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I appreciate this opportunity to have presented an adversary view of the Space Shuttle System.

THE CVAN-70

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, a major issue raised by the military procurement authorization bill, now being considered by the Senate Committee on Armed Services, is the Navy's request for funding a fourth nuclear carrier, the CVAN-70. After a careful review of the most recent congressional testimony on this issue, I am convinced that the Navy has failed to make the necessary case for funding this carrier. The Navy itself estimates that the total investment cost of the CVAN-70 will be approximately \$1 billion—which makes this carrier the most expensive ship in history.

On April 11, 1972, I wrote both the chairmen of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee explaining in some detail my reasons for opposing the funding of the CVAN-70.

Since that time, several letters raising other questions about the funding of this ship have appeared in the Washington Post. The first of these letters, dated April 18, 1972, is from Rear Adm. Gene LaRocque, who recently retired from the Navy; the second letter, dated April 29, 1972, is from Stuart B. Barber, former Assistant Director of the Navy's long-range objectives group.

I ask unanimous consent that these two letters to the Washington Post, as well as a copy of my letter to the chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the following items were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 18, 1972]
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR: CONGRESS AND THE AIR WAR

The presence of a large number of U.S. aircraft carriers currently stationed off Vietnam has encouraged press speculation that the Congress will be stampeded into approving funds for the new aircraft carrier CVN-70. Before Congress commits itself to this billion-dollar carrier, it would be well to ascertain what has been accomplished in the past eight years through bombing in Southeast Asia. What has been the net military effect? At what cost in men, money and aircraft? Has it strengthened or weakened the will of the North Vietnamese? Have eight years of bombing increased our national security? Will more bombing do the same?

A complete analysis of the entire air war in Southeast Asia is long overdue. It should be conducted and made available to the Congress before it takes final action on the new attack carrier requested by the Department of Defense.

GENE LA ROCQUE,
Rear Admiral, USN. (Ret.).

WASHINGTON.

BILLION DOLLAR CARRIER

Your correspondent Rear Admiral LaRoque is entirely correct in suggesting that the value of our bombing in Southeast Asia should be carefully scrutinized by Congress before it approves the proposed fourth nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, budgeted at \$951 million. But in fact he fails to state the full case against this ship.

As one who for 30 years has strongly supported naval carrier forces, I consider the

Navy's request for this carrier an unconscionable, parochial imposition on the nation, in defiance of national priorities, interests and needs.

In the first place, it is absurd to suggest that a single ship, without its aircraft and escorts, is worth nearly a billion dollars. Only a mind wholly out of touch with the realities of today could believe that it is.

More damning is the fact that the Navy's own studies—as Secretary Laird well knows—indicate that the Navy has grave deficiencies in anti-submarine warfare. The billion dollars could buy a lot of other things far more valuable against submarines—and available sooner—than this CVAN.

There will be much Navy palaver about flying anti-submarine planes from this CVAN. Sure, and you could drop depth bombs from the fantail of a battleship, but that wouldn't justify buying battleships for anti-submarine warfare. For a billion dollars you could build three genuine anti-submarine aircraft carriers. No, the only honest justification for this CVAN is carrying air war against land areas.

What is most disturbing is the disregard, by the Navy and Mr. Laird, of factors one would think basic. For one thing, there has developed a vast national opposition to banging the boondocks of Asia. There is also the problem of the defense budget. These two factors call for a fresh look at our priorities. I believe it generally accepted that our first non-nuclear priority—well ahead of Asia—is NATO. Our anti-submarine deficiencies go to the very heart of the NATO defense. It is news to many people that NATO needs more U.S. attack carriers than the 11 modern ones already funded, when U.S. and other NATO naval forces combined couldn't get our military shipping safely across the Atlantic (let alone bring in essential oil) against submarine opposition.

It would be very healthy if the Congress would stop this mindless perpetuation of our no longer tenable addiction to imposing our will on Asians, and re-focus Pentagon attention on our high priority problems and of sea control.

