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other, in the near future, I think this editorial is particularly appropriate, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Nevada State Journal,
June 20, 1971].

No Robots—Those M.D.'s

Judging by the growing interest in a four-day workweek, the three-day weekend will be a fact of life for most Americans in a comparatively few years—with a few notable exceptions. Very likely, physicians will be among those exceptions. Legislative proposals for National Health Insurance treat doctors as if they were pieces of X-ray equipment—to be worked 24 hours a day.

In the course of testifying before a Congressional Subcommittee on matters pertaining to national health care, Dr. Max H. Parrott, chairman of the Board of Trustees of the American Medical Association, remarked that, "The American doctor is the one who will be asked to provide health care for out people, whether we stay with our present system, modify it . . . or scrap it to substitute something unproven . . . he has a capability that is rarely matched. He has virtually eliminated an impressive list of diseases. He has increased his ranks by 28 percent in the last ten years . . . but he still, most often, works a 50- or 60-hour week. And, though he has personal, daily access to the highest quality health care in the world, he lives no longer than anyone else. The American physician is largely responsible for the state of his art. He is proud of it. And he wants it to be even better, to improve it wherever possible, to provide better and better care for everyone."

No, the doctors will likely never see a four-day workweek—nor do they want it. They would much prefer to see the perfecting of a medical system which they have worked hard to build on the principles of voluntarism and free choice.

MINNESOTA AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, as our Nation is about to enter its third century, it is facing perhaps the greatest challenges of its history—namely, those of population imbalance and the urban crisis. The necessity of meeting these problems head on, with bold and corrective solutions, can hardly be overstated, for the condition and health of tomorrow's cities, environment, and population depend almost entirely upon the action which we take today. For too long, remedial and half-hearted measures have sufficed in dealing with the growing problems of our cities and urban development.

The creation of new cities, with a major emphasis on unity of design, integration of functions, and anticipation for the future, offers a significant opportunity for understanding and reversing the problems of urban development.

I am proud to say that the State of Minnesota has taken a bold initiative in analyzing and implementing models of new city development. The idea of the experimental city originated at the University of Minnesota in the mid-1960's, and this year the Minnesota State Legislature created and funded an Experimental City Authority.

The experiment is presently entering its second phase, concerned with the

elaboration of its planning framework and the design of a planning process to permit implementation.

On September 23, 1971, Otto A. Silha, publisher of the Minneapolis Star and Tribune, spoke before the National Board of Directors meeting of the American Institute of Architects. Mr. Silha, who is also presently serving as chairman of the Minnesota Experimental City project, spoke of Minnesota's experimental city and its role in the Nation's future urban development. I feel that his speech most emphatically describes the problem, and the significance of the experimental city in its solution.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Silha's speech before the AIA be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MINNESOTA'S EXPERIMENTAL CITY—AND THE NATION'S FUTURE URBAN DEVELOPMENT

The need for new cities has been recognized by virtually every serious student of urban problems and national growth policy. If one thing is clear in that complex of issues, it is that we cannot continue indefinitely to pack people into existing metropolitan areas. And because of the lead times involved, it is imperative that we begin as a nation to take corrective—and I would stress corrective as opposed to remedial—action now.

The leading indicators of serious problems are unmistakable; the storm warnings are flying. Environmentally we are developing the public mechanisms to contain the problem, but there is much to be learned about what to do. Politically, the breakdown of major social service delivery systems and the fiscal crises and bankruptcies of local governments tell us that we must be doing something wrong. Socially, the desperation seen in our judicial and penal system is to me an all-too-clear indication of the urgent need for some basic actions. The common element among our national problems is that they all tend to converge in our major cities.

Barbara Ward has stated the rationale for new cities quite succinctly when she says ". . . excessive growth in very large cities can best be controlled not by any rigid attempt to set limits; rather, expansion can be checked only by attracting it to other centers." Our problem has been that we don't have any "other centers" or any effective way for creating them.

In its analysis of the problem of a national urban growth policy, the National Goals Staff in the White House outlined four alternatives:

The first is to continue with present policies which will result in more sprawl, more concentration into a few metropolitan areas, more patch-work redevelopment.

Second, we can try to create a higher rate of growth in rural areas, but we know that this approach, assuming we knew what to do, is only a part of the solution to the larger problems and that it can have almost no effect on the national pattern.

Thirdly, we can stimulate the development of growth centers by various governmental actions. This approach has its limitations as well as its pluses.

The fourth strategy, which has worked well abroad, is one which has been tried only to a limited extent in this country—the creation of new cities, both as parts of major metropolitan areas and as truly new cities.

New cities offer the opportunity for major advances in the state of the art in every facet of urban design, social and physical, to test and prove out both social and physical systems which can subsequently contribute to existing cities. The general experi-

ence of the U.S. new cities, however, has been an inability to realize inherent social goals and a difficulty in achieving significant innovation in both physical and social systems.

