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ity, or five people each get 2 units, the health consequences are the same. Two times five equals 10, but so does 5 times 2. What matters is the 10 units of radioactivity reaching people.

One thousand deaths per year was, I repeat, an imaginary figure. The actual figure from radioactive gas could be much lower or much higher. The figure will be determined by the amount of radioactivity which leaves the gas wells and intersects with people. The more bombs, the more radioactivity.

The only way to prevent deaths from radioactive gas is not to sell it. Dilution is a vicious hoax.

MAKING MURDER A COST-BENEFIT MATTER

I would like to quote Dr. John W. Gofman at the University of California, Berkeley, on this subject because he clarifies the undeniable moral issue in atom bombing for gas:

The use of gas stimulated by nuclear explosions inevitably means increasing the radiation dose to the public.

It is a travesty upon rational thinking for anyone to hide behind the claim that the amount of radiation exposure will be 'small'. Particularly fraudulent is the effort to compare such ostensibly 'small' exposures with natural background radiation.

All this is fraudulent because all responsible authoritative bodies, including the BEIR Committee of the National Academy of Sciences in November 1972, are on public record as stating that there is no evidence for any safe threshold of ionizing radiation exposure.

Therefore, the so-called 'small' radiation exposure from the Rio Blanco test and from the entire Plowshare gas stimulation program will undoubtedly cause increased leukemia and cancer deaths plus deaths and deformities by gene mutation. No authority will contest this statement.

I know of no Congressional authorization to either the Interior Department or the Atomic Energy Commission willfully to take action to cause the murder of any citizens of the United States or to any descendants of present citizens of the United States.

Over and above the violation of the "consistent with public health and safety" features of the Atomic Energy Act, there is the very serious question concerning "criminal charges that should be appropriately placed against any officials of the A.E.C. and the Interior Department for willfully participating in an act of human murder.

A person would recoil if he were promised natural gas for the Nation plus his own safety, provided he would personally help strangle or electrocute just 100 innocent people per year. Unthinkable. Yet few people recoil when a bureaucrat makes a cold-blooded cost-benefit judgment requiring a comparable or much larger number of human sacrifices.

INTERVIEW WITH SENATOR MONDALE

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, the May 19 issue of the New Yorker magazine contains an interview with the senior Senator from Minnesota, Mr. MONDALE.

In the article Senator MONDALE ably articulates the need for positive and humane leadership in a wide range of domestic areas. In addition, he offers valuable insights into a number of issues ranging from the congressional-execu-

tive relationship to the role of the American family.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this interview by Elizabeth Drew be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the interview was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A REPORTER AT LARGE—CONVERSATION WITH A SENATOR

Walter Frederick Mondale, a forty-five-year-old Democrat from Minnesota, is an increasingly important member of the United States Senate—one of the second tier of leaders (the first is made up of those whose power lies in their seniority), who define the issues and get them on the agenda, and occasionally even win acceptance of their ideas. He is a liberal in the Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor tradition. A protégé of Hubert Humphrey, he became Attorney General of the state at thirty-two and was appointed to fill Humphrey's Senate seat when Humphrey was elected Vice-President in 1964. Mondale was returned to the Senate in 1966, and again in 1972. Despite Mr. Nixon's overwhelming victory last year, Mondale won reelection then by fifty-seven per cent, and his efforts on behalf of Senator McGovern are credited with reducing Mr. Nixon's victory margin in Minnesota to only six percentage points. Mondale has established credentials with both the center and the left of the Democratic Party, and has a growing reputation among members of the press and others in Washington who observe, and can affect, politicians' careers. He was co-manager of Humphrey's 1968 Presidential campaign. He supported the war in Vietnam longer than many of his Democratic colleagues did. He has also fought for the powerless in our society, identifying himself with such unpopular issues as welfare and busing.

I interviewed Mondale recently, in his Senate office—Room 443 of the Old Senate Office Building. The office contains the typical objects a politician accumulates: the state seal; awards; books written by colleagues and friends. The furniture is Undistinguished Government Issue. Mondale, wearing a short-sleeved shirt, sat in a corner of the only unusual piece of furniture, a pale-blue tufted Victorian sofa. Above him were large color photographs of the St. Croix River. Mondale is slim, youthful, with a touch of gray at the temples. He has prominent blue eyes, a nose that is slightly beaked, and straight, dark-blond hair cut in such a way as to avoid commitment on the length issue. He has the earnest air of a son of a Midwestern Methodist minister, which he is. But he also has a streak of wry irreverence, which has made him popular among Senate staff members. As we talked, Mondale piled the loose pillows of the sofa under his right arm, arranging and rearranging them, and occasionally pounding them for emphasis. From time to time, he put his feet on a coffee table that was in front of the sofa.

I began by asking Senator Mondale about the dilemmas of the contemporary liberal. What gave the Senator his belief that the social programs of the nineteen-sixties were really worth defending?

