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the only life in the solar system. Many a star has since been born and died.

About two million years ago, man appeared. He has become the dominant species on the Earth. All other living things, animal and plant, live by his sufferance. He is the custodian of life on Earth. It's a big responsibility. The thought that we're in competition with Russians or with Chinese is all a mistake, and trivial. Only mutual destruction lies that way. We are one species, with a world to win. There's life all over this universe, but we are the only men.

Our business is with life, not death. Our challenge is to give what account we can of what becomes of life in the solar system, this corner of the universe that is our home and, most of all, what becomes of men—all men of all nations, colors and creeds. It has become one world, a world for all men. It is only such a world that now can offer us life and the chance to go on.

LAW AND ORDER

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, we often hear today the cry for "law and order." It seems, however, that for some people this cry is really an incantation. That is, they believe if they say "law and order" often enough and loud enough the crime problem will disappear.

What is needed more than incantations is systematic analysis. What is it we really mean when we say we want "law and order?" Do we want to double our police forces or mete out stricter sentences to lawbreakers so as to retard their activities? Do we really know that these are the most effective means to accomplish this end? Perhaps we would accomplish more by working to correct the social causes of crime rather than merely seeking to deal with crimes after they have been committed.

Mr. President, once again I invite attention to a report called "Toward a Social Report," prepared by HEW. Among other things, the report tries to analyze systematically the problem of crime as it relates to the quality of American life.

Under the Full Opportunity Act of 1969, S. 5, the President would be required to submit such a report to Congress annually. The Full Opportunity Act would also establish a Council of Social Advisers to help the President formulate the social report and a Joint Committee of the Social Report to help the Congress evaluate it. Of equal importance is the fact that S. 5 declares full opportunity for every American to be a national goal.

Let me say a few words about what the fifth chapter of "Toward a Social Report," entitled "Public Order and Safety," has to say about how crime impairs the full opportunity of many Americans. According to statistics compiled by the FBI, major crimes have increased 13 percent in 1964, 6 percent in 1965, 11 percent in 1966, and 17 percent in 1967. It is noted that the victims of crimes, as well as the perpetrators, "are more likely to be residents of the poverty area of central cities than of suburbs and rural areas."

The report notes that Negroes have higher arrest rates than whites, but that Negroes also "have higher rates of victimization than whites of any income group." Quite related to this phenomenon

is the fact that it is precisely in the ghetto areas "where the prospects for legitimate and socially useful activity are the poorest." As the report states:

It seems unlikely that harsh punishment, a strengthening of public prosecutors, or more police can, by themselves, prevent either individual crime or civil disorder.

These measures do not really speak to what I consider to be one of the major causes of crime in the ghetto: powerlessness and frustration born out of the culture of poverty. What is really needed is to bring full opportunity—in all of its ramifications—to the people whose dominant cultural milieu is poverty.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that "Public Order and Safety," the fifth chapter of "Toward a Social Report," be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the chapter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CHAPTER V. PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY  
WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF CRIME ON OUR LIVES?

To assess the quality of American life, we must consider the impact of crime on our society. People neither want to be the victims of crime nor to live in fear of crime. Moreover, crime challenges the basic assumptions of civilized society. A society cannot claim to be minimally civilized if greed and aggression are regularly permitted to override respect for other people.

An increase in crime has a variety of implications for the well being of a society. It is reflected in the workload of the police, the amount of harm to victims, and the prevalence of criminal behavior and attitudes. The impact of crime needs to be appraised from each of these perspectives to determine how crime can best be prevented and controlled.

