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writer might say or some side remark of some announcer are not worth a continental to us in trying to perform this serious duty.

This is the proper degree of proof required, in my judgment, and the standard which should be adhered to by the Senate.

I believe that I must adhere to these standards in order to faithfully execute my sworn duty under the Constitution, and I believe that each Member of the Senate will want to perform his duty to the fullest.

Members of a grand jury and trial jurors do not go around giving opinions on a case to come before them.

For emphasis, I repeat, that as a Member of the Senate, I have the most solemn constitutional duty that any official could possibly have to refrain from opinions and conclusions until all of the sworn testimony and evidence has been duly presented to the Senate.

I want to mention just one other point as to the nature of these proceedings. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 5 minutes remaining.

Mr. STENNIS. In my opinion, there is no appeal in impeachment cases. That is my opinion and my present reasoning after study and analysis of the cases. There can be no change of venue, as we use that term in the courts, and there should not be. A Senator cannot be ruled ineligible to vote, even if he expresses partiality before the full evidence is presented. He is a constitutional member of this court, even if he misbehaves. Following my duty, I do not believe I can be excluded from a vote in these proceedings should they come to pass. I could be excluded under a procedure directed against me, perhaps, but just on the grounds of having expressed partiality before the evidence was presented, although it is totally out of order, I do not think I could be declared ineligible.

These points emphasize, underscore over and over again, our obligation to remain impartial, to avoid premature opinions, and to make up our minds only when all the sworn evidence—the sworn evidence—is presented.

I emphasize the sworn evidence; it is one of the safeguards taught us by hundreds of years of experience under the common law system and many other systems as well.

In reading there rigid obligations, every Senator needs the understanding and help of each of his colleagues—for my part, I solicit that help—and all of us need an understanding by the people of the Nation. That is one reason why I concluded that I would make some remarks along these lines. I think that more should be said in explaining to the people of the country at large the true nature of these proceedings, if they develop, our obligation under the Constitution, and our position.

These remarks are made solely in a spirit of counsel and understanding with my colleagues. In this I am certainly by no means "my brother's keeper." I do firmly believe we must meet these mini-

mum requirements if we are to live up to the position of trust placed on us by our Constitution. In this, all of us need the assistance of each other, and we need the understanding of our constituents throughout the Nation.

In my opinion—and this is partly repetitious—there is no appeal in impeachment cases. There can be no change of venue. There is no way to challenge a Senator for cause and have him disqualified if he is not found to be impartial. These points, therefore, greatly emphasize our obligation to remain impartial, not to form premature opinions, and to make up our minds only when all the sworn evidence is presented.

I also concluded that a Member here could make a statement on the procedural subjects only, without prejudging or without expressing an opinion.

Thus, it is in that spirit, and with that feeling, I present this matter to the Senate and to the people of the Nation.

Mr. President, I thank the Senator for giving me this time. I assume it is in order for me to yield back the time I have not used, unless someone wishes to speak.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT— APPROVAL OF A BILL

Messages in writing from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Marks, one of his secretaries, and he announced that on April 9, 1974, the President had approved and signed the act (S. 2174) to amend certain provisions of law defining widow and widower under the civil service retirement system, and for other purposes.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session, The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HUDDLESTON) laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of Senate proceedings.)

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had agreed to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 9492) to amend the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act by designating the Chattooga River, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia as a component of the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System, and for other purposes, with an amendment, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

The message also announced that the House had passed a bill (H.R. 14013) making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and for other purposes, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

The message further announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the enrolled bill (S. 1745) to provide financial assistance for research activities for the study of sudden infant death syndrome, and for other purposes.

The enrolled bill was subsequently signed by the Acting President pro tempore (Mr. METCALF).

HOUSE BILL REFERRED

The bill (H.R. 14013) making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and for other purposes, was read twice by its title and referred to the Committee on Appropriations.