"Well, first of all, I have no argument with those who seek reform in these programs, and maybe even termination of some of them, because I don't argue that they're perfect and that there is not waste," he replied. "But I believe that the federal government has a fundamental role in delivering services to people who are overwhelmed by problems that they can't handle themselves: hungry children, and children who need to be educated; people who are handicapped, mentally ill, or retarded; people who have special learning difficulties; people who can't find work; old folks who can't care for themselves.

And then there is a need for social programs that deal with the environment, transportation, and a whole range of human problems, in which I think the federal government has an indispensable role—leading, and helping to find national solutions. And I think many of those programs must include the provision of services, which means people, bureaucrats, delivery systems; and those programs cannot be disbanded. The President's attack has not been one of reform. It's been fundamentally one of assaulting the whole notion of the delivery of services to people who need them. As a matter of fact, there's a very disturbing notion that I find which somehow suggests that in our free society we're incapable of efficiently and effectively delivering essential services through government employees."

I asked him if he believed we were capable of doing so.

"I think there is more good going on than the President's dark appraisal of these programs suggests," he replied.

"Do you have appraisals that suggest to you that these services are getting through to the people who need them and are improving their lives?"

"It depends on the program. I could give as examples many programs where you have signs that two things have happened. First, the services of this whole range of poverty-related programs (student assistance, and so on), together with the philosophy that poor people can make it—which is what Johnson and Kennedy were saying in the sixties—have encouraged thousands and thousands of persons from disadvantaged backgrounds to believe that they can make it, and that the government and society would like to help them make it. And I think that what we learned in the sixties is that these problems are more difficult to solve than we expected, that government does not work automatically and efficiently and without waste, but that the fundamental commitment to help is a valid and essential role for this country, and I think that that's what Nixon is attacking—the notion that we can help. I think he's telling the federal government to get out of the social-reform business, and I think that that's a terrible notion."

"You said in response to my first question that you do believe these programs need some reform and some of them should be eliminated. What sorts of reforms would you propose?"

"Many. Because I think that it's in these social programs that the contemporary liberal is most vulnerable, and this is where some of us have been trying to do something for some years. I set up a pathetic little subcommittee on social-policy planning and evaluation a few years ago to try to begin, to evaluate and plan what we're doing."

"What ever happened to that?"

"It was a pathetic little subcommittee. We had no staff, and the one thing we did do which was important was we continued to push a bill, which I was—and am—very interested in, calling for a Council of Social Advisers, which would be an institution like the Council of Economic Advisers but would concentrate on human programs. It would be required to put out an annual social report indicating how we were coming, and to try to do some pioneering in what we call social indicators, to see if we couldn't apply computer technology and data-gathering to give us a better understanding of how well we're doing. One of the things that appall me about our government programs is we just don't know how well they're doing. You can go out in the field and you can get anecdotal examples of how we're succeeding. You can talk to teachers who are thrilled with smaller classrooms or with new textbooks or with a school-lunch program, and they say it has changed their classrooms, but you can't get any data to back them up."

"Isn't that one of the points about this

whole debate—you have an anecdotal syndrome that works both ways? Some people will tell you success stories, and the Secretary of Housing can talk about a public-housing project that's a calamity, and in fact there is no base of information that gives us any broad picture?"

"That's correct. That's correct. So the question, then, is what you do about evaluation and data in the face of this anarchy, and of the lack of a strategic approach to human problems, and of the lack of the data base that gives you the hot facts rather than the cold facts."

"What do you mean by 'hot facts' versus 'cold facts'?"

"Well, most of the cold facts are inputs facts. I mean, how many teachers, how many bricks in the building, how many soybeans south of Mankato. The hot facts are the output facts, like what we are feeding hungry people, whether we are educating children, what comes out of the system. This is what's missing in so many programs. We know how much money is going in; we don't know what we're getting for it. We know how much we're spending on manpower; we don't know how many are being trained and finding jobs, improving their position, and so on. That's what I tried to do in this little subcommittee, and there are several things I would suggest. First of all, I would like to see my Council of Social Advisers' annual social report—for social indicators—set up. Second, I would like to see a national social-science foundation set up to concentrate on the social-science questions in the same way the National Science Foundation concentrates on the natural-science questions. The N.S.F. claims it's doing both, but it isn't. Third, I would like to see us in the Congress be required when we pass a bill to define specifically what it is we claim we're going to accomplish. If we pass a Head Start program, how many children do we expect to reach? What do we expect those children to receive? What do we expect the result will be if this is done? How much money do we want? And then, once the bill is passed, I would like to see us set aside a percentage of the program's funds—say, one-half of one per cent—to be controlled by the committee (the Labor and Public Welfare Committee in this case), and we'd hire some of the best social scientists in the country and say, 'Now, your job is to go out in the field, evaluate these programs, test them, and prepare a report two years from now. Did we achieve those objectives? Why didn't we? Is there waste? Did we do better than we thought? Did we do less than we thought? How can we improve our program?' So that every program we passed would have built into it an independent, highly sophisticated public evaluation. In other words, so that all of us would have to face the music and no program would be sort of an unguided missile on its own. You see, right now the evaluation usually comes from agencies that have a tremendous built-in incentive to either approve it or destroy it, depending on the policy."

