vietnam only to accomplish the following objectives:

(1) To bring about the orderly termination of military operations there and the safe and systematic withdrawal of remaining American armed forces by December 31, 1971;

(2) To insure the release of prisoners of war;

(3) To arrange asylum or other means to assure the safety of South Vietnamese who might be physically endangered by withdrawal of American forces; and

(4) To provide assistance to the Republic of Vietnam consistent with the foregoing objectives."

INTRODUCTION OF THE VIETNAM DISENGAGEMENT ACT OF 1971

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, one central event has taken place since the Congress last considered legislation requiring a deadline for our withdrawal from Vietnam. The President has signed the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. It was that resolution which often had been cited as a positive congressional authorization for our military involvement in Indochina. Its repeal would seem to remove the last vestige of constitutional legitimacy to our war policy. Certainly the President has the constitutional power to protect American troops and to bring them all home; but he is not empowered, in my judgment, to continue a policy involving offensive military operations and leading to a limitless commitment of American forces in Vietnam. Questions are far more than support or opposition to a particular policy are involved here. Fundamentally, we are dealing with the basic meaning of the Constitution, and whether its intentions regarding the balance of powers between the executive and legislative branch in matters of war and peace are to have any real meaning today.

During a televised conversation with three newsmen on July 1, 1970, Howard K. Smith of ABC asked the President about the legal basis of our Vietnam involvement in light of the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution:

LEGAL BASIS FOR VIETNAM ACTION

Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, one of the things that happened in the Senate last week was the rescinding of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution by the Senate. Mr. Katzenbach, in the previous administration, told the

Foreign Relations Committee that resolution was tantamount to a congressional declaration of war. If it is rescinded, what legal justification do you have for continuing to fight a war that is undeclared in Viet-Nam?

The PRESIDENT. First, Mr. Smith, as you know, this war, while it was undeclared, was here when I became President of the United States. I do not say that critically. I am simply stating the fact that there were 549,000 Americans in Viet-Nam under attack when I became President.

The President of the United States has the constitutional right—not only the right but the responsibility—to use his powers to protect American forces when they are engaged in military actions; and under these circumstances, starting at the time I became President, I have that power and I am exercising that power.

LIMITED U.S. OBJECTIVES

Mr. SMITH. Sir, I am not recommending this, but if you don't have a legal authority to wage a war, then presumably you could move troops out. It would be possible to agree with the North Vietnamese. They would be delighted to have us surrender. So you could—What justification do you have for keeping troops there other than protecting the troops that are there fighting?

The PRESIDENT. A very significant justification. It isn't just a case of seeing that the Americans are moved out in an orderly way. If that were the case we could move them out more quickly; but it is a case of moving American forces out in a way that we can at the same time win a just peace.

Now, by winning a just peace, what I mean is not victory over North Viet-Nam—we are not asking for that—but it is simply the right of the people of South Viet-Nam to determine their own future without having us impose our will upon them, or the North Vietnamese or anybody else outside impose their will upon them.

When we look at that limited objective, I am sure some would say, "Well, is that really worth it? Is that worth the effort of all these Americans fighting in Viet-Nam, the lives that have been lost?"

I suppose it could be said that simply saving 17 million people in South Viet-Nam from a Communist takeover isn't worth the efforts of the United States. But let's go further. If the United States, after all of this effort, if we were to withdraw immediately, as many Americans would want us to do—and it would be very easy for me to do it and simply blame it on the previous administration—but if we were to do that, I would probably survive through my term, but it would have, in my view, a catastrophic effect on this country and the cause of peace in the years ahead.

Now, I know there are those who say the domino theory is obsolete. They haven't talked to the dominoes. They should talk to the Thais, to the Malaysians, to the Singaporeans, to the Indonesians, to the Filipinos, to the Japanese, and the rest. And if the United States leaves Viet-Nam in a way that we are humiliated or defeated—not simply speaking in what is called jingoistic terms, but in very practical terms—this will be immensely discouraging to the 300 million people from Japan clear around to Thailand in free Asia; and even more important, it will be ominously encouraging to the leaders of Communist China and the Soviet Union, who are supporting the North Vietnamese. It will encourage them in their expansionist policies in other areas.

