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as a nuclear power is making it clear that today's forward Pacific bases will soon be too close for safety to missile bases on the China mainland.

The big question is: Where to move?

The preference of top military planners is already known. There will be a withdrawal to the Mariana Islands, if present planning is approved.

The Marianas, including the island of Guam, are 2,000 miles from China's mainland—out of range of intermediate-range ballistic missiles, but still close enough to function as a "forward defense" for the continental U.S.

What will be needed is a complex of troop-staging and logistics bases for conventional wars in Asia. Sites for nuclear stockpiling will also be required, with missile bases and huge airfields for atomic bombers. A fleet-repair facility able to handle the biggest carriers is under consideration.

Military men do not want to center all this on one island, as was done on Oahu in the Hawaiian Islands before World War II. There, the single attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 had a devastating effect.

Military officials would like to fortify four separate islands in the Marianas. In addition to Guam, they would include three nearby islands made famous in World War II—Saipan, Tinian and Rota.

The map on these pages gives details on the exact location, size and suitability of these islands.

ISLANDS IN TRUSTEESHIP

Guam belongs to the U.S. and is an important base already. But the other three islands are unfortified and belong to no one. They were seized from Japan in World War II and are now part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, administered by the U.S. for the United Nations. Their future status is indefinite.

Fortifying these islands cannot be done without ruffling some feathers in the U.S. State Department and at the United Nations. Military men, aware of this, insist that it is in America's vital interest to make the move despite the political consequences.

In recent weeks, military authorities have surveyed existing facilities on Guam with an eye to expansion. They found the island not nearly big enough for all the future needs.

Guam already is being used as the major base for B-52 bombers on missions to Vietnam. It serves as the support center for Polaris atomic submarines on long-range patrols off the China coast. It is a big naval-supply base.

Says one officer:

"I don't see how we can make intelligent plans for the future without including Saipan, Tinian and Rota. We would be insane to put all our eggs in one basket on Guam alone."

Withdrawal from the present forward defense line will mean giving up half a dozen big air bases in Japan, as well as naval bases at Sasebo and at Yokosuka, regarded as the finest naval-repair facility in the Pacific.

A pullback from the Philippines would raise a need to replace the sprawling Clark Air Force Base as well as the big naval bases at Cubi Point and Subic Bay.

IF OKINAWA GOES

It will be the loss of Okinawa, however, that will be most damaging. The U.S. has invested more than 1 billion dollars in the postwar years on what is probably the most elaborate multiservice military installation anywhere in the world.

Since the start of the Vietnam war, activity has increased tenfold. Okinawa, long the mainstay of U.S. defenses in the Western Pacific, has now become also a giant funnel through which much of the paraphernalia of war pours into South Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

U.S. money and imagination have turned the island—67 miles long and from 2½ to 19 miles wide—into one vast patchwork of military posts, airfields, an Army port, training camps, ammunition dumps, warehouse depots, storage areas and housing complexes. In all, there are 117 separate military installations on the one island.

Under terms of the 1952 peace treaty with Japan, from which the island was wrested in World War II, no time limit was placed on the U.S. occupation of Okinawa.

In recent years, however, pressure has been growing in Japan to force the U.S. to loosen its hold on the island and eventually to return it outright.

A former Ambassador to Japan, Edwin O. Reischauer, considers this demand for reversion "the gravest problem in Japanese-American relations."

Resurgent nationalism in Japan is one reason for the demand. So is the desire to wipe out a lingering vestige of wartime defeat and what many Japanese consider an "unequal" peace treaty.

Okinawans themselves want to be reunited with the Japanese, whose race, language and culture are similar.

U.S. military men insist that a show-down over Okinawa is coming much faster than State Department officials are willing to recognize.

THE NUCLEAR THREAT

Weighing heavily on the minds of military men responsible for U.S. security is the emergence of Red China as a nuclear power. This by itself lessens the value of Okinawa. The island is barely 500 miles from the Chinese mainland—within range not only of relatively short-range missiles but also of Red bombers and submarines.

U.S. strategists insist that sound military doctrine, leaving aside any political factors, dictates that the U.S. fall back from a position within an enemy's nuclear reach.

Hawaii, once the key defense outpost in the Pacific, is now considered too far to the rear of U.S. defense commitments in Asia. Islands such as Wake and Midway are not large enough to support modern military complexes. Only the Mariana Islands fill the bill.