"But, as I understand it, there could be several problems with that, as there have been even within agencies that have tried to get honest evaluations. These things are very hard to measure. Over at the Office of Education, they're knee-deep in reports on whether or not their programs have 'worked.' But nobody really knows what the criteria for deciding that should be."

"Well, I would hope that the Council of Social Advisers would help bring us out of the anarchy that you describe."

"Also, isn't there a time-lag problem? In other words, you would want an evaluation, you say, in two years. But aren't you talking about things that you would like to see improve people's lives in ways whose effects might not show up for some time, or might not be measurable at all?"

"Yes. The time frame would, I think, depend on what you were doing. Education is a slow process, and I think one of the things we do that are unfair to educators is to expect a quick yield that's quantifiable. Second, as your question implies, we don't give much credit for things like a healthy child or a child who has been sick mentally and is now becoming healthier. So much of our data and so-called quantifiable material dismiss the human element and ask—you know—how are they doing in math? How are they doing in reading? But I still think we should insist on quantifiable data in basic skills, and so on. What bothers me today is that there is no manageable structure or approach for finding out what's going on, for leading these discussions in terms of reform in this government. John Gardner [Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare during the Johnson Administration] said when he left that we've got a time-honored way of backing into the future."

Joe Califano [Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Special Assistant to President Johnson for Domestic Affairs], when he finished in the White House, noted how little data they had to work with on fundamental questions, like welfare reform and manpower, that we spend billions on. He said that our way of deciding questions about basic human programs more closely resembles the intuitive judgment of a tribal chief in Africa than it does modern decisionmaking techniques. And what I'm saying is that we ought to be geared up in a way that would permit us to evaluate, to understand, to reform, and to build into every program some kind of system that would help us find out what's happening. That's all."

"Isn't the results of the current debate that the liberals are busy defending what has been happening, and trying to save the programs from being cut, instead of thinking about new ways to accomplish the same purposes?"

"Yes, and partly that's our fault and partly it's the President's fault, because when he attacks the whole idea of federally assisted housing, say, we have to counterattack in a tough way. You just can't go back into your social-science laboratories and say that three years from now you're going to come up with a better delivery system because then there won't be any program at all. In other words, he's created what I think is a radical environment, where we have to fight back on political terms to create a counterforce that will prevent the dismemberment of all these programs."

"Do you reject the idea that in attacking the programs of the sixties Mr. Nixon may have been on to something: perhaps an incipient national mood that was tired—tired of federal programs, tired of taxes, tired of guidelines, tired of bureaucracies, and disappointed in the results?"

"I think he very shrewdly and cunningly exploited a sense of frustration and fatigue in American life. For nearly a decade, at least, Kennedy and Johnson and many of us were pleading with the American people to move on—more solutions, more programs. I think the public saw just an endless number of programs being passed, many of them oversold, and then they waited for the results. Many times, the programs weren't fully funded. Many times, they were maladministered, and many times it was impossible to achieve what it was claimed those programs could achieve—in the time frame, at least, that we talked about. And I also think the impression was given—which Nixon exploited very shrewdly—that part of what was being done was to make it possible for lazy people not to work, so that those who had the work ethic worked and paid their taxes for those who just would not work. I think he has exploited it and hoped to convert it into an

enormous social retreat, which I think would be—well, I don't know what else to call it—immoral, because there are a lot of problems behind those statistics. And it's all right to flail the bureaucrats, but there are those poor kids out there who need help—who are handicapped, who are mentally ill, who are retarded, who desperately need help and affection—and the thousands of children out there who are poor, and hungry, and live in lousy housing, and many of whom don't have two parents. The Indian kids who never go to school with a textbook or a teacher that has any respect for them. The Chicano children who never hear a word of Spanish, or Portuguese children that no one speaks to in their language. There are a lot of problems out there. There are a lot of lonely old folks who live in housing by themselves, in poor health and with no one to care about them, and a lot of decent people who are looking for work and can't find it, and a lot of bright kids who can't afford to go on to college or to vocational school. There are a lot of disabled people who can't live on what's available to them. There are so many human problems in the midst of our wealth that need a country that cares and a government that tries. I don't think the average American is that selfish, and I think this is where the Nixon approach is going to go wrong. I think the average American is more just and more compassionate than Nixon thinks he is. I think we're going through a period of reaction from the sixties, but I think it's going to spring back. I don't think the American people want to live on a diet of selfishness, which is what is served up to them now. I think they'd rather be united and hopeful and helpful and humane than be just niggardly and selfish, and I think our time will come. It may not be right now, but I think it's going to come."

"There is also, as you know, an attack on the liberal programs from the other side, which says that the liberal approach amounts to simply tinkering with the status quo. That argument runs that if you're really talking about equality of opportunity in this country, which was one of the fundamental premises of these programs, you have to do much larger things, you have to have much greater transfers of income. It says that these programs did not really go to the heart of the matter of unequal opportunity or unequal existences in this country."

