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children who come to school speaking a language other than English and it will provide better education for children who come to school speaking only English.

We must somehow make sure that our neighbors and friends who are handicapped by not being able to speak any language except English understand the great gift which children who speak another language bring to the schools—a gift they can share with all children if they are allowed to.

We must find a way to see that every child is allowed to learn about the many kinds of people who have written the history of America, and about the treasure of many cultures which are now ignored.

We must alert the tax-paying public of the United States to their great future loss if the multiple cultures and languages of America are destroyed—and their great future gain if those languages are developed and those cultures are encouraged to grow.

If, a hundred years ago, educators all over the United States had known what you here tonight know about teaching bilingually, think what a difference it might have made! We in America, more than any other nation in the world, had the opportunity to become rich in a variety of cultures. We could have been the nation which was ready first to communicate with the whole world about the problems we face today: world hunger, world energy problems, world environmental problems, world peace.

People from many nations came here to find freedom—and brought with them the stored knowledge of their many homelands. Today, as a result of that rich heritage, we should be the focal point of international understanding and progress.

Knowing that, and understanding the thousands of ways in which America would be better today if we had taught our children about the riches of history and language and culture which were present in the native Americans who were here first and in every group which came later, we can see now how foolish it was to try to melt people down into something homogeneous so that all Americans would be limited and identical.

I think the challenge we must take from this meeting is the challenge not only of increasing and improving bilingual education for minorities. We must also accept the challenge to provide for our country the multicultural knowledge which the twenty-first century will demand.

We must see that every citizen in the United States understands that when children are asked to forget their own identity and their own traditions they do not miraculously turn into something better—instead, they shrink inside and when that happens our whole nation shrinks too. These small citizens lose hope of education and opportunity and a future—and as each one of them is diminished so the opportunities and knowledge and future of this nation is diminished too. The dollar loss is monstrous. For every child who only graduates from the eighth grade when he could have graduated from high school the lifetime income loss is more than $100,000. Multiply that by the millions who drop out of the schools which are not providing the education they need, and the gross productivity loss to the nation is staggering.

But even more important to the average American must be the loss of education HIS child could have had, but missed—the chance to learn two languages instead of one, the chance to expand into many cultures instead of one, the opportunity to be ready for the many-cultured world of the twenty-first century instead of being forever handicapped by being both monolingual and monocultural.

Recently Norman Cousins wrote about the remarkable abilities of human beings to succeed in spite of earlier failures. Using the example of our final liberation from earth gravity, he said "What was most significant about the lunar voyage was not that men set foot on the moon, but that they set eye on the earth. . . . They enlarged the human horizon."

I think when we talk about bilingual education in the last ten years we have to say that in many ways we have failed. But I also think that in trying to solve the problem we have learned and we know enough now to be able to enlarge our own horizons and the horizons of every American.

If we can leave this meeting in Albuquerque understanding that opportunity we can more easily open the doors to rapid expansion of bilingual and bicultural education. But we will have done more—we will have started on the road to a multicultural America, a place of leadership in the multicultural world in which we must all learn to live harmoniously if we are to survive.

BUDGET REFORM

Mr. BROCK. Mr. President, during the month of November, an action was taken in Congress which did not receive great publicity, and probably received very little public attention. But, nonetheless, it was probably one of the most important actions taken by the Congress of the United States in many, many years. Committees in both the House and the Senate passed out measures which would put control of the Government's purse strings back with the Congress, making the process closer to the people. Additionally, these measures contained built-in controls which would give Congress, and the people, a tighter reign on the amount of money spent, and how it is spent. I refer, of course, to the budget reform measures. I firmly believe that this legislation is as important as any that has faced action by both Houses in this century.

We simply have to return responsibility of Government spending to the Congress, to find out what we are doing, and where we are going. Noted columnist James J. Kilpatrick took note of the budget control measures, and wrote an excellent article, calling for quick action on these measures. I entirely agree, and I ask unanimous consent that his article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CONGRESS SEEN MOVING TO RECLAIM FISCAL CONTROL

(By James J. Kilpatrick)

More than 50 years have passed since Congress adopted the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. Since then, so far as congressional control of the purse is concerned, it has been downhill all the way. Now the real and hopeful possibility is emerging that the trend may be reversed. If the two chambers can agree on a major pending bill, Congress may be back in the saddle again.

The matter is of towering importance to the American people, but the issue lacks political pizazz. Not many observers are much interested in the companion House and Senate bills that are scheduled for consideration in December.

Yet if a workable bill can be passed, and if the two chambers thereafter abide by the spirit and the letter of this reform proposal, a new sense of order will be imposed on the present chaos of federal spending.

