

UNITED STATES



U.S. CONGRESS
OF AMERICA

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 92^d CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

VOLUME 117—PART 35

DECEMBER 8, 1971 TO DECEMBER 11, 1971

(PAGES 45313 TO 46528)

generated by the refugees in order to buy time for the necessary political evolution.

We committed \$90 million for the support of the refugees in India and \$155 million to avert famine in East Pakistan. [Note: The problem in India was to care for upwards of 5 million refugees during this period. The problem in Pakistan was to avert famine for a province of 60-70 million people.]

The President requested the Congress to appropriate under the Foreign Assistance Act an additional \$250 million to continue this work. He made clear that this would be supplemented by food shipment as necessary.

In short, the United States has committed or has in prospect some \$500 million for the relief of refugees already in India and to prevent more refugees from coming into India, and to create a framework within which normal political and Administrative life could return to East Pakistan.

This humanitarian effort by October had assured that there would be no province-wide famine in East Pakistan. There would be no new flood of refugees from hunger.

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND MILITARY AID

At the same time, the Administration did not support what was done in East Pakistan.

No new development assistance has been committed to Pakistan since March. All of the economic assistance committed has been for the purpose of relief in East Pakistan.

The Administration also began the prospect of restricting military supplies immediately after the outbreak of fighting in March. The U.S. immediately suspended the issuance of any new licenses for Munitions List exports and stopped the shipment of military supplies out of American depots that were under American governmental control. It stopped renewing old licenses. This immediately ended the prospect of some \$35 million worth of arms in early April. In the months that followed old licenses progressively expired until the pipeline was dried up at the end of October. During these intervening months only some \$5 million worth of spare parts were shipped to Pakistan on old licenses in commercial channels. There was no lethal equipment involved.

POLITICAL

As has been said, the Administration recognized that the problem was essentially one of political evolution. There were limits on what an outsider could achieve in this field because the problem was essentially an internal problem of Pakistan. The United States did not make any public declarations of its views on the kind of political settlement required because the United States wanted to retain influence both in New Delhi and in Islamabad to bring about a political settlement that would enable the refugees to return.

This was explained to the Indian Foreign Minister here in June and to the Indian Prime Minister in New Delhi in July.

The government of Pakistan agreed to a number of steps that could facilitate a return to normal conditions in East Pakistan: They agreed that relief supplies should be distributed by international agencies in order to increase assurance of their fair distribution. The government of Pakistan agreed that a timetable would be established for returning to civilian rule by the end of December. The government of Pakistan announced an amnesty for refugees, established a civilian governor in East Pakistan and finally, as tension mounted this fall, accepted the idea of a unilateral pullback of Pakistan troops from the border.

The Administration also established contact with the Bangla Desh people in Calcutta in August, September and October. President Yahya expressed his willingness to begin negotiations with those in Calcutta who had not been charged with crime in Pakistan. The Administration understood that the Indian government discouraged such negotiations.

In short, the Administration attempted to supplement the political process in Pakistan with negotiations between the government of Pakistan and those Pakistanis outside Pakistan. The government of India was aware of this exercise and was invited to help make it a serious negotiation. The Administration also told Prime Minister Gandhi when she was here of Pakistan's offer to withdraw its troops to the border, but there was no response.

No one claims that the negotiating procedures were adequate or that they had achieved the necessary. The point is that efforts were made at negotiation and that there was little effort in India to make those potential negotiations the principal vehicle of their policy.

SUMMARY

In summary, the Administration: Through humanitarian efforts sought to achieve a framework which would allow sufficient time for a political solution;

Supplemented the political process already going on within Pakistan by seeking to facilitate a serious negotiation between the government of Pakistan and Bangla Desh leaders outside;

Painstakingly, though unsuccessfully, sought India's cooperation in making the necessary political process succeed;

Put forward numerous proposals to reduce military tension which threatened to disrupt the political process—proposals which were by and large accepted by Pakistan and ignored by India.

In short, the Administration made energetic efforts towards the achievement of a peaceful solution. Throughout the process, India refused to contribute in a constructive way and instead chose to resort to armed force to achieve its objectives. It is the U.S. view that India's recourse to military action was unjustified. Under these circumstances, the American people cannot but question the use to which extensive U.S. economic assistance to India will be put. If the U.S. were to accept the principle that "might makes right" and that a nation, by greater numbers and power, can impose political solutions on its neighbors, then anarchy must ensue.

THE FINAL TRAGEDY OF THE VIETNAM WAR

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, almost a year ago I read to the Senate a letter from a mother in Minnesota. Her son was killed in Vietnam in December 1970. This is a part of what she wrote me:

We have just buried my son, who never had a chance to hold his baby daughter in his arms . . . Mike went not believing in the cause but only because he felt he was no better than anyone else who was forced to go.

From the outpouring of sympathy from our relatives, friends and total strangers, I realize the people want an immediate withdrawal so no more will die in vain.

Please lead the people of this truly great country in a cry for immediate withdrawal so no more sons, brothers, and fathers will die in vain.

