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sle) at a higher altitude (see statement of Dr. Jeremy Stone, Federation of American Scientists, in testimony before the AEC hearings in Anchorage, May 28, 1971). Cannikin was designed to test the larger yield basic Spartan warhead. This was revealed by Dr. Harold M. Agnew, Director of the Los Alamos (New Mexico) Scientific Laboratory in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 20, 1971 in his statements about Cannikin.

Alaska Attorney-General John Havelock asked the AEC after the May 28 hearings on Cannikin in Anchorage if the national security necessity for the test had been reviewed at the Presidential level in view of this apparent change in strategy. He has not yet received an answer to his question, though an answer was promised. Additionally, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird has not responded to the same question directed to him by letter by Alaska Governor William Egan, a point made by the *Anchorage Daily News* in an editorial against the test on Friday, August 13, 1971. The implication clearly is left that the AEC is using the "national security" argument as a blanket authorization for a test which presents grave risks to human life, but which is not in fact necessary militarily. Numerous Senators and Representatives in the Congress have called for cancellation or postponement of the test until the AEC and the Department of Defense consent to answer publicly the exact purpose of the Cannikin test at Amchitka in October. (See, for example, Attorney-General Havelock's statement in the *Congressional Record* for July 29, 1971, and Governor William Egan's letter to Secretary Laird).

#### THE SALT TALKS

The purpose of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks now being conducted in Helsinki, Finland, is to limit the production of nuclear weapons as a step in slowing down the arms race, and thereby reducing the possibility of atomic warfare between the United States and Russia. By going ahead with Cannikin the United States may in fact jeopardize the progress of those talks, progress which has only been achieved in this past year. In an editorial in the *Washington Evening Star* for July 26, 1971, it was revealed that five different federal agencies have recommended against the planned blast on Amchitka (the Department of State, the U.S. Information Agency, the Office of Science and Technology, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Council of Environmental Quality). Primary among these is the State Department, which suggested that at a minimum this test should be delayed until the completion of the SALT talks. It could well be that as a result of the talks we would not need to test atomic weapons any further.

Moreover, the test is of international concern from a different standpoint. Already the Canadian government has requested cancellation of the test, on the grounds of proximity to the site as well as progress in the SALT talks. By insisting on carrying out the test the United States seems to suggest defiance of the very purpose of the talks and of the legitimate protests of other governments. Only if the test were clearly and unequivocally necessary to the national security could such defiance be justified.

#### SUMMARY

The planned Cannikin atomic test at Amchitka Island in the Aleutians in October, 1971, is clearly unjustified in terms of the risks involved to human life and to the environment, and to the progress of the SALT talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Neither the Atomic Energy Commission nor the Department of Defense, the only two federal agencies in favor of the test, have justified the blast in terms of national security. Apparently, the warhead for which the test was originally designed is now considered outmoded, and the test is there-

fore militarily unnecessary. Moreover, the State Department has asked that the test be cancelled until the SALT talks have been concluded so as not to jeopardize whatever progress might be made in those talks.

Perhaps more important is the fact that the AEC has not presented convincing evidence that the test is safe. The largest underground tests to date have been 1 megaton; the Cannikin test is to be 5 megatons. The shock wave from the blast may trigger a major earthquake along the Circum-Pacific Seismic Belt, perhaps as far away as the San Andreas Fault in California. Moreover, if the blast does trigger a quake of 7.5 magnitude or greater, a tsunami (tidal wave) is a certainty. The AEC has erred in its predictions of earthquake activity in the past.

While in 1964 the AEC stated that underground blasts did not cause quake activity except in unusual circumstances, by 1970 the AEC was forced to admit that underground blasts inevitably cause quake activity. Because of the tremendous magnitude of the planned Cannikin event, the seismic consequences simply cannot be predicted. Earthquakes have prior thresholds; that is, it takes a shock of sufficient magnitude to trigger the activity. 1 megaton may not be high enough, 5 megatons may be. It is just not known. Moreover, quakes apparently build from a low magnitude to a higher, so that a 6.5 quake may build on itself and peak as an 8.5 quake, as was the case with the 1964 Good Friday Earthquake in Alaska. The Cannikin blast is expected to generate a shock of 7.0 on the Richter scale.