The world will be much safer in which to live.

Mr. SMITH. I happen to be one of those who agrees with what you are saying, but do you have a legal justification to follow that policy once the Tonkin Gulf resolution is dead?

The PRESIDENT. Yes, sir, Mr. Smith, the legal justification is the one I have given,

and that is the right of the President of the United States under the Constitution to protect the lives of American men. That is the legal justification. You may recall, of course, that we went through this same debate at the time of Korea. Korea was also an undeclared war; and then, of course, we justified it on the basis of a U.N. action. I believe we have a legal justification, and I intend to use it.

The apparent lack of any clear constitutional authority for our actions in Vietnam, and the uncertainties about this fundamental question, seems to be clear from this discourse. For I do not believe the constitutional right and duty of the President "to protect the lives of American men" is sufficient legal and constitutional justification for sustaining American troops and power indefinitely in prolonged armed conflict in the support of a foreign government, with no positive grant of approval by the U.S. Congress.

These matters transcend our beliefs about whether present policy is the proper way for us to seek an end to the conflict in Indochina. At stake is the sanctity of constitutional government.

Congress' responsibility for participating in the decisions and the responsibility of war was expressed eloquently by Abraham Lincoln when he said:

Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion, and you allow him to do so whenever he may choose to say he deems it necessary for such a purpose, and you allow him to make war at his pleasure. Study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this respect, after having given him so much power as you propose . . .

The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making power to Congress was dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons: Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was the object. This our convention understood to be the most oppressive of all kingly oppressions, and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing oppression upon us. But your view destroys the whole matter, and places our President where kings have always stood."—Letter to Herndon while in Congress.

I can think of no more urgent question before the 92d Congress than the attempt to define and determine the constitutional authority for our military actions in Indochina. Therefore, I am compelled to introduce this bill in order to prevent the further erosion of our constitutional process.

The President has pointed out how his policies have reduced casualties from as many as 300 per week to as few as 30 per week, and how he has significantly reduced our troops in Vietnam. In these efforts he has my full support and approval. Yet, I am concerned about the ultimate result of our present direction of policy. Our first concern must be finding a solution that will stop the war; the goal of our policy in Indochina must be directed at a political solution to the conflict that will enable an end to the fighting, the bombing, the suffering, and the destruction in that land. I do not believe it is necessary to recite the litany of the devastation that continues to inflict Indochina. And even the brutalizing facts of death and destruction seem to fall on

a numbed and hardened national conscience.

Suffice it to say that our policy must be directed toward enabling a political settlement of the war. In recent months more and more reliance has been placed upon "Vietnamization" as a means of "ending the war." Yet, it should be clear that by its definition, "Vietnamization" is a strategy for perpetuating the conflict. Of course such a policy may seem desirable to some Americans, since the main emphasis is to shift responsibility for infantry combat from Americans to South Vietnamese soldiers; thus, it allows reductions in the number of our troops in Vietnam and decreases American casualties. However, this strategy fails in two very important ways. First, it will not lead to an end of American involvement in Vietnam; second, it will not enable a negotiated political settlement of the war, which is also the only way to insure the safe return of captive Americans. Further, it could even fail in a third way; it may prove to be militarily unfeasible.

Vietnamization will lead this spring to the "end of the ground combat role" for Americans. But many seem to be misled by just what that means. Ending ground combat implies, as I said, that the offensive infantry operations will fall more to the South Vietnamese. Yet, Americans will still fly helicopters, fire artillery, and drop bombs, as well as "protect" their installations, convoys, and troop deployments. In reality, Vietnamization is a change in the tactics of the war, designed chiefly to make our policy more palatable to the American public. It is not a formula for ending American involvement or achieving a settlement of the conflict. The success of Vietnamization requires a continued American involvement and postulates the lack of a negotiated settlement of the war.

I am also concerned from a purely military point of view about our present policy. For the moment, the policy seems to have succeeded in reducing casualties and withdrawing some troops. Yet where will our policy lead us, militarily, by the end of this year? What will happen if, when American ground combat units are deactivated, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong choose to move against the South Vietnamese Army, and make substantial strategic gains? There are many military analysts who believe that they will have this capability. In other words, what will happen if Vietnamization begins to fail militarily? My fear is that we would be tempted by steps of futile military escalation in order to prevent the failure of a policy. It is my sincere concern that our present course of action may not succeed even in its military objectives.