"Well, I would say two things. First, I think most Americans accept the notion that every child ought to have a chance in terms of opportunity—not in terms of result but in terms of opportunity. I think that if we abandon the notion that people have to, through their own effort, through excellence and through energy, through trying to learn, be a part of society and achieve on those terms—I think we've cheapened society. I'm too old-fashioned to abandon that notion and I think that this country must do a far better job than it's done, and spend more than it has and spend it more wisely and with more spirit and compassion, and with a fuller commitment than we ever have had, to give every child a chance, and I think that's so central that I am sickened by some who would abandon that effort. Now, second, I also believe in dealing with the problem of the unequal distribution of America's wealth, and that's why I'm interested in tax reform, and that's why I'm interested in reform of welfare programs, that's why I'm interested in public-service employment, interested in improved antitrust-law enforcement and other things that might help the average American get a better break in the distribution of the vast wealth of this country. But I do not believe in some massive program of dollar redistribution of wealth. I don't think the American people would stand for it, and I think it's folly to spend much time on it."

"You have often said that one of the problems of the programs of the sixties was that 'we authorized dreams and appropriated peanuts.' Would you, then, be willing to argue that taxes should be raised in order to do the things you think are necessary?"

"Well, I might, but there are some things that come first here, in my opinion. I think there are some very substantial revenues that can be raised in tax reform. I reported the other day—on the basis of some figures I got from the I.R.S.—that two hundred and seventy-three Americans who earned a hundred thousand dollars or more in 1971 didn't pay a dime in taxes. Two who earned more than one million dollars didn't pay a penny in taxes. Then we looked at those who paid practically nothing, and we found that some thirty-four thousand Americans in 1971 reported loophole income of a hundred and sixty-seven thousand dollars on the average and paid only four per cent tax on it.

"They took in nearly four billion dollars, and they paid something like a hundred and thirty-six million dollars in taxes. So there's several billion dollars that can be picked up by closing loopholes, or by reducing them in a way that does not hurt the business climate and that, in my opinion, would create a better sense of equity in America, because the average worker and his family think they're taking a hosing, and they've got a pretty good case. Also, I think there's still enormous waste in American government. For example, they're proposing, in effect, an increase of eight billion dollars in the defense budget this year, when we're supposed to be entering a generation of peace. We have something like two thousand bases overseas, in thirty countries. I think we're spending seventeen billion dollars this year in NATO. We just cannot continue to spill money on things in that way and have the money we need to deal with the problems of our own people. I'm not an isolationist, but I think we lack a sense of balance."

"Those are fairly familiar liberal arguments, if I may say so."

"Yes, they are, but they are still arguments. And we're not winning them."

"You have been moving into—at least by definition—a new set of issues, having to do with children and the family. Is it really a new set of issues, or is it old issues in new rhetoric? Why has your attention taken this turn?"

"Well, I sort of slipped into it. I started with problems of poverty and hunger and migrants, and the rest, and became more and more convinced that we were mutilating thousands and thousands of children before they had a chance, and that if we wanted this fundamental notion of social opportunity and fairness and justice to have significance and substance, we had to deliver justice in those first few years of life. And we had to help the family do so. I helped create the Subcommittee on Children and Youth, which I now chair, and we've simply tried to look at a whole range of problems, from crib deaths to child abuse, child care, day care, the question of the mother's health during pregnancy—all those issues. And I'm becoming convinced that one of the revolutions under way, which is perhaps the most damaging thing going on in this country, is the growing pressure on and destruction of the American family. I believe, for ancient historical and biological reasons, and for psychological reasons and health reasons, that it is absolutely fundamental that a child be brought up in an atmosphere of security and love and respect, with stimulation and self-respect and all that goes with a healthy, strong family, and that children who are denied that pay the price. All of us pay the price, in a host of tragic and sometimes bizarre ways. We're starting to try to see behind some of these pathological problems, like child abuse, or the divided

family, and ask what's happening about them. It's estimated, I think, that over forty per cent of mothers now work. With inflation and economic pressure, I think that percentage is going up. Is it a wise thing to require mothers to work when they have children at home? Do our tax laws encourage people who work when at least one of them ought to be home with the kids? If it's necessary that both parents be gone, are we really concentrating on adequate alternatives—decent, warm, supportive child-development centers—or are we just dumping them in cold custodial areas? What happens when a family breaks down and it leads to divorce or leads to a separated family, or where there's a family that's psychotic or so emotionally in trouble that the parents abuse their children or don't raise them properly, and so the children stop thriving and they have profound psychological problems, and all the rest? How do we deal with the necessity of strengthening the family and strengthening the ability of the family to produce those healthy, loving children that are the hope not only of our country but of the world? That, I think, is an issue that needs to be looked at."

"Is that not suggesting a range of government concern about the nature of people's lives that is unprecedented?"