Legally, there is nothing to stop the U.S. from moving ahead now and fortifying the islands.

In 1947 the U.N. Security Council gave the U.S. a "strategic" trusteeship over the Marianas and all of Micronesia—the former Japanese mandate that includes more than 2,000 islands covering an area the size of the U.S.

This was the only strategic trusteeship granted. It differs from 11 other U.N. trusteeships in that it entitles the U.S. "to establish naval, military and air bases and to erect fortifications in the trust territory."

State Department legal experts concede that the U.S. could move ahead "without asking approval from anyone, the language of the trusteeship agreement is so strong."

PRECEDENT ON KWAJALEIN

The U.S. already has established a precedent elsewhere in Micronesia by turning the island of Kwajalein into a site for nuclear-missile tests. That event was simply "noted in the trustee's annual report to the Security Council."

But there are hitches, and these are leading to friction between military men and some State Department officials.

The U.S. is supposed to be preparing the Micronesians for "self-determination" under the trusteeship agreement. That would carry with it the right to veto any U.S. plan to erect bases in the Marianas. Military men familiar with the situation know what they want: to go right ahead and fortify the Marianas while they are still in U.S. hands. At the same time, they would give the in-

habitants of the Marianas the chance to vote themselves out of Micronesia and into a union with Guam.

This would make Saipan, Tinian and Rota part of the U.S. territory of Guam. Its people would be American citizens, as are Guamanians. The rest of Micronesia could go its own way.

Sentiment in the Marianas, right now, is in favor of joining with Guam, its best trading partner.

A U.S. official reports: "The people of the Marianas, especially on Saipan, feel very close to the U.S. and would like to be even closer."

State Department officials, however, are dead set against letting the Marianas detach themselves from the rest of Micronesia. The Marianas, they point out, are the most progressive and best-developed of the Pacific trust islands. They doubt that the rest of Micronesia could ever set up a going economy without the Marianas.

These officials see the Marianas as part of an independent Micronesian union of the future, taking its own course in the world. They detect a growing cohesion among Micronesia's 100,000 widely dispersed people, and they do not want to disturb it.

The U.N.'s Trusteeship Council, in its most recent report, also opposed separating the Marianas and joining them to Guam.

There the matter now stands. In the military view, the State Department may turn out to be the big stumbling block to fortifying the Marianas, despite the recognized legal right of this country to do so.

Says one top military officer: "If it has its way, the State Department is sure to drag its heels for years on this whole issue, as it does on other things that relate to U.S. interests."

THE BASIC QUESTION

It boils down to this question, in the view of military planners: Will long-range defense of the Pacific take precedence over the ideas of a united Micronesia?

A State Department official counters:

"The military will not make the decision. The Micronesian people themselves will have the right to choose their own future status."

With a pullback from forward bases only a matter of time, and with the search on for alternative bases, military men are seeking a clear-cut decision on the Marianas.

THE METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT SUPPLEMENTARY GRANTS PROGRAM

Mr. MONDALE, Mr. President, it was my privilege to be appointed this year to the Housing and Urban Affairs Subcommittee of the Banking and Currency Committee. As a member of this subcommittee I have tried to look at the full range of urban problems now facing us. A great deal of attention has been given to the model cities program, and this is proper. It is important that we reverse the decline of older neighborhoods and revitalize inner-city areas. But we must remember that our urban problems are not restricted to central cities and older business and residential districts. We are a nation of many expanding metropolitan areas. As such we face problems other than blight at the core of a few large cities. Urban sprawl, rapid growth, and an ever-rising demand for services and facilities place the suburbs and other outlying communities in difficult economic and governmental circumstances. Increasingly we have come to realize that the financial and legal capacity of rapid-growth areas may not be adequate to meet their problems.

Efforts to help these growth areas cul-

minated last year in an important but neglected and unfunded piece of legislation: The metropolitan development supplementary grant program. I would like to review the needs that led up to that legislation and make a plea that we provide funds for this program. We must meet the problems of growth adequately and intelligently.