STUART B. BARBER,
Former assistant director of the Navy's
long range objectives group.

ARLINGTON.

APRIL 11, 1972.

HON. JOHN C. STENNIS,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
Old Senate Office Building, Washington,
D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As the Committee begins its deliberations on the Military Procurement Authorization Bill, I wanted to repeat my opposition to funding for a fourth nuclear attack carrier, the CVAN-70. A careful review of the most recent testimony has shown again, I believe, that the Navy has failed to make the necessary case for spending \$299 million for CVAN-70's long lead-time items, or in the larger sense, for spending approximately one billion dollars overall for this most expensive ship in history.

The basic issue now, as in the past, is how many carriers we need for national defense. The Navy has tried to justify the CVAN-70 on general grounds of fleet obsolescence.

However, even if we accept the Navy's own "rule of thumb" that a carrier is obsolete after 30 years (a very questionable assumption, as I stated in testimony April 8, 1970 before the Joint Senate-House Armed Services Subcommittee on the CVAN-70), the fleet will still consist of the following eleven fully modern attack carriers until the mid-1980's:

Eight large-deck *Forrestal* class carriers, the oldest of which was commissioned in 1955;

One *Enterprise* nuclear attack carrier, commissioned in 1961;

Within the next three years, two more nuclear carriers will have joined the fleet.

The oldest of these eleven carriers will not reach the 30-year limit until 1985.

Thus, the burden of proof for this billion-dollar investment in the CVAN-70 is to show why more than eleven fully modern carriers are essential to national security. Yet nowhere has the Navy made that case.

Moreover, since a primary mission of carriers is providing tactical air power, there are several important factors—bearing upon the relative merits of carriers vis-a-vis land bases for tactical aircraft—which indicate that a 12th modern carrier is not essential—and that 11 carriers or even less are adequate to meet our present and future national security needs.

First, there is substantial evidence that carriers are a far more expensive means of delivering tactical air power than land bases.

According to the Navy's own estimates, the CVAN-70 will cost \$951 million. But since the Navy only operates the carrier with a task force, consisting of various escort and logistical ships, and since every carrier is equipped with an air wing, these procurement costs must also be considered.

Several years ago, the Navy estimated the four destroyer escorts for a carrier and a carrier's air wing would cost approximately \$1.3 billion—bringing the total procurement cost for a typical carrier task force (which does not include operating costs, basing costs, and other logistical ships) to almost \$2.3 billion. Needless to say, these costs will often run a great deal higher.

But even this is not a complete picture. For the Navy normally deploys two task forces "on station" in the Mediterranean and three in the Western Pacific on a continual basis. For every carrier task force "on station", two must be held in reserve as back-ups, since the normal rotation time of a carrier is 4 months. The investment cost of maintaining one nuclear task force on continued deployment, therefore, amounts to a multiple of 3 times the cost of one task force—or \$6.9 billion.

A land base is a far cheaper operation. According to the Air Force, a base in the Pacific can be built for under \$75 million; the Base Base Support Program can convert an existing civilian runway for about \$50 million.

It is not surprising, therefore, that studies by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis have concluded that a sea-based wing is 40% more expensive than a land-based wing. I believe all these cost factors argue compellingly against procuring an additional nuclear carrier at this time.

In addition to the comparative cost of land and sea-based air power, there is also the issue of the relative vulnerability of these two means of delivering tactical air power. Again, the evidence indicates that the carrier suffers a major disadvantage in its vulnerability to attack by modern missiles and submarines.

While modern technology has augmented the defense of land bases—including new methods for protection, maintenance, and rapid repair—the latest weapons and reconnaissance developments have made carriers easier to find and to damage to the point of making them inoperable. Furthermore, the necessary compensation for this increased vulnerability—the need to maneuver widely and commit the carrier's air power to defensive actions—diminishes the overall offensive capability of the carrier's tactical strike force.