Their experiences suggest, in fact, a further hardening of patterns established in the suburban development since 1945 and very little contribution to the solution of the problems of the central city and its residents. Reasons for this situation include economic and financial constraints; an inability to deal with the entire process of innovation including technical, financial, political and market factors; and the absence of models of alternative systems on which to build.

I am convinced that a key strategic reason for the paucity of urban innovation is that we are sadly lacking in models for future development, for carefully spelled out and demonstrated alternatives to present patterns. This can be critical to unblocking other constraints.

Certainly we are not lacking for ideas. What we are lacking is an opportunity to put a series of ideas together in a systematic manner, then actually implement them in an integrated, experimental setting, designed to prove out our best thinking in an operational situation. We do this in virtually every phase of American industry, but when it comes to the most important thing of all—the environment in which we and succeeding generations will live—we somehow assume that serendipity will take care of us. The evidence, I would suggest, is to the contrary.

The current generation of new communities, both in this country and abroad, is a welcome addition to our urban development; they are badly needed to meet current needs and for the most part they represent a significant advance over urban developments of the immediate past. But the irony of the new communities—as fine as they are—is that they are tending to reinforce patterns which have proved to be unsatisfactory. They will become a part of the problem.

Let me illustrate: A new city of half a million people has been proposed for the meadowlands in New Jersey just west of Manhattan. I have every expectation that it will be well planned and well executed, and will represent an improved living condition for its inhabitants. But the question which must be asked is whether it is wise to put still another half million people into the heart of the most troublesome urban complex in the country. Should we not instead be finding ways to bring about a better balance of population and resource distribution on a national basis?

Most new cities are forced into obsolete technology. The pattern of new cities, I fear, will represent a great opportunity missed. One of the lessons of the British in their first generation of postwar new towns near London has been just that: that they were too conservative in building their new cities, that they were not sufficiently innovative; that they were willing too early to "accept the inevitable" and to abide by the conventional wisdom of another era.

It is apparent that there is a wide gap between what we espouse as desired goals for urban growth for the next several decades and our capabilities to date in achieving these goals, that we are not making the best use of the technological and other resources which are ours. Clearly, the process of adapting and applying current technology into urban settings is more complex than it appears. The steps from "here" to "there" are not well understood.

Some of the basic concepts for the MXC project are to evaluate the current state-of-the-art in terms of a specific prototype situation, to advance that state-of-the-art, and to provide a "real" opportunity for testing and further advancing models of new city development and the application of technologies to these ends. That is to say, to learn

how and to build a city better than we have done to date in this country.

When David Starr Jordan was president of Stanford University, he observed that wisdom is knowing what to do, knowledge knowing how to do it, and virtue, having done it. In a sense, that is the theme of the Experimental City. At least in a general way, we do know what the problem is and have some good hypotheses about what to do; we certainly have the technology and the resources; but up to now we are acting—when at all—at an almost minimal level.

The idea for an experimental city originated at the University of Minnesota in the mid-1960's. The University obtained funding from private sources and from three federal agencies (HUD, HEW, and EDA) to investigate the concept and to determine what some parameters would be. Grants of \$80,000 each from these three agencies plus grants of \$10,000 from a dozen private firms—largely Minnesota-based—provided the funding for the first phase.

We arranged for a series of 14 workshop sessions which brought together almost 200 scholars and practitioners from across the country. In many cases issue papers were prepared beforehand, and after usually three days of discussion, reports and recommendations were issued. The output of the workshops has been published and has found widespread interest. The discussions were organized around major urban systems—education, transportation, energy sources, manpower, communications, city building technology, government, and so on.

In addition, a national steering committee was formed to develop the general conceptual framework for an experimental city and to provide overall policy direction. This committee includes nationally recognized physical and social scientists, engineers and humanists ranging from such diverse backgrounds as Buckminster Fuller to the late Whitney Young. The contribution of these people to the project has been invaluable.

The Phase I study arrived at a number of conclusions about the key parameters which will largely determine the location and some of the physical characteristics of the city. A population of 250,000 was determined to be "the right size" if the city is to be essentially self-sufficient or freestanding. (This turns out to be the same conclusion the British reached about their second generation new city—Milton Keynes.) Such a city will perhaps require 35,000 to 50,000 acres.

Environmental and economic analysis in Phase II will further refine that figure. Minnesota has thousands of acres of low-utilization, publicly-owned land, some of it in very large tracts, which could be logically acquired for an Experimental City. This would tend to minimize many of the dislocation problems, minimize the cost of acquisition, and suggest new concepts in the use and control of public lands.

The Phase I participants agreed that for the city to have maximum impact, it should be built largely in a relatively short period of time—10 to 15 years. And to ensure that it be truly freestanding and not adversely influenced by existing urban constraints, the City will be at least one hour's ground travel time from a major metropolitan area.

The second, and current, phase is concerned with the elaboration of the framework provided by Phase I and with the design of a planning process to permit implementation. Two major parts of the Phase II effort have been completed, and, as you will see, both are critical to our future success.