The Federal Government has in the past responded to several needs of developing communities. Grants have been made available for a variety of public programs and facilities: To provide transportation, for recreational purposes, to acquire and develop open spaces, for water and sewer facilities, for community beautification and historic preservation, to mention only some. These programs are important and will remain so. In the last decade municipal tax revenues rose 60 percent, expenditures 76 percent, and debt 80 percent. Furthermore, capital outlays over the past two decades, which have been enormous, will be exceeded greatly in the next single decade. Unquestionably, then, small and large cities, suburbs and central cities alike have needed and do need aid in order to meet their financial responsibilities.

Financial aid alone is not sufficient, however. If growth problems are to be met adequately, needs have to be foreseen and public facilities and programs coordinated. Thus the Department of Housing and Urban Development also provides money for comprehensive planning in urban areas. Indeed, the value of such planning for all jurisdictions has come to be appreciated. Legislation is now pending which would authorize comprehensive planning for rural as well as urban areas.

Planning agencies have made important contributions, but it is not enough to do studies and make recommendations. Real economy and efficiency require that actual projects, not just paper proposals, be carried out in accordance with areawide needs. This is the essential reason for the metropolitan development supplementary grants program. It assumes that good planning has been done and that an incentive would assure programing in accordance with that planning. It is not, we should all note, a device to assure excellence in planning. We have good planning. Our most pressing problem concerns the effectiveness of planning, not the quality of it. Under the metropolitan development supplementary grants program, an incentive would be offered for local governments to cooperate in a voluntary program of meeting growth needs. In this way locally elected officials would be encouraged to make sure that opportunities to cooperate and to coordinate their efforts will not be lost.

Mr. John Mulroy, speaking on behalf of the National Association of Counties, referred to the metropolitan development legislation of last year as "probably the most important step Congress has taken to emphasize and encourage the drastic need for coordination at the local level." One reason we require so much money for local public facilities is that mistakes were made in the past

when existing areas were developed. Duplicating and conflicting facilities have resulted from a lack of developmental planning and project coordination. Neither the Federal Government nor State and local governments can afford further costly mistakes. We cannot afford, for example, to have schools built on land that is taken for highways. There have been too many unfortunate instances in which one community has contaminated the water supply of another. We must pursue savings that can come from such projects as a consolidated rather than fragmented water or sewage system. Economies of scale can be realized in the construction of projects and in the operation of services.

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has thoroughly documented the costs of failing to achieve cooperation in one area, that of combating pollution and supplying water. The costs have been high. Ground-water reserves have been depleted in some places, recreational areas spoiled in others. Suburban homeowners, unaware of the inadequacies of their original water and waste facilities, have often resisted the construction of a community system and then, in the face of a crisis, opted for a small, inefficient system. As a result some suburbanites have made triple investments. The Advisory Commission described the process this way:

For the homeowner, individual systems usually are a source of inconvenience and expense. Initial installation costs, in a development of any size, are generally higher than those of either a rudimentary community system or a connection to a central system. Upkeep, particularly for septic tanks, is higher than normal sewer use charges, ranging from \$40 to \$100 a year in most areas. As the system begins to fail, maintenance charges rise sharply. Fire insurance costs reflect the lessened protection available with individual water supply systems. And in most areas, the resale value of a home with individual systems is lower than one with community water and sewer service. Additional outlays inevitably are necessary when wells run dry or become polluted, or when the septic tank no longer works.

Since the homeowner generally is unaware that his original water and waste facilities are temporary, he resists proposals to build a community system until the hazards produce a crisis. Then the inclination is to take the cheapest alternative, usually a small, inefficient community system. Thus the homeowner pays twice for his water supply, and sometimes three times for sewerage disposal, as the small community systems are absorbed into larger, more economical, and more logical collection and treatment systems. There is an inevitable element of civic disillusionment built in this costly process.

Incentive grants to stimulate cooperation among local governments would assure that Federal funds are being used efficiently at the point of impact. Surely we must exercise our responsibility to see that federally assisted projects are being executed effectively by not duplicating one another needlessly. And certainly we should make sure that the benefits of one project are not nullified by another project through a failure to achieve cooperation and understanding.

Metropolitan development supplementary grants are widely supported as an effective means for synchronizing Federal projects in growth areas. Local gov-

ernment officials have given the program their strong endorsement. Representatives of the National League of Cities, the National Association of Counties, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors have appeared before both authorizing and appropriating committees to ask that the program be put into effect. In fact, all three of these organizations have urged that the program be expanded to include rural and nonmetropolitan areas.

