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of heroin and opium prior to my arrival in Thailand.

Two weeks ago the papers carried the news that the Thai authorities had seized another 2.5 tons of opium and another No. 4 heroin laboratory.

Mr. SOURWINE. What does that mean; No. 4 heroin laboratory?

General WALT. That is the pure—that is the white stuff and the most difficult to make.

One of the greatest problems the Royal Thai Government had to contend with involved the activities of the Chinese Irregular Forces—CIF—along the northern Thai frontier. It had been common knowledge for years that these forces were heavily involved in the flow of opium. The Royal Thai Government in March of this year moved to resolve this problem by granting resident status and resettlement assistance to the several thousand members of the CIF in Thailand in return for their promise to get out of the opium business completely and turn over their stocks of opium.

Now, these CIF forces—Chinese Irregular Forces—sir, came out of Mainland China at the time of the Communist takeover there, and they have been without a home and without any place they could call a home. And so the Thais took advantage of this and they offered them a home and they gave them land—if they, in turn, would turn over to the Thai government the opium that they had on hand, and would get out of the opium growing business. This was a businesslike deal.

The resident status was a particularly precious item of exchange for the CIF because they had up until then been suspended in a condition of statelessness. The resettlement assistance included the grant of a tract of land away from the Burmese border, an agreement to build essential structures and roads, the provision of livestock and equipment, plus cash aid over a period of several years until the settlement became self-supporting. All told, the Thai government committed itself to some \$1 million in assistance.

The CIF, on conclusion of this agreement, turned over to the Thai government 26,245 kilograms, or 26 tons of opium, which was publicly burned on March 7 of this year. For some reason this event received virtually no mention in the American press despite the fascinating history of this political-economic swap and despite the staggering amount of opium involved. At the current street price of \$390,000 per kilo, this amount of opium, converted into heroin, would be worth approximately \$3 billion. The amount of heroin equivalent which the Thai government negotiated off the world market in this transaction was far greater than the total amount of heroin seized by all the free world's enforcement agencies over the previous 12 months.

The news blackout of this incident is something that defies comprehension. I have had the Library of Congress research the matter and they tell me that they have been unable to find any article about the incident in 10 or 12 major newspapers which they checked.

Mr. Chairman, recently some question was raised about whether the 26 tons of opium burned actually was 26 tons of opium. I have here a few photographs I would like to show you of the preparation for the opium burn and of the actual burning.

This is the preparation for the burning. You will note the opium is on top and under the opium are piles of logs that are going to be used as fuel for the burning process. This shows the entire lot piled out on the vacant area where the burning is going to take place. This is a picture of the actual burning. There is nothing left there but the charred logs.

Mr. Ingersoll is going to elaborate on this in a few minutes.

I would like now to ask, Mr. Chairman, that my testimony be interrupted so that you can take the testimony of Mr. John Ingersoll, the director of BNDD; Mr. William Wanzel, until recently director of the BNDD bureau in Bangkok; and Mr. Joseph Koles, forensic chemist for the BNDD, on the steps they took to make certain that the 26 tons of opium that were burned was really opium and that they were not burning hay or something else. I respectfully suggest that these three witnesses be called to the stand in a group.

EXCERPTS FROM GENERAL WALT'S TESTIMONY ON THE WORLD DRUG TRAFFIC BEFORE THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1972

I have prepared this special map of Southeast Asia, including Burma, because I wish to enlarge on my initial presentation.

Fact No. 1 that emerges from this map is that in Laos the communists occupy some 80 to 90 percent of the opium growing areas. The diagonal lines indicate the areas under communist occupation, and the heavy black boot-shaped line indicates the major opium producing area. Obviously, the Meo tribesmen who now produce their opium under communist control aren't "eating" it all.

Fact No. 2 which emerges from the map, is that the communist-led guerrillas in Thailand are in effective control of an important stretch of opium producing land along the Laotian frontier. The diagonal shading on the Thai side of the frontier indicates the area under communist control.

In both Thailand and Laos, the villages where the opium is grown are controlled by communist manager-cadres, trained in Peking and Hanoi. Both movements are armed to a large degree with Chinese weapons, and both have their major radio propaganda operations based on Chinese territory. The money which they make from selling opium is used to support their respective insurgencies.

A highly interesting feature of the current political situation in southeast Asia is this road, marked with a double line, which 25,000 Chinese communists have been building across northern Laos in the direction of the Thai frontier. Eight meters wide and hard-surfaced, the road is now only 50 miles away from that portion of the Thai frontier where pro-Peking guerrillas are already in control. The road is reported to be very heavily protected by radar and anti-aircraft batteries.

The Communists component also plays a vital role in the Burma drug situation. Burma, as I pointed out in my previous testimony, is the single most important factor in the southeast Asia drug situation. This is where most of the opium is grown, it is where most of the refineries and traffickers are concentrated, and it is the ultimate source of most of the morphine base and heroin, as well as raw opium, that comes out of southeast Asia. The Burmese government is unhappy about the situation, but there are several major insurgencies in the area which prevent it from exercising any effective control.