The AEC has also erred in its predictions of radioactive leakage associated with underground tests. Between 1963 and 1971 17 tests at the Nevada test sites leaked radioactivity which was detectable outside the limits of the test site. In at least one instance, fallout in the air was detectable over most of the Western United States. Moreover, the AEC has admitted in its environmental impact statement that while unlikely, radioactive water from the test could leak into the ocean from around Amchitka Island within two or three years. Merely the rumor of contaminated fish in Alaskan waters could destroy the fishing industry of the state for more than a decade. Were the rumor demonstrated to be fact, the industry could be destroyed into the foreseeable future.

The risks of the Cannikin shot are not justified by the declared purpose of the test. It is difficult to judge what circumstances might justify the taking of such risks to the people of Alaska and their environment. But clearly the AEC and the Department of Defense have not demonstrated the necessity of the test, and therefore, have not complied with the spirit of the National Environmental Policy Act which establishes that destruction of the environment by the government must rest on evidence of compelling necessity. The warhead for which the test was originally designed is now considered obsolete; a low-yield weapon is contemplated instead. Again, the AEC's own high level evaluation commission, headed by Dr. Kenneth Pitzer (then president of Stanford University) concluded that the need for the Amchitka tests "... should be compelling if they are to be conducted in the face of the possible risks that have been identified."

In conclusion, the Cannikin test blast scheduled for October, 1971, on Amchitka Island in Alaska may trigger a major devastating earthquake, may set in motion a severe destructive tsunami, may leak fatal radioactive material into the air or into the water, thereby damaging the human environment or destroying the Alaskan fishing industry, may impede or erase progress in the strategic arms talks, and is not apparently necessary to national military security. Such an inordinate and unnecessary risk cannot be taken; to do so would be to defy reason and intelligent judgment. In the name

of the people of Alaska and America, in the interest of human life, for the sake of the mothers of Alaska and their children, it is not worth it.

#### SOCIAL PROBLEMS RESEARCH

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I have long been concerned with the woefully inadequate information which is available to us as we make decisions affecting millions of our citizens and billions of dollars of our tax payments. For this reason, I have proposed the creation of a Council of Social Advisers to spearhead efforts to develop sophisticated systems of social indicators and social accounting.

The St. Paul Pioneer Press has just commented favorably on this proposal in an editorial headed "Social Advisers Needed." The Pioneer Press is one of the leading newspapers in my State. I am proud to have its support for enactment of the Full Opportunity and National Goals and Priorities Act, S. 5.

As the editorial states so well:

The President currently has advisers available in such important areas as the economy and the ecology. It makes good sense that he have advisers in sociology as well. America's social problems need immediate attention, but they will never be solved as long as the nation's leaders rely on unsupported information as a basis for legislation.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the St. Paul Pioneer Press, Sept. 21, 1971]

#### SOCIAL ADVISERS NEEDED

Sen. Walter Mondale has resumed his long struggle for the establishment of a Council of Social Advisers in the executive office of the President. Mondale first introduced legislation to create such a council nearly five years ago. It was needed then and the need has not diminished.

The Minnesota Democrat is proposing a council that would be composed of three of the nation's leading social analysts (appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate) and staffed by a number of the country's brightest social scientists. This council would be responsible for monitoring on an on-going basis, specific and actual conditions in the country which affect the "social opportunity" of the American people.

The idea is to put some continuous research and evaluation into the social problems of the nation, so that future social legislation can be based on a more comprehensive knowledge of the country's real needs. All too often, social problem solving has been carried out on the basis of hunch, intuition and good intention.

For example, it is possible that the nation's welfare system would be vastly different today if a Council of Social Advisers had been available several years ago when great masses of social legislation were passed. In the cold light of expert evaluation, many programs which seemed so grand might have been discarded and many others which died might have survived.

The President currently has advisers available in such important areas as the economy and the ecology. It makes good sense that he have advisers in sociology as well. America's social problems need immediate attention, but they will never be solved as long as the nation's leaders rely on unsupported information as a basis for legislation.

After almost five years of subcommittee

and committee hearings, Congress should have all the information it needs about Mondale's bill. Surely it is time for congressional approval.

#### CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BENTSEN). Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

#### MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed a bill (H.R. 7072) to amend the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 to further clarify the intent of Congress as to priorities for airway modernization and airport development, and for other purposes, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

#### HOUSE BILL REFERRED

The bill (H.R. 7072) to amend the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 to further clarify the intent of Congress as to priorities for airway modernization and airport development, and for other purposes, was read twice by its title and referred to the Committee on Commerce.