If it is an end to the war that we wish to achieve, that must come through negotiations. In order for negotiations to make any progress, we must demonstrate flexibility on either of two critical points: The first is a deadline for our complete withdrawal of troops; the second is a willingness to suspend our unqualified support for the Thieu-Ky regime. My own belief is that the most feasible and responsible step for us to take is the establishment of a date certain for our

withdrawal. True negotiations for settling the war would be the likely result of such an initiative. This is the principle motivating the Vietnam disengagement of 1971.

Our present course of action seems designed to achieve the same objective of our past policy: The survival of a friendly, non-Communist government in South Vietnam; thus, it attempts to preserve the support of those who have favored our present policies. Yet, our policy is also constructed to enable troop reductions and lowered casualties, attempting to win the support of those who have opposed the war. But if this policy appears to be jeopardized militarily, and also prohibits the complete withdrawal of our troops, then it will no longer hold decisive support from either of these segments of public opinion. The grim truth is that it is not possible to construct a policy that will satisfy everyone.

The majority of Americans, however, have made clear their opinion: They favor withdrawal of all our troops by the end of 1971. The most recent survey of public opinion, conducted by the Harris poll, estimated that 65 percent of Americans favored this option—a growth of about 10 percent from last September, when this proposal came to a vote in the Senate. There is no unanimity possible on any alternative for our future Vietnam policy. Yet, there is a clear majority of opinion which favors a date certain to complete our withdrawal.

A negotiated settlement is the means for ending the war; a timetable for withdrawal is the means to enable authentic negotiations; it is also the means for assuring the return of our prisoners of war.

In his state of the Union address, the President said that the 92d Congress can help end our longest war. There is no cause that I want more to achieve. The President's programs, and the spirit in which they were presented, won my deepest respect and admiration. Because I share his belief in these, I offer this alternative as the most responsible means for bringing the war in Indochina to a close. Without that accomplishment, all of our noblest goals will remain idle dreams.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, the 91st Congress ended at a moment of deceptive apathy about the war in Indochina.

Many of us in the Senate felt this sense of indifference. In some ways, we even welcomed it. We were numbed by the frustrating debates.

And, in fact, there seemed to be a breathing space.

The Church-Cooper amendment was supposed to put clear limits, by law, on more U.S. involvement in Indochina. The Secretary of State assured us there was no real difference on that score between the Senate and the administration. Of course, we were told, there would be no wider war.

But as this new Congress begins, our "advisers" are seen again in Cambodia, and our bombers and helicopters are all over Indochina. As I wrote the President recently, there are reports that our CIA and military are instigating and supplying a new invasion of southern Laos by Thai battalions. These reports

have since been substantiated by sources in Laos.

I also came back to the new session to find on my desk this letter from Minnesota. The signature is withheld to protect the privacy of the family:

DEAR SENATOR MONDALE: I write to you my plea, not only because as the years have gone by more people believe, admire, and appreciate the stand Senator McCarthy took against the war, but because I feel you too would have the great courage to step forth.

We have just buried my son, who never had the chance to hold his baby daughter in his arms. He was killed in combat December 23, 1970 in Vietnam—Mike went not believing in the cause but only because he felt he was no better than anyone else who was forced to go.

I know now that we, their very own family and friends, not some government, are forcing them to go. From the outpouring of sympathy from our relatives, friends, and total strangers, I realize the people want an immediate withdrawal so no more will die in vain. I'm sure the outcry of the people coupled with giving the boys an opportunity to serve their country only in a truly peaceful effort here in these United States so all its people will gain the principles for which our Flag stands. If ever our dear Flag is being desecrated it is in Vietnam.

Therefore my plea—please lead the people in this truly great country in a cry for immediate withdrawal so no more sons, brothers, and fathers will die in vain.

The columnists and pollsters tell us the war is no longer a major issue.

It is an issue for this mother, and the thousands like her all over America.

