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interest Christmas Clubs into plans which yield capital and interest at Yuletide. And, although there is still rampant inertia in the banking community, free checking is becoming more common, as people ask, "If the Mellon Bank lets its customers check for free, why doesn't my bank?"

But it's a long way from free checks to a square deal at the bank. The average man must learn to ask a lot more questions of the kindly institutions which safeguard his money. Those friendly folks at the local bank may need to hear from Marley's ghost before they start asking the questions of themselves.

OIL MONEY AND STARVATION

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, the international monetary shifts which are occurring due to the rise in Middle Eastern crude oil prices will have many worldwide effects. As a developed country, we have been concerned primarily with our balance of payments, domestic implications of more expensive petroleum products, and initiating efforts to become self-sufficient in supplying our petroleum needs.

The world's underdeveloped countries are feeling these effects in other more drastic ways. Chester L. Cooper describes these effects in a New York Times article on April 4 entitled "Oil Billions for the Few—Sand for the Starving." That article is deserving of our attention and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OIL BILLIONS FOR THE FEW—SAND FOR THE STARVING

(By Chester L. Cooper)

WASHINGTON.—By the grace of Allah, a few Middle Eastern nations have become rich beyond even the wildest dreams of the fabled potentates of ancient Araby. Through little effort of their own, 55 million people—or, more accurately, their leaders—of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Libya "earned" \$16 billion in 1973 and are expected to "earn" almost \$65 billion this year. The spice trade was but salt and pepper compared with commerce in black gold.

The roll of the dice and the leaders' greed have combined to raise havoc with the energy-intensive, interdependent economies of Western Europe, Japan and the United States and to jeopardize the development prospects of scores of countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia. Because of quantum jumps in oil prices, worldwide inflation is sharply accelerating. International monetary arrangements, chronically fragile in the most stable of times, are under severe stress. The specter of a worldwide depression is becoming all too real.

Meanwhile, life goes on, at least for some—the lucky ones whose only urgent need is oil. But millions of Africans are facing another, more terrifying crisis. They are dying of thirst and hunger. Unknown thousands have perished over the last year and scores of thousands have fled from baked fields and destroyed herds to rot slowly away in unfamiliar, frightening cities.

On his return recently from the sub-Saharan region of Africa, Secretary-General Waldheim of the United Nations was aghast at what he had witnessed. "Peoples and countries could disappear from the face of the map," he said. "This region has not seen such a disaster in two centuries."

The international community, or rather

a part of it, has not remained unconcerned. Approximately \$350-million in aid—food, money and services (not including airlifts)—have been contributed to the stricken countries of Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Chad, Niger and Upper Volta. Of this, the United States, despite domestic problems, has contributed more than a third. The European Economic Community, racked by balance-of-payment problems and inflation, has contributed slightly less than a third.

The United Nations and its subsidiaries, not including the Food and Agriculture Organization, has given approximately 7 per cent. The F.A.O. has provided separate assistance, largely from American and European contributions. France, West Germany, Canada, China, Nigeria and the Soviet Union have made up the remainder.

On rereading the roster of contributors, one has the feeling that it must be incomplete. Are there not some countries missing? Some of the very rich, perhaps? Some Moslem countries, since most of the stricken people south of the Sahara are also Moslems? Some fellow African countries, possibly? We had better review the official data.

Strictly speaking, three countries were overlooked: Libya contributed \$760,000—from the \$2.2 billion it collected in oil revenues last year. Kuwait contributed \$300,000—from the \$2.130 billion of its oil earnings in 1973. But what of Saudi Arabia, which earned twice as much as Libya? Not a dollar in 1973, and only \$2 million so far this year.

And Iraq, which earned as much as Kuwait? Not a penny. Abu Dhabi, which earned over \$7 billion, or about \$23,000 for every one of its inhabitants? Nothing. And Qatar, which earned almost \$400 million, or about \$2,600 per capita? Zero. Bahrain? Zero. Algeria? Another zero. And what of Iran, with almost \$4 billion in oil revenues in 1973 and \$15 billion projected for this year? A further zero.

Altogether, then, the Middle Eastern oil-exporting nations have contributed less than 1 per cent of the total aid to the starving people south of the Sahara.

This is not to say that they remained entirely aloof. Not at all. They raised the price of oil, not only for the rich industrial countries but for the desperately poor ones as well. As a consequence, virtually all of the American financial assistance to the stricken countries of sub-Saharan Africa will be absorbed by the increased cost of their oil imports—a "contribution" by the oil exporters to the needy that should not go unnoticed.

To be sure, the Arab League, with all deliberate speed, has been discussing easing the borrowing terms and doubling, to about \$400 million, the capital of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa. And there has been talk of preferential oil prices for some of the developing countries and some desultory discussion of eventually doing something about the famine. But, meanwhile, by the grace of Allah, the oil flows out and the billions flow in. And life goes on, for some.

PRESIDENTIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, a recent column by Austin Wehrwein, in the Minneapolis Star, thoughtfully discusses a question on which I have spoken repeatedly and which I believe to be central to the present dilemma in which we find ourselves—the problem of Presidential accountability.