Details remain to be hammered out but these are the main features: The President will continue to send up his budget in January but it will cover a fiscal year beginning in October instead of in July. As soon as they are received the White House figures will be examined by a new Congressional Office of the Budget and by newly created budget committees in each chamber.

The idea at this point is for Congress itself, by joint resolution, to agree upon a single comprehensive ceiling on total prospective spending. The two chambers would debate national priorities, and undertake to fix recommended goals within the ceiling for major areas of spending.

Appropriations committees and subcommittees would then go to work, but no spending bill—and this is the key to the new structure—could become operative until all spending bills had been adjusted to a ceiling figure.

Within a few years, if all goes well, Congress might regain the one constitutional power that stands above all others—the power of the purse. It is an admirable goal, but seeing is believing. The proposed reforms demand that politicians turn into statesmen, and no alchemist yet has perfected that conversion.

Even so, a new spirit seems to be working on Capitol Hill. These bills, after all, have now emerged from committee. The problem in coming weeks is to get them through the floor, and to write some sensible controls into law.

THE TRADE REFORM BILL AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I wish to call to the attention of my colleagues a recent speech delivered by Robert N. Gardner, a professor of law at Columbia University and a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Kennedy administration, before the National Foreign Trade Convention in New York.

Professor Gardner, an authority on international trade, proposed that the Trade Reform Act of 1973 "be revised from top to bottom" in order to deal with the problem of export restrictions. He stated that the negotiating position in the upcoming trade talks would be strengthened "by some carefully drawn amendments to the trade bill that put the oil-producing nations and others on notice that they cannot wage economic war upon us with impunity."

Last week I introduced several amendments to the trade bill designed to broaden the scope of this legislation to deal with the problems which Professor Gardner so eloquently described.

As the oil embargo shows, we need new international procedures to deal responsibly with the problem of shortages. Since World War II, the international trading system has concentrated on the problem of access to markets. In an era of shortages and rapid inflation, we must update the rules of the international trade system to focus on access to supplies.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Professor Gardner's speech be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE TRADE REFORM BILL AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY

(By Prof. Richard N. Gardner)

Considering the political and economic ills that currently afflict our country, the new trade bill as it has emerged from the House Ways and Means Committee can be regarded as a minor miracle. That the bill has so much good in it is a tribute to the Ways and Means Committee and to those in the Administration like Bill Eberle who have worked so hard over the last year on behalf of strong and liberal trade legislation.

If I am somewhat critical about some aspects of the bill, it is not out of a desire to be perfectionist. My assignment at this meeting is to discuss the bill as an instrument of U.S. foreign economic policy. To say that the bill is a remarkable achievement in the light of our domestic difficulties does not mean it is an ideal instrument for the promotion of our national interests.

So that no one will be misled about the analysis which follows, I should state at the outset that I speak as one who favors the maximum freedom of international trade and investment guaranteed by clear rules of international law and strong international institutions to apply and enforce them. In a world of widespread poverty, growing resource scarcity, and accelerating inflation, the free flow of goods, services and capital and the encouragement of productive efficiency are more necessary than ever. Those who disagree with this philosophy should tune out from this point on.

Let us start with what is good about the new trade bill in its current version. If the good things don't deserve three cheers, they deserve at least two and a half.

The bill gives the President the power to eliminate tariffs of 5% or less, to cut by 60% tariffs from 5% to 25%, and to cut by 75% tariffs which are over 25% (provided no rate over 25% is reduced below the level of 10%). In view of the bill's explicit objective of promoting open and non-discriminatory world trade—and its implicit aim of reducing to a minimum the common external tariff of the European economic community—it would have been better to have retained the zero tariff authority contained in the original Administration bill. The Senate, when it considers the legislation, would be well advised to put back zero tariff authority in some form—the formula of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 authorizing the elimination of duties on products on which the Community and the United States account for 80% or more of world trade might be a good compromise. Nevertheless, the bill's tariff cutting authority is probably enough to give us adequate negotiating leverage, provided it is not cut back further in subsequent Congressional consideration.

The bill also gives the President the power to bargain away the whole range of U.S. non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on a mutually advantageous basis, subject only to the sensible requirement that Congress be given prior notification of NTB agreements and the right to veto them by a majority vote of either House within 90 days after they are concluded. The broad grant of authority coupled with the right of Congressional veto represents an excellent compromise between the requirements of effective international economic negotiation and the requirements of democratic control of foreign policy. This is the very formula recommended three years ago by the President's Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy, known as the Williams Commission, on which Tony Knoppers and I had the privilege to be members. Unfortunately, this board authority to negotiate on non-tariff barriers is seriously compromised by a new provision which I shall mention in a moment.