I said then, a year ago, that all of us—the Congress as well as the President—had to answer this mother.

But we have not answered her plea. And our failure will earn for all of us a cruel indictment in history.

As I said in that speech a year ago, this issue is far beyond partisan differences. It can never be simply Johnson's war or Nixon's war. This tragedy is the responsibility of every public official—including myself—who watched it begin and go on and on.

Some of us may have had doubts in

the early years, but we found reasons to hesitate, reasons to go along.

Just as I suspect so many of us are going along now, mercifully returning to other business because we somehow believe that this horrible war is no longer an issue. And our escape now is no less blind or irresponsible than the rationalizations so many of us made in supporting the war earlier.

That mother in Minnesota, and too many others like her around the country, know what we have preferred to forget—that behind all the talk about winding down the war, behind all the claims of progress in declining casualty rates, behind all the seeming public apathy is the inexcusable fact that their sons, brothers, and fathers are still dying and suffering in this war.

For 1971, through November 20, the Pentagon informs me that only 1,355 Americans have died from hostile action in Indochina. It is even hard nowadays to find the casualty figures tucked away in the back pages of the newspaper or spoken as an incidental item on television news programs.

But how can we pretend that those 1,355 lives are incidental items for the men who died, for their loved ones, or indeed for a country whose historic greatness is supposed to be the value it places on the individual human being.

Since 1969, only 207 young men from my State of Minnesota have been killed in action in Vietnam. Yet how is any one of these deaths less painful, how can any one be less an issue for this Government, simply because it is a part of a dropping line on casualty charts in the Pentagon?

What does it say about us as a people that we turn our backs, that we go along to other business, that we let this nightmare continue one more day, because 1,355 Americans are somehow a better, more acceptable number than 9,000 or 15,000? Have we become so numb by the carnage of the last several years that American boys can go on dying so long as their numbers are below some gruesome threshold of public outrage?

It is not only our own loss we have tried to put out of our minds. The dehumanized illusions of "progress" in ending the war also hide the terrible toll of what we are doing to others.

A recent Cornell University study on the air war in Indochina tells us that civilian casualties in Laos have totalled 10,000 more in the period 1969 to 1971 than in the earlier period 1965 through 1968. That study estimated that throughout Indochina an average of 130,000 civilians have been killed, wounded, or refugeeed each month since 1969. That compares to an estimated 98,000 each month during the period 1965-68.

According to Senator KENNEDY's Subcommittee on Refugees, the number of refugees in Laos since 1969 has grown to twice the total number during the period from 1965 through 1968. Homeless victims of the war in Laos now number more than 10 percent of the population of that country. Senator KENNEDY told us last April that our bombing in Laos is responsible for at least 75 percent of these refugees.

If one is a villager in Laos, Cambodia, or South Vietnam, the terror of this supposedly disappearing war is greater than ever before. According to our own official Department of Defense figures, the United States dropped 400,000 tons of bombs more in the period 1969 to the present than in the period 1965 to 1968. The tonnage totals for the period since 1969 are greater than those of all the bombs we dropped in World War II and the Korean war combined.

Or to put it another way, every month our bombs are falling on Indochina at the equivalent tonnage of twice the nuclear bomb we dropped on Hiroshima.

Of course there is no end to these numbers games. This administration and its supporters—like the last administration and those of us who supported it—can always summon reassuring statistics. The sorties are substantially down, they tell us; the casualties are low; the troops are withdrawing; the other side is exhausted; and the end is in sight.

And so it may be.

Perhaps this President will find a way to make the war disappear before the American people by the time he faces them for his reelection. Perhaps this Congress will find a way to explain to its constituents why it has not been able to cut through all the words and claims to end this war thousands of lives and billions of dollars earlier than the President would end it.

But I do not think those answers are ever going to be enough for the mother in Minneapolis. Her son's death was one of those lonely single tragedies lost in statistics that just need not have happened. For her and others like her, there will be no explanation slick enough to conceal the truth that when they cried out, no one really listened.

I do not know—nor, I suspect, does President Nixon know—exactly what will happen in Indochina when we have finally gone. But the odds are that we will leave behind there largely the same corruption and turmoil and unhappiness that we came upon more than a decade ago.

I am afraid that when that depressing fact sinks in on the American people—when they know at last the awful truth that we really had no business there and that we made so little difference in the long run—there will be no comfort in comparative casualty rates or the dropping lines on Pentagon graphs.

Then the American people are going to see clearly that their Government too long lacked the courage to face the facts, and that it too long asked American sons, brothers, and fathers to die for that lack of courage.

One of the final casualties of this war will surely be the belief of the American people in all of us in public life. And one of its ultimate tragedies will be that this casualty, like the others, could have been avoided.

U.S. RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, on December 6, David Rockefeller, the honorary chairman of the Council of the Americas, made an enlightened address about U.S.

relations with Latin America. Mr. Rockefeller called for a new cooperative effort between the nations of North and South America—an Alliance for Development.