Experts have concluded, therefore, that carriers would not be suitable for use in any situation where an enemy could concentrate land based aircraft, missiles, or submarines against them. Since this would minimize, if not rule out altogether, action in any conflict in which the Soviet Union were involved, vulnerability would dictate that the use of the carrier's force would be limited to those contingencies involving only smaller powers—another strong

reason why eleven modern carriers or less would be adequate for our national security needs over the foreseeable future.

Finally, any effort to define the proper size of our carrier fleet should take into account the existing and potential U.S. capability for providing land-based tactical air power. I believe that the present carrier fleet duplicates and overlaps this land-based capability.

Carrier task forces are assigned to the two major "trouble areas" of the world—9 are available for the Western Pacific and 6 for the Mediterranean. But our capacity to deploy land-based tactical air power is more than adequate in these areas, as well as in most other parts of the globe where peace or U.S. interests may be threatened.

The United States Air Force maintains 21 wings of tactical fighters and bombers in active forces at home and abroad.

The geographic spread of overseas bases either operated by, or available to, the United States gives us an impressive land-based tactical capability, especially in the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific. In Europe, the U.S. has bases in 8 countries, with approximately 475 tactical aircraft; at least 4 of those bases are within striking distance of the Mediterranean. In the Pacific, we have bases in 6 countries, in addition to our bases in Guam and Hawaii, with over 300 tactical aircraft.

The U.S. also has the capacity for creating new land bases as needs arise. There are at least 700 overseas civilian air fields which the Air Force, within three days time, claims it can convert to a fully equipped tactical air base using the "pre-positioned kits" of the Bare Base Support Program.

Furthermore, the range of modern tactical aircraft is between 2 and 3 times greater than that of the older jets. This increased range is expanded even further by the use of midair refueling. Consequently, our overseas land-based planes are capable of reaching many more targets than they were even 10 years ago; and U.S. based tactical aircraft can be operational anywhere in the world in a short period of time.

The Navy contends that the reduction in the number of our overseas land bases justifies the need for the CVAN-70. While these bases have decreased from 119 in 1957 to 47 at the present time, the number of tactical air wings has increased from 16 to 21 during the same period. More important, the greatly increased range of these planes—both in the U.S. and overseas—means that far fewer land bases can provide ample tactical air support in any areas of potential conflict. And the Bare Base Support Program enables the U.S. to supplement existing land bases to the extent that it is necessary to do so. Even with fewer overseas land bases, then, carriers still overlap and duplicate our land-based capability.

This point above overlap and duplication was dramatically illustrated in a September, 1969 letter and memorandum from the Department of the Air Force to Senator Hatfield. Senator Hatfield asked whether the loss of overseas land bases had jeopardized the Air Force's tactical air capability. The Air Force responded that "the capability of USAF tactical air has in no sense been diminished by land base inactivations." The memorandum to Senator Hatfield also contained an extremely significant statement about the overall capability of land-based tactical air power, which reads as follows:

"There are enough land air bases in Southeast Asia and Europe to base all the tactical fighter aircraft which the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimate are required to meet a major contingency in those areas."

It may be argued that this statement by the Air Force should be disregarded, since it is merely a reflection of the long-standing Air Force-Navy controversy over the role of land-versus sea-based air power. But before

rejecting this evaluation as "anti-Navy propaganda," I urge you to consider whether or not the Navy's insistence on funding the CVAN-70 in FY 1973 might also be classified as the effort by one service to maintain its position—with little regard for military realities.

In short, the Congress is faced with conflicting claims; on the one hand, the Air Force asserts that carriers are essentially redundant in furnishing tactical air power; on the other hand, the Navy claims we need a large carrier fleet and argues that the obsolescence of that fleet makes the CVAN-70 essential. Without thorough investigation, I do not believe we can reject as self-serving the claim of one service, while accepting the claim of another service as the complete truth.