It is going to be a major issue for this Congress until every American soldier is out of Indochina.

I am not talking about Nixon's war or Johnson's war. This war belongs at the doorstep of every public official—including myself—who stood by and let it happen.

We quibbled. We gave the benefit of the doubt. We were never more wrong.

We are in danger of doing it all over.

The North Vietnamese, the Vietcong, the Pathet Lao, the Thai, the Cambodians—everybody knows what we are doing in Indochina except the American people, who are paying for it all with their men and their money.

That is why I asked the President about reports of U.S.-supported Thai troops in Laos. That is why the administration must be pressed at every turn to define the vague formulas, to say what they mean on these life-and-death issues.

When the President stood before the Congress and the country to tell us the state of the Union, he had an obligation to tell us the truth about the state of this war.

We paid nearly 50,000 lives and billions of dollars for that kind of straight talk from our President.

But whatever the evasion, the false optimism, or the sophistry, the Congress has an obligation to draw the line once and for all on the killing and dying.

Then, and only then, can any public official really answer the plea of these mothers—"so no more sons, brothers, and fathers will die in vain."

I am proud, Mr. President, to join in cosponsoring the Vietnam Disengagement Act of 1971, which would bring the

orderly withdrawal of our forces by the end of this year.

The need for this act is as overwhelming today as it was last year when it was known as the end-the-war amendment. Of the many questions that test this Congress, none will weigh more heavily on our place in history.

We saw our Nation sink into the Vietnam tragedy before, and failed to stop it. We cannot let that happen again.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to include in the body of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD a statement by the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES).

There being no objection, Senator HUGHES' statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT OF SENATOR HUGHES

Mr. President, the United States is now in its second decade of fighting a war in Vietnam. Every day that passes, more and more Americans, in the Congress and in the country at large, become convinced that we must withdraw our troops and end that war.

When they talk of disengagement of our fighting forces from Vietnam, I am convinced that the vast majority of Americans mean *total* disengagement. It is commendable that President Nixon is removing ground troops from Southeast Asia. But to change the nature of our military involvement to a predominantly air and military advisory effort is still short of ending our intervention.

Today I am joining colleagues in sponsoring the Vietnam Disengagement Act of 1971, an updating of the End the War Amendment which was defeated although substantially supported in the Senate last year.

By offering this bill, I believe we are keeping faith with millions of Americans by giving expression to their prayerful conviction that partial disengagement is not enough, that we must totally disengage as rapidly as is safe and practicable.

We propose this legislation at a time when events in Cambodia bear tragic resemblance to early stages of our actions that led to our plunge into the quagmire of Vietnam.

Headlines tell us of increased bombing, increased terrorism, increased casualties and increased instability. The optimism of only a few weeks ago has given way to the familiar pessimism we have experienced for years about this seemingly endless undeclared war.

Despite attempted rescue missions and stern governmental pronouncements, the destiny of the brave men who are prisoners of war in Indochina is as insecure as ever.

Although at this hour we appear to be facing new crises of widening conflict in Indochina, the proposed bill is not an emergency response to these current problems. It is, rather, an effort to look beyond the tactics and crises of the moment down the long road of strategic policy.

Are we to continue using military intervention as a primary instrument of our foreign policy? Are we to continue to spend American lives to support corrupt dictatorships, politically unresponsive to the will of their own people? These and other questions need to be squarely answered.

The press reports, the secrecy by the Pentagon, the confusing explanations offered by our government each day, can only lead us to one conclusion—that our policy is to change the form of our involvement in Indochina, but not to end the conflict.

American lives are American lives, whether they be of soldiers or airmen. Substituting firepower for manpower may seem to be more efficient, more politically tolerable, but the fact remains that Americans are risking and losing their lives in a war that should be ended. Moreover, by perpetuating our in-

volvement, we are destroying more villages, more farms, more innocent people in a war-ravaged country which wants peace and an end to our intervention even more than we do.

No one doubts the President's devout desire for peace. But it is our conviction that he will never attain that peace without making a clean break with the policies of the past that got us into Vietnam in the beginning.

We want to build peace in unison with the Administration, not in opposition to it. We want the Congress to reassert its constitutional responsibilities and powers in the determination of policy for peace and war.