"No—I do not think that the government ought to substitute for parental guidance and authority. And I think that idea is one of the reasons people shy away from this issue—because they think it smells bad. I'm very much opposed to that. But what I want to do is to have policies that strengthen the family, so that it isn't necessary that both parents work when they don't want to. Take, for example, these child-abuse cases that we're looking at. When the parents are scolding, mutilating, poisoning, dismembering an infant child, it doesn't help the situation just to say that you're strong for the family. Now, we found that in ninety per cent of the child-abuse cases the child can stay at home and the parents can be helped, and the family unit can be strengthened to everyone's benefit. That's the direction we ought to go in. Then, I think one of the questions we might ask is whether government isn't already interfering with the family and putting pressures on it that many families can't resist. Under the present welfare laws in many states, the only way the parents can take care of the family when the father is employed is to separate—the mother and the family can get help *only* if the man leaves. And that doesn't seem to me to strengthen the family. Also, I guess we're about the only Western society or modern industrial society that doesn't have some kind of children's allowance, so that during the early, formative years of the family it gets a little extra help to stay together, to help the kids until the kids are older. When we do provide day care, I think we're chiseling. We put a lot of these children in centers where there is no emotional support, no education, no stimulation. The children are just rejected for hours per day, and they must feel that. I mean, children are like flowers—you can damage them, and you can damage them permanently. Child psychiatrists will tell you that you find a serious psychological problem and often it's traceable to some things like that—things that happened in those first couple of years of life. We've got these environmental-impact studies that are great. With everything the government does, there's now supposed to first be a study that asks 'What does this do to the environment?' I think that's a good thing. I wonder if we shouldn't have a family-impact study. When we pass tax laws or welfare laws or housing laws or transportation laws, we ought to say, 'Well, what will this do to the families?' Urie Bronfenbrenner [professor of Human Development and Family Studies at Cornell University] said that

it is remarkable that over the million-year history of mankind almost every society, no matter what the differences of religion and culture, ended up with the family unit. And he said that before we destroy that unit we'd better ask why they all found it essential. Wouldn't it be ironic if this nation, the wealthiest and most powerful in the world, should be the first to substantially destroy that system which mankind has always found essential?"

"You also took on the question of busing, and, when it was controversial, volunteered to head a special committee to examine the problem of how to achieve equal educational opportunity. You recently put out a report that called for 'quality integrated education' and said that busing was a misleading issue, but it's still busing that you're advocating, isn't it?"

"It is and it isn't. I'm not for busing for busing's sake."

"Well, no politician would say that he is."

"No, but I don't know of any reason he should be, either. In other words, the idea that American children, for the sake of some theory of computerized mixtures, ought to be bused to carry out some kind of balance notion never has made any sense to me, and I've said so many times. Where I draw the line is in trying to deny the court the power it needs to eliminate discrimination—and by discrimination I mean deliberate public policies that separate children on the basis of race. That, I think, is intolerable under the Constitution and intolerable from a public-policy standpoint. And that's why I have resisted attempts to limit the courts' jurisdiction to eliminate discrimination—attempts that often include a ban on busing. There are many other ways that we can work on this problem, but fighting limits on the courts is one that we must work on if we intend to eliminate discrimination. And that's been my position, and I don't know how you could say that you're against discrimination without taking that position."

"One issue that has been before us this year, in various forms, is the relative power of the Congress and the executive. Do you think the Congress is really capable, institutionally, over the long run, of acting effectively—of leading on important issues?"

"Yes. We haven't always done as well as we should, and there's much that we should do, but I think we can do it."

"Yet isn't there a streak of passivity in every legislative body?"

"Yes. I think that's correct. We're slow to anger and even slower to organize, but it may be that when we get organized, it's more definite and final. There's much that we should do to improve the way in which we act here in the Congress. I would like us to move toward some sort of arbitrary retirement age. I would like to see us eliminate seniority. I would like to see the Congress build in, under its own control, an adequate system for evaluation and planning, and the ability to tear apart a budget and start from zero and work on up to see what we can do in each of the agencies to cut out waste. I would like to see us set a spending ceiling. There are many things I think we must do here, and I think that if we did them there would be far more public respect for the Congress than we see today. But, having said that, I must say I also think that we often do better than we get credit for doing. I think the average American, with some good reason, wants to see expedition and efficiency in the Congress. I think there's a certain value to delay, and to the aging of an issue, that one perhaps appreciates only after one has been around here for a while. I think that in a democracy there's some value in allowing time for issues to be ventilated, for digging out facts, for having the debates, for having the efforts to compromise, which take time and for which the Congress is given little credit, because what people say is 'What are you producing?' Sometimes it

looks as if you weren't getting anywhere, but I think in the long run the Senate, more than any other institution in America, is the forum for great public-policy debates in which the public takes a part. The Senate is the only agency I know of of which that's true. It's certainly not true of the executive. Too much of the hot stuff has been decided behind doors. It's not true in the House as much, just because of the numbers—they can't have four hundred and thirty-five people debating. But in the Senate we can debate. And, looking at the great issues of the war, the environment, the consumers' movement, civil rights, I'm proud of the kind of forum that we have had on these great issues over the years. Now, we've not accomplished all that much, but once an idea is out, once the public sees the clash, I believe that in a strange fashion the public finally gets its way and decency finally gets there. It may be a little slow in getting there, but it gets there. So I think sometimes the standard that we're judged by—efficiency, prompt action—is one that does not give us credit for an even more fundamental role that we perform."