I commend this article, which discusses both the difficulty and the necessity of restoring the office of the Presidency to a

position of real accountability to the American people, to each of my colleagues.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PRESIDENTIAL REFORM: PEEKING AHEAD TO '77 (By Austin C. Wehrwein)

NEW YORK.—Let us suppose that it is 1977. Richard M. Nixon by then, by one means or another, is out of the White House. No longer can he kick the Constitution around.

Let us suppose that, by then, there is a mood of reform: a real sense that we can't slip back to "normalcy" but must, regardless of who is then president, make changes in "the presidency" that will prevent its being manipulated the way Nixon did.

What changes could we expect in the "post-Watergate" presidency?

A symposium at Columbia University Law School on that subject last weekend reached a consensus which is reassuring or disappointing, depending upon your viewpoint. It was that in basic, institutional terms, there isn't much that could or should be done.

Among those on the lecture platform were Prof. Louis Henkin, author of "Foreign Affairs and the Presidency," Prof. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Sen. Clifford P. Case, R-N.Y. and William T. Gossett, former American Bar Association president.

In truncated, indeed perhaps simplistic, form, the discussion can be summarized along these lines:

We are dealing not only with the post-Watergate but the post-Vietnam War presidency. In retrospect, was the problem usurpation or was it simply that the Constitution didn't work very well?

In the area of foreign affairs the Constitution says very little about presidential powers. The specific references are to the president's power to "make treaties" with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the senators voting . . . and to "appoint ambassadors (and other public ministers) and consuls."

That's all.

The controversy, you see, is about what's missing.

The ability to run the foreign affairs of this country with a free hand is the result of the inevitable day-to-day monopoly a president has, whether he wants it or not. That began, not with Nixon, not with the Roosevelts. It began with George Washington.

Through the ambassador (actually, now the State Department) power, a president gets a monopoly on communication. Too, of course, only the president "speaks for the United States" in the world community. And unlike Congress, the presidency is always in session.

Delegation of any of this power serves to increase rather than diminish this presidential role.

Moreover, it is unrealistic to contend there is a clean line between foreign policy (to be made by Congress) and foreign affairs (to be conducted by the president). Simply by conducting those affairs a president makes policy. A dramatic example: Nixon's embrace of a newly compliant China.

Nevertheless, if Congress has the guts it can curb the president. It could have ended the Vietnam War, for example.

The Supreme Court refused to let Truman seize the steel mills under "war powers."

While it is often impossible to disentangle the parts of the presidency, it is absolutely and perfectly clear that not all foreign affairs involve "national security." Congress must force that issue.

Separation of powers does not of itself enlarge presidential powers, as Nixon contends.

The question, finally, is: Would major structural changes in the presidency be either possible or wise? Do we really want to "break up the presidency"?

Will a fervent desire to cut down Nixon in 1974 necessarily become in 1977 an equally ardent will to cut down the scope of the presidency?

Those who most ardently nurture the 1974 passion are usually those who in the past most admired strong presidents and their good works.

Where do would-be reformers go in 1977?

Well, far short of catastrophic confrontation, Congress could review and limit the massive body of legislation that has enhanced presidential discretion. Congress also has the ever-ready power of the purse to force the executive to come across with information. Congress must be a place where people can call the president to account. But any notion that a parliamentary system holds a clue is absurd, because that system unites executive power.

If the central problem stems from one man's control of day-to-day foreign relations, then it follows that the people, through and with Congress, must have more access to the presidency, day by day.

Congress might, for example, set up consultative joint committees with the whole house. Instead of calling the executive to Capitol Hill, Congress would go into the executive valley. To an extent, secrets would have to be shared far more than today.

Congress has already taken some steps toward collaboration. It did, after all, pass the War Powers Act, albeit after Vietnam involvement was ebbing.

In the pre-World War II era, Congress passed a Neutrality Act of 1935. That, however, was buffeted by the great debate between the isolationists and internationalists, so that the 1937 War Policy Act gave FDR the first of his wide "emergency" powers. The flood that began then surrounds the presidency like a Sargasso Sea, much to Nixon's glee.

But long before Nixon, it is obvious on reflection, Congress and the people lacked the will and/or the confidence to check presidential exercise of foreign affairs policies, and that spills over to domestic affairs. This is not, however, "inherent" or a form of divine right.

The solution is more a matter of increasing accountability than of reducing power, the Columbia Law School panel tended to agree.

In the words of Teddy Roosevelt, a president should be "sharply watched."

Rather than "getting off his back," the nation should be forever on it.

The oversight prescriptions do not so far sound remarkable. Or radical.

Still, their implementation would require tremendous skill, attention and energy on the part of both those on Capitol Hill and we, the people, who sent them there. Is there, however, no more concrete proposal to offer in 1977?

One object surely should be to avoid another White House staff like that under and over Nixon. It was an independent operating bureaucracy with absolute and, by axiom, corrupting power.