For these purposes it is best to concentrate on crimes generally considered most serious. There is a set of actions which almost every society has felt it necessary to combat. These include criminal homicide, assault, rape, and different varieties of theft. Because such actions have been prohibited at almost all times and places by a nearly universal consent, the study of these crimes answers best to the needs of social reporting for data, for meaningful comparisons, and for phenomena of clear concern to our society.<sup>1</sup>

INCREASES IN MAJOR CRIMES

The periodic reports of law enforcement agencies to the Federal Bureau of Investigation show large and persistent increases in the numbers of known crimes. The FBI statistics show increases in major crimes generally considered serious of 13 percent in 1964, 6 percent in 1965, 11 percent in 1966, and 17 percent in 1967.<sup>2</sup> Major crimes have been increasing faster than the population. The FBI index of major crimes per hundred thousand population increased at an average rate of 8.7 percent per year between 1958 and 1967.

Different types of crime have been increas-

<sup>1</sup> It should not be forgotten, however, that other sorts of crimes create an immense case-load for the police and the courts. Over half of all arrests are for public drunkenness, drunk driving, other liquor offenses, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, and gambling.

<sup>2</sup> The FBI Index of Crime is composed of murder and willful manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery (involving at least the threat of personal violence in an attempt to steal), aggravated assault, burglary (with or without the use of force), larceny (stealing without the use of force or fraud), and automobile theft. Arson and kidnaping are the most obviously serious crimes not included.

ing at very different rates. Indeed, the homicide rate was actually lower in 1967 than in 1933. From 1958 to 1967 FBI index crimes per 100,000 population increased at the following average annual rates:

	Percent
Homicide .....	2.9
Rape .....	5.6
Aggravated assault.....	7.8
Robbery .....	10.0
Burglary .....	8.4
Larceny .....	9.9
Auto theft.....	8.2

The problem of underreporting

It has long been known that there has been a difference between the total number of crimes and those officially reported. In fact, sample surveys undertaken for the President's Crime Commission in 1965 indicate that several times as many crimes occur as are reported in official crime statistics. One explanation is that the victims of crime often do not report incidents because of the circumstances in which a crime occurs. Assaults, for example, commonly occur among members of the same family or among neighbors and the participants involved often prefer to make their own peace with each other. If a juvenile steals something it may seem kinder to obtain restitution through his parents rather than through the police.

THE HARM DONE TO VICTIMS

In addition to information on the number of significant criminal offenses, we need to know how much harm these offenses do to their victims. If in a given year there were 90 more murders and 100 fewer burglaries, most people would surely say that victims had suffered more, though the number of criminal offenses would be less. We need a way of "weighting" each crime that occurs according to the amount of harm it does.

So that a burglary will not count as much as a murder, property crimes could be weighted by the average amount of the dollar loss which results and murders weighted by some appropriately much greater figure. A very conservative, if not callous, figure would be the projected life-time earnings of an individual, perhaps \$200,000. This weighting procedure would be crude, but it would be far less misleading than counting every crime equally as one. To illustrate, there were on average 298,661 burglaries reported in the years 1938 to 1942. There were on average 7,525 murders in the same years. In a latter 5-year period, 1952 to 1956, there were an average of 491,864 burglaries and 7,000 murders. The total number of the two crimes per year was 192,678 greater on average in the second period. But if we weight the burglaries in constant dollars and the murders by \$200,000, even this crude and illustrative weighting would strongly suggest that there was less harm to victims.

Vulnerability and property risks

Information on the aggregate amount of harm resulting from crime would tell us something important from the victims' point of view, but not enough. Different people—or the same people at different times—are vulnerable in different degrees. A physical injury which represents a brief period of pain and inconvenience to a young person can be catastrophic to an older one. A loss of a few dollars might hardly be missed by a rich man, but felt sorely by a poor one.

Analogously, we need to ask questions about the vulnerability of whole societies or the same society at different times. How much does crime hurt the members of a society, given their ages, activities, wealth and way of life?

If we consider only crimes of theft against property we can estimate both the amount of harm and the degree of our vulnerability. We can estimate the dollar losses from such crimes from FBI statistics going as far back as the thirties. At the same time, we can

contrive a very crude dollar measure of our vulnerability over the same period. We can estimate the dollar value of consumer durables in each year together with the amount of currency in circulation in that year as the measure of our wealth exposed to theft. This makes it possible to say whether the rapacity of criminals is gaining on the growing wealth of the country, or lagging behind it.