"Do you not at times find yourself impatient with the pace, though?"

"Yes, but I must concede this as a liberal: many times I have to concede that an ornery, cantankerous conservative in the committee or on the floor asking mean questions about my beloved programs—many times he makes me face up to issues that I should face up to, and I think there's a certain validity to this business of democracy and give-and-take and listening to all sides."

"Isn't it still true, whatever happens as a result of the upheaval over Watergate, that the executive, as an institution, has inherent advantages, which a President can use to dominate the government, and which may, over the long run, make an accumulation of power in the executive branch inevitable?"

"I hope not. I think we need a coequal system. The executive will always have certain advantages, because there's only one President, and he can make almost any decision he wants to—especially if he doesn't believe in the law. Also, he can get access to television and dominate the news when he wants to. He can make television and radio practically a private communication system with the American people. We have few ways to counterattack."

"Is it possible, though, that the increasingly complicated questions and large-scale enterprises and organizations that the federal government is dealing with just do not lend themselves to parliamentary control?"

"Oh, I don't believe that for a minute. I think that control may sometimes be more difficult. Let me say this—I think Watergate, when it's all over, is going to be very encouraging in terms of the fundamental strengths of American society and its institutions. As I understand it, there was a strategy for corrupting the last election, for literally buying it and then keeping the facts from public view, so no one knew what had happened. But slowly the courts were angered, the Congress was angered, the press bestirred itself, and the truth started coming out, and I believe we can follow now with legal reforms to prevent or discourage that sort of thing in the future. We were slow getting there, but I think the fact that we did get there showed that the traditions and strengths of our institutions were greater than even the tremendous power and inside advantages of the Presidency. And I don't think for a moment that the government is bigger than democracy. You know, I've been through some fights that I've lost here, but it's interesting to see what happens. I led the fight against additional aircraft carriers. I'm not against all aircraft carriers, but I didn't see why we needed a new one every year, costing a billion dollars.

I lost on the Senate floor. But it's an interesting thing that we've now reduced the aircraft-carrier attack-force level by three carriers; that's a thirty-billion-dollar saving over the life of those carriers. I think the public debate here in the Congress made people face up to some of the realities they didn't want to face up to. I've been leading a fight lately against the space shuttle, which I think is a horrible waste. That never won on the Senate floor, but I noticed the other day that the chairman of the Appropriations Committee said that one of the ways we can save a lot of money is by delaying that space shuttle—which may mean the end of the space shuttle. I think that sometimes things work slowly, but if you're right they work, even against enormous commercial and governmental interests on the other side."

"Have we had an example here of the axiom that where you stand depends on where you sit? When the liberals were in charge of the White House—when one of their own was in power—there were frequent complaints that the Congress was blocking things. We heard about the 'deadlock of democracy.' There were all sorts of proposals for strengthening the hand of the President at the expense of the Congress. But then the Democrats lost the White House, and the power of the Congress to block the President looked more attractive. Do you think the liberals are coming to some new conclusions about this?"

"Well, I hope that to some extent we are, but I also think that the nature of the challenge the President posed at the beginning of the year was different from anything we'd had in the past, and ought to be a warning to us. I don't think that that was just another effort on the part of the President to crowd the Congress. What the President tried to do amounted to a massive, wholesale, unconstitutional dismantlement of our system, in an attempt to convert it into a Presidential system. I think you have to look at the domestic side differently from the foreign one. I think in foreign relations the Congress has permitted itself to forfeit its Constitutional powers and responsibilities through many different Administrations, of both political parties. I think it's going to take us thirty years to repair the damage to the foreign-relations powers—warming powers, treaty powers—of the Congress. And we must do so. We're beginning to do it, but it's going to be a slow show. The Administration people tried to apply the same unlimited Presidential powers domestically that they've applied to foreign relations, and that's what was new about this challenge, it seems to me."

"How seriously will the Watergate controversy affect the President's power and affect the nature of his relationship with the Congress?"

"Some people have been saying that the damage will be so great that he can't govern. I don't believe that this is true, unless it develops that the President was personally involved in or personally knew of widespread illegal acts. Even so, I think the scandal is much greater than anything else that has happened in or around the White House in our nation's history. If it would just make the President realize the strengths that come from working with the system, I think we could begin to restore government to some legal, due-process proportions; and I think the dramatic erosion of public confidence in the President and the great doubts about those who have been around him will inevitably force him to give some ground on these questions of Constitutional importance. And I think the weakening of the President politically will make him deal more realistically with other institutions, too."

"Does that mean that we have to wait for a President to get himself in trouble before

politicians in the Congress will take him on?"