My own view is that the truth lies somewhere between these conflicting claims. While I believe that some carriers are necessary to ensure flexibility in our overall tactical air capability, I also believe that there is no need for a fleet consisting of more than 11 large modern carriers.

In order to justify the funding now of the CVAN-70, the Navy must show that a 12th modern carrier is essential. I think it is clear that they have failed to meet this burden.

Refusing to authorize the CVAN-70 until the Navy can justify a fourth nuclear carrier will in no way jeopardize national security. Since our potential adversaries have no attack carriers and since we now have 16—with the assurance that there will be 11 fully modern carriers under the Navy's own criteria until 1985—we can afford to insist upon a clear justification for such a massively expensive project.

If it is determined that 11 or fewer modern carriers will be required through the mid-1980's, there is no reason to fund this ship now—particularly in light of the present deficit in the Federal budget and the impact on this deficit of another multi-billion dollar program.

I believe that there are far more urgent and justifiable demands on limited Federal funds, both within the defense budget and in other areas of critical national importance.

But regardless of my position, the central fact remains that the Navy has failed to make its case for the present funding of the CVAN-70.

I therefore respectfully urge the Committee to withhold authorization of all funds requested for this carrier.

Thank you for your consideration of this matter.

Sincerely,

WALTER F. MONDALE.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SPONG). The time for the transaction of routine morning business has expired.

FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1972

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SPONG). Under the previous order, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which the clerk will state.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 3526) to provide authorizations for certain agencies conducting the foreign relations of the United States, and for other purposes.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill.

NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM NO. 1

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD, Mr. President, I move, in accordance with rule XXXV of the Standing Rules of the U.S. Senate—believing that the subject matter which I wish to discuss does, at this moment, require secrecy because of the rules of the Senate—that the Senate go into closed session.

Mr. TOWER and Mr. BENTSEN. I second that motion.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The motion having been made and seconded that the Senate go into closed session, the Chair, pursuant to rule XXXV, now directs the Sergeant at Arms to clear the galleries, close the doors of the Chamber, and exclude all the officials of the Senate not sworn to secrecy.

The question is not debatable.
[At 1:27 p.m. the doors of the Chamber were closed.]

CLOSED SESSION

CALL OF THE ROLL

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD, Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. This will be a live quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll and the following Senators answered to their names:

	[No. 176 Leg.]	
Allen	Cranston	Schweiker
Allott	Fong	Sparkman
Anderson	Fulbright	Spong
Beall	Gravel	Stennis
Bellmon	Griffin	Taft
Bentsen	Harris	Talmadge
Bible	Hollings	Thurmond
Burdick	Jordan, Idaho	Tower
Byrd,	Magnuson	Weicker
Harry F., Jr.	Nelson	Williams
Byrd, Robert C.	Randolph	Young
Chiles	Ribicoff	
Cook	Roth	

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SPONG). A quorum is not present.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD, Mr. President, I move that the Sergeant at Arms be directed to request the attendance of absent Senators.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. HARRIS, Mr. President, I would like to be recorded as present.

Mr. STENNIS, I would also like to be recorded as present.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair is advised that all Senators who are present in the Chamber are recorded as present.

The Sergeant at Arms will execute the order of the Senate.

After some delay, the following Senators entered the Chamber and answered to their names:

Aiken	Ellender	Metcalf
Bayh	Ervin	Mondale
Bennett	Fannin	Montoya
Boggs	Gambrell	Pastore
Brooke	Gurney	Pell
Buckley	Hansen	Proxmire
Case	Hart	Smith
Church	Hartke	Stafford
Cooper	Hatfield	Stevens
Cotton	Hruska	Stevenson
Curtis	Javits	Symington
Dole	Kennedy	Tunney
Dominick	Long	
Eagleton	Mathias	

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD, I announce that the Senator from Nevada (Mr.