Has a dollar in property values become safer or less safe from the common forms of theft? Table I shows that by the above calculation the overall risk per \$1,000 has increased from \$3.55 to \$3.91 from 1938 through 1967. For robbery, larceny, and auto theft it was less than in 1938 as recently as 1965; but for burglary it was already considerably greater.

TABLE 1.—VALUE OF PROPERTY INVOLVED IN THEFT (WHETHER RECOVERED OR NOT) PER \$1,000 OF APPROPRIABLE PROPERTY<sup>1</sup>

Year	Robbery	Burglary	Larceny	Auto theft	Total loss
1967	0.14	1.18	0.79	1.80	3.91
1966	.12	.99	.73	1.65	3.48
1965	.11	.94	.68	1.57	3.30
1964	.12	.89	.71	1.63	3.35
1963	.11	.80	.67	1.33	2.90
1962	.09	.70	.58	1.18	2.55
1961	.11	.68	.56	1.08	2.43
1960	.11	.66	.54	1.09	2.41
1959	.07	.54	.47	1.00	2.08
1958	.07	.55	.46	.99	2.08
1957	.06	.45	.53	1.12	2.16
1956	.06	.43	.51	1.09	2.09
1955	.07	.43	.48	1.02	2.00
1954	.08	.50	.54	1.13	2.24
1953	.08	.45	.55	1.35	2.43
1952	.08	.50	.61	1.43	2.63
1951	.07	.39	.47	1.30	2.23
1950	.10	.40	.46	1.16	2.12
1949	.09	.42	.51	1.20	2.22
1948	.11	.48	.62	1.48	2.69
1947	.12	.55	.67	1.60	2.94
1946	.13	.63	.74	1.94	3.44
1945	.12	.57	.70	2.19	3.58
1944	.08	.45	.60	1.90	3.02
1943	.07	.37	.56	1.66	2.66
1942	.08	.36	.56	1.52	2.52
1941	.13	.42	.62	1.90	3.07
1940	.13	.42	.57	1.83	2.95
1939	.15	.47	.62	1.90	3.14
1938	.15	.52	.69	2.20	3.55

<sup>1</sup> Appropriate property represents currency in circulation plus a rough estimate of the stock of consumer durable goods.

<sup>2</sup> Data not strictly comparable to previous year.

#### The uneven burden

There are groups in our society which bear a larger share of the harm done by crime than others. Those most likely to be victims of major crimes—poor Negroes living in the central city—appear to have a rate of victimization several times that of those least likely to be victims—middle-income whites living in a suburb or rural area (see tables 2 and 3).

In general, victimization rates tend to decline as one moves outward from central cities to rural areas. This tendency is pronounced for violent crimes against the person, which seem to show a central city rate five times greater than that of small cities and rural areas. Property crimes, on the other hand, show a rate only twice as great. The rates of "white collar crimes" such as forgery, counterfeiting, and the various types of fraud do not seem to vary with the type of community.

#### The response to risk

How do different groups in the population respond to their different risks? Many people are seriously frightened by the risk of crime, and forgo certain activities in order to minimize this risk, such as working or seeking entertainment in certain areas of cities where they live. It would be valuable to know the extent of such dislocations, for they detract significantly from the quality of life.

TABLE 2.—VICTIMIZATION BY AGE AND SEX

[Rates per 100,000 population]

Offense	Age						All ages
	10 to 19	20 to 29	30 to 39	40 to 49	50 to 59	60 plus	
<b>MALE</b>							
Total	951	5,924	6,231	5,150	4,231	3,465	3,091
Robbery	61	257	112	210	181	98	112
Aggravated assault	399	824	337	263	181	146	287
Burglary	123	2,782	3,649	2,365	2,297	2,343	1,583
Larceny (\$50 plus)	337	1,546	1,628	1,839	967	683	841
Auto theft	31	515	505	473	605	195	268
<b>FEMALE</b>							
Total	334	2,424	1,514	1,908	1,132	1,052	1,059
Forcible rape	91	238	104	48	0	0	83
Robbery	0	238	157	96	60	81	77
Aggravated assault	91	333	52	286	119	40	118
Burglary	30	665	574	524	298	445	314
Larceny (\$50 plus)	122	570	470	620	536	405	337
Auto theft	0	380	157	334	119	81	130

Source: 1965 survey by the National Opinion Research Center for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice.