AUTHORIZATION FOR SECRETARY OF THE SENATE TO RECEIVE MES- SAGES DURING THE HOLIDAY RE- CESS

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Secretary of the Senate be authorized to receive messages from the President of the United States and the House of Representatives during the adjournment of the Senate until Monday, April 22.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, before the Chair rules, may it be clear that "messages" includes also nominations for offices in the Government which need confirmation from the Senate?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. It is my understanding that they are included.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. They are included.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AUTHORIZATION TO SIGN DULY EN- ROLLED MEASURES DURING THE RECESS OF THE SENATE

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Vice President, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the Acting President pro tempore be authorized to sign duly enrolled bills and joint resolutions during the recess of the Senate over until Monday, April 22.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AUTHORIZATION FOR COMMITTEES TO FILE REPORTS DURING THE RECESS

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all committees be authorized to file reports on Friday, April 19, until the hour of 4 p.m.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I thank the Senator from New York.

SALT NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, tomorrow Foreign Minister Gromyko will come

to Washington to meet with the Secretary of State. In these discussions, the strategic arms limitation talks will be high on the agenda.

During the last meeting between the Secretary of State and Soviet leaders in Moscow, there were disturbing reports that the Soviet Union was trying to take advantage of internal U.S. difficulties in the strategic arms negotiations. These reports suggested that the Soviet Union was taking a particularly tough line because of Watergate and pressing a position that would have put the United States at a disadvantage.

At the same time, there are commentators in the United States who suggest that SALT be abandoned because of Watergate and the threat of impeachment. The argument is that the President is so weakened that either he cannot negotiate a good agreement, or that he will be tempted to negotiate a poor one.

I believe the view that the Soviets can now take advantage of us and the idea of a moratorium on SALT are both wrong. The control of strategic nuclear arms is above Watergate. Its purpose is to insure against nuclear war and halt the continuing and dangerous competition in strategic nuclear weaponry. As such, SALT is a national objective that transcends the difficulties of this administration.

For this reason, I believe that we must convey to the Secretary of State, and he in turn must make clear to the Soviet Union, that the American people and the Senate of the United States overwhelmingly support his efforts to achieve a fair and effective SALT agreement. At the same time, we will not be pressured. We will not accept an agreement which is unfair, which fails to take into account the differences in the forces of the two sides, or which can jeopardize our security. We will take the necessary steps to assure our security whatever the outcome of the negotiations.

I believe it is also clear that we cannot simply call off SALT while we sort out the question of impeachment. The arms race moves ahead. In particular, the Soviet Union continues to test a wide variety of strategic weapons. If all these weapons test programs are brought to a successful conclusion, and deployment begins on each of them, the problem of achieving an adequately verifiable agreement will be greatly increased.

So there is urgency to SALT. The arms race will not wait for resolution of our domestic crises. If the arms race continues unchecked, the security of the United States, and indeed all mankind, will be put in further jeopardy. Thus it is essential that SALT not fall victim to Watergate and that we not abandon our responsibility to continue to seek further limitations on strategic arms.

For this reason, I am pleased to join with the majority leader, Senator MANSFIELD, the minority leader, Senator HUGH SCOTT, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator FULBRIGHT, and Senator MATHIAS in conveying our concern in a letter to the Secretary of State and expressing our strong support for his continued efforts to control strategic arms.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, the SALT negotiations—the strategic arms limitation talks—are the most important negotiations that are now being undertaken by the United States. It has been and continues to be a national goal of the United States to negotiate with the Soviet Union strategic nuclear arms limitation and reduction treaties and agreements with the purpose of reducing the danger of nuclear holocaust that would certainly result if war between the Soviet Union and the United States should take place. This national goal is supported, in my view, by the majority of the Congress and the people of the United States. The Soviet Union or any other nation should not make the mistake of believing that this clear and unmistakable national goal is in any way affected by any present domestic difficulties.

The great task of statesmanship and diplomacy which lies before both the United States and the Soviet Union, is to translate into fair, equitable and enforceable treaties and agreements the physical reality that there is nothing now or in the foreseeable future that either the United States or the Soviet Union can do through further weapons deployments to alter the parity that now exists between the two great superpowers. All scientific experts agree, and all military analysts agree that both the United States and the Soviet Union have the capability in being of destroying the other side totally, even after absorbing a first strike. While there is some argument about the exact number of times the United States can destroy the Soviet Union, the rough figure is 50 times over. The Soviet Union's capability is estimated to be somewhat less, but no one disagrees that it is more than enough. The present discussions about weapons inadequacies or new targeting policies are largely theological in nature and not fundamental; they are, in essence, relatively esoteric discussions which if played out to their logical conclusions are about how many times the dust of nuclear destruction can be refined by nuclear bombardment piled upon nuclear bombardment.

