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inadequate to provide adequate stocks of modern equipment for our Army.

Meanwhile, it is most important to note that the overall trend of defense spending is definitely downward. Whether you measure it in terms of percentage of the Gross National Product or as a portion of total budget, defense outlays continue to go down. For example, in FY 64, considered the last peacetime year, the defense expenditure represented 8.3% of the Gross National Product and 41.8% of the Federal Budget. In 1968, the peak spending year for Vietnam, took 9.5% of the Gross National Product and 42.5% of the Federal Budget. FY 72 was programmed for defense outlays of 6.8% of the Gross National Product and 32.1% of the total National Budget. A Nation as great as this can afford something more than one-third of its Federal Budget for an adequate National Defense.

In 1953, the peak for the Korean War, the Defense Budget hit 13.3% of the Gross National Product and 62.1% of the total Federal Budget. This was due in large measure to the fact that we had permitted our Armed Forces to get so low in strength and equipment inventory that our credibility was seriously doubted—the North Koreans and their backers didn't think we had the strength or the will to retaliate, hence that costly misadventure. This is an awfully high price to pay for unpreparedness.

The late Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State, had some interesting observations on this point in testimony before Congressional Committees in 1969.

"I see no basis for the notion that we tend to overdo the military aspects."

To the contrary, the nation has repeatedly neglected to provide a military basis to match its policy or to cope with aggressive forces. We tried unilateral arms reduction in the inter-war period. We got Pearl Harbor. We reverted to habit after World War II. We got the Korean War. With respect to military power, I do not share the worries of those who discern and deplore dangers of too much. We had a temporary advantage in ratios of available military resources at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. Some would have called it a redundancy. That margin was not a surplus. It provided a basis on which President Kennedy was able to bring off an acceptable outcome—

General Marshall used to drill into me the vast importance of maintaining a means of preparedness in armaments at all times and not to raise it to terrific heights during times of trouble and then to scrap the whole thing and go down to almost zero between crises. We have always been unprepared for conflict. Our wars as a result have lasted too long. The casualties have been too high."

At the Annual Meeting of this Association in October 1971, we took the position that with the winddown of the war in Vietnam, that the U.S. Army total force strength—Active, National Guard, Reserve—should not be reduced below a minimum of 1.6 million. It is our firm view that the Active Army should not be reduced below 900,000. As indicated earlier, Active Army strength will this year drop to the 850-860,000 range and the Reserve Forces are already down to 635,000. In our view this 100,000 deficit presents unacceptable risks.

In the preamble to our Resolutions, we took cognizance of this growing problem. We were particularly struck by a passage in the Supplemental Statement to the Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel which was submitted to the President on 30 September 1970:

"Within a span of less than two decades we have moved from complete security to perilous insecurity.

"Yet, the response of the public generally, much of the media and many political leaders ranges from apathy and complacency to affirmative hostility—not against the poten-

tial enemies which threaten us—but toward our own military establishment and the very concept of providing defense capabilities adequate to protect this country and its vital interest. . . . Thus, we respond as a nation—not by appropriate measures to strengthen our defense, but by significant curtailments which widen the gap.

"In short, the mood of the people and much of the Congress is almost one of precipitous retreat from the challenge. This paradox in response to possible national peril is without precedent in the history of this country."

Our task at hand is to reduce the apathy and create an awareness of the essentiality for an adequate defense posture if the freedoms and liberties we now enjoy are to be preserved.

Mr. Acheson gave Congress a very simple explanation of the position of this nation in the world where he said "the power of the United States alone blocks the Sino-Soviet ambitions in this world. They may fall out between themselves, they may have difficulties, they may fight with one another in a minor way, but on one matter they are completely and wholly agreed. The United States is the enemy.

"It is our power which stands in the way of their ambitions and they have no doubt about that at all. We are alone at this pinnacle of power."