TABLE 3.—VICTIMIZATION BY RACE AND INCOME

[Rates per 100,000 population]<sup>1</sup>

Offenses	White				Nonwhite		
	0 to \$2,999	\$3,000 to \$5,999	\$6,000 to \$9,999	Above \$10,000	0 to \$2,999	\$3,000 to \$5,999	\$6,000+
Total	2,124	2,267	1,685	2,170	2,894	2,581	3,387
Homicide	0	0	0	0	56	0	0
Forcible rape	58	46	0	17	111	60	121
Robbery	116	91	42	34	278	240	121
Aggravated assault	146	289	147	220	389	420	121
Burglary	1,310	958	764	763	1,336	1,261	2,056
Larceny (\$50 plus)	378	700	565	916	501	300	363
Auto theft	116	183	167	220	223	300	605

<sup>1</sup> Rate per 100,000 population of each specific race and income group.

Source: 1965 survey by the National Opinion Research Center for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice.

Information on the character of such dislocations was obtained by the President's Crime Commission. Sixteen percent of respondents in one survey said they had recently wanted to go out but had stayed home because of fear for their own safety. One out of three Negroes had done so and one out of eight whites. Those who were worried about burglary and robbery were 50 percent more likely to take precautions (such as installing locks or bars on windows and keeping firearms) than those who were not.

The Commission also discovered, however, that there was no clear relationship between having been a victim or witness of crime and the taking of precautions. There was a similar lack of clear relationship between the relative rate of crime in a respondent's neighborhood and his perception of it.

#### THE DEGREE OF CRIMINALITY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

The harm criminals do to their victims is the main reason we are concerned about crime, but it is not the only reason. The crimes that are committed call in question the decency of our society and the dependability of our social institutions.

When assessing the criminality or law abidingness of a population it is necessary to consider the age distribution of the population. Since young people commit a disproportionate share of crime at all times, it would be possible for the crime rate to increase with a growing proportion of young people even if the propensities of both older and younger age groups remained the same.

This possibility is pointed up by the fact that for any one-year age bracket, the greatest number of people arrested for rape, aggravated assault and robbery are age 18, for burglary probably age 15, for auto theft age 16. Crime rates for all age cohorts fall off as their members get older, the rates for the

lesser property crimes as early as age 16 or 17, the rates for the major crimes considerably later.

Part of the recent increase in crime rates can thus be attributed to the growing proportion of young people in the population, since there were more adolescents and young adults in the United States in the sixties, relative to the rest of the population, than there were in the fifties. But part of the increase apparently must also be attributed to greater criminality among the young. The percentage increase in juvenile arrest rates from 1960 to 1967 was nearly a third more than that for adults. Arrest rates themselves may not be a good indicator, but they point to the possibility that the propensity of youth to crime is increasing.

If we take into account the size and age composition of the population, the rate of increase in criminality over the past decade appears to have been less than the rate of increase in the absolute number of reported crimes. In 1958, there were 1,573,210 major crimes officially reported; in 1967, there were 3,802,300 such crimes, an increase of 142 percent, for a compound annual rate of increase of 10.3 percent. The rate of such crimes per 100,000 population was 903.6 in 1958 and 1,921.7 in 1967. This crime rate increased 113 percent, for an annual rate of 8.7 percent. But if the proportion of young people, ages 13 to 20, had been the same in 1967 as in 1958, there would have been fewer crimes, a 92 percent increase in the rate, for an annual rate of increase of 7.5 percent.