Most of the opium in Burma is grown in the Shan state, which you see here. Some is also grown in the Kachin state to the north. Both the Shan tribesmen and the Kachin tribesmen have been in a state of insurgency against the Rangoon government ever since Burma became independent. But by far the most serious insurgency in the area is the white flag communist insurgency, which is under the immediate control of the Burmese Communist Party and of Peking. Here again, it is Peking which has armed the insurgents and trained their leaders, and which supports them with a China-based radio operation.

Over the past year, the white flag communist insurgency has grown to the point where it absorbs probably 80 percent of the total

counter-insurgency energies of the Rangoon government, in northern Burma.

The Shan and the White Flag Communist insurgencies overlap each other. The heartland of the Shan insurgent movement is shown on this map in the area surrounded by a wavy line. The White Flag Communists are in pretty solid control of the area east of the Salween River, marked in lighter shading.

All of the armed groups in Burma, pro-Communist and anti-Communist, have been involved in the drug trade. This goes for the Shan and the Kachin insurgents: for the anti-Communist KKY or Burmese self-defense force, and for the Chinese irregular forces: and for both the White Flag Communists and the Red Flag Communists, a smaller group which is supposed to be under Trotskyist influence. Opium is the nearest thing these groups possess to gold—and they have all used it with abandon to purchase arms and support their activities.

The situation has been marked by a strange division of labor and by some highly enterprising, if unprincipled, accommodations between the rival factions. The KKY and the CIF are the dominant forces in the Thai-Laotian border area. Both of these forces have been heavily involved in the transport and smuggling of opium, and the KKY has also been heavily involved in the refinery operation. On the other hand, most of the opium in Burma, as I have pointed out, is grown by Shan tribesmen, under the control of the Shan states army or under the control of the Communists.

The shaded area which the communists control east of the Salween River is reputed to be the most fertile opium producing territory in the whole of Burma and is credited with some 25 percent of Burma's total production. Burma's production is estimated at some 400 tons a year, but the tribesmen use most of it for themselves, exporting only some 100 to 150 tons. Because it produces the largest surplus of any area in Burma, the territory under communist control may be responsible for as much as 40 to 50 percent of Burma's entire opium export.

How does the opium get from the areas where it is grown to the Thailand-Laos border? Obviously, it has to change hands in order to do so: It has to get from the Shan insurgents and from the white flag communist Shans into the hands of their hated enemies, the KKY and the CIF. To permit the consummation of these mutually profitable transactions, clearly, hostilities must be temporarily suspended by both sides. The town of Lashio—shown here on the map—is the principal exchange point, where the producers deliver their opium and where the caravans form up to move the opium south to the tri-border area.

In view of the fact that Peking mothered the white flag communist movement and that it still controls them, it cannot escape moral responsibility for their role as prime producers in the Burma opium traffic. Moreover, the act of this insurgency places the Burmese government in the invidious position of not being able to enforce its own laws in the area, and of having to tolerate opium trafficking by the regional military forces which oppose the communists.

This is a situation which calls for some plain talk—all the more so because China has now been brought into the world community of Nations.

WHAT SENSE TO THE VIETNAM WAR?

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, another monsoon season will soon be over in Vietnam.

But the tragedy of the war goes on. Indochina has been turned into a grim and sordid theater of the absurd, where

every act is masked in falsehood, pretense, and illusion.

Where is the sense in it all?

We are fighting, so we are told, to get out of Vietnam.

Our combat troops have left Vietnam, and we might almost believe that the American presence has been ended. But we are fighting a newer war, a commuter war, shuttling daily between Hanoi and our sanctuaries offshore and in Thailand. Our deathly shadow still lies across Vietnam.

It is not enough to talk about Vietnam, as though our war in that plagued country did not now have its roots elsewhere. Nearly 100,000 Americans wait on the perimeters of Vietnam to carry on the war in our name. We do not know with certainty whose orders they may follow. The Lavelle revelations tell us we cannot be sure.

We are fighting, so we are told, to defend an ally—to show, as the President likes to say, that we will never betray our friends.

But this ally has turned his back on us. He has made a travesty of the democratic principles that we once urged on him.

He has sought refuge in martial law and rule by decree. A year ago, he turned his own election into a farce. Now he has simply canceled local elections—and abandoned the last poor pretense of democracy.

On his behalf, we send 300 airstrikes against North Vietnam every day. And on his behalf, we are now mining the waterways of the South. No matter that his people may depend on them—U.S. mines will keep the North Vietnamese from moving supplies southward by boat.

We are fighting, so we are told, to secure the release of our prisoners.

Yet in the months since the President ordered the resumption of the bombing, a merciless bombardment unprecedented in human history, we have lost prisoners at a rate unequaled since 1967.

In the first 3 years of this administration, 36 men are known to have been taken prisoner. In the first 3 months of 1972, seven men were officially lost. Since the resumption of massive U.S. bombing of the north in April, 48 men were reported to have been taken, 24 of them since July 1. Fifteen were reported in the month of August alone.

These figures tell us that more men were taken prisoner last month than in all of 1971.

More were taken prisoner over the last 2 months than in the past 2 years.

More have been taken prisoner over the past 5 months, in that very period of bombing intended to secure the release of our prisoners, than in all the other 39 months of the Nixon administration.