#### APPOINTMENTS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BENTSEN). The Chair, on behalf of the Vice President, appoints the following Senators as advisers to the annual meetings, Boards of Governors of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, in Washington, D.C.: the Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) and the Senator from Vermont (Mr. AIKEN). The following Senators are appointed as observers to the same meeting: the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG); the Senator from Virginia (Mr. BYRD); the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER); the Senator from Utah (Mr. BENNETT); and the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) to be held September 27–October 1, 1971.

#### MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, 1972

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pursuant to the previous order, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which the clerk will state.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

(H.R. 8687) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1972 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill.

#### AMENDMENT NO. 423

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate amendment No. 423, on which there is a limitation of 2 hours. The amendment will be stated.

The amendment was read, as follows:

On page 16 strike out lines 9 through 23; on page 16, line 24, strike out "Sec. 504" and insert "Sec. 503".

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, and I ask unanimous consent that the time be equally charged against both sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MCGEE. Mr. President, I understand the pending business at this moment is my amendment to H.R. 8687, the defense procurement bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. MCGEE. Mr. President, this amendment would propose to delete from the bill section 503. Section 503, which is sponsored by the senior Senator from Virginia (Mr. BYRD), would amend the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 to the effect that the President may not prohibit the importation into the United States of a strategic commodity unless import of such a commodity from Communist-dominated countries is also prohibited by the same provision of law.

I am sure that most of the Members of this body are aware that the language of section 503 is specifically designed to have the United States unilaterally break the United Nations embargo against Rhodesia and to import chrome ore from that area. That is really the substance and thrust contained in the proposal.

Before going into my main objections to section 503 and why I seek its deletion from the bill, let me say that this is the same proposal that was introduced earlier in this session in this body as S. 1404. That bill was referred to the Foreign Relations Committee, which was a proper reference, I would suggest, and at the urgent suggestion of the senior Senator from Virginia, the sponsor of the proposal, we expedited hearings on the bill.

The point I make is that we have held hearings on this bill in the committee with the appropriate responsibility for the thrust of the suggestion. The hearings were held on the 7th and 8th of July. We heard out all sides on the question, and then the Foreign Relations Committee met in executive session to exercise its judgment in the light of the very detailed hearings.

Since I was chairman of the African Subcommittee and bore the responsibility for the action, I recommended to the Foreign Relations Committee that was exceedingly poor timing at best for a

proposal of this nature, and had much too simple a point in it in order to address it to the many ramifications with which the Rhodesian chrome ore embargo proposal are laden. The Foreign Relations Committee, without a dissenting vote, recommended against reporting the measure out of the committee at this time.

I stress that. Here is a measure that has had a hearing. It was the judgment of a committee of this body, the committee responsible for this kind of jurisdiction, that the measure should not be forwarded to the floor of the Senate. I stress this point for the reason that, now that we find the measure included in the military procurement bill, it is dressed in the clothing of "strategic necessity."

So the point I would make is that the strategic necessity has to be "gussied up" a good bit in relation to the facts of the time, and that it needs to be carried into question very seriously by all who are seeking a wise policy decision that transcends many lines of policy concern.

The administration, for example, is supporting a bill currently pending before the Armed Services Committee, S. 1773, which would recommend the release from our strategic stockpile of chrome of approximately 1.3 million tons of chrome ore over the next 3 years. What this says is that in the assessment of those who have responsibility to measure strategic necessity, the necessity is of such a low point that they feel compelled to release 1,300,000 tons from our stockpiled reserves.

The Office of Emergency Preparedness, which is responsible for making judgments in this category, testified before a House Foreign Affairs Committee that they had reassessed the whole question again as late as June of this year, scarcely 3 months ago, and it was their judgment, likewise, that those releases from the stockpile were in order.

I quote from the language of the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness when he says that—

In establishing the requirements and the supply for chrome in this country, the allowances that we are now recommending would cover all contingencies that might arise in an emergency, and our objective has been concurred in by the appropriate departments and agencies, including—

And I stress this—the Department of Defense.

I am simply trying to say, Mr. President, that it is very difficult to establish a strategic requirement for the proposal that is now being made in section 503 of the pending legislation.

I am aware of the complexities of the sources of chrome ore, and the needs for it in some of our domestic industries, and as well as its defense requirements in a very limited way. Let me say that even before the embargo of Rhodesia, fully a third of all of the chrome ore we were importing into the United States was coming from the Soviet Union.

I mention that as a reminder that we keep this matter in perspective. Nobody has just invented the question of importing ore from "a Communist-dom-