We recognized from the outset that government—at several levels—must be involved in the project as an active participant. Accordingly, we began working with the State of Minnesota two years ago. The Legislature created joint operating committees of the House and Senate which held extensive

hearings to determine what the State's role should be. Their findings were presented to the 1971 Session which created and funded a Minnesota Experimental City Authority.

The Authority is charged with the selection of a site, recommending the manner of land acquisition and financing, and general approval of plans. It will report to the Governor in January of 1973, so that the Legislature can take action during the 1973 session. The Authority is made up of eleven citizens, appointed by the Governor. To provide needed liaison, the directors of the state departments of planning, economic development, pollution control, and natural resources are ex officio members. Most of those departments have already been involved in our deliberations.

As soon as a site has been designated, no later than October 15, 1972, all public improvements on the land will be frozen, effectively stopping any development until the decision can become final and the land assembly begun. To my knowledge, this is the first time such powers have been granted to a state agency, and we believe that it represents a major innovation.

Sometime next month, an economic base study for the experimental city will be completed. It was determined in Phase I that the city's economic base would be significantly different from that of most cities today, reflecting the structural changes which are occurring in our economy. Activity will be heavily oriented to the knowledge-based industries and will have a large services component and a relatively small basic manufacturing component.

Our current base study is identifying which industries are the most logical candidates for location in the city and what their locational requirements are likely to be. From that information, we are determining the character of the public and private infrastructure investment and staging, and the workforce which could be anticipated. This, in turn, tells us what kind of demographic mix is probable and provides a good initial base for planning. The information from the study is clearly of use to the Experimental City planning, but it can also be the basis for a better base of information for future urban planning elsewhere.

Our Phase II timetable calls for research and preliminary planning in the major systems areas, running in parallel with the site selection and land assembly process, which we hope can be completed by late 1973 or early in 1974.

It is significant to note that we are not talking about vast new expenditures to already overburdened public budgets. We are talking about a better, more rational expenditure of the billions which we will be spending anyway in this country over the next generation or so simply to house the millions of new Americans who will be arriving and to replace certain of our physical plant which has become obsolete.

In an all-too-real sense, our expenditures for urban development are the most critical ones to make, because they shape our environments conclusively for years to come. Yet, we invest less on research and development and planning on which to base those expenditures than in almost any other field of endeavor I know about. In the aerospace industry, for example, it is usual to devote from five to ten percent of a total budget to research and development (and I am not suggesting that this is not appropriate). I am convinced that a much smaller investment in urban research and demonstration could be one of the most effective expenditures we could make. We must take what President Nixon has so aptly termed "the long view". We must "look down the road" not just at initial expenditures, but consider the total costs—economic, social, and environmental—we incur as we continue to build this country.

We are well aware of the magnitude and

the complexity of the task we propose. We do not suggest that it is a panacea, rather a single but significant step toward a better America.

As this nation prepares to enter its third century, it is fitting that we question the values which underlie the way in which we live, to challenge assumptions and established practice, to ask why—and why not. It is an appropriate time to look at our national goals, to see how well they are reflected in the patterns of urban living which characterize our society today, to find if we like what we see, to re-set our sights.

We have a need to demonstrate—as Americans did two hundred years ago—that we can again articulate the American dream in ways which can motivate all our citizens toward the realization of our common goals. We must translate our disappointments and dissatisfactions of today into possible dreams and plans, and hence into a legacy, for tomorrow. And that is what the Minnesota Experimental City is really all about.

TRIBUTE TO THE LATE SENATOR HOLLAND

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. Mr. President, it was with sadness that I learned of the passing of the Honorable Spessard L. Holland on November 6.

Although we sat on separate sides of the aisle, the late Senator and I shared many interests. As a matter of record we voted together most of the time. He was never one to alienate a person whose opinions may have differed from his own and in his own reserved way, he became a powerful and respected Member of this body during his quarter of a century tenure.

Senator Holland served his State in a manner most faithfully with its best interests at heart. He elected to retire after a distinguished career in public service. His loss will be lamented by his many friends and coworkers. Mrs. Jordan and I extend our most heartfelt sympathy to Mary Holland—may she take comfort in the knowledge that during her husband's years here on earth, he was a great and good man whose devotion to public service earned him the respect of his fellowman.

THE WSB STORY

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, modern food technology and the enterprise of American food processors are being linked together to help fight hunger in the world and close the protein gap threatening serious malnutrition in many areas.

One example of this that has been brought to my attention is a paper delivered by Dr. Frank E. Horan, director of research for the Archer Daniels Midland Co. of Decatur, Ill., at the Western Hemisphere Nutrition Congress III held August 30 to September 2 at the Americana Hotel in Bal Harbour, Miami Beach, Fla. Entitled "The WSB Story," it is an impressive account of development and use of a new low-cost, high-protein food product that is gaining rapidly increasing acceptance in the food-for-peace program, is the mainstay of the CARE program for feeding refugees in the Gaza Strip, and is currently serving the same constructive purpose of providing essential sustenance for Pakistani refugees in both India and strife-