In a report to the Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee, the Joint Center for Urban Studies of MIT and Harvard supported financial incentives for local cooperation. The executive branch has also given staunch backing. Last year's Presidential message on cities called for supplemental grants to any jurisdictions which show "that they are ready to be guided by their own plans in working out the patterns of their own development and where they establish the joint institutional arrangements necessary to carry out these plans." Almost all parties concerned agree that financial incentives are the most practical and acceptable way to achieve local cooperation and joint action. Section 205 of last year's legislation authorized the necessary grants. If we do not provide the incentives for cooperation now, we face a proliferation of problems and continuation of inefficiencies.

As we give consideration to incentives in the form of supplemental grants, we should keep in mind specifically what the Federal role is in rapid-growth areas. The report by the Joint Center for Urban Studies explained that role clearly:

The nature of the Federal Government's responsibility for and interest in metropolitan development differs in kind from that of State and local governments. Federal action should and does seek limited ends, in terms of assuring and increasing the efficiency of the Federal investment in metropolitan areas. It properly should and does leave to local and State entities the detailed decisions as to the goals, organization, and powers of the bodies set up to do metropolitan planning, review, and cooperation.

Consequently, the Federal Government should not act with respect to the specifics of metropolitan planning, but only more generally, to buttress the climate in which cooperation at the metropolitan level grows. Procedural requirements attached to substantive benefits can contribute to this atmosphere by opening channels of communication and creating areas for negotiation within the everyday workings of the local decisionmaking process. Administrative actions and incentives clarify the roles and purposes of metropolitan planning agencies, thus giving them a more concrete place in the governmental structure, so that the Federal Government may achieve a wiser and more economical use of its program in metropolitan areas.

The metropolitan development supplementary grants are admirably suited to the attainment of these limited goals. The grants would be an incentive to coordinated and planned metropolitan development, but would involve no Federal supervision and guidance. State and local bodies and agencies would receive supplemental grants for projects carried out in accordance with their own metropolitan planning and programing.

To be eligible for supplemental grants, an area would need to: First, establish metropolitanwide arrangements ade-

quate for coordinating development policies and activities affecting the larger area; second, undertake metropolitan-wide planning and programing adequate for evaluating the location, financing, and scheduling of public facility projects and for evaluating other proposed land uses which have significance to more than one jurisdiction; and, third, see that public facility projects and other land uses which have a major impact on the development of the metropolitan area are carried out in accordance with comprehensive planning.

The supplementary grants may not exceed 20 percent of the cost of an eligible project, and the total Federal contribution is limited to 80 percent. Communities could receive supplemental assistance under 10 Federal programs administered by five different departments:

First. Grants for basic water and sewer facilities, administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development under the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965;

Second. Grants for the construction and modernization of hospitals and other medical facilities, administered by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare under the Public Health Services Act—Hill-Burton Act;

Third. Grants for the construction of libraries, administered by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare under title II of the Library Services and Construction Act;

Fourth. Grants for construction of sewer treatment works, administered by the Department of the Interior under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act;

Fifth. Grants for highway construction—Federal-aid primary and secondary systems and urban extension, but not the Interstate System—administered by the Department of Transportation;

Sixth. Grants for airport development, administered by the Federal Aviation Agency, Department of Transportation under the Federal Airport Act;

Seventh. Grants for urban mass transportation facilities and equipment, administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development under the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964;

Eighth. Grants for acquisition and development of open space land, for urban beautification and improvement or for historic preservation administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development under the Housing Act of 1961—the historic preservation provisions are added to the 1961 act by the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966;

Ninth. Grants for the acquisition and development of lands and waters for recreation purposes; administered by the Department of the Interior under the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965;

Tenth. Grants for public works and facilities in redevelopment areas, administered by the Department of Commerce under the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965—but only if they involve works or facilities of a type which the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development determines to be eligible under items 1 to 9, above.

Each of these programs has particular

relevance to growth patterns. Each therefore represents a critical need for cooperation across jurisdictional lines. By tying incentives to the actual execution of projects, the role of elected officials in planning and programing would be strengthened. Areawide plans would no longer be neglected, but closely related to each area's agenda of action and development.

