

UNITED STATES



OF AMERICA

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 91st CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

VOLUME 115—PART 3

FEBRUARY 5, 1969, TO FEBRUARY 21, 1969

(PAGES 2775 TO 4178)

by an investment analysis firm was entitled "Nike X: \$30 Billion for Whom?" It listed 23 companies with large defense contracts that "could profit handsomely" if a full-scale ABM system were to be installed. This has been broken down to show that companies on the list have 300 plants in 42 States and 172 congressional districts, with a minimum of 1 million employees. Even a political novice can readily see that this adds up to a great deal of potential political influence and pressure.

Mr. President, it would be far better to spend these billions of dollars to help to cure the many troubles afflicting our cities and millions of Americans living in poverty and hunger than to waste them on a plaything of the generals of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

OPERATING FUNDS OF SELECT COMMITTEE ON NUTRITION AND HUMAN NEEDS

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I join the distinguished chairman of the Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs in protesting the Rules Committee's decision to cut the operating funds of the select committee from \$250,000 to \$150,000. This cut, which amounts to 40 percent of the select committee's request, is a very serious matter.

On July 30, 1968, the Senate unanimously approved Senate Resolution 281, which established the select committee. The committee was to conduct a complete study of all materials pertaining to the food, medical, and other related basic needs among the American people. Matters within the committee's mandate include first, the extent and causes of hunger and malnutrition in the United States, including educational, health, welfare, and other matters related to malnutrition; second, the failure of food programs to reach many citizens who lack adequate quantity or quality of food; third, the means by which this Nation can bring an adequate supply of nutritious food and other related necessities to every American; fourth, the divisions of responsibility and authority within Congress and the executive branch, including appropriate procedures for congressional consideration and oversight of coordinated programs to assure that every resident of the United States has adequate food, medical assistance, and other basic related necessities of life and health; and, fifth, the degree of additional Federal action desirable in these areas.

Despite the crucial duties assigned to the committee by the Senate, the committee did not receive authority to employ a staff or expend funds until October 4, 1968, when the Senate agreed to an authorized budget of \$25,000 through January 31, 1969. It was clear to everyone concerned that if the committee was to even come close to fulfilling the Senate's mandate, it would need a much larger budget. Frankly, I believe that \$25,000 was too small a figure, but since the committee staff believed that it could operate on that amount, I accepted their calculations.

Now, even that very tight figure has

been significantly slashed. This is simply not acceptable, especially in light of some of the evidence of hunger and malnutrition which our committee has already received. I am sure that you are all aware of the preliminary findings of the National Nutrition Survey, reported to the committee by Dr. Schaefer. While we have just skimmed the surface, it is already evident that the problems of hunger in America are even more severe than any of us anticipated.

The budget cut by the Rules Committee is open to serious challenge in and of itself. But the cut is especially indefensible when it is considered that almost every other investigating committee was given the funds it requested; and in most instances, the budgets of these other committees were larger than that requested by the Select Committee on Human Nutrition Needs.

The American people have closely followed these hearings. Surely they will not want to see its work hamstrung by an inadequate budget.

LET THE MISSILE TALKS BEGIN

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, it is the hope and intention of President Nixon that the next few years will be a period of negotiation rather than confrontation. I am sure we all share this hope of our new President and wish him success.

There is no area where a period of negotiation rather than confrontation is more important than in arms control. I believe that both countries gradually are coming to the conclusion that ever-increasing investment in offensive and defensive missiles does not bring an increase in security but only makes us poorer and thereby less able to cope with the enormous social problems facing both countries.

The Soviet Union has recently indicated that it wishes to begin negotiations as soon as possible with the United States in the field of strategic offensive and defensive missiles. According to an excellent article by Victor Zorza, this decision on the part of the Soviet Union came after considerable debate and controversy within the Soviet hierarchy. The Soviet Union, it seems, also has its hawks and doves. Mr. Zorza points out that the position and credibility of those within the Soviet Union who argue for missile talks will be damaged, perhaps beyond repair, if President Nixon listens to those in the United States who argue against immediate talks on missile limitation.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article entitled "Nixon Could Aid Soviet Doves by Agreeing to Missile Talks," written by Victor Zorza, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NIXON COULD AID SOVIET DOVES BY AGREEING TO MISSILE TALKS
(By Victor Zorza)

LONDON.—The Soviet invitation to President Nixon to enter into missile limitation talks might have been designed as a trap.

Whether it was so designed depends on which of the Kremlin factions inspired it. For in addition to those Soviet leaders who really want disarmament, there are those

who believe, as is evident from the Soviet press, that genuine disarmament is unattainable in the present state of the world.

Until the middle of last year, this second group balked the repeated efforts of Premier Kosygin, reflected in his public and private utterances, to accept President Johnson's longstanding invitation to join in missile limitation talks. The Kremlin accepted the invitation only when it became evident that, in the absence of missile limitation, the United States would proceed rapidly to vastly increase its strategic forces.

It is thus arguable that the recent Soviet agreement to join in talks, and the calculated and pressing reminder of this issued in Moscow on the day of Mr. Nixon's inauguration, were inspired not by the disarmers, but by their opponents. They might have finally agreed to the talks in the hope that these might lull American suspicions and delay the American arms drive, while giving the Soviet Union additional time to develop secretly its own strategic strength.

Duplicity of this kind is a habitual tool of Soviet diplomacy. The honeyed words and smiles of the Soviet leaders after the Cierna and Bratislava meetings, just before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, are only the most recent example of this.

An even closer parallel is to be found in the repeated Soviet assurances to President Kennedy that the Soviet Union was not introducing offensive missiles to Cuba—at the very time when the Soviet Union was secretly doing just that.

Less obvious, but even more relevant to the prospect of missile limitation talks, is the Kremlin's apparent duplicity during the first months of the Kennedy presidency, when the Soviet Union and the United States were observing a moratorium on nuclear tests while their delegates were trying to negotiate a permanent ban in Geneva.

President Kennedy insisted that the moratorium must be observed. But the Kremlin used the cover of the Geneva talks to prepare its 60-megaton test with which it perfidiously breached the moratorium, and which was later claimed to have given the Russians a 100-megaton bomb and a vast superiority over the United States.

President Kennedy vowed that he would never again allow himself to be caught "with his trousers down," and President Nixon must now consider whether he ought to expose himself to a similar danger while the missile limitation talks proceed in the usual slow and leisurely way.

Certainly the two situations are not exactly similar, but there are enough parallels to invite comparison, and to draw the obvious lesson. But the less obvious parallels should also be considered. For there was considerable evidence at the time that Premier Khrushchev was engaged in a tough struggle with his opponents in the Kremlin over the resources to be devoted to defense.

Khrushchev's power position was challenged, and in order to survive he had to give them what they wanted in the way of arms or at least to make a 60-megaton bang to show that Russia already had much bigger and better weapons than America.

There was evidence of the challenge to Khrushchev between the lines of the Soviet press, and he even went so far as to drop private hints to Western leaders that, unless they met him half-way on the disarmament questions then under discussion, his position in the Kremlin might be endangered.

His greatest need was for rapid progress at the Geneva talks on the nuclear test ban. An agreement at Geneva which he could present to his Kremlin associates as reasonably satisfactory would have eased the pressures on him, and he would not have had to break the moratorium by ordering the 60-megaton test.

But President Kennedy, too, was under pressure from those who advised against any