The bill provides for adjustment assistance to help workers and firms hurt by imports to move into new lines of production that can survive without the need for protection. One could wish that the adjustment provisions were even more generous, but what is proposed could nevertheless form the basis of a new policy by which developed countries as a group actively promote a more rational international division of labor by dealing with the very real human problems associated with change in their own societies.

The bill provides the President with authority to grant tariff preferences in the form of duty-free treatment to exports of developing countries—a measure that is long overdue. Unfortunately, limits have been placed on the amount of any one commodity that can come in under preference from any one country and key items like textiles are not now eligible for preferred treatment. Nevertheless, the preference provisions do represent an important first step. We should work to enlarge the U.S. and European preference arrangements into a bold policy of unlimited free trade for the exports of developing nations.

The bill gives the President authority to grant most-favored-nation treatment to the Soviet Union, China and other Communist countries. As we all know, the Jackson Amendment has now made the grant of "MWF" to Communist countries conditional on the granting of free emigration. Since the issues raised by the Jackson Amendment are extremely complex and have already been the subject to extensive public debate, I shall say no more about them except to note my own opinion that in its present form, the Jackson Amendment does not appear to be the best way of advancing its admirable human rights objectives.

Finally, the bill provides a strong statutory basis for the office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, assuring his independence and his role as our chief representative in international trade negotiations and as our chief policy-maker on international trade matters. This is a well-deserved tribute and an valuable assist for Bill Eberle and for the other members of his extraordinarily able and dedicated them—Bill Pearce and Harald Malmgren, his two deputies, and John Jackson, his General Counsel.

Having noted those things that are good about the bill, let me now turn to three major shortcomings that I believe require serious reconsideration:

First, the House Ways and Means Committee has introduced the unprecedented requirement of sectoral reciprocity. In the vital area of non-tariff barriers the President must now use his powers to achieve, with respect to "each product sector of manufacturing" and with respect to the agricultural sector, "competitive opportunities" for U.S. exports to developed countries that are "equivalent" to the "competitive opportunities" afforded to these products in the U.S. In pursuit of this objective, he is required "to the extent feasible" to negotiate trade agreements on a sector by sector basis and to demonstrate with respect to each trade agreement submitted to Congress that equivalent access in each sector has been achieved. Although these provisions do not appear in the section of the bill covering the President's tariff-cutting powers, the report of the Ways and Means Committee states (on page 19) that the objective of sectoral reciprocity is also to be applied "to the extent feasible" in the tariff area as well.

It is earnestly to be hoped that these requirements of sectoral reciprocity will be removed from the bill when it reaches the Senate. In the forty years since the trade agreements program was inaugurated, we have conducted our trade negotiations on the basis of overall reciprocity, permitting concessions in one product sector to be reciprocated by concessions in another, subject only to the requirement that there be a balance of advantage in the total package. Trade-offs between product sectors have been and will continue to be necessary for the achievement of substantial progress in the reduction of trade barriers—particularly non-tariff barriers—because in individual product sectors we and our trading partners differ in trading interests, productive efficiency, and the type of trade barriers we employ. It might conceivably be appropriate to require that the President seek reciprocity within the manufacturing sector as a whole in order to prevent excessive concessions here on behalf of our agricultural and service exports—although even this kind of requirement would need careful examination. But requiring that reciprocity must henceforth be achieved in thirty or forty product sectors—which is apparently the way the legislation is being interpreted by the Ways and Means Committee and the Executive Branch—risks placing unsuperable handicaps on our negotiators before the negotiations even begin.

It is significant that the idea of sectoral reciprocity was carefully considered and firmly rejected by the Williams Commission when the idea was put forward by one of its members three years ago. I believe the reasons given by our Commission are as timely now as they were then:

"Reciprocity should be conceived in terms of the whole set of negotiations rather than as an objective to be achieved within self-contained compartments. . . . In some cases, of course, it may be possible to arrive at mutually advantageous solutions within specific industrial sectors, and efforts should be made to find such solutions. On the other hand, in many cases a country will have to give more than it gets in one sector or functional area, and recoup by securing an equivalent advantage in another."

Second, the bill is much too permissive in allowing U.S. industries to resort to tariff and other forms of protection in the face of import competition. True, the section on import relief does emphasize adjustment to import competition, provides more ample assistance for this purpose than ever before to workers and firms, and favors relief through tariffs and tariff quotas over quantitative limitations and orderly market agreements. But other innovations in the bill could substantially increase the number of successful applications for escape clause relief which will go from the Tariff Commission to the President.