I have a very personal feeling about this discussion, however, Mr. President, because it was my fate to have been present in both Nagasaki and Hiroshima within 30 days of the explosion of the atomic weapons there, and so I have a very personal and very visceral reaction to my own observation of what happens in a nuclear holocaust.

It is the task of the national and international leadership to make it clear to the people of the world that there are no advantages to be gained by the deployment of additional nuclear weapons systems; that there are no essential advantages or imbalances in capabilities of the nuclear arsenals. It is the task of national and international leadership to make clear that limited nuclear war is just as dangerous to humanity as total nuclear war, because no one has devised plans or scenarios or theories which would with any degree of certainty prevent so-called limited wars from developing into total annihilation.

It is the task of national and interna-

tional leadership to point out that there are no bargains at SALT—that the parity of the certainty of nuclear holocaust that hangs over the heads of all people on Earth if nuclear weapons are ever used makes efforts which somehow attempt to achieve superiority through diplomatic sleight of hand irrelevant to the physical facts of nuclear annihilation. The clear and unmistakable national goal of the United States should be to achieve limitations and reductions of existing nuclear weapons stocks through fair and equitable agreements with the Soviet Union.

It must be recognized that the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States are sufficiently different in nature that limitations and reductions cannot, in many respects, be on a 1 to 1 basis. Yet, despite the asymmetries of our respective nuclear forces, fair and equitable agreements to lessen the likelihood of nuclear war can be achieved if the national purpose of both the United States and the Soviet Union remains constant to both nations' stated goals of making every effort to limit and reduce our respective nuclear weapons systems.

There is no more important diplomatic task. Dr. Kissinger and his chief associates at SALT should be confident that his efforts to achieve this national goal of nuclear arms limitations and reductions on a basis of fair and enforceable agreements will receive the support of the Congress and the people.

I would like to place into the RECORD at this point a letter sent to the Secretary of State, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, by the majority leader, Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, the minority leader, Senator HUGH SCOTT, Senator MONDALE, and myself, affirming this support on the part of the Senate. In addition, I ask unanimous consent that the following additional cosponsors be added to Senate Resolution 283: Mr. HASKELL, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. MAGNUSON, Mr. MONTOYA, Mr. METZENBAUM, and Mr. PELL. I also ask unanimous consent that the text of Senate Resolution 283 be placed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I wish to express my appreciation to the distinguished Senator from Maryland for his leadership in developing the letter to Secretary Kissinger, which I think speaks to a very crucial point and helps express the view of the Congress, and I think the country, on this particular issue.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland has 9 minutes remaining.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, at this time I should like to submit for the RECORD a letter written by several Senators to the Secretary of State, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger. I think it is notable that the leadership has joined in signing the letter. It is signed by the majority leader, Senator MANSFIELD; by the minority leader, Senator HUGH SCOTT; and also by the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. MONDALE) and myself.

The purpose of the letter is to affirm the support within the Senate for the positions that have been taken by the Secretary of State. There are other

means of support within the Senate for this general policy.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Colorado (Mr. HASKELL), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON), the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA), the Senator from Ohio (Mr. METZENBAUM), and the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL) be added as additional cosponsors of Senate Resolution 283.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that the text of Senate Resolution 283 be printed at this point in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. SENATE.

Washington, D.C., April 10, 1974.

HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: There is concern among many of our colleagues over recent reports which assert that during your discussions upon strategic arms limitations in Moscow, the leadership of the Soviet Union may have come to believe that internal issues in the United States might somehow lead the United States to accept an unfair agreement. Such a conclusion by the Soviet Union would be unwarranted, and their leadership should be so informed.

We believe that the Senate, Congress, and people of the United States support overwhelmingly the efforts made thus far by the United States government to control the strategic nuclear arms race. We believe that the American people support a continued effort to further control strategic nuclear weapons through equitable and enforceable strategic nuclear arms limitation and reduction agreements which fairly take into account differences between strategic nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Such agreements would contribute to our national security by enhancing stability and reducing the risks of nuclear war.