Our announced National Policy precludes further weakening of our National Defense. The Nixon Doctrine does not espouse isolationism. It recognizes that the United States has commitments which must be honored. The extent of these commitments must be clearly understood by other nations. We must maintain a level of credible military power sufficient to make deterrence a reality.

We need a strong Army for the future and the stronger it is the less likely we are to have to use it. The cause of peace has no more ardent advocates than those who have been to war. The soldier above all other people prays for peace, for he must suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war. We therefore agree with President Nixon when he says that America's strength is one of the pillars in the structure of a durable peace. He puts it this way: "Peace requires strength. So long as there are those who would threaten our vital interests and those of our Allies with military force, we must be strong. American weakness could tempt would-be aggressors to make dangerous miscalculations." He goes on to say that we cannot trust our future entirely to the self-restraint of countries that have not hesitated to use their power even against their allies.

It is our firm conviction that we have already reduced our Army strength below acceptable security minimums. The cause of prudence and safety demand a reversal of the current downward trend in our ability to protect our national interests and to continue as the masters of our fate.

The principal objective of United States military power is to deter war by having sufficient and credible power to maintain peace. We cannot have this without paying for it. We cannot afford to be without it.

CHILD DEVELOPMENT VETO

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, following President Nixon's veto of the OEO-child development bill in December, Mrs. Ben W. Heineman, president of the Child Welfare League of America, issued an excellent statement comparing the day care provisions in that legislation with those in H.R. 1, the administration's proposed welfare reform bill.

The comparison she makes between these bills with respect to whether they authorize voluntary or mandatory serv-

ices and with respect to the quality of services provided, will be of interest to anyone concerned with child care.

In order that Senators may have an opportunity to review this excellent statement, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE
OF AMERICA, INC.,
New York, N.Y.

(Mrs. Ben W. Heineman, president of the Child Welfare League of America, Inc., issued the following statement in the wake of President Nixon's veto of legislation that would have established a national system of child development and day care programs. A copy of Mrs. Heineman's statement is being forwarded to the White House.)

"The Child Welfare League of America, Inc., deeply deplores the action of President Nixon in vetoing legislation that would have established a national system of child development and day care services," Mrs. Heineman said. "We view the President's action as a cruel blow to children and working parents all across the nation, particularly those single parents who must work or go on welfare. We believe the legislation would have been a giant step toward alleviating the problems of children in low income families by providing for their adequate care while their parents work to earn a living. We believed this was a goal of the President as well."

"We find it incredible that in vetoing this legislation and stating that the veto was the sign of the President's concern about the family as 'the keystone of our civilization,' the President would then cite the day care programs contained in his welfare bill, H.R. 1. The provisions of the Administration's welfare bill are truly 'family-weakening;' poor mothers have no practical choice but to hand their children over to day care centers. And the kinds of services poor mothers must use—or lose their welfare benefits—will be harmful to children because the Administration is not budgeting sufficient funds for these centers. These damaging, cheap programs are the kind that parents would not place their children in if they had any choice," Mrs. Heineman said.

"The bill vetoed by the President had two very important features: participation by families was voluntary; the programs for children were of good quality. Under H.R. 1, participation by family is not voluntary; parents are forced to give up their children to whatever programs are available. The day care under H.R. 1 will be of low quality and, unlike the services that would have been provided under the bill President Nixon vetoed, H.R. 1 day care will be harmful," Mrs. Heineman said.

"We do not wish to speak to the other issues raised by the President's veto," Mrs. Heineman said, "but we believe no one should be misled about the reasons for the veto of the child development programs."

LEAKAGE OF GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Mr. MCGEE. Mr. President, the recent publication of the so-called Anderson papers gives rise to questions of serious ramification.

One cannot, and should not, fault columnist Jack Anderson for his publication of the memorandums and minutes surrounding high-level administration discussion of possible U.S. policy formulation in reaction to the India-Pakistan war. However, the individual or individuals responsible for leaking these docu-