Appropriation authority can curb this sort of aggrandizement; such purse-power can in turn be combined with the requirement that all key aides be subject to confirmation plus constant inquisition on Capitol Hill.

Kissinger's former role as a de facto secretary of state should never be repeated.

What is often overlooked is that the Nixon system also is to "extrapolate" the staff, not only by adding (as others have done) droves of bureaucrats on White House detached service, but by putting its zealots into the bureaucratic structure, rather like implanting political commissars.

Be that as it may, the major points (slogans, if you will) at Columbia were that we should be able to punish the offender without punishing the office.

The goal is to restore the presidency, not to emasculate it.

THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, it has been 25 years since the first nation signed the Genocide Convention. At that time the United States was in the forefront of those who sought to make genocide an international crime. In the intervening years over 75 nations have ratified this treaty, but this body has yet to give its consent. It is as vital that we do so today as it was 25 years ago.

Throughout history, the United States has been known for its leadership in the field of human rights. Our concern with preserving the right of religious, racial, and ethnic groups to coexist dictates that we sign the Convention. The fact that we have not yet signed the treaty puzzles our allies and delights our enemies. In fact, former U.S. Ambassador Charles Yost testified that our refusal to ratify the treaty was one of the most difficult and embarrassing things he has ever had to explain.

The psychological impact of our ratification of this Convention should not be underestimated. International law grows extremely slowly. It requires the unanimous support of the world community to become established. Thus it is hard to see how any international understanding can become binding without the concurrence of the United States.

Also, if the United States now adds its signature to the treaty, it could well prompt new nations to join in support of the convention. It is imperative that we here in the Senate give our consent to this treaty.

DÉTENTE: SOME QUALMS AND HARD QUESTIONS

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, in today's New York Times an article by Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway voices some of the questions regarding détente that have been of some concern to me.

I ask unanimous consent that this article entitled "Détente: Some Qualms and Hard Questions" be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

DÉTENTE: SOME QUALMS AND HARD QUESTIONS
(By Matthew B. Ridgway)

PITTSBURGH.—"Détente," I believe, poses the potentially gravest danger to our nation of all the problems we face. Whether it is to prove a siren's call to lure us to our destruction, or the first long step toward defusing the terrible threat of nuclear warfare and worldwide holocaust, no man can today predict with any assurance.

But what any reasoning person can clearly perceive is the distinct possibility that treaties can be abrogated or ignored, that solemn undertakings by the Soviet leadership can be deliberately flouted or repudiated and that an overnight reversion to the hard-line policies of a former Soviet Government can take place.

Against these possibilities this country must have ample safeguards, for we are dealing not with the fate of our own nation, though that may well be what we are doing, but with the fate of a civilization, the fate of the fundamentals on which our nation and the free world have built that civilization through two millennia.

What must be done is to critically and coldly examine and analyze every facet of this problem through the widest practicable public debate and then to make basic decisions and formulate policy guidelines.

Fortunately, it appears that an assessment of where we may be going, for what reasons, and for what guarantees of national benefits, is being made, constructively, by highly qualified individuals, in and out of Government, whose intellectual honesty, integrity, competence and devotion to our country command respect.

There can be no real lessening of tensions, except in an atmosphere of mutual trust. Such trust does not exist. Positive action, not mere words, by the Soviet Government will be required over an extended period to create such trust. For America's part, I fail to see how it can exist in view of the unrelieved evidence of the actions taken and the courses pursued by the Soviet Government over the last fifty years, the frequently expressed fundamental objective of spreading its form and concept of government throughout the world—in short, of its aim of world domination.

Would it be in our national interest to extend long-term credits to the Soviet Union for the development and marketing of Siberian oil and gas reserves in exchange for Soviet promises to let us share them at fair prices years hence; to furnish technology that we have developed and that the Russians lack and eagerly seek; to continue to pare our military strength while the Soviet Union continues to augment its own in the nuclear and conventional fields, as it has been doing for the last five years; to consent to the present disparity in nuclear capabilities brought about by our 1972 agreement on limiting strategic weapons; to agree to a common percentage in the reduction of armed forces in Europe, leaving the Soviet Union in its present position of greater strength—another Soviet proposal?

These are hard questions of immense significance to us and to the free world. They demand hard thinking.

Under the vision of those who established our form of government, mankind's fires of imagination were kindled. They burned with an intense flame and spread over much of the world. They have yet to be extinguished. But now in the continuing erosion of morals and ethics, and in the apathy and muddled thinking of many of our own people today, they have been allowed to burn dangerously low.

We now have before us in our greatest hour for two centuries, an opportunity to show the world whether we are determined to keep those fires burning; whether we shall be found too lacking in integrity, too weak in moral courage, too timid in planning, too irresolute in execution to set before Almighty God and mankind an example of those principles, faithfully adhered to, on which our Founding Fathers staked "their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor"—whether we will show the world an example of what in our hearts we know is eternally right.

In this Bicentennial era, the choice is ours to make.

ENERGY SHOCK AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROSPECT

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, one of the people calling for immediate attention to the impact of the energy crisis