#### CRIME PREVENTION

If "crime does not pay," it is because society tries hard to see that it does not. It hires policemen and prosecutors and punishes those convicted of crime.

It is natural that any increase in crime or fear of crime should bring forth demands to

apprehend more criminals and punish them more severely. Just as higher wages should attract more labor, so harsher punishments and greater probabilities of apprehension and conviction should deter more crime.

#### *Incentives that deter crime*

There is obviously much to be said for this "deterrence" or incentive-oriented approach to the crime problem. Fear of punishment undoubtedly deters some crime. Moreover, if the legal system can, in fact, succeed in inflicting harm only on the guilty, this approach appeals to the sense of justice, in a way that police harassment of "suspicious characters" or preventive detention do not. And unlike vengeance, it has a positive social purpose.

The implications of this approach are, however, a good deal less clearcut than they seem to be. If the theory is not properly stated and qualified it can be a disastrous guide to policy. The conclusion that an increased concern about crime demands harsher punishments is in need of distinction and qualification.

One alternative to harsher punishment is greater reward for legitimate and socially useful activity. For example, there is not much doubt that the poor have higher crime rates for the major and violent crimes than those who are well off. That there is a relationship between poverty and crime is clear, although its precise nature is not.

It is most unlikely that the greater involvement of the poor in criminal activities can be explained entirely, if at all, in terms of the relative severity of potential punishment. In law the punishment is not supposed to vary with the income of the criminal. The social and economic loss resulting from a criminal record are probably greater for those who are well off, but on the other hand, it has been observed that the well-off often receive milder sentences. The rewards for legitimate activity are, on the other hand, systematically and considerably greater for the well-off than for the poor, and this makes crime a relatively less attractive alternative for them than for the poor. Thus informal penalties and incentives to lawful and productive activity seem more likely to explain the difference between the crime rates of rich and poor than the formal deterrents of the law. Adding plausibility to this view is the fact that those with a criminal record are more likely to commit further crimes and have fewer opportunities for legitimate activity because of their criminal records.

#### *The complexity of criminal motivation*

Whether a potential criminal is tempted to commit a criminal act or not depends on his perception of the alternatives open to him. There is always a risk that the criminal may be caught, and the potential criminal may perceive such a risk. But he is not likely to be deterred from committing a criminal act by the perception that there is a small chance that he will be severely punished.

The fact that the criminal is often confident he will not be caught, and may be disposed to taking chances, does not mean that harsher punishments would not deter some crime. But if punishments are already sufficiently severe that few will commit criminal acts unless they are disposed to take chances and think the odds are good that they will not be caught, then somewhat more severe punishments can often have only a minor deterrent effect.

This line of reasoning does, however, argue that additions to police forces that are large enough to make it clear to everyone that he is very likely to get caught if he commits a crime would have a significant deterrent effect. And there is clear evidence that more intensive police deployment does, in fact, have such effects. When authorities saturate

a high crime area with policemen, the crime rate in the area drops dramatically.

Most crimes are committed by the young, whose experience and knowledge are limited. The alternatives a young person considers, and his evaluation of them, depend particularly on what he learns from his family and friends. Presumably most children brought up in fortunate circumstances never even consider becoming criminals. They know crime is wrong, realize it doesn't pay, and are intellectually and emotionally prepared for legitimate careers. They are, moreover, taught to look upon the police and the system of law and order as something that helps and protects them.

For some young Americans, the situation is very different. They grow up in miserable circumstances and are given no reason to think that legitimate effort will brighten their future. The law for their forbears may have been an instrument of oppression; the police a source of rudeness or even brutality, rather than of protection. In some slum areas most young men have police records, and a readiness to risk arrest may be considered a sign of manhood.

What this means is that the social context of poverty, and the poorer prospects for those who grow up in it, both tend to make socioeconomic deprivation a major cause of crime. A crime prevention strategy which focuses only on punishment, prosecution, and policing is therefore not only insufficient in terms of the theory that is used to justify it, but in addition neglects the cultural factors that must also be taken into account.