"Well, I think that there is what is always referred to as a 'honeymoon period,' when a President who's been newly elected or just been reelected is given a period of special deference to develop and propose legislation. And I think the length of that honeymoon depends upon how he behaves and how he uses it. In the case of Mr. Nixon, he blew one of the largest mandates in American history in about a month by his divisive, hostile, and other negative tactics and his wholesale disregard for the law. In other words, I think that you can't suspend human nature, and it's the proper thing to do, in terms of normal Western traditions of civility, to be decent to a new President, to give him a chance. I think Herblock said every new President gets a free shave, and that's what we try to do, and that's what I do."

"But there are other times, not only after elections, when there is the phenomenon of the politicians backing off because they think the President may be powerful, even if he isn't right. I can think of President Nixon's November 3, 1969, speech about Vietnam, which a lot of people up here disagreed with but were not very vocal about, for fear that the President had in fact captured public opinion—a fear that then became self-fulfilling."

"I can't deny that that's what happened. But, fortunately, the fact is that there were some here who didn't follow that strategy and spoke up and criticized it. There was clearly an effort on the part of the White House to silence dissent. They warned everybody, 'Don't criticize us or you're going to be embarrassed.' The same thing followed the Cambodian invasion. I don't think the critics of the war will ever get credit—at least, in the short run—but I think those criticisms and that debate helped end the war."

"That brings up something else I have been wanting to ask you. You supported the Vietnam war for a longer time than several of your colleagues. In 1967, you gave a very closely reasoned speech laying out what you considered to be the dilemmas, and came out on the side of supporting the war. How do you now look back on that?"

"The biggest mistake of my public career."

"How did you make it?"

"Well, several ways. First of all, I think I trusted the executive and its answers too much. I just couldn't believe that they could be that wrong. And I recall going to Vietnam myself for a week and going all over."

"What year was that?"

"It was early '66. And I came up with some questions about 'Why are they still fighting so close to Saigon if you're winning, if the people are for you?' And the leadership all had answers—the Defense Department or the State Department—and I guess if there's one thing that I learned out of all that it is that you have to trust your own judgment. You can't be sure of the accuracy, or sometimes even the honesty, of what you hear from established departments. That was one of my big mistakes. Another mistake I made was that I was applying what you might call the European analogy to Asia. It had no relationship at all, but I thought it did. Then it slowly dawned on me that there are limits to American power, limits to how we can influence what are essentially indigenous problems of another country. Finally, I saw first-hand what the war was doing to this country. It was not a pretty sight. The deaths and the injuries—permanent injuries. The costs—over a hundred billion dollars—which devastated so many human programs. But also the incredible spiritual and emotional costs. The war poisoned the public dialogue. It divided our country. It destroyed the affection of millions of Americans for their own government,

and I think we'll be paying for it for the rest of my life."

"In what you were saying earlier, you painted a more positive picture than many do of the potential effectiveness of the Congress, and particularly the Senate. I'd like to ask you a little more about some of the human and realistic factors that make it difficult for senators to organize their colleagues to take action, or for the Senate in general to do very much at certain times. Each senator has his own constituency, has his own reelection to think about. Collective action is not easy. It seems that after a large effort up here it's very difficult to mount another one; people get tired, they want to go home, they're caught up in having to answer their mail and greet constituents. Are these not also factors that affect what really happens?"

"Sure, they're factors. This is a democracy. We all have to be mindful of what our own people want in our states and how they want us to spend our time. That's part of our job, and anybody who said that wasn't true would not be realistic. And sure we get tired. We don't fight every fight that we perhaps should fight, and we don't win every round that we should, because of these factors that you mentioned. And I think we can do better; I think we should do better. I think we should reorganize in some of the ways that I've suggested. More fundamentally, I think we need campaign-funding reform. I keep coming back to that. People do not realize the skyrocketing cost of campaigns and the growing temptation for compromising the public interest because of money. Now, that certainly has been exposed in an ugly way in the Watergate episode—how that money came in and how it was used and how it was falsely received and reported—but money in politics is the dark side of the political moon, and until we take full, pervasive action to solve that problem, we're going to have this continuing tawdry, tragic, dispiriting, demoralizing spectacle of public men trading public decisions for private money."

"Does this affect even those politicians who would like to be honest—who would like to feel that they are making decisions regardless of who has contributed how much?"

"It affects everybody. I think the miracle is that the system has remained as honest as it has. But the temptations are undeniable, and some people are weak. And the thing is subtle. For example, take just the access question. If you give money, you get an ear. I try very hard not to take money in amounts or from sources that would affect my course of action. But I would be less than candid if I did not say that when I've had a large contributor he gets in to see me and I talk to him. While I try very hard to listen to everyone, I must admit that this is true. We're all a part of this system, and I think maybe in subtle ways that we don't even appreciate. We tend to remember who helped us financially, and even the most honest person cannot be unmindful of that support. And I just hope that we can get out from under this system."

"How?"

"Well, this goes back nearly seventy years. Teddy Roosevelt once called for public support of federal campaigns. I think we ought to begin with the Presidency and do that right. We've seen enough, I think, to understand the corruption of money. Maybe we could have a system like the one Albert Gore talked about a few years ago, where we would estimate approximately what a campaign would cost, give a candidate an amount out of the public treasury which would pay for a decent campaign, and then prohibit any outside money—something like that."