Mr. President, in conclusion I want to say again that the rapid expansion of metropolitan areas is creating problems we must cope with. Urban communities, some of them rural and nonmetropolitan in character a few years ago, now face abrupt increases in expenditures to pay for needed public facilities. Growth has pushed many of these communities to the limits of their financial capacity. The metropolitan development supplementary grants would aid these communities, and do so in a way that would foster sound growth. We need to coordinate Federal programs in development areas, to promote economy and efficiency in capital improvements, to strengthen arrangements for cooperation on policies and projects of area-wide significance, to utilize the planning process as an effective guide to metropolitan development, to make consistent the activities of special districts and general governments in metropolitan areas, and to involve the elected officials in comprehensive planning. All of these needs could be served by the supplementary grants program. Our communities cannot go it alone financially or otherwise. These incentive grants would help local governments and enable them to achieve the kind of growth they want. I think this is an excellent way to maximize benefits from Federal assistance.

JOHN McNAUGHTON—A EULOGY

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. President, John McNaughton was a man of great ability and integrity. His services will be badly missed in the years ahead. I had the privilege of working with him on a number of matters and I know particularly how important his contributions were during the period of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Test Ban Treaty in 1963.

He knew the importance of the United States being strong but he also realized the necessity of this country making an effort to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union. He understood the importance of military power and at the same time he was one of the leading advocates within the Government of the use of that power in a measured, careful, and responsible way. I was always impressed as were all of his colleagues with his keenness of mind and his special sense of dedication.

Adam Yarmolinsky, who was with the Department of Defense and worked side by side with John McNaughton, knew him well as a friend as well as a colleague. At the funeral services at the Washington Cathedral, Mr. Yarmolinsky delivered the eulogy and caught, in the most touching way, the spirit of John McNaughton and his family—his wife and son, who died with him, as well as

Alexander, his sole surviving son, and his marvelous parents.

I ask unanimous consent that this eulogy of John McNaughton, an outstanding and dedicated public servant, be placed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the eulogy was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EULOGY BY ADAM YARMOLINSKY

The last time I saw John McNaughton was just a month ago when we spent an evening with a group of friends talking about the enormous demands that people in the world of ideas make on their government, to be wise and just and good, and the enormous difficulty that people in government have in getting anything done at all.

If ever anyone was fitted by temperament, preparation, and rigorous self-discipline to bridge the gap between those two worlds, it was John McNaughton.

He recognized, as sharply as anyone I've known, the difficulties of effecting a change in the practice of government, once a decision has been taken in principle. Whether the task was to remove obsolete missiles from foreign bases, or to introduce new concepts into NATO doctrine, he knew in advance the kind of effort that would be required, and he marshalled all his resources to meet the challenge.

And those resources were formidable. We all recognized his sheer intelligence, his articulateness, and the physical energy that enabled him to put in twelve-hour days six days a week. It was a measured energy too. He seldom came into the Pentagon on Sunday mornings. Part of that time was reserved for accumulated reading at home on matters that could be deferred during the week.

His multiple careers, as a newspaperman, a lawyer, and a teacher, all contributed to his achievement.

Whether it was a clause in the test-ban treaty, or the shape of the naval quarantine proclamation in the Cuba missile crisis, or a reply to Congressional mail, his lawyer's skills were focused on the problem as he turned to the typewriter that was always available behind his desk. No bureaucratic controversy ever dimmed his lawyer's sense of fair play. He insisted on precision in thought and word. I remember when we were considering a man for promotion to a new job, and I observed that he had some blind spots. John corrected me: "He doesn't have blind spots; he has bright spots. He sees some things so clearly they obscure other things he ought to pay attention to." There were few blind spots or bright spots in John McNaughton's vision of the world. He had already mastered the lawyer's highest art, the art of the relevant.

His newspaperman's sense of where the spotlight of popular attention would turn stood him often in good stead. One day he came out of a meeting and called for special precautions to anticipate a possible news leak, because, he said, an incident in the meeting was the kind of story he would want to tell his wife, and that was an infallible test of news. The story did leak almost immediately, but the government was prepared and could minimize the consequences.

Since he first taught the law of evidence at Harvard, John McNaughton never stopped being a teacher. Everyone who came into contact with him, learned from him. And the standards he set for his students were no higher than the standards he set for himself.

With all the talents and energies that he brought to his work, he still had talents and energies to spare. His physical energies found expression in tournament tennis, and his mental energies in music and painting. The abstract oil painting he did of the Cuba missile crisis expressed not only for him, but