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Whitehead, director of the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy, to Patrick J. Buchanan, special assistant to the President, to Henry Loomis, president of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the well-orchestrated lament was for a return to "localism," where in effect most stations couldn't monetarily afford to be a threat to anyone.

The official dictum seemed to be "less is more," neatly wrapped in sanctimonious declarations of impartiality. Any detections of an Administrationwide conspiracy to silence, or at least better to control, portions of the press were dismissed with patronizing condescension.

Then, happening to be a day after the showing of "An Essay on Watergate," Senator Lowell P. Weicker Jr., Republican of Connecticut, made public a series of White House documents obtained by the Senate Watergate committee. The memorandums—involving such familiar names as H. R. Haldeman, Charles W. Colson and Jeb Stuart Magruder—were written over 12 months, beginning in February, 1970. At issue was nothing less than a series of efforts to "tear down the institution" of broadcast journalism.

One of the most revealing, both of the Administration and of broadcasting, was a Sept. 25, 1970, memorandum from Colson to Haldeman. Colson had been pressuring top executives of the three commercial networks to deny requests by the Democratic party for free air time to reply to televised Presidential statements. Colson wrote:

"These meetings had a very salutary effect in letting them know that we are determined to protect the President's position, that we know precisely what is going on from the standpoint of both law and policy, and that we are not going to permit them to get away with anything that interferes with the President's ability to communicate."

With the President as the only person in the nation having unlimited and virtually instant access to television, it is curious to find his aides so worried about an "ability to communicate." But, of course, the thrust of their efforts went much further. It concerned the ability of the President to monopolize communications, to eliminate altogether the possibility of questioning and criticism, whether from political opponents or TV commentators. That would be the ultimate victory in a crusade "to protect the President's position."

In his television essay, Moyers presented an especially apt sports context to define the name of the game, the cause reflecting the old American will to win, with a modern twist: "When the one great scorer comes to write against your name, he marks not that you won or lost, but how you played the game."

"The sports writer Grantland Rice formulated the ethic in 1923. In theory, at least, the name of the game was fair play.

"By the nineteen-sixties; football had a new ethic, articulated by Vince Lombardi of the Green Bay Packers and Washington Redskins: 'Winning isn't everything; it's the only thing.'

"In the situation room of the Committee to Re-elect the President, a windowless, well-guarded command post across from the committee's headquarters, the President's team hung a sign borrowed from Lombardi: 'Winning in politics isn't everything; it's the only thing.'

"The name of the game was victory."

If the consequences weren't so tragic for the nation, the playing of the game, the tactics employed, might be almost laughable for their ineptness and miscalculation. Consider another section of the same Colson memorandum:

"To my surprise CBS did not deny that the news had been slanted against us. [William S.] Paley merely said that every Administration has felt the same way and we have been

slower in coming to them to complain than our predecessors. He, however, ordered [Dr. Frank] Stanton in my presence to review the analyses with me and if the news has not been balanced to see that the situation is immediately corrected. Paley [chairman of CBS] is in complete control of CBS—Stanton [former president of CBS] is almost obsequious in Paley's presence."

Since the Nixon Administration continues to complain strongly about TV news commentaries, it can only be concluded that CBS did not find any reason to have the situation "immediately corrected." And it was the "obsequious" Stanton who later stood up to the Administration and Congress in the fracas over "The Selling of the Pentagon" documentary.

The self-deception is almost laughable, but not quite. As Moyers put it, commenting on the entire Watergate quagmire: "It was close. It almost worked. But not quite. Something basic in our traditions held . . . What is best about this country doesn't need exaggeration. It needs vigilance."

By Mr. MONDALE (for himself, Mr. JAVITS, Mr. NELSON, Mr. STAFFORD, Mr. WILLIAMS, Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. MONTOYA, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. HATHAWAY, Mr. PELL, Mr. SCHWEIKER, Mr. BROOKE, and Mr. RIBICOFF):  
S. 2700. A bill to postpone the implementation of the Headstart fee schedule. Referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

#### HEADSTART FEE SCHEDULE

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, today I am introducing on behalf of myself, Senator JAVITS, Senator NELSON, Senator STAFFORD, Senator WILLIAMS, Senator RANDOLPH, Senator KENNEDY, Senator CRANSTON, Senator MONTOYA, Senator HUGHES, Senator HATHAWAY, Senator PELL, Senator SCHWEIKER, Senator BROOKE, and Senator RIBICOFF, a bill which would postpone implementation of the fee schedule for nonpoor children participating in Headstart until July 1, 1975. This same measure has been introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressmen PERKINS, QUIE, HAWKINS, STEIGER, BRADEMANS, BELL and MEEDS.

Mr. President, the fee schedule in question was originally developed as a compromise to gain administration support for the Comprehensive Child Development Act of 1971, which was vetoed by the President. Authority for the same fee schedule was then added to the Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1972, apparently in the belief that it would encourage participation of nonpoor children in Headstart programs. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, in exercising its discretion under this authority, set fees for nonpoor children at or very close to the maximum levels permitted by this legislation, and the fee schedule went into effect earlier this year.

The results have been very disturbing. The reports I receive from my own State of Minnesota and from numerous localities throughout the Nation indicate that this fee schedule is causing serious problems both for many families whose children have participated in Headstart or want to participate, and for the Headstart program itself.

Rather than encouraging the participation of nonpoor children in the Head-

start program, this fee schedule appears to be decreasing nonpoor participation.

Rather than raising additional funds which could be used to expand Head Start programs, reports suggest that in some cases it is costing more to implement and administer the fee schedule than the fee schedule produces in additional funds.

In addition, in some localities I am told that the fee schedule is causing previously popular Headstart programs to lose community support: is producing a bitterness between poor and nonpoor participants; and is causing special problems for families with handicapped children at the very moment that increased involvement of handicapped children in Headstart programs is required by law.

Mr. President, for these reasons, I am introducing legislation today which postpones implementation of a Headstart fee schedule until July 1, 1975. This bill will provide the authorizing committees and the Congress as a whole an opportunity to review and reconsider the need for a fee schedule during our work next spring regarding the extension of Headstart and the Economic Opportunity Act.

I am hopeful that we can enact this bill in the very near future so that we can end the confusion and difficulties the fee schedule is now creating for families and Headstart programs across the country.

By Mr. PELL:

S. 2701. A bill to require the establishment of safety standards for snowmobiles, and for other purposes. Referred to the Committee on Commerce.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, today I am introducing a bill that will provide for improved safety in the manufacture and operation of snowmobiles.

The use of the snowmobile in the northern tier of States has increased rapidly over the last few years. It is now estimated that more than 2½ million machines are in use. The sport has added millions of dollars to the economies of the States in the snow belt.

However, Mr. President, this growth has not been without a great price. In the winter of 1967-68, 54 persons lost their lives in snowmobile accidents. In 1968-69, this number increased to 84. By the winter of 1970-71, the number of deaths had risen to 104, including that of a close family friend. Last year, 1971-72, that figure rose to 164. We do not yet have the figures for 1971-73, but it is estimated that 50,000 persons will be injured seriously enough to require treatment at a medical facility. It appears the numbers of deaths will again increase.

Even though the figures on death and injury are sobering, there are other hidden injuries not reflected here. The noise levels of these machines is so great that many operators are sustaining permanent ear damage.

Further, this raucous invasion has created a serious noise problem for the other users of recreation lands. The hiker, the skier, the fisherman, and hunter who seek out the restful solitude of open spaces now find their recrea-