"What makes you think, from what we've seen, that federal support of campaigns could be set up in such a way that the process itself would not be corrupted or manipulated?"

"I can't be sure about it, but I am sure that the present system isn't doing it, and we'd better try. Maybe then the public could trust the government again. People all think it's being bought off. Even my son—he's eleven years old—said to me the other day when we were talking about Watergate, 'Daddy, are the courts honest?' Eleven years old, talking that way. The American people are being served up a raunchy, smelly, nostril-filling mess, and so much of it comes from money. It wouldn't cost much to try to change that. We have a national budget of about two hundred and sixty-nine billion dollars, and we're talking about an expenditure of a few million dollars to keep the thing honest. Well, why not do it? Well, I'll tell you the reason I think we haven't done it. It's that the people who control the American system with money now don't want to, because they know they control the American system and they don't want to let loose. It's been such a long, deeply embedded tradition in American life that you restrain and influence government through money—and that that's part of doing business in America—that they all do it and have more or less accepted it as being the proper thing to do. Well, it isn't proper. It's wrong and it's corrupting, and I think it's getting to the point where it's shaking American confidence in the basic integrity of our free system, and someday a demagogue is going to come along and really ride that wave unless we can correct it in a way that will restore confidence in the system. And I don't think Mickey Mouse changes are going to work; I think you need a basic system of public support. You know, I saw a poll the other day that showed that, of all the occupations in this country, the politician ranked second to last in public confidence, just ahead of a used-car dealer. Well, one more month of this and we're going to be behind the used-car dealer."

"But you do think it is possible to restore faith in the governmental process and institutions?"

"It has to be done, and underneath all the current tragedy I feel better today than I have in a long time, because the institutions stood up to this mess. When you look at what Mr. Nixon's people had in mind—to sidetrack that last election and to hide what they did and to receive and spend money corruptly . . ."

"But wasn't there a failure of confidence in the institutions even before the Watergate story began to come out?"

"Yes. But what I'm saying is that four or five months ago I was really feeling depressed, on the ground that there was no hope in the courts, there was no hope in the Congress, there was really no hope in the press, and a cynical Administration could ignore the laws, could ignore and could corrupt the truth, and could get away with it. In the middle of this mess, I think what we're learning is that the strength of our institutions is great—is greater than even the President—though it takes some time, it takes some pressure for the strength to show itself, it takes a while to anger. I feel that after this whole mess we can move for the kinds of reforms we're talking about in the Congress, in the way we fund elections, in the way we prohibit who can contribute and how they can contribute. If we just look at this whole investigation when we get done with it, we can say 'Now, all right, where did the system break down?' and pass laws and establish institutions that protect it."

"Do you feel that recent events—Watergate—will accelerate the kinds of change you seek?"

"Yes, I do. I hear more talk now about the system—how it can be improved and strengthened and made more honest—than I have heard before in my entire public career. I think leaders are both hopeful and worried. It can't go on like this. It must be changed."

"Do you at least entertain a question about the long-range success of our democratic experiment?"

"Yes, because I don't think it's secure, and I think there's so much more that needs to be done. I think there are so many danger points in our system."

For example, I view these private wars that have gone on as a very dangerous thing—Cambodia, Laos. I think they've been carried on without a shred of legal support. I believe that the President's wholesale attempt to terminate programs he doesn't believe in—unless we can destroy that precedent over the next four years—will lead future Presidents to continue to press for omnipotence in the domestic field. Then we would move toward a Presidential system rather than a shared congressional system, a representative system—and that, I think, would be very dangerous. I can see that unless we deal with this money problem corruption could undermine the fundamental faith of the people in our government to the point where some demagogue could take it over in an anti-freedom and anti-politician campaign. There are many things that could happen. But I believe that we've got the wisdom and the strength to deal with these problems, and I believe that out of this mess may come some very important progress."

"Has the scope of what has been revealed in the Watergate affair suggested to you that there were greater dangers to our democracy than you had supposed—dangers hard to deal with through passing laws?"

"Greater dangers and greater strengths. It had never occurred to me that a major party would adopt and use on our own society tactics that had been developed in the C.I.A. to subject foreign governments to disruption and espionage and dirty tricks. In a sense, the invention has returned to plague the inventor, and it's very dangerous. There is much that we can do in terms of the law, and I've described some of them. I think there should be a study of the connections between our covert disruptive tactics abroad and the political process here at home. We might learn how to safeguard American society, and maybe other societies as well. But I think the fundamental decision is beyond the law. It is founded in the judgment that the American people make about our country, its institutions, and its leadership. If the final judgment is one of despair and cynicism, our nation will be fundamentally weakened. But if it's one of outrage against those who have tired to tamper with our laws, our freedom, and our Constitution—with the just powers of our institutions—and if that outrage is harnessed toward specific reforms, then it may be that out of the tragedy of Watergate can come a new level of confidence and morality in public life."

ELIZABETH DREW.

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