It is our view that you will continue to have the full support of the Congress in your negotiations with the Soviet Union to achieve such agreements. This is an overriding national objective and the Soviet Union should be informed that it is one which is strongly supported by the Congress and the people of the United States.

In this regard, we hope that you in your capacity as Secretary of State will communicate to the leadership of the Soviet Union the view, which we believe is held by the majority of our colleagues, that the long range importance of the strategic arms limitation negotiations for both countries should transcend any present domestic difficulties.

Thus, it remains our view that the Congress and the American people remain willing to support good faith negotiations leading to strategic arms limitations and reductions between the Soviet Union and the United States. However, it is also our view that you should make every effort to advise the Soviet Union that it should not miscalculate the determination of the Congress and the American people to achieve sound and equitable strategic arms limitations and reductions agreements that contribute to our vital national security interests; and that should these important and hopeful negotiations fail to reach such an agreement, the Congress and the people will take whatever steps are necessary to protect our national security.

In sum, you may be confident that the Congress will continue to support your efforts to achieve equitable treaties and agreements limiting and reducing strategic nuclear weapons within the context of a secure strategic capability to protect our national security interests.

We would like the opportunity to meet with you at your earliest convenience to discuss this very important question.

Sincerely yours,

S. RES. 283

Resolution relating to further arms limitation and reduction treaties and agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union

Whereas the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic-missile systems and the interim agreement on certain offensive weapons systems, concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union on May 26, 1972, strengthened the security of the United States by setting limits on particular categories of nuclear weapons systems; and

Whereas the first round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) began a constructive dialog between the two nations which could lead to further nuclear arms limitations through mutually agreed upon reductions of existing nuclear weapons systems; and

Whereas the nuclear arms race, despite the positive achievements of the treaty and interim agreement signed on May 26, 1972, has continued its costly and dangerous course in areas not covered by such treaty and interim agreement; and

Whereas research, development, testing, and deployment of more advanced nuclear weapons systems continue at a rising level of expenditures by both the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and

Whereas such further efforts and expenditures for research, development, testing, and deployment of advanced nuclear weapons systems could undermine the nuclear deterrent now possessed by both the United States and the Soviet Union and weaken the mutual confidence of both nations in their ability to prevent nuclear war; and

Whereas the negotiations now underway in Geneva in connection with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) still offer the best opportunity to conclude further treaties and agreements which would lessen the possibility of any nuclear war and reduce the costly and dangerous burden of armaments borne by the United States and the Soviet Union: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is hereby declared to be the sense of the Senate that—

(1) the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and their advisers should (a) give the highest priority to concerted efforts to achieve treaties and agreements which will halt the nuclear arms race through reductions of existing weapons stocks on a mutually agreed upon basis of overall equality; and (b) take such additional steps as might be necessary to lessen the probability of nuclear holocaust;

(2) concerted efforts should be made to achieve restraint on the part of both the Soviet Union and the United States during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks now in progress with regard to further expenditures for research, development, testing, and deployment of all nuclear weapons systems;

(3) inequalities that may now exist in the respective nuclear weapons systems of both the United States and the Soviet Union should be eliminated through mutually agreed upon reductions of existing nuclear weapons systems;

(4) a mutually agreed upon equality of the deterrent forces of the two countries will necessarily involve an overall balance in their

respective forces taking into account the following elements, among others:

(A) quantitative factors of nuclear weapons systems such as numbers of launchers, amounts of megatonnage, and numbers of deliverable warheads;

(B) qualitative differences between nuclear weapons systems such as reliability, accuracy, reload capability, survivability, maneuverability of warheads and range; and

(C) geographical factors bearing on the effectiveness of nuclear weapons systems.

SEC. 2. It is further declared to be the sense of the Senate that the President of the United States and the Secretary of State should, and are hereby urged and requested to, (a) maintain regular and full consultation with the appropriate committees of the Congress and (b) report to the Congress and the Nation at regular intervals on the progress toward further arms limitations and reductions within the context of an assured deterrent which is the basis of our national security.

SEC. 3. The Secretary of the Senate is directed to transmit copies of this resolution to the President and the Secretary of State.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. On whose time does the Senator request that the quorum call be had?

Mr. MATHIAS. On my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Maryland yield his remaining time to me?