For example, the existing requirement that imports be the "major" or principal cause of injury to a domestic industry is changed to a requirement that they be only a "substantial" cause—a cause defined as "important and not less than any other cause." Alongside the existing law's tight definition of "serious injury"—the significant idling of productive facilities, the inability to operate at a reasonable profit, significant unemployment, etc.—we have a new standard relating to a "threat" of serious injury on the basis of which relief can be granted. The "threat" can take the form of a decline in sales, a growing inventory, and a downward trend in production, profits and employment—obviously a much easier test to meet.

Those who are dedicated to the cause of freer trade might be reconciled to these new provisions if relief in the form of higher tariffs or other restrictions were clearly limited to a shot time period. Unfortunately, the legislation provides for a five-year period of protection renewable by an additional two years—with the opportunity to apply for yet another period of relief after a two-year interval. If the concept of the legislation is to grant temporary protection to permit industries to become more competitive or to change into another line of production, one seven-year period ought to be enough.

No less disturbing is the legislation's ambiguity on the key question of whether the more permissive standards for import relief are to constitute the exclusive mode of protecting domestic industries—or whether such industries will continue to have access to non-legislated methods such as the special international arrangements on textiles and steel. If we are going to set a new and easier standard by which industries are to get temporary relief from imports for the purpose of making competitive adjustment, should not these standards apply to everyone?

Some loosening of the current escape clause provisions is obviously necessary as the price for passing a trade bill, but I fear the loosening in the Ways and Means Committee has gone too far. The new provisions will mean more recommendations for trade restrictions by the Tariff Commission—and much more political pressure on the President under the escape clause than he has faced in recent years. It would be desirable to tighten up the escape clause when the bill gets to the Senate. And it is absolutely essential to retain the discretion the President has under existing law and in the proposed legislation to deny the application of an industry for new trade restrictions in the light of broader national and international considerations.

Third, the bill is entirely focused on the question of access to markets and is totally silent on access to supplies. In this respect, it has the appearance of a Rip van Winkle who has returned to the international trade arena after a long sleep unaware that the most serious current threat to the economy of our country and that of our allies is the withholding of oil by the Arab countries.

When Roosevelt and Churchill met on a destroyer off Newfoundland in 1941 to draft the Atlantic Charter, they proclaimed the postwar goal of "access, on equal terms, to the trade and raw materials of the world." In the first postwar decades, international trade negotiations focused almost entirely on access to markets and virtually ignored the problem of access to supplies. Now, however, we are moving into an era of resource scarcity and accelerated inflation—an era in which producing countries are increasingly tempted to withhold supplies for economic or political reasons. A few months ago the United States itself unilaterally cut off exports of soybeans and other agricultural products in order to deal with domestic inflation. Yet obviously we cannot expect the European community to phase out its agricultural protection and become dependent on our foodstuffs if we reserve the right to cut them off at any time.

I believe the new trade bill needs to be reviewed from top to bottom with a view to the new situation in which we find ourselves. For example, its statement of purposes should emphasize access to supplies as well as access to markets and its authorization to the President to deny our market to foreign countries which unreasonably do the same to us should be broadened to include the denial of U.S. exports and aid to countries that deny us vitally needed raw materials.

Let me make it clear that I am not proposing that we retaliate against the Arab oil-producing countries at this time. We should continue to work through quiet diplomacy for a fair Middle East settlement and the termination of the oil embargo. But the negotiating position of the Administration would be strengthened by some carefully drawn amendments to the trade bill which put the oil-producing nations and others on notice that they cannot wage economic war upon us with impunity. We and other OECD countries are dependent on the Arab countries for oil, but they are dependent on the U.S. and our OECD partners for food, medicines, industrial machinery and consumer goods. The Soviet bloc is not in a position to fill the gap completely if the OECD countries cut off supplies; in any event, countries like Saudi Arabia would think twice about becoming completely dependent on the Communist countries. Thus economic warfare is a game that all can play. Amendments of the trade bill should provide due notice of this fact of life.

Cordell Hull, the father of the trade agreements program, was a believer in the theory that "if goods can't cross borders, armies will." One of the central objectives of our trade policy since Hull's time has been to create the kind of non-discriminatory, secure access to markets and supplies that would remove the economic motives for the use of armed force.

Since the U.N. Charter, countries are no longer permitted to use force to back up their economic claims. Quite apart from legal prohibition, such actions now entail costs and risks that make them politically undesirable. But if the Atlantic Charter concept of equal access to raw materials cannot be guaranteed by the use of force, we need to consider guaranteeing it in some other way.