In describing this concept, Mr. Rockefeller stated:

It should embrace political development, economic development, and social development. To accomplish this far reaching goal, it would have to draw together business and governments—organizations and people—universities and international agencies. Only through such concerted efforts can it expect to overcome the common and inter-related problems that have stalled true development as one sector or the other sought domination.

Mr. Rockefeller also had some wise words on the future role of private capital in Latin America and continuing U.S. private sector involvement in the area.

I ask unanimous consent that his speech be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REMARKS BY DAVID ROCKEFELLER

Seven years ago this week, I was one of a group of businessmen who had an appointment with the President of the United States. We were to discuss ways in which the U.S. Business Group for Latin America could help to realize the goals of an ambitious program—an Alliance between the free and independent countries of the Southern and Northern continents of America to assure the economic and social advancement of all the people.

President John F. Kennedy was able to keep that appointment, having decided at the last moment to go to Dallas. The next day, he met his tragic end; so that our group never did meet with President Kennedy. Although the idea of government-business cooperation in Latin America was picked up and actively pursued by President Johnson and his Administration.

Regrettably, the main thrust of his Alliance for Progress, which started with such promise, has since been blunted, deflected and largely dissipated by a steadily rising demand for nationalization in Latin America and, more recently, by a short-sighted reversion to "Fortress America" sentiment here at home. Nevertheless, the Alliance in its conception, despite its critics then and now, was a significant move in the right direction.

That Alliance bound us together for a while in a single purpose—to make human existence throughout the Americas something more than merely scratching out inadequate food from the barren soil of the hills. It held out the hope that being alive in the Americas need not mean the wail of hungry children or the unbearable knowledge that there would not be enough schools or enough jobs for them even if they managed to survive and grow.

The Alliance was to have coordinated a flow of technical skills and investment resources from the U.S. private sector—in cooperation with our own and Latin American governments—to create jobs, modernize agricultural techniques, stimulate manufacturing and increase international trade in Latin American nations. To understand why an Alliance founded on these worthy objectives has fallen into its present disarray, we will have to consider—without the emotions that usually surround it—the rise of chauvinism and nationalization in many countries of Latin America.

To a considerable extent their striving for self-identity and self sufficiency, however premature from an economic viewpoint, is understandable, especially when one takes into account the extreme youthfulness of the people of Latin countries. Because of their high birth rate and rapid population growth, nearly two-thirds of the Latin Amer-

ican population is less than twenty-five years old. As Eduardo Frei Montalvo, former President of Chile, has pointed out, "This youthful mass is in a deeply critical mood, like their peers in the rest of the world." Consequently, he concludes, "headquarters, both for ideas and for actual change, are . . . the universities and student groups."

If that sounds familiar, it is because we, in the United States, have been responding to the same passionate involvement and political concern of our own young people who are playing a growing role in public issues. In response to their concerns, we amended our Constitution to lower the voting age to eighteen. As a nation, we should have little trouble in recognizing and accepting the reality of comparable changes in other countries. But many of us are reluctant to accept the consequences.

When these youthful nations express their independence of thought and purpose through aggressive action affecting our interests, we find many of our own legislators are tempted to respond in kind with punitive and retaliatory measures.

But neither an arbitrary, uncompensated expropriation of foreign investments, nor a resort to violence in retaliation, is an acceptable assertion of self-determination in the context of today's world. In the long run, however, ill-considered expropriation is bound to be self-defeating for those nations that have not as yet accumulated sufficient capital or managerial depth to plan and carry out self-sustaining programs for internal development. On the other hand, in view of our own revolutionary origins as a nation, there are many other expressions of the new rising nationalism in Latin America to which we should not be able to comprehend and accept with patience and insight.

This breach in our hemispheric alliance, caused in large part by the growing spirit of independence in Latin America, is further widened by a growing indifference here at home. As we approach 1972, we are preoccupied with the problems of our own people and our own nation. The young and the radicals among us, the disadvantaged minorities, the affluent and the conservative are all asking if we shouldn't solve our own internal problems of the cities, of our economy, of our youth and of our educational system before we worry about others outside our borders.

But even if it were possible to solve all our own problems without concern for and in total isolation from the rest of the world, it would prove an empty victory to emerge as an island of prosperity in a sea of misery. The truth is, of course, that we share too many common interests, cultural ties, and mutual dependencies with other nations ever to return to "Fortress America." Whether we like it or not, we live in one world and we have to act accordingly.

When I spoke before this Council one year ago, I expressed the earnest hope that we would be able to prevail on Congress, our State Department and the Executive Branch generally to respond more fully to that mutuality of interests especially as it concerns our neighbors to the south. Now, a year later, we must regretfully acknowledge that the need is greater than ever. But we can temper our disappointment by reflecting that on a number of fronts progress has been made in meeting the goals of the Alliance.

As a result of cooperative efforts over the past decade, I know of tens of thousands of miles of new roads—thousands of new schools—millions of children going to them—falling death rates—more jobs—more income—and hope that was not there before. But in the face of rapidly rising populations, the question remains, how can more progress be accomplished? The record as revealed in case after case, seems to indicate that government-to-government programs alone never really affect the root problems