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I am happy to yield to the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield myself not to exceed 5 minutes of the time of the distinguished assistant majority leader (Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD).

Mr. President, I wish to express, once again, my gratitude to the distinguished Senator from Maryland for making the statement which he has made this morning. It was brief and to the point, and encompasses the whole concept which I should like to emphasize again. It cannot be said too often:

While there is some argument about the exact number of times the U.S. can destroy the Soviet Union, the rough figure is 50 times over. The Soviet Union's capability is estimated to be somewhat less, but no one disagrees that it is more than enough.

Mr. President, it is far more than enough; and we are steadily increasing our nuclear stockpile of atomic weapons. I would hope that that would be kept in mind, not only by Members of Congress, but by the American people and also, most important, the executive branch of the Government—the executive branch in all areas. I would hope that the success which has been achieved and the progress being made in SALT I, and the progress being made in SALT II—and progress is being made—under the leadership of Secretary of State Kissinger would be continued. I would hope that what we would see would not be

merely a limitation, but a reduction in arms in both countries, to the end that the mad momentum of appropriations and expenditures for potentially destructive purposes could be turned around, and that the appropriations and expenditures would be used for the benefit and welfare of the peoples of both countries.

So Secretary Kissinger has our good wishes.

I again commend the distinguished Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS) for taking the lead, as he has so often done, in this field as well as others, and hope that what he has said will have some effect, because, as the Senator has said, let no nation make the mistake that its national goal is affected by any present domestic difficulties.

A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW APPROACH ON ECONOMIC FORESIGHT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at the beginning of the year a proposal was advanced at the first meeting of Senators of the majority party on January 24, and again in the State of the Congress television address on February 1, concerning the establishment of some instrumentality to bring together representatives of the legislative and executive branches with representatives of agriculture, business, labor, and other private communities for the purpose of identifying and doing something about areas of potential national crisis.

This proposal was discussed with the Senate Minority Leader (Mr. HUGH SCOTT) on a completely nonpartisan basis and, together, we addressed a letter to the President on February 19, 1974. On March 25, the President wrote to us, responding affirmatively to our letter suggesting that several representatives of the executive branch—Secretary of the Treasury George Shultz; Director of OMB, Roy L. Ash; Director of the Cost of Living Council, John T. Dunlop; Assistant to the President, Peter M. Flanagan; and Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, Herbert Stein—join in an initial exploratory meeting.

On April 9, the Senate Democratic Policy Committee endorsed the idea of the proposed meeting in a formal resolution. The House and Senate leaderships of both parties subsequently discussed the matter and agreed on the desirability of pursuing the matter. An initial meeting has been called for April 30, 1974, at 10 a.m. in the office of the Senate majority leader. We expect that about a dozen persons from the two Houses and the executive branch will be in attendance.

Mr. President, just as an indication of what is ahead, I cite from a Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. survey, under date of March 1974, a list of U.S. import dependents as a percent of consumption in 1973. We depend upon imports for 84 percent of our bauxite. We do not have bauxite domestically.

Chromium, our dependence is 100 percent. Cobalt, 100 percent. Copper, 8 percent. Iron ore, 29 percent. Lead, 19 percent. Manganese, 100 percent. Mercury, 82 percent. Nickel, 92 percent. Tin, 100 percent. Tungsten, 56 percent. Zinc, 50

percent. With respect to three-quarters of these critical materials, the United States depends for more than half its needed supplies on sources outside of our country. In many cases we are 100-percent dependent.

Mr. President, this is just a beginning. At the present time, for example, we import 84 percent of our bauxite needs. The bauxite-producing nations have been following the example set by the OPEC countries—the oil-producing countries—for the purpose of increasing the price of bauxite.

At about the same time, seven banana-producing nations got together for the purpose of considering an increase in the price of bananas. Certainly we do not need bananas to get by, but we do need many other commodities and materials, such as bauxite, copper, iron ore, and the like, if we are to survive. We have to recognize that we are a have-not nation in respect to many items.

If we have learned anything from the oil embargo that was placed against us during the past winter, it is that we are vulnerable in other areas, as well. So let us hope that this will mark the beginning of facing up to a situation that we cannot avoid.