I have no easy solution to this problem, but I do suggest that we bend every effort to write some new rules of international law providing for equal access to raw materials into the GATT and into other international agreements and that we develop some multilateral sanctions against countries that violate these rules, whether they are parties to the agreements or not. If we can propose cutting off air services to countries that give refuge to hijackers, if we can contemplate denying port facilities to nations that pollute the oceans with their tankers, we should certainly explore the possibility of multilateral trade and aid embargoes on nations that withhold vital raw materials for political purposes.

Like many new ideas, this will be labelled "unthinkable" by some at the outset, but time often changes conventional opinion. Even if only two or three other countries were to indicate interest in the concept of "collective economic security," it might serve to promote new thinking in some key oil-producing nations.

As I close these comments, I must admit to a feeling of deep anxiety that the Arab oil embargo is going to do severe damage to the whole fabric of international economic cooperation that has been painfully put together since the Second World War. I say this more in sorrow than in anger as one who worked hard in the U.S. Government for the first U.N. Development Decade and as one who has consistently argued for more generous aid and trade policies on behalf of the developing countries.

For years the American people and the citizens of other developed nations have been lectured on the obligations of economic power and on the necessity of sharing our resources with those who are less fortunate. Now it appears that the concept of sharing is regarded by many as a one-way street—something which developed countries are expected to do but which developing countries are not expected to do when the resources are in their possession. Yet this policy of sharing through aid and trade was justified not only as morally right but as politically sound in order to assure the cooperation of developing countries who might otherwise deny their resources or markets to us. If the oil embargo continues indefinitely and the people of the United States and other developed countries begin to suffer, there will be some disagreeable second thoughts. Those whose houses are cold, whose movement is curtailed, whose fuel bills are prohibitive or whose very jobs may be threatened by the deliberate action of foreign governments are not likely to respond to old appeals on behalf of "interdependence" and "solidarity."

Let me be very specific. I wonder whether the American people can be expected to share their wheat and soybeans with the developing countries through the proposed "world food reserve" when some of these countries are refusing to sell us their oil. I wonder what is going to become of the Second Development Decade, of tariff preferences for developing countries, of multilateral aid appropriations, of the proposal to earmark SDRs for development, and of meaningful revenue-sharing from our exploration of the seabed.

It is curious and tragic that the non-oil producing developing countries, many of whom seem indifferent to our problems and some of whom are even cheering on the Arab countries in their oil embargo, do not seem to be asking themselves these questions. I hope and pray they begin to do so before it is too late.

THE OIL WEAPONS

Mr. BROCK. Mr. President, 6 months ago, these United States faced an energy problem. Slowly that problem grew larger and larger, until finally, from an energy crunch, we emerged into an energy crisis. One of the contributors to that crisis which is now upon us was the Arab oil boycott. Certainly, this cutoff of oil shipments has hurt, but it results in only a small percentage of the actual percentage of oil which we find ourselves in need of presently. Considering this fact, and considering the many other energy sources which we have available to us, which should immediately be pursued, I find it ridiculous that we might even consider bowing to an Arab oil boycott.

The Wall Street Journal, in its November 28, 1973, issue, contained an excellent editorial on the threat to the Nation in many other areas if we were to succumb to the Arab threats. I ask unanimous consent that this editorial be printed in the RECORD so that we should not forget the consequences of bowing to blackmail.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE OIL WEAPON

From what we can gather, Arab leaders at a "summit" conference outside Algiers this week are full of self-congratulation, and perhaps even some wonderment, over how effective the oil weapon has been in shaking the confidence of the world's major industrial powers.

Indeed it has shaken confidence. As Mr. Janssen observes on this page today, the impact of a continuing oil shortage on the NATO nations of Europe could be grim, both in economic and political terms. Japan, which is heavily dependent on Arab oil, responded with alacrity to Saudi Arabia's demand that it change its leaning from support to criticism of Israel's position in the Mideast dispute.

It should not be surprising that all this is a heady experience for leaders who mainly rule large acreages of sand. But some Arab leaders, Tunisia's wise Habib Bourguiba, for example, are making it clear at the conference that this sudden grip on immense power could prove to be a little too good to last. It is politically unnatural for small countries to be successful for very long in twisting the tails of major, industrial powers. Politics abhors romanticism in much the same way that nature abhors a vacuum.

We're not sure how this translates into a political scenario for the months just ahead. But we are convinced that the Arab leaders would be wise to listen to the cautionary advice they are getting from Mr. Bourguiba, who called the oil weapon a "double edged sword," and from Mahmoud Riad, secretary general of the Arab League, who urged them to be "judicious" in its use. Reports from Algiers yesterday that the Arabs will relax their shipment curbs to all European Community nations except Holland suggest that they may indeed heed that advice.