If we continue to lose men at this rate, we will have lost over 100 men to POW status within a year's time.

So we continue to play out the tragedy. We are bombing to defend our troops; bombing to bring our prisoners home; bombing to insure the survival of President Thieu.

Since 1969, we have achieved a single

objective—the survival of President Thieu—at a cost of more than 20,000 American lives, 4 million civilian refugees, and 165,000 civilian deaths in South Vietnam alone.

The statistics numb the mind. Like the images of villages destroyed, families running for their lives, children fleeing in terror from a napalm strike, they have become part of our daily life.

After all, we are told, the cost of the war is down to \$20 million a day.

We are being asked to accept the war as merely another inconvenience of modern living. There is less and less talk of turning the corner or glimpsing the light at the end of the tunnel. There is more talk of next year, or 2 years more, or 4 years if necessary.

Two months ago a New Yorker columnist noted sadly:

The war has become part of America's business as usual . . . so much a part of our lives that we scarcely notice it any longer. The war cannot now be seen as something we are doing; it is what we are.

It is this dull acceptance that hurts us most. And we vote today to reaffirm our conviction that the war in Vietnam must not be the measure of our Nation.

URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF PROJECTS

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I have spoken many times about the criteria which UMTA proposes to use in the selection of projects for capital grants. My views opposing these criteria are well known and if the voters of Colorado see fit to return me to the Senate this November I expect to introduce legislation next year to deal with this problem.

Meanwhile one of the Nation's most widely respected transportation consultants, Mr. Stewart F. Taylor, makes some very cogent comments concerning the new criteria in the September 18, 1972, issue of Transport Central. Mr. Taylor analyzes exactly the problems I have articulated with respect to the UMTA policy.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Taylor's article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

UMTA CRITERIA CONSIDERED PROBLEM

(By Stewart F. Taylor)

"The press gave wide play to a recent setback suffered by the rail transit industry when the U.S. Senate Public Works Committee pried open the Federal Highway Trust Fund for bus projects but refused to allow any for rail systems. Less publicized was another blow struck by the Executive Branch in Washington.

"The Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) has recently published a 33-page document entitled, 'Capital Grants for Urban Mass Transportation.' The booklet describes application procedures, the

criteria for selecting projects, and the bases for determining the amount of a grant.

"In a section on guidelines there is a statement of 'objectives' on which the project selection system is based:

'1. To reinvigorate public transportation.
'2. By providing better general service and developing special services, to provide greater mobility for substantial groups of people who are totally dependent on public transportation.

'3. To promote transit as a positive force in influencing and supporting desired development patterns in urban areas and in improving environmental conditions.'

A LIMITED CHOICE

"These appear to be enlightened goals to which most leaders and planners would subscribe. But when you get into the guts of the criteria you will find a rather narrow bus bias.

"Any applicant area seeking a grant would be tossed into one of three Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) population categories: under 250,000; 250,000 to 1,000,000; and over 1,000,000. The key sentence indicating U.S. DOT's attitude can be found in the description of that last ('large system') category of over 1,000,000: '*Applications for rail projects will be placed in this category regardless of metropolitan area size.*' [Italics mine].

This statement is reinforced by a list of projects which would be given priority in medium-sized areas (250,000 to 1,000,000). Among the more significant:

1. Those helping to prevent a total halt in service.

2. Those related to Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) TOPICS and FHWA-UMTA Corridor Demonstration Projects. Examples: 'Bus lanes,' 'buses to control traffic lights,' and parking spaces . . . in conjunction with terminals for express or improved bus services.

BEYOND THE PALE

"What is the significance of these pronouncements? It appears to mean that the 90 SMSA's throughout the United States with populations between 250,000 and 1,000,000 will have an uphill battle—to say the least—in seeking federal assistance for rail or other grade separated systems. But let us be more realistic and look only at areas between 500,000 and 1,000,000. There are still 31 in that group, including Providence, R.I. (910,781), Columbus, O. (916,228), and Albany-Schenectady-Troy, N.Y. (721,910).

"It means, for example, that recent studies to determine the feasibility of low-cost rail service in Rochester, N.Y. (882,667) and Dayton, O. (850,266) could have the rug pulled out from under them. It means, moreover, that any attempt for assistance to extend the much-lauded M&O Subway in Ft. Worth, Texas would be greeted with a cold eye.

"It is more than a little ironic that many a DOT official has made the junket to Europe and apparently failed to note the successful application of grade-separated rail systems in dozens of cities with populations under 1,000,000—many with less than 500,000.

"UMTA's stance is disheartening. World-wide trends make it clear that urban rail systems attract greater, sustained ridership, are less detrimental to the environment and exert a stronger influence on orderly urban growth than do buses. And regardless of labels, when an area institutes transportation improvements which are primarily highway oriented, the long term beneficiary is the automobile.

THE NEEDLESS KILLING OF OCEAN MAMMALS

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, contrary to what any of us thought before we were

¹ June 1972. Information for Applicants, U.S. Department of Transportation, Urban Mass Transportation Administration, Washington, D.C. 20590. (No document number indicated.)