The distinguished minority leader (Mr. HUGH SCOTT) and I have discussed the so-called Paley Commission Report, which was issued in 1952 and was a creature of the Truman administration. The Chairman of that Commission was Mr. William Paley, chairman of the Columbia Broadcasting System.

In that report, we find many things which were prophetic, but which no one paid any attention to at that time. The result is that we have suffered and suffered drastically.

We hope that if this proposal of the distinguished Republican leader's and mine gets under way, one of the people with whom we could establish contact for advice and counsel would be Mr. William Paley, because of his expertise and because of the validity of his report, which still stands today.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an excerpt from the Morgan Guaranty survey of March 1974 entitled "Foreign Raw Materials: How Critical Are They?" be printed in the RECORD at this point along with various correspondence, statement excerpts and the Majority Policy Committee resolution on this matter.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FOREIGN RAW MATERIALS: HOW CRITICAL ARE THEY?

Over the past twenty years a gradual erosion has taken place in this country's self-sufficiency in raw materials. Domestic output of a broad range of basic metals and minerals—quite aside from oil—has lagged behind the rise in consumption. The U.S., as a consequence, has entered a new era—one marked by mounting dependency on foreign resources.

The U.S., for example, for a long time has been completely dependent on imports for its cobalt, chromium, manganese, and tin. Foreign sources last year supplied 84% of the bauxite consumed in the U.S., 92% of the nickel, and 82% of the mercury. In the last decade alone, reliance on foreign-source

tungsten has doubled, and imports as a percentage of consumption of many other commodities from asbestos to zinc have shown sizable increases.

In some cases—such as lead and mercury—increasing concern with industrial pollution control has resulted in curtailed domestic smelter production. In others, foreign sources have been tapped simply because it is easier and cheaper. Iron ore is one example of many. High-grade iron ore can be brought in from Venezuela, for instance, for several dollars a ton less than low-grade ore can be produced in Michigan's Mesabi Range.

The mounting dependence of the U.S. and other developed nations on imported raw materials is bringing a significant change in relations between consumers and suppliers. Particularly in the environment of the recent past—featured by a world-wide boom among industrialized nations—producer countries have found that their rich mineral endowment can be used to score gains, both economic and political.

Oil, of course, is today's most publicized example. But many other commodities have been affected in one way or another. Prices have been raised. Producer nations have insisted that raw products be processed to a greater degree at home. And in many places local ownership of production facilities has been increased—in some cases to 100%—through nationalization and other governmental actions.

Is there a possibility of new cartels similar to the one formed by foreign oil producers?

The question is not merely academic, judging by the statements of officials of some producer nations. They have heralded the dawning of a new era of "product diplomacy." Not unnoticed, too, was the meeting earlier this month in Guinea of seven major bauxite producers. Press reports told of the formation of a "bauxite club," but indicated that—for now, anyway—the governments had decided against embargo or price control moves similar to those of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

A key consideration in all this, of course, is the degree of concentration of world mineral reserves. Providence, in sprinkling minerals around the earth's crust, has favored some areas in a lavish way while scrimping in others. A relatively few countries, thus, hold the bulk of a number of major minerals. (In the case of the U.S., even though abundantly blessed, its rapid—some would say profligate—chew-up of minerals has depleted many of its reserves.)

The pattern of concentration for a dozen key minerals is shown in the box on page 11. It lists U.S. reserves along with those of other nations which individually account for at least 8% of total world reserves.

Examples of concentration: Australia and Guinea together are found to have more than half of the world's bauxite reserves. South Africa alone has 63% of chromium reserves and, with Southern Rhodesia added, the concentration rises to 96%. Spain has just under half of world mercury reserves. Three countries—Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia—have 60% of tin reserves. And nearly half of world reserves of nickel is held by two countries: New Caledonia and Canada.

Note, however, that the pattern of concentration shown by official reserve estimates is necessarily a qualified and limited one. Reserves are defined as known, identified deposits of mineral-bearing rock from which minerals can be extracted profitably with existing technology and under present economic conditions. New discoveries could swiftly change the picture. So, too, could new breakthroughs in extractive technology. (For example, not long ago a new chemical "floatation" method was developed to produce pellets of iron from low-grade ore. Mined crude ore reserves of the U.S., as a consequence, were increased by 750 million tons