Among those who commit crimes there are not only those whose values and perceptions are the result of the influence of deviant social groups such as teenage gangs. There are also those whose deviance is a product of mental illness. There are some people in every social class who act as though they wish to be punished or as though they have determined that their values will be the opposite of those that social authorities lay down, whatever these values may be. For those who value punishment in general or deviance in general to some degree, to a like extent the punishments generally prescribed to deter crime will be ineffective. This illustrates the importance of keeping the extraordinary complexity of criminal motivation in mind.

#### *Crime and civil disorders*

The importance of group attitudes toward the law and the police, and of the objective obstacles to legitimate success in the slum environment, are illustrated by the civil disorders. These disorders tend to center in ghetto areas whose residents regularly list police behavior—lack of service and protection as well as rudeness and brutality—as primary complaints.

It seems likely that such negative attitudes toward the police and the system of law, and pessimism about the prospects of legitimate success, cannot be remedied through harsher punishment, a strengthening of public prosecutors, or more police. Such measures may help, but they are unlikely by themselves to prevent either individual crime or violent protest. The objective opportunities for the poor, and their attitudes toward the police and the law, must also change before the problems can be solved.

#### *The policy challenge*

The crime problem confronts society with a number of alternatives. Apprehension and punishment serve as deterrents to crime, as of opportunities, and measures to improve tiveness. At the same time an enlargement of opportunities, and measures to improve the social context in which crime emerges, are also necessary. Crime is, in other words, an index of the health of the entire social organism.

## REVIVAL OF A FAILING COOPERATIVE SUPERMARKET

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, I am informed that a little over a year ago Safeway Stores, Inc., undertook a project to revive a failing cooperative supermarket known as the Hunters Point Cooperative Supermarket in San Francisco, Calif. The Hunters Point Cooperative Supermarket was on the edge of bankruptcy when Safeway stepped in with financial, managerial, and technical support. Since that time the Hunters Point Cooperative Supermarket has once again become profitable and is now an ongoing, sound business. I think this is an excellent example of the contribution that private industries can make toward the problems of business in the inner city. I, therefore, ask unanimous consent that certain articles concerning this matter be printed in the RECORD in order that others might be able to acquaint themselves with this success story.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Immaculate, December 1968]

ALL FOR \$1

(By Evelyn M. Raabe)

Two men entered the Neighborhood Co-op. The all-but-bare shelves underscored the plight of the business.

"Got any ideas what we might do to save it?" asked John Wilks of his companion, Cal Pond.

The story of what followed has all the facets of once upon a time.

This co-op is located in San Francisco's Negro community of Hunters Point. It had its beginning in a dream that "goes back 6 or so years," said Sam Jordan, one of its founders—owner of a bar and catering service in the area. "At that time, some other fellows and I were picketing that very store—now the Neighborhood Co-op. We had pickets at the other stores as well. We wanted them to hire more of our people, and also give the people a fair shake for their money—fair prices and better merchandise.

"A few of us got to thinking then," Jordan continued. "Maybe the answer was to have a store owned by the people. When we learned that that particular store was available, a group of us—having been working on the co-op idea for a few years and raising money—jumped at the chance in 1965 to buy it."

This Neighborhood Co-op thus had its beginning.

But the business did not flourish and, gradually, as the months mounted into more than 2 years, things went from bad to worse. The credit rating tottered—until the co-op could buy only on a cash basis.

"Maybe we rushed into it too fast, under-financed, not realizing the complexities involved in food retailing," the directors later summed up the situation.

Another factor. "It costs \$5 to own a share in the business, and many of the investors thought that they would immediately start getting rebates on their investment—rebates whether or not they bought anything in the store.

"Then, too, because this is their store, and because they have so long been made to feel inferior, they think the merchandise in their store is inferior, too. So, in spite of having a personal interest in the welfare of their store, they probably feel they are rising above their environment and circumstances by shopping elsewhere."