Only last week, the President told the Congress that the Federal government is remote from the people, and that the power to govern must be returned to them and their elected representatives.

This is true—and the truth extends to foreign affairs as well as to domestic policies.

The introduction of the Vietnam Disengagement Act at this early stage of the session will, I believe, assure that this overriding issue gets full hearing and consideration before the nation, as well as before the Congress.

S. 378—INTRODUCTION OF BILL TO AUTHORIZE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BIG THICKET NATIONAL PARK, TEX.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I rise to offer a new approach to the establishment of a Big Thicket National Park in east Texas which I believe merits early approval by the Congress and the broad support of Texans.

Last year, the Senate approved legislation in this regard, but the bill was not considered by the House of Representatives. The legislation passed by the Senate had been offered by our former colleague, Senator Ralph Yarborough. But, before Senate passage, it was amended to limit the area of the proposed park to 100,000 acres. The original version of the bill had called for a park of at least 100,000 acres.

The new Senator from Texas (Mr. BENTSEN) has now reintroduced the bill in the form in which it passed the Senate last year.

Mr. President, that legislation leaves, in my opinion, much to be desired in terms of satisfying the realities of requirements for establishment of a Big Thicket National Park in east Texas.

I support the concept of a national park to preserve a portion of the ecologically unique areas of the Big Thicket so that future generations may enjoy them and so that scientists will not be deprived, through the encroachment of civilization, of the opportunity to observe and study this area.

At the same time, I recognize the need for increased recreational opportunities in east Texas. And I recognize that legislation passed by the Congress should not be so drawn as to stifle the east Texas economy by unreasonably hampering existing commercial operations.

Mr. President, I did not support the Big Thicket bill originally offered in the Senate because I thought it left too many unanswered questions. The bill did not specify a boundary for the proposed Big Thicket National Park. Also, it failed to rectify the cross purposes of preservation

and recreation. Additionally, I feel that a huge expanse of land larger than 100,000 acres would be detrimental to the economic growth and general welfare of east Texas.

After listening to many various park advocates for the past few years, I have been working during recent weeks to draw up a legislative proposal which would preserve the Big Thicket and simultaneously provide for increased recreational facilities in east Texas, all without undue economic hardship to existing industry.

Today, I am offering the result of that work.

My bill would authorize the Secretary of the Interior to establish a Big Thicket National Park of 81,472 well-defined acres in two adjacent parcels in Hardin, Polk, and Liberty Counties in east Texas.

One parcel has been known previously as the Profile unit of the String of Pearls concept earlier put forward as a Big Thicket National Park. The String of Pearls concept, however, composed of nine separate land parcels, has been generally discounted, I believe quite correctly, since the separate parcels would be extremely difficult to administer. It would be particularly difficult to enforce the preservation aspect of a national park composed of so many noncontiguous areas. Thus, the basic preservation goal of the national park would be subverted.

The Profile unit begins near Saratoga in Hardin County and extends generally northward to touch, but not include, the Alabama-Coushatta Indian Reservation in Polk County. A section of this unit also juts into Liberty County.

The second parcel defined in my bill to be included in the park is a rough triangle of acreage touching the Profile unit near Saratoga and having its remaining corners near the communities of Kountze and Sour Lake in Hardin County.

My discussions with east Texans indicate that a contiguous park composed of these two parcels will provide the protection required for a portion of the Big Thicket representative of the area and including most of the ecologically unique areas.

The bill I am now offering also authorizes increased development of recreational areas in east Texas in conjunction with Lake Livingston, Sam Rayburn Reservoir and Toledo Bend Reservoir, and the four national forests of east Texas: Sam Houston National Forest, Davy Crockett National Forest, Angelina National Forest and Sabine National Forest.

The bill specifies that the additional acreages for recreational areas plus the defined acreage for the Big Thicket National Park shall not exceed 100,000 acres.

It is my belief that the Secretary of the Interior should be allowed discretion in establishing the recreational areas in order to best meet the needs of east Texans. It may be that, in some cases, a tradeoff of National Forest land, administered by the Secretary of Agriculture, may be made with the Interior